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ABSTRACT
Volume II, contained herein, of the Final Study Report provides a summary of significant
study results that are products of the Phase B conceptual design task. This document is
hereby submitted in accordance with the Phase B contract, NAS8-36526. Major elements
of the study effort are addressed in this volume. Study results applicable to each major
element or area of design are summarized and included where appropriate.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This volume addresses major Statement of
Work (SOW) tasks as defined in the Phase
B Contract, NAS8-36526. This document
is submitted in response to Data Require-
ment (DR) 15, Final Study Report. The
contents contained herein reflect not only
the original tasks described, but also re-
flect deviations to original Work Package
(WP) definition which has resulted from
realignment of WP Elements throughout
the course of Phase B.
1.1 Scope
The contents in this document provide
Phase B final study results. Significant re-
sults are provided for each identified
element. References are made DR that
contain Phase B preliminary design de-
tailed data where applicable.
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2.0 SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND INTEGRATION (SE&I)
2.1 Systems
Dynamic conceptual design development,
response to changes in requirements and
performance of trades and analyses have
been key elements of the Phase B study
effort.
2.1.1 Systems Engineering and
Integration (SE&I)
Defining the system and allocating re-
quirements to configuration items are
prime asks essential to baselining a con-
figuration. A brief synopsis of the SE&I
effort for accomplishing this ask is in-
cluded herein.
Methodology incorporated was to support
definition and integration of WP-01 end
items and provide data to support Space
Station definition, planning and the estab-
lishment of system and interface require-
ments and traceability. Performance of
trade studies and analyses, cost and tech-
nical performance measurements, support
of technical reviews and working groups
and integration of contract asks into the
system definition and WP element and
subsystem design also played major roles
in the SE&I effort.
Trades and analyses were conducted, con-
cept options investigated and design to
cost and technical performance measure-
ment completed. Systems integration allo-
cated, controlled, and made change
recommendations where necessary, on all
requirements. Using the design team ap-
proach, inputs from ask interfaces were
integrated into the requirements. Trade
Study products, including plans for soft-
ware, automation and robotics and growth
were provided per the SE&I plan schedule
and are summarized in DR-02 (13.20.
2.1.2 SEM Plan
Boeing's SF_M effort followed and basi-
cally conformed to the Level B SF_.M Plan
included in the Phase B contract. DR-19,
Time Phased SEM Products, contains de-
ailed products of the SF.M effort, includ-
ing Engineering Master Schedules (EMS)
development, rationale and themes.
2.1.3 Requirements Development
Support to the requirements development
effort has involved the generation and/or
review, evaluation and submittal of recom-
mended changes to the various require-
ments documents produced during Phase
B.
2.1.4 Interface Requirements Documents
gRDs)
IRDs were prepared in order to document
and define the external interfaces existing
between WPs. The effort was accom-
plished and delivered in accordance with
DR-02.
2.1.5 System Requirements Document
(SRD)
The SRD, which can be considered a sys-
tem segment document was prepared in
order to baseline WP-01 requirements.
These requirements were established and
documented in order to form the basis for
the WP-01 end item requirements con-
mined in the Part 1 Contract End Item
Specifications. The document was gener-
ated by MSFC, with Boeing providing
complete support in its review and evalu-
ation.
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2.1.6 Contract End Item Specifications
ceo's)
The production of the CEI specifications
was accomplished and delivered in accor-
dance with DR-03. A CEI specification
was written for each designated WP end
item. The documents were baselined and
revised as necessary to accommodate WP
realignment, changes in requirements and/
or other miscellaneous revisions.
CEI's were produced for the following:
a) SS-Spee-0002, U.S. Laboratory
Specification
b) SS-Spec-0003, Logistics Elements
Specification
c) SS-Spec-0004, Airloek Specification
d) SS-Spee-0005, Hyperbaric Airlock
Specification
e) SS-Spec-0006, Resource Nodes
Specification
f) SS-Spec-0100, Habitation Module
Specification
SS-SPEC-0002 U.S. LABORATORY
SPECIFICATION
The U.S. Laboratory Module's major func-
tion will be to serve as a facility for mate-
rials and microgravity research and
processing experiments. The laboratory
will be an outfitted module with all the
necessary equipment required for com-
plete functional capability. It will be able
to accommodate generic and user supplied
equipment such as: furnaces, crystal
slicers, photo lab provisions, x-ray dif-
fraction equipment and microscopes.
SS-SPEC-0003 LOGISTICS ELEMENTS
SPECIFICATION
The Logistics Elements provide pressur-
ized and unpressurized carriers for trans-
porting equipment and supplies between
the ground and orbit; and for the tempo-
rary on-orbit storage of station con-
sumables, waste products and customer
equipment.
The Logistics Elements pressurized and
unpressurized carriers will be used to sat-
isfy the logistics requirements of the
Space Station. The carriers support the
transport of four generic classes of cargo:
pressurized cargo, unpressurized cargo,
propellants and fluids.
SS-SPEC-0004 AIRLOCK
SPECIFICTION
The Airlock provides a means for the
transfer of crew and equipment between
pressurized and unpressurized zones. This
general purpose EVA airlock will include
WP-01 provided equipment which in-
eludes the following:
- Primary and secondary structure
- Meteoroid Protection
- Hatches, windows and hatch mecha
nisms
- Utility distribution
- Tools/supplies support
- Outfitting
SS-SPEC-0005 HYPERBARIC
AIRLOCK SPECIFICATION
The Hyperbaric Airlock will withstand
five atmospheres of internal pressure to
support the treatment of decompression
sickness. The Hyperbaric Airlock struc-
ture, pressurization/depressurization, utili-
ties, distribution .and outfitting is the
responsibility of WP-01.
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SS-SPEC-0006 RESOURCE NODES
SPECIFICATION
The Resource Nodes provide an intersec-
tion between Space Station pressurized
modules for the passage of personnel,
equipment and utilities. They are pres-
surized structures which may be con-
nected to a pressurized module,
pressurized attached payloads, airlocks
and the Orbiter via docking/berthing
mechanisms. Resources Nodes may also
accommodate viewing, station storage
and some user equipment, but will not be
outfitted at IOC.
SS-SPEC-0100 HABITATION MODULE
SPECIFICATION
The Habitation Module accommodates
crew habitation and station operations. It
includes systems such as: crew quarters,
personal hygiene systems, galley/ward-
room, station command and control work
stations, a general purpose work bench,
crew personal storage, waste collection
and management provisions, recreational
provisions, dishwasher, clothes washer
and dryer.
The WP-01 specification tree is shown in
Figure 2.1-1.
2.1.7 Preliminary Design Data
The following preliminary design items
can be found in DR-02 (13.2f).
Layouts
Drawings
Mass properties
WP Element and Subsystem Performance
Data
Subsystem Definition
Master Equipment Lists
Refurbishment Activities List
Risk Assessments
Alignment
Contamination and Other
suits
Analyses Re-
2.2 Man Tended
2.2.1 Man Tended Strategy and
Approach
A Man Tended Space station will be a key
evolutionary step towards a permanently
manned station. Work Package 01 strategy
has been to emphasize the configuration
evolutionary process keying in on Man
Tended options and capability. Key ele-
ments in the approach to satisfying the
Man Tended study have included: (1) de-
termining Man Tended Approach (MTA)
impacts on experiment cost and productiv-
ity; (2) defining a minimal but productive
Man Tended Configuration and opera-
tional scenario; (3) developing sensitivity
parameters and (4) identifying additional
costs that might evolve from developing a
Man Tended station into a permanently
manned station.
2.2.2 Man Tended Study Flow
The Man Tended study effort paralleled
and received inputs impact from the per-
manently manned station study. Design
trades, analyses and evaluations were per-
formed on the Level B provided Man
Tended reference configuration. A key re-
sult of this effort was the identification of
parametric cost, risk, performance and ca-
pability data to support the Man Tended
station design analysis.
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2.2.3 Man Tended Results
Although the Man Tended configuration
has been determined to be a reasonable
step in the evolution of a manned station,
study results show the MTA would be sig-
nificantly less productive for a higher total
cost. Findings supporting this conclusion
are summarized as follows: (1) MTA al-
lows for a deferral of funding (18%), yet
at a 30% higher total cost; (2) only one-
third of the initial necessary experimental
results would be attainable utilizing the
MTA station; (3) the cost per experiment
would be higher for the MTA station and
(4) MTA would be a reasonable step in
the evolution of a Permanently Manned
Station (PMS) if duration of MTA is short.
A significant portion of the Phase B effort
was dedicated toward the Man Tended op-
tion analysis, evaluation, trades and over-
all concept study. Specific Man Tended
approaches are covered in detail in
deliverables under DR-02, Preliminary
Analysis and Design Document. A com-
plete summary of the Man Tended study is
contained in document D483-50066-1,
Man Tended Approach (MTA) IRR Report
(WP01 Input), which is provided as part of
this supplemental DR-15 submittal.
2.3 Automation and Robotics
Effective implementation of Automation
and Robotics (A&R) has the. potential to
increase Space Station productivity while
significantly reducing operatiag costs.
2.3.1 Introduction
The Congress, in Public Law 98.-371, es-
tablished a requirement for th¢ Space Sta-
tion Program to study the development
and application of advanced automation
technology not in use on existing space-
craft. In response to this public law,
NASA formed the Advanced Technology
Advisory Committee (ATAC). This com-
mittee was tasked to provide NASA with
recommendations as to promising areas of
development in A&R and to report their
findings to Congress. These recommenda-
tions were used as guidelines in the devel-
opment of the Space Station A&R Plan
(DR-17).
As part of the ATAC effort, BAC strongly
supported and contributed to the work of
the University and Industry Panel, lead by
the California Space Institute (Calspace),
which provided A&R candidate recom-
mendations and technology evaluations. In
fact, BAC's noncontractual volunteered
support provided significant additional
study breadth, especially in the area of op-
erator systems interfaces. Additionally,
our independent technology assessment
provided the ATAC invaluable support in
their recommendations.
2.3.2 Scope
Application candidates identified in this
document are limited to those arising out
of WP-01 areas of responsibility.
2.3.3 Approach
In our preliminary report, dated June
1986, we identified a large number of
A&R candidates, performed a parallel
technology assessment, and established
the criteria to be used for candidate
screening. The remainder of the sub-
tasks have now been completed through a
first iteration and are covered within this
report. From the initial large set of candi-
dates a reduced set was selected for fur-
ther study. From the reduced set an
implementation plan has been prepared
and can be found in Boeing Document,
D483-50055-1 (DR-17).
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2.3.4 Selection Criteria
The criteria employed are as follows:
Productivity
Crew and station safety
Autonomy
Human limitations
Technology transfer
Cost
2.3.4.1 Description of Criteria
Space Station resources required for op-
erations are expected to be critical and
limited. It is very important to make the
work as productive as possible. A&R tech-
nology will enable the crew to function in
a supervisory mode, making their work
more productive.
Time consuming tasks are prime candi-
dates for automation because on-orbit
man hours are costly. For example, it is
important that inventory control is accom-
plished, but it is time consuming if done
manually. An on-board, computerized in-
ventory management system can eliminate
manual inventorying and simplify the task
of searching for equipment and material
at the same time.
A smart man-machine interface is re-
quired on the station because the crew
must interact efficiently with automated
devices. A vocal interface such as an Ad-
vanced Conversational Operator System
Interface would enhance crew productiv-
ity. It uses conversational style spoken
language as the primary operator system
interface. The interface is a "natural" in-
terface (it is the way humans are trained
to communicate between ourselves) and
the crew can operate or porform other
tasks while interfacing with this system.
The user can interactively query the sys-
tern for data while performing a primary
function. For example, when a crewmem-
ber is performing OMV docking, his hands
will be engaged in operating the
manuevering controls. If he has to obtain
additional data (i.e., rate and distance), he
would have to remove one _hand from the
controls to input the query on a keyboard.
With a vocal interface he can voice query
the system for the data he needs, leaving
his hands available to continue controlling
the OMV.
Using an intelligent data management sys-
tem, computer graphics and speech syn-
thesis, an integrated system can be
developed to display information to the
crew in a condensed, visually informative
manner. Systems which will accomplish
this are the Integrated Training System.
2.3.4.2 Crew and Station Safety
Crew safety has been a critical considera-
tion in any manned space project and will
continue to be so with the Space Station
Program. A&R will support safety re-
quirements to ensure the integrity of the
Space Station.
Safety related tasks involve hazardous ma-
terials handling, large mass material han-
dling and a need for EVA activities.
Handling fuels and some on-board experi-
ments fall in this category. Candidates
such as the Module Safety Advisor were
selected primarily because the system can
identify/predict hazards and recommend
appropriate crew safety countermeasures.
It is capable of providing an explanation
for its action, so the crew can develop con-
fidence in using the system.
2.3.4.3 Ground Autonomy
Current space operations rely heavily on
large ground support teams using many
man-hours. One of the main design
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guidelines for the Space Station is to be
opeationally autonomous. Operational
autonomy is also a safeguard against
emergency situations where failures or
natural phenomena will disable commu-
nications.
Many A&R systems are needed to achieve
autonomy from ground operations. Expert
systems such as the Fault Prediction/Trend
Analysis are needed to perform many
monitoring and control functions requiring
complex status analysis and automated de-
cision making. A&R help relieve the
added load on the on-board system im-
posed by autonomy. The automatic de-
vices are allowed to make lower level
decisions to unload as much work as pos-
sible. The crew can be left undisturbed to
perform their missions.
2.3.4.4 Human Limitations
"Human limitation" refers to four basic
factors,
(1) Reaction time
(2) Task workload
(3) Monitoring capability
(4) Strength/precision
Human reactions are not adequate to ef-
fectively deal with many real-time events.
Candidates such as the Intelligent control-
ler would automatically perform opera-
tions which the crew could not accomplish
quickly enough.
Task workload in a manually operated sys-
tem involves monitoring gauges and oper-
ating switches. A human has limits on the
amount of work he can do. A&R technol-
ogy relieves the workload, allowing the
crew to do the work best suited for hu-
mans.
The monitoring capability of humans also
has a limit, the crewmember will begin to
inadequately scan or monitor at some high
rate of data input. The ability of machines
to perceive data outside the range of hu-
man sensory capability is another impor-
tant criteria for automation. Such tasks
includes detecting small particles, infra-
red, microwave radiation, or atmospheric
contaminants such as CO2.
Many of the Space Station functions im-
pose requirements that are beyond the
strength capabilities of EVA astronauts.
Tasks that require handling of large pay-
loads and OMV berthing are candidates
for handling by expert robotic systems.
The inversely proportional relationship be-
tween strength and precision indicates that
gross movements of massive objects may
be accomplished by robots and final, pre-
cise adjustments performed by humans.
This allows lower cost design of the robots
because it removes the need to design a
device which has both great strength and
precise motion.
2.3.4.5 Technology Transfer
A&R applications which could benefit ter-
restrial technology and commercial indus-
try should be considered for development.
Space Station A&R applications would en-
hance the Nation's technical and scientific
base leading to more productive industry
on Earth.
History has shown that there is a close link
between advances in technology and the
strength of the U.S. economy. The Space
Station Program can provide the new tech-
nology that will keep the U.S. economy in
a competitive position in the world. Tasks
such as remote inspection and automatic
systems monitoring occur in many fields.
The A&R development for such systems
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are worthwhile candidates for technology
transfer.
Development of expert system applica-
tions for the Space Station will greatly af-
fect technology on Earth. Expert system
technology such as the Module Safety Ad-
visor can be transferred to safety sensitive
systems such as nuclear power plants.
In the area of robotics, technology can be
transferred for terrestrial applications,
which in turn can increase U.S. employ-
ment. A summary statement from a study
done by a Congressional subcommittee
and the Office of Technology Assessment
states: "In the long run, industrial robots
should lead to improved working condi-
tions, higher real wages and the creation
of more jobs." The development of
dextrous manipulators, smart sensors,
voice control, operator system interfaces,
applications software and integration of
expert systems in real time will be key ad-
vances in the practical large scale use of
Automation and Robotics in commercial
industry.
2.3.4.6 Cost
The importance of cost as a selection cri-
teria for A&R candidates becomes appar-
ent when one considers Space Station as a
design to cost program.
There are two major categories of cost.
The first is nonrecurring cost. This is a
one time cost, such as tooling cost, the
cost for research and development, the
cost to design the system, and manufactur-
ing and testing cost. The second element
of cost is the recurring cost, commonly re-
ferred to as operations cost. This occurs
on a continuous basis and pays to main-
tain and operate a system.
The selection of a candidate must be
based on non-recurring and recurring
cost, because an A&R candidate might
have a low initial cost but have a high fail-
ure rate.
Cost will be the dominant criteria in
Boeing's A&R trade studies. This is due to
the fact that this is a design to cost pro-
gram and trade studies are cost/benefit
analyses.
The preliminary candidates selected for
further study and subsequently for inclu-
sion in the plan were basically those with
a high benefit rating. Realignment of work
package boundaries eliminated some can-
didates with a high rating. In some cases
we chose to combine similar functions
from different work package elements.
The selected set of candidates is shown in
Figure 2.3-1. These candidates are dis-
cussed in detail in Boeing Document
D483-50055-1 Rev B (DR-17) dated Oct.
31, 1986 - A&R Plan.
A technology assessment has been per-
formed for each candidate in which ex-
pected dates for the availability of the
required advancements are estimated.
Costs have been estimated using the RCA
Price H model for hardware, and esti-
mates of the number of lines of code and
number of rules for software. A crew
workload model has been built to evaluate
the effects of automation on crew utiliza-
tion. Based on Skylab experience and
driven by crew size, number of pressur-
ized U.S. modules and external payloads,
this modeling approach makes it possible
to assess the impact of automation during
a growth scenario. The on-orbit activity
time percentages which drive the workload
model are shown in Figure 2.3-2 and the
workload evaluation methodology is shown
in Figure 2.3-3. A time-phased imple-
mentation plan has been formulated and
hook and scar requirement for the IOC
station identified.
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Percentages based on total
on-orbit time (for one team)
3 crew x 24 hours x 90 days -- 6,480
hours
J
FIGURE 2.3-20N-ORB1T ACTIVFrY TIME pERCENTAGES
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FIGURE 2.3-3 METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATING CREW UTILIZATION OF A&R
CANDIDATES
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2.4 Space Station Evolutionary Process
Included here is a brief summary of the
Space Station Evolutionary process.
2.4.1 Contract Start Date (C&D)
Configuration
At contract start date the configuration of
the station was:
a. Gravity Gradient "Power Tower"
b. Vertical Racetrack pattern
c. Four US Modules
• two Habitat
• two Laboratory
d. Two Airlocks
• 1 Hyperbaric
• 1 EVA Airlock
e. Modules were at the base of the
Tower
f. Photovoltaie Power was the reference
power sources
2.4.2 RUR-1 Configuration
At RUR-1 the configuration of the Station
remained basically unchanged.
2.4.3 RUR-2 Confiugration
At RUR-2 the configuration of the Station
had evolved to:
a.
b.
C.
Gravity Gradient "Power Tower"
Twin Keel
Horizontal "Figure - 8" pattern
d. • Four US Modules
• 2 Habitat
• 2 Laboratory
e. Six Nodes
f. Three Tunnels
g. Two Airlocks
• 1 Hyperbaric Chamber
• 1 EVA Airlock
h. Modules were located below the
transverse beam
i. Photovoltaic Power
2.4.4 IRR Configuration
At IRR, the configuration of the Station
had evolved to:
a. 1 balanced "Power Tower"
b. Horizontal "Figure - 8" pattern
c. Four US Modules
• 2 Habitat
• 2 Laboratory
d. Six Nodes
e. Three Tunnels
f. Two Airlocks
• 1 Hyperbaric
• 1 EVA Airlock
g. Modules were located above the
transverse beam
h. Photovoltaic Power
2.4.5 SRR Configuration
At SRR, the Station configuration had
evolved to:
a. Inertial balanced "Power Tower"
b. Horizontal "Figure - 8" pattern
c. Two US Modules
• 1 Habitat
• 1 Laboratory
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d. Four Nodes
e. Two Tunnels
f. Two Airlocks
• 1 Hyperbaric
• 1 EVA Airlock
g. Module pattern above transverse
beam
h. Photovoltaic/Solar Dynamic Power
2.4.6 Post SRR Configuration
Subsequent to SRR Evolutionary cycles
continued and the configuration discussed
in Section 6 is:
Inertial balanced "Power Tower" Horizon-
tal "Figure - 8" pattern
Two US Modules
One Habitat
One Laboratory
Two Resource Nodes
Two Airlocks
One Hyperbaric
One EVA Airlock
• Module pattern above travnserse
beam Photovoltaic/Solar Dynamic
Power
2.5 Software Development
This section will deal with software in two
parts 1) Interface definition occurring for
WP-01 with some data flow diagrams and
2) Boeing's view of them.
2.5.1 External and Internal I/F Definition
This section identifies the functional inter-
faces occurring within WP-01 and inter-
faces between WP-01 and other work
packages. To identify the interfaces, a top
down structural approach was utilized. A
hierarchy of data flow diagrams DFD's
were created, identifying functions to be
performed and the data required to per-
form them. Each level downward in the
hierarchy shows a more detailed version,
breaking down the "parent" function and
data flows into subfunctions and sub-data
flows. The DFDs are followed by a data
dictionary describing the contents of the
data flows.
These DFD's are shown on Figure 2.5-1
and 2.5-2 and the associated dictionary is
shown in Table 2.5-1.
2.5.2 Software Support Environment
The central objectives of the Software
Support Environment (SSE) are the pro-
duction of less expensive and more reli-
able software - and in less time than has
historically been the case. It must be em-
phasized that the production of software
involves an integrated discipline ranging
over the entire product lifetime, from re-
quirements to retirement of the program-
ming system. The discipline alluded to
must be described, encouraged and ulti-
mately enforced by an appropriate Soft-
ware Engineering Program consisting of
standards, procedures and tools - as well
as a programming and managerial
workforce trained in the effective use of
the relevant parts of the program.
The standards and procedures under
which software development occurs are, in
many ways, the most critical of the Soft-
ware Engineering program elements men-
tioned. These will detail a well-reasoned
set of administrative and technical policies
and constraints under which the program-
ming task must take place. The value of
an intelligently formulated programming
discipline of standards and procedures has
been repeatedly demonstrated within
Boeing and elsewhere. Errors, particularly
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FIGURE 2.5-1 DATA FLOW DIAGRAM
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ORiGiNAL FAGF.. IS
POOR QUAU'rY
FIGURE 2.5-2 DATA FLOW DIAGRAM
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TABLE 2.5-I DFD DICTIONARY
(Table continues and concludes on sheet 38)
NAME:
"ITI'LE:
Manage Resources
INPUT/OUTPUT:
Comm_Utility_Req : data_in
Comm_Utili_ Aiioc_And_Dah, : data_out
Therrnai_Utilit__Req : data--m
Thennai_UUlit__Alloc And_Data : data_out
Power_Allocations : data out
ECLSS Utility._Req : data_in
ECLSS_Utilibf_Alloc And_Data : data. out
HSO__UU. __Req: dga_ 
HSO UUlity_Alloc_.And_.Data : data_out
Log_Utili__.Req : dataJn
USL_Utllity_Req : data._in -
USL_Utility_Alloc._And_.Data: data..out
_.i Utility_Req : data in
tiiity...Allo_..,_nd .Data : data out
ty_Req : data_out
RM._Short Term Plan : data in
RM__Activity_And State Info : dala_out
Utility._.Alloc_And...Data : dabz_in
RM_Cmds : data_.in
Log_.Utility._Alloc._And...Data : dala_out
BODY:
This process manages power, thermal rejection, ECLSS, and co-_-_m_cation
resources. When a module/subsystem requires a resource, it makes a request
to the resource manager. The resource manager determines the availability
of the resource, sends the appropriate c_mlnds to the affected resource
control processes, and answe__s the request with the amount of resource to
be granted. This process has a concept of priority, and has the ability to
r--duce the amount of resource allocated to a module/subsystem if something
of a kigher priority requests that resource. This process also has knowledge
of the short term plan, and takes into consideration the resource recuirements
expected in the near future when granting resource requests.
D
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A_vity_And..State._Info (dataflow) =
[ ECLSS_Activity_And_State._lnfo [ Power .__And_State._lnfo I
ThermaJ Actlvity_And..$tate._lnfo i Comm Activity_And_.State Info i
HSO Aclivity_And..State_lnfo I Log_.A_vity_And_.State_lnfo i
USL_Ac'_ty And_State_lnfo I SM _ty And_State._lnfo I
R M_Act_ty_And_.S ta__ln fo ].
Actuator_Cmds (dataflow) -
[ ECLSS_A_ator_.Cmds I Power_Actuator_Cmds i Thermal_Actuator Cmds I
Comm_Ac_ator_Cmds I HSO_Ac*JJmor._Cmds I LE-FMS_Actuator_Cmds i
USL_Ac_uaZor_Cmds i SM__tor_Cmds ].
Approved._Cmds (dataflow) =
"Approved commands from the command manager to be sent to appropriate
subsystem/element"
[ ECLSS_Cmds I Power_.Cmds I ThermaJ_Cmds l Comm_Cmds I HSO_Cmds I
Log_Cmds ! USL_Cmds I SM_Cm .ds I RM_Cmds ].
Comm_ActJvity__And._State._lnfo (dam,'low) =
"TBD'.
Comm_A_ator_Cmds (dataflow) =
•-I-BD °.
Comm_Cmds (d_flow) .=
--i-BD°
Comm_CW Msgs (dataflow)=
"not-defined'.
Comm_Req._lnfo (dataflow) =
"rEID'.
Comm Requested_lnfo (dataflow) =
"TBD'.
Comm_Requests (da_low) =
"TBD'.
OF POOR QUALITY.
Comm_Sensor_.Data (datatlow) =
"i'BD".
Comm_Short._Term_.Plan (dataflow)=
-TBD-.
Comm_Test._Response (da_ow) =
"TBD'.
DFD Dictionary
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Comm_Test_.Stfmuk= (de,flow} -
"TBD'.
Comm Ublity Ailoc..And_D;rm (d,_ow) ,,
"not-defined'.
Comm_U=ity_ReqCda= ow},,
"rBD'.
CW_M. s (d ow}-
"Cau1_on and warning messages from the elements and subsys_ms
to the globaJ caution and warning manager (pazt of OMA) °
[ ECLSS_CW_Msgs I Power_CW_Msgs I Therm__CW_Msgs I Comm CW_MsGs I
HSO_CW Msgs ! Fiuid_CW Msgs I USL_.CW_Msgs ! SM CW_Msgs ].
ECLSS_Ac_vity_And..State_lnfo (dataflow)=
"Measurement values obtained from ECLSS sensor readings*.
ECLSS_Ac_zztor_Cmds (d=tP--_flow}=
THC Ac*aJ=or...Cmds
+ ARC Actuator Cmds
+ WRM Ac:uaIoLCmds
+ FDS._Ac*JJ--tor_Cmds
+ WM_Ac_JmOr..Cmds
ECLSS_Cmds (de'flow) =
THC_Cmds +
ARC Cmds +
WRI_ Cmds +
FDS Cmds +
_A_ .Cmds
ECLSS_CW_Msgs (d-=Cafiow}=
ECLSS CW_Messages
+ ECLSS_C#d_,J._F_ures
ECLSS lnv Usage (dat_flow) =
"Irwentodes used by ECLSS- ARC and W_M are the pdmaty users of inventorX
ies °.
ECLSS_Req_info (c[_mJlow} =
ECLSS_Monitor._Req
+ ECLSS_Request_lnfo
+ ECLSS._Range_Limits
ECLSS Requested_lnfo (daZaflow) =
- ECLSS_Requested_.Dat_+ECLSS Monitor._D _-t_
ECLSS _Sensor_Da_ (da_1ow) -
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"IncJudes all sensor measurements from all ECLSS subsystems"
ECLSS._$hort_.Tenn._Plan (dataflow) ,,
"Schedules and priorities for ECLSS oper"ations'.
ECLSS_.Tes%_Response (dat_flow) =
ARC_.TestResponse +
FDS_Test Response +
THC_Test Response +
WM_Test Response +
WRM_Te.st Response
ECLSS .Test_.Stimulus (daY, flow) =
ARC_Test_SlJmulus +
FDS_Test_StJmulus +
THC Test Sl_nulus +
WM_Test SUmulus ÷
WRM_.Test_Stfmulus
ECLSS_Ut_iity._AUoc_And_D__ (d_t_"low) =
"Utilites and rel=md inform=tJcn _Jloc"_ed to ECLSS'.
ECLSS_.UtJlity._Req (d._flow) =
"ECLSS request for utilitMs based on ECLSS su_sy=em requirements'.
F_Jid_CW_Msgs (da_==flow)=
ERuid_CW_AIan'ns I Ftuid..CW._Notfce_
FM_Ac_vity_And_Sl_l:e_lnfo (d_t__J'low)=
"noPdefined".
FMS_.Power._Request (d=--t_"lcw) =
FMS._Power_Required + Required_Time_Fe._cd
HSO_Ac_ity_And_St_t__lnfo (dF_t_flow) =
"sensor da_.. trend d_t_'.
HSO Actuator Cmds (dz/aflow)=
"comm_nds to HA8 a_--_ors*.
HSO_Cmds (d-=taflow) =
- "comm_nds to HSO func'Jons'.
HSO CW_Msgs (dataflow) =
DFD Dictionary
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"the subset of h/w and _ responses
• a_ inoicate somelt_ng has gone
wrong".
HSO Inv..Usage (_ow) -
"report of HSO inventory usu=:je'.
HSO Req._lnfo (dam_ow) -
"request for ¢fzsplays'.
HSO_Requested_lnfo (damflow) =,
HAB._Sensor..DaJ_ • + s'-..-_c,/dynamic dLsplzys"
HSO_Sensor .D--m (dmzzlow) =
•data from HSO sensors °.
HSO_Short_.Term_P -Jan(daz_ow)=
•short term plan far HSO •.
HSO._Test._Response (d__--,=f]ow)=
"hardware and softw'a.re responses to s_muius'.
HSO..Te__St/mulus (d_z_low) =
•comm_.nds to h_Jdw-a.re,continuity checks ,to acOJrators •.
HSO UtJlity. Allcc_And_Dzm. (dataflow) =
•responses to utility mques_ •.
HSO Utilitx_.Req (dztzflow)=
•ask EP$ for power, FMS for fluids, etc. °.
lnv_usage (d_Jzflow)=
• Usage of consume_hie inventory (fluids, era.)
[ ECLSS Inv Usage l Therm-.=J Inv_Us_ge I
HSO_inv._Us--ge J Log_lnv_Usage [ USL_.lnv...Usace ].
LE-FMS_Ac_ator_Cmds (dz_..flow} =
Ruid_Pressure._Regulamr_AcCu_J_on +
F{uid_.Temp er'a_re _Regufato r_Ac_J__t/o n +
Fuuid_Tr-,=nsfer_.Ac*JJat or_.D.=lm
LE_Payioad_S_us (d,=-mflow) =
LE_.Power Status + LE .AC_Status + TSS._S_tus
"Status of specific __rgo that requires
continuous monitoring during transport. The
dam _ be for the NSTS or _e MSCS. No other element
Rev .
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requires cant/naus monttorfng dudng transport.
AC - Ac:_ve Cargo
TSS - Transport Slams System
L_ - Logi_c_ _ement'.
L g._. t ty_ d._SmteJnfo (dat ow) =
[LE T_o_ .Mode i LE-Ruid. Status]
Log..Cmds (dat_ow) =
[L.E-IMS-User._.Comma_ds J LE-F_uid Comma_nds]
Loa Inv Usage (d_flow) =
[I_E-IMS ReorderL.Lst I L._-IMS ..Responses]
Log_.Req_lnfo (d=t_flow] =
LE-IMS-User._Requests
Log_Requested_lnfd (da.t_.ffow) =
[LE-IMS_.Reorder_Ust I I.E-CGD_J_ ! L.E-l_Responses I
I_.__Tr-=nspo_..Mode I LE-Fiuid .StF.tus [ LE_P_.ylczd S_s]
Loa_._Sensor...DF.t_ (d_'low) =
[LE-IMS._SensorDam ! LE-FMS._Sensor._D=m]
Log_Sho__.Term_Pla_ (d_tmlow} =
{Ruid_.lD + Ruid..Us_.ge_Schedule}
Loa_.Test_Response (dataflow)=
[I_E F'Juid...Sensor_Test_Responses [ L.E Ruid_E_uipment._Test._Respons_=s]
Lco_Test_.Stimulus (d-=t_flow} =
[FMS..Sensor...Test_Stimulus JFMS_Equipment_Test_Sl_mutus]
MSCS-t.E_Paylo-.=d_Req_Fcr_S_tus (d.at_,'lcw) =
MSCS-LE_Power_.Request + LE. AC._S_*us._Request + TSS Mode
"Monitor st_JS request of ',he pressurized
Iogis_cs element c._rgo thzt re_J[res c=ntfnuous
life support., power, _ndJor other monitoring
during tx-=.nsport."i-ne d=m _.n be for _e NSTS or the MSCS.
LE - Logisitics EJements
AC - Ac'3ve Ca'go
TSS - Tr'-,=.nsp_rtS_t,.J,s System'.
P=-yioad_Req_ForServices (da_.flow} =
P.'_yload Requestor._lD + Requests_For_.Utility_.Services.
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F';_oad_.Se_c:es_A.oc (c_ow) =
Payload_Requestor._lD + Serv/c_s .Alrocated +
Sctmdule._of...Anocatlon
"og.16.B6.SC °.
Pawer..lC_vity_And_.S=m__fo C_ow) =
{Checked..Power._Sl:atus + Condition +
Swit=h_.lD + Switctl Posiffon}
Power_Ac_Jator._Cmds (daJ_.tlow) =
[Power O_u_on Ac*JJ=tOr_.Comm_nds [Loads_Ac_J_tar Comma.ntis]
Power_Allocations (d_taflow) =
Power..Av=qable + Power Period
Power_C,'nds (d_.:zaftow) =
[LE_.Tr-,=nsport Mode i Po';','er_Dis_butio n..Co mm_.nds__d..Requests]
P_wer_CW_Msgs (cmtaflcw) =
• [Loed_CW_Notice [ P_wer_CW_Noticss]
Power_.Req_lnfo (d_taflow) =
[Power_.User...DisCzbu_on._ChF.nges [ Power._User_Lo=d_.D__ !
Power_.User Load_Sct_edule J Power._Clh--Limits]
Power._Requesmd_lnfo (-¢:_ow) =
[ Power...User Lo__d_Responsas [ Power._User Lo-,=d_Schedule._Responsas]
Power_Sensor _Data (d-,=/_low)=
[lnput_Power...Sensor_Dam I Power._Limit_.Sensor..D_= I
ID_ulJo n._Power_Sensor_DF.ta]
Power_Short_Term _ Plan (d-=_'_J1ow) =
Lo_..d_lD + Schedule On Time + Lo-=d_Cp_Time
Power_Test_Response (d_'-=_low) =
[Power_Test_.S_ms._Response I Power_Te__Lo_ds_Response]
Power...Te_ S_mulus (dat_Jlow) =
[Power .Sensor_Test_Sl_mulus i Power_Ecluipment_Te__S_mulus]
RM __And._S_l:e_.lnfo (d_,-_.flow) =
"HistodcaJ data from resourc_ management procsss consis_ng
of messages sent, messages mce_ved, etc. ".
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R__Sho_.._rrn_F_an (dameow)-
""i'SD "
Sensor_Data. (data/low) =,
[ ECLSS..Sensor...O_ta [ Power..Sensor...Oata i Therrnal_Sensor_.OaJa I
Comm_Sensor_O=m I HSO_Sensor Oata [ Log._Sensor._DaJa [
USL..Sensor._D=m JSM_Sensor...Data, ].
SM..Ac_vity And_Smm..Info(dmaflow)=
*sensor data_ trend d,_t_°.
SM Ac*JJator Cmds (din=flow} -
[SM- HazrJl._Ac_J_orCo mma.ndslS M-B erCdng_Mec,hanism_Ac_JatO rC omm_j_,ds],
SM Grads (datatTow] =
[S'M-H_tch_CommandlS M-B erthino_Mech_nism_Co mmaJ_dJ.
SM_CW_Msgs (dz_J_ow)=
"the subset of h/w and s,'w responses
that indic_te some_ing has gone
wrong'.
SM_.Req..lnfo (da/_ow) =
"reques_ for d'zspl=-ys*.
SM_Requested __lnfo (dalaflow) =
SM. Sensor._Data" + _c/dynamic dLsplays °.
SM_Sensor. Da_ (d-.=P_ow} =
[SM-Ha_ch Sensor_D_t-=_S M-B er_ing._Mech__nisrn_D =1_].
SM_Test._Response (d_--=Mlow)=
"_ and softw._re responses
to stimulus'.
SM Te= Stimulus (data.flow)=
"_omm_=nds to h-=tdw-=re, _ntJnuity checks to _-¢uators and sensors'.
SM_U___ocJne_Oam (dztanow) =
*responses to uti'litymques_'.
SM_.Ut_'iity._Req (d_.ftow) =
"u_Trty requests;e.g, power to run motors, ECLSS to
reJpressudze doc_dng mecttardsm °.
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STS-LE3wload_Reo For_Smt=s(de=now) -
S'l'P_q.E_Power...Reque_t + LE AC _¢a_.m_Rec_est + TSS_Mode
"Monitor sta/us request of De pressurized
Iogis_cs element cargo ¢=at requires continuous
We support, power, and/or other monitoring
during tx'armport. The da_ can be for the NSTS or Itte MSCS.
LE - Log_ Sements
_,C - Ac_ve Cargo
TSS - Tr-=nsport StalLs System'.
Test_Response (c_taflow) =
[ ECLSS Test Response i Power_TestResponse ! ThermaJ_Te.st Response l ComX
mTestResponse I
HSO_Test_Response I Log_Test Response I USL_Test Response I SM_.Test_ResX
ponse ].
Test_Sl_mulus (d_t_low) =
[ ECLSS._Test..Stimulus I "Power_Test_SlJmulus [ ThermaLTest._S_'nulus I
Comm..Test SUmulus IHSO_Test_.SUmulus l Lcg..Test SUmulus !
USLJest SUmulus I SM_Test...Stimuius ].
Thermal_Ac'3vity...And_St_te..Info (d_==,_ow) =
"T'_D'.
Thermal Ac_ator..Cmds (dr_flow)=
--rBD o.
Thermal_Cmds (d_taflow) =
_rBD o.
Thermal_CW_Msgs (dat ow) =
"not-defined'.
Thermal_Inv._Usage (da.tmflow} =
--rBD o.
ThermaJ_Req Info (de,flow} =
"TBD o.
ThermaLRequested_lnfo (dst_ow) =
"TBD'.
Thermal Sensor D.=ta {dataflow)=
" "not-defined'.--
Thermal_Short_Term_Plan (dataflow} =
Rev
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Thermal Test Response (de,flow) =,
-TBD o.
Thermal_Test SUmulus (da_ow) -
"rBD'.
Ther aJ_UU  _Anoc_ d..0=z (e ow) =
_=BD °.
ThermaJ UtJlity._Req (d_/low) -
-TBD °.
T_S_F_=5_.Slztus (d_t_flow)=
LE-EP S_Cautfon.__nd...Waming_.NotJces +
Power_St_us +
User_.l._ad Respbnses +
User._Load_Sc.hedule ..Respo rtses
Upd,_d_Sho__Term_P1_J_ (d._,,=flow) =
• "FinaJ" version of snort term plan, sent to'sTstems/elements °
ECLSS_.Sho_ .Term_P -_n + Power_Sho__Term_PI_n + Therm-.=t_Shc_, .Te.'Tn F[_-1 ÷
Comm_Sho_ Term._F!an + HS__Sho_.Term. P_.n + L___Shc_._Te.,T_. Finn +
USL...Sho_._Term P_'_ + RM_Short_Term PI_.
Usar_Req_lnfo (d_=.=._ow) =
° User initiated reque_ for info from subsystem/element °
[ ECLSS Req_lnfo [ Power Rea._lnfo [ Therm-.=J Rea Info [ Comrn_Rea.._[nfo [
HSO Req_lnfo [ Loa_ Rea._lnfo [ USL._RecL_lnfo [ SM Req._lnfo ].
User__Requested_lnfo (d_.ta_ow} =
"info sent to users from subsystem/element on reque_"
[ ECLSS. Requested_lnfo ] PowerRequested_.info ] Therm_l._Requested_lnfo [
Comm_Request_=d_ Info i HSO Requested .Info ! Log._Requested Info [
USL Reque_ed_lnfo [ SM Requested_lnfo ].
USL__or Cmds (d_t_flow) =
USL Amuator._iD + USL_Ac_u=tor__on D_a.
°09_4_6.SC o.
USL_.Cmds (d_flow)=
User_lD + User_Cornm_nds._to USL_.Suhsystems
"09.24.B6.SC °.
USL_CW Msgs (_ow)=
USL. Caution _nd. W_.rning._Advisodes + Originator ID
Rev
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"08.28.86".
USL_lnv Usage (damflcw).
Time _Sl;;mp..ID + User..ID + Inventory.Number +
ItemName + {New_Loc_on}
USL_Req. Info (damflow) -
[Cmw_.lD [ GRound_User_.lD] + Request_lD + USL_lnformation..Request
t o09.24.86.SC.
USL_Requested_lnfo (dat_flow) =
[Crew Requestor_lD [ Ground_Requestor_iD] + Request_lD + USL._Reque_ed_lnX
formation
"09-24.86.SC'.
USL._Sensor_Dam (_ow) =
USL.._Sensor._lD + Forrn--tted..USl Sensor_.Reading
"09.24.86.SC °.
USL_Short._Term_Plan ('_ow) =
Sctteduled_.Ta.sk_.lD + Schedule_For Task
°09.24.86.SC °.
USL..Test_Responsa (dam_ow) =
Tested Sys-tem_lD + Form_ted_Test_Results
"09_.4.86.SC °.
USL_Test_.Sth-nulus (dat_ow) =
USL_system to._Test ID + Test._requestor...ID + USL System_.Test_.Prcc..dures
"09.24.86.SC °.
USL_Utility_Alloc And_.Data (datatlow) =
USL._Task_ID + USL._Utility_AJloc_on._to_Task +
Allocation_Schedule
°09_4_6.SC'.
USL_UUli__.Req (dat_flow) =
Requestor_.iD + USL .Ul_rrty_Request
"09.24.86.SC °.
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Ub_J_ooj_d_O_ (dem_ow) =
° U_ty _loc'._on Ver_c_on from extem_ u_ sources (Power,
GL.SS,
Thermal, and Communication) _o resoume manager °
Resoume_lD + Quan_y + Units.
utir_/_Req (dataflow)=
"Requests for external resources (Power, ECLSS, Thermal, Commmunic_onsX
) from resource manager °
Resoume_.lD + Quantity + Units.
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in the critical requirements and design
phases, are detected both earlier and
morereliably in such environments. Thus,
productivity is consequently greater than
under the historic rather free-form proc-
ess.
The merits of such disciplined environ-
ments are greatly increased in the highly
complex world of embedded software due
to their intricate interfacing and timing re-
quirements. The merits are still further en-
hanced in the case of large programming
systems where a need for software sub-
contracting arises due to problem size;
here the additional requirement of inte-
grating products from several sources ne-
cessitates formal requirement and
interfacing methods. All of the above com-
plicating factors will be present in the
Space Station software and will richly re-
gard early formalization of the develop-
ment process. It bears repetition that the
role of software tools is to encourage the
adherence to and effective use of an intel-
ligently constructed set of standards
and procedures. The tools should assist in
the production, maintenance and testing of
all required software products, some of
these being of the nature of documents,
others being test data sets, code segments,
etc.
2.5.2.1 Software Standards and
Guidelines
It is stressed that "software tools" should
properly be viewed as instruments to en-
force and make convenient adherence to
carefully formulated standards for soft-
ware development. It was mentioned that
Boeing has developed and adopted such
standards for internal mandatory use for
embedded software. Any standards which
NASA may adopt should explicitly ad-
dress two fundamental issues:
a. The life cycle definition employed
b. The software products - documents,
code segments, test data sets, etc.
which are to be produced in each
life cycle phase; it should be explic-
itly stated which products are manda-
tory, optional, etc.
The SSE tool set adopted will then be ex-
pected to support the development of all
software products identified by automating
the use of these standards.
2.5.3 Requirements for the SSE
2.5.3.1 General SSE Philosophy
The Boeing view of the SSE is essentially
one of a carefully crafted set of software
development standards and associated
products (code, documents, etc.), together
with appropriate software tools permitting
convenient computer-assisted adherence
to those standards. It is further required,
however, to offer a hardware environment
for hosting such tools. This hardware envi-
ronment is determined to a significant de-
gree by the tool philosophy adopted. To
illustrate, a reasonable policy is to buy
commercial tools whenever suitable candi-
dates exist, the alternative being to de-
velop these in their entirety. The main
advantages of this policy are that such
tools are relatively inexpensive, error-free
(due to larger using communities) and
yield extensive capability in a relatively
short time period. There are disadvantages
to this approach in that the tools are often
specific to particular hosts and are rarely
integrated with other desirable software.
In order to overcome these, a solution can
be devised consisting of a distributed net-
work of processors communicating via an
appropriate Local Area Network (I.AN')
with integration addressed through the me-
dium of a common Data Base Manage-
ment System (DBMS) and tailored tool
interfaces. Several popular larger proces-
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sors should be employed for language
processing, configuration management,
etc., while single user work stations should
be used to off-load the mainframes for
smaller project oriented tasks.
It will, in the above conceptual architec-
ture, be necessary to develop an operating
system "kernel environment" to communi-
cate with user and local processor operat-
ing systems, as well as to manage tool
execution and DBMS activity.
The conjunction of a distributed network
of popular processors (for which a rich
commercial base of tools are available),
the availability of suitable commercial
tools to aid in the production of standard
specified software products, together with
common data management and user inter-
face offers many outstanding advantages
to the software development community
and are as follows:
- Extensive and inexpensive capability in
short time periods.
- Good system response through the
addition of more processors.
- Support of software standards and
associated products by an appropriate
and convenient development
environment.
- Tool integration.
- User-friendly standard interface.
2.5.3.2 System Definition
The remainder of this section is devoted to
a description of the requirements for the
SSE. As described earlier, Boeing views
the SSE as an environment enabling con-
venient adherence to a carefully formu-
lated set of standards.
2.5.3.2.1 General Description
The SSE system consists of:
a. The software environment and tools
required to automate and support the
NASA standards, procedures, and
guidelines.
b. The hardware required to implement
and support the software environ-
ment and tools.
2.5.3.2. I. I Software System Equipment
Most tools have their own user interface
and data base management system and
schematics and do not communicate with
each other; they are meant to do a single
task and then exit. The SSE shall support
the integrated set of software tools that are
required for the total life-cycle support of
embedded software. The environment
shall provide:
a. A flexible architecture that can easily
integrate evolving technology and
new tools as they become available.
b. A uniform user interface for all soft-
ware tools.
c. Access control to all software tools
and data.
d. Execution control of all software
tools.
e. A uniform data base interface for all
software tools
f. A standard, data-structure represen-
tation of the user's project that can
be created and used by tools in the
concept definition life-cycle phase,
passed on,developed further, used,
and tested by tools in succeeding
phases.
g. User access via distributed worksta-
tions. Workstations shall be sup-
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ported by host machines only as
required to supplement the computa-
tional limitations of available work-
stations.
h. The capability of communication be-
tween users of the system.
i. The capability for compliance with
the Ada Programming Software Envi-
ronment (APSE) as described in
document "Requirements for Ada
Programming Support Environment".
j. Ada language support in compliance
with MIL-STD1850 and NASA Man-
date.
2.5.3.2.1.2 Software Tools
Life-cycle support for embedded software
requires the accomplishment of many
tasks. These tasks are divided into three
main areas that shall be supported by SSE
software tools. These tasks are as follows:
a. Management tasks.
b. Engineering tasks - include all tasks
required to cover the entire life cycle
for the development of embedded
software.
C. General user support tasks - include
all tasks of general use to both man-
agement and engineering tasks as
well as office and administrative
tasks.
2.5.3.2.1.3 Management Tasks
SSE shall provide software to aid manag-
ers in the following tasks:
a. Planning
b. Organizational interfaces
c. Technical control
d. Progress monitoring
e. Software configuration control
f. Procurement
g. Cost management
h. Software quality assurance
2.5.3.2.1.4 Engineering Tasks
In addition to the categories of engineering
support tools specified below, SSE shall
have a software tool for maintaining
traceability of all project software require-
merits for the entire software life cycle.
SSE shall have tools to support:
a.
b.
Concept definition
C.
System design and requirements all,-
cation
Software implementation requirement
development
d. Basic design
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
Additionally,
Detailed design
Code and module test
Software functional test
Software formal test
Operations and maintenance
engineering tools shall be
provided to aid in the development of pro-
posals.
2.5.3.2.1.5 General Tasks
Software tools shall be provided to support
those tasks that are of a general nature.
These tasks are:
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a. Documentation support
b. Text and graphics editor
c. Data base management
d. Configuration management
e. Presentation materials generation
f. Spreadsheet
g. Electronic mail
h. Report generation
2.5.3.2.1.6 Hardware Configuration
The hardware configuration shall:
a. Support the execution of the environ-
ment and tools described in this
document.
b. Support both distributed execution of
tools and distributed file and data
base systems. This distributed capa-
bility shall be transparent to the us-
er.
c. Support communications with exter-
nal systems.
d. Support interactive user-computer
communications via a microcom-
puter-based workstation with bit-
mapped graphics display capable of
displaying at least 80 columns by 24
lines of text.
e. Support multiple workstations access-
ing a common set of output devices.
f. Allow applications dealing with
graphics data to access a color out-
put device.
g. Support real-time environment simu-
lation and target computer testing.
2.5.3.2.2 Mission
The mission design goals of the SSE sys-
tem are:
a. To increase the overall productivity
of personnel involved in the develop-
ment of embedded software.
b. To increase the overall quality of the
software produced for embedded
software projects.
2.5.3.2.3 System Identification
2.5.3.2.3.1 SSE System Diagram
The context of SSE within its external en-
vironment shall:
a. Communicate with customer, prime
contractor, or project personnel to:
(1) Accept external documentation
(2) Interact with status and control
information
(3) Electronically deliver embedded
software and associated documenta-
tion.
b. Interact with project software man-
agement personnel to aid in project
management.
c. Interact with project software engi-
neering personnel to develop the pro-
ject software.
d. Interact with project test engineering
personnel to test the project soft-
ware.
e. Communicate with subcontractor.
f. Communicate with external systems
for transfer of information and data.
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g. Communicate with the target com-
puter for downloading executable
software, data, test control, and for
receiving test responses.
2.5.3.2.3.2 Functional Areas
The SSE system consists of the following
nine functional areas that shall support in-
tegration of tools and management, engi-
neering, and general support tasks.
a. Management (MGMT).
b. Requirement Definition (REQ-DEF).
c. Design (DESIGN).
d. Construction (CONST).
e. General User Support (GUS).
f. Common Operational Software Tool
Environment (COSTE).
g. Test Preparation (TP).
h. Test Conduction (TC).
i. Post test Evaluation (PE).
2.5.3.2.4 Interface Definition
Interfaces to the SSE system are described
in the following subsets:
Customer, Prime Contractor, or Project
Personnel Interfaces
The external documentation, status and
control, and the released software and
documentation interfaces between cus-
tomer, prime contractor, or project per-
sonnel and the SSE are defined in the
interface standards. SSE shall support the
electronic networks and standard protocols
for these interfaces.
2.5.3.2.4.1 Man-Machine Interface
A uniform SSE Man-Machine Interface
(MMI) shall encompass user interfaces to
the following SSE users:
a. Project software management person-
nel.
b. Project software development engi-
neers.
c. Project software test engineers.
The SSE video display screen shall be di-
vided into the following areas:
d. Command-menu display area at the
bottom portion of the screen.
e. Message display area above the com-
mand-menu area.
f. Tool display area in the remaining
screen area.
These display areas shall be alterable by
the user or an executing tool. The control
language shall provide for:
g. True defaults (e.g., parameters re-
quiring absolutely no user action to
accept).
h. A command history log.
i. Direct command entry.
j. Menu-driven command selections.
k. Development and execution of mac-
ros (e.g., user-defined names for a
series of commands).
1. Function key input.
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2.5.3.2.4.2 External Systems
Communications
SSE shall support the electronic networks
and standard protocols for the following
organizational interfaces:
a. Technical staff.
b. Systems engineering.
c. Configuration management.
d. Quality assurance.
e. Program planning and control.
f. Hardware design organization.
g. System test.
h. Security.
i. Logistics engineerin.g
j. Manufacturing.
k. Contracts.
1. Data management.
m. Material.
n. Finance.
o. Software functional executive.
2.5.3.2.5 Functional Area Characteristics
The SSE system consists of the software
environment and support tools to auto-
mate and support NASA standards, proce-
dures and guidelines and the hardware to
implement the environment and tools.
The SSE software functional characteris-
tics are described under the following
functional areas:
a. Management (MGMT).
b. Requirements Definition (REQ_DEF).
c. Design (DESIGN).
d. Construction (CONST).
e. General User Support (GUS).
f. Common Operational Software Tool
Environment (COSTE).
g. Test Preparation (TP).
h. Test Conduction (TC).
i. Post test Evaluation (PE).
2.5.3.2.5.1 Management
The SSE management functional area con-
sists of the following SSE management
subfunctional areas:
a. Planning. This area will support the
managers in planning software pro-
jects and life-cycle phases.
b. Status. This area will support man-
agers in collecting status information
and making status reports.
c. Control. This area will support man-
agers is controlling the project or
life-cycle phase while the software
end items are being developed.
d. Review. This area will support man-
agers in reviewing completed end
items and completing life-cycle
phases.
The following sections will show how the
SSE subfunctional areas will support the
management tasks:
2.5.3.2.5.2 Planning
a. Planning (SSE management subfunc-
tional area) shall provide support for-
software managers to do the
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following management planning
tasks:
(I) Prepare the software manager's
input to the proposal.
(2) Prepare a preliminary software
development plan.
(3) Decompose the software program
plan into work packages.
(4) Revise the work packages
throughout the software develop-
ment.
b. Planning shall provide support for
software managers to make an or-
ganizational structure.
c. Planning shall provide support for
software managers to set project
standards.
d. Planning shall provide support for
software managers to:
(1) Make Progress Tracking Sched-
ules and incorporate the sched-
ules into the work packages.
(2) Revise Progress Tracking Sched-
ules according to changes.
e. Planning shall provide support for-
software managers to:
(1) Do procurement planning.
(2) Make subcontractor selection.
f. Planning shall provide support for
software managers to:
(I) Do cost estimation.
(2) Do risk analysis.
(3) Do budget allocation
g. Planning shall provide support for
software quality assurance managers
tO:
(1) Participate in project planning.
(2) Develop a Software Quality As-
surance Plan.
2.5.3.2.5.3 Status
a. Status shall provide support for soft-
ware managers to:
(1) Make technical performance
measurements of computer re-
sources.
(2) Do requirements traceability.
b. Status shall provide support for soft-
ware managers to:
(1) Collect status information from
tasks.
(2) Update Progress Tracking Sched-
ules.
(3) Compare progress status with
plans and determine variances.
c. Status shall provide support for soft-
ware managers to execute the sub-
contract.
d. Status shall provide support for soft-
ware managers to:
(I) Do cost collection.
(2) Do cost tracking.
e. Status shall provide support for soft-
ware quality assurance managers to
monitor all software development ac-
tivities.
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2.5.3.2.5.4 Control
a. Control shall provide support for
software managers to coordinate with
all organizations concerning software
development activities.
b. Control shall provide support for
software managers to make con-
trolled engineering releases.
c. Control shall provide support for
software managers to:
(1) Review variances and impact of
changes.
(2) Coordinate with others.
(3) Make changes and send to Plan-
ning.
d. Control shall provide support for
software managers to execute the
contract.
e. Control shall provide support for
software managers to:
(1) Do cost collection
(2) Do cost tracking
f. Control shall provide support for
software quality assurance to monitor
all software development activities.
2.5.3.2.5.5 Requirements Definition
Software tools shall be provided to support
the definition, documentation, and analy-
sis of software requirements. Products of
subsequent life-cycle phases must be
traceable to the requirements.
2.5.3.2.5.6 Requirements Analysis
A combination of graphical and textual ca-
pabilities shall be provided to enable soft-
ware engineers to develop and document
software requirements. Requirements shall
be stored and available for subsequent
processing by requirements analysis tools.
Top-down development of requirements
shall be supported. A user shall be al-
lowed to start at any level of requirements
and add upper or lower level nodes. Sup-
port shall be provided to allow a user to
insert nodes, delete nodes, move nodes, or
change nodes. Nodes shall be uniquely
identifiable.
Support shall be provided to enable a user
to input, preserve, recall, and analyze data
flows and control flows between nodes.
The requirements definition capability
shall support the adaptation of different
software development methodologies. De-
velopment of detailed requirements, such
as equations, algorithms, scaling informa-
tion, display formats, and timing data,
shall be supported. The product of re-
quirements definition shall be transferable
to the documentation support system and
easily incorporated into project docu-
ments. The product of requirements defi-
nition shall be transferable to software
design tools for subsequent analysis and
transformation.
2.5.3.2.5.7 Simulation
Simulation modeling tools shall be pro-
vided to support modeling of computer
system components, to conduct prelimi-
nary performance evaluations, and to ana-
lyze computer sizing and timing estimates.
A computer system simulation modeling
and analysis support system shall be pro-
vided for construction of computer system
models for simulation analysis of hard-
ware and software designs. This tool shall
support the total simulation process which
consists of concept development, design,
implementation, execution, and analysis
of simulation results.
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 46
2.5.3.2.5.8 Requirements Traceability
Identification, classification, and cross-in-
dexing of requirements shall be sup-
ported. Requirements shall be traceable
across all documents. The requirements
traceability capability shall support impact
analysis, in determining what software
components and documents are affected
by proposed requirement changes.
2.5.3.2.5.9 Interface Requirements
Definition
Support shall be provided to enable the
development of interface requirements.
2.5.3.2.5.10 Allocation
Support shall be provided for allocating
requirements to hardware and/or software
components.
2.5.3.2.5.11 Prototyping
Two types of prototyping shall be sup-
ported - functional and man-machine in-
terface.
2.5.3.2.5.12 Design
Design tasks consist of design analysis, in-
terface definition and data base design.
Support shall be provided to enable close
coordination and simultaneous develop-
ment of these tasks.
2.5.3.2.5.13 Design Analysis
A combination of graphical and textual ca-
pability shall be provided to enable a soft-
ware engineer to develop and document
software design. Consistency checking be-
tween requirements definition and design
shall be supported. The capability shall be
provided to support different software de-
velopment methodologies. Top-down de-
sign development shall be supported. A
user shall be allowed to start at any level
of design and add upper and lower level
nodes. Support shall be provided to allow
a user to insert nodes, delete nodes, move
nodes, or change nodes. Nodes shall be
uniquely identifiable.
The product design information shall be
available for subsequent analysis.
2.5.3.2.5.14 Interface Design Definition
Software tools shall be provided to support
the design of software interfaces.
2.5.3.2.5.15 Data Base Design
A tool shall be provided to support data
base design, and data base analysis. A ca-
pability shall be provided to support coor-
dination between data base design and
software design.
2.5.3.2.5.16 Construction
Tools shall be provided to support code
construction through module test. Addi-
tional module test support is provided by
testing functions for downloading and test-
ing on target computers.
2.5.3.2.5.17 Editors
Programming language context editing
shall be supported.
2.5.3.2.5.18 Code Generation
Tools shall be provided to enable the gen-
eration of executable code.
2.5.3.2.5.19 Compilers/Assemblers
The SSE will provide the Ada compiler
and environment.
2.5.3.2.5.20 Integration
Integration is the process of collecting
software modules in object code form and
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building executable code. Software tools
shall be provided to support this activity.
2.5.3.2.5.21 Analysis
Tools shall be provided to support static
and dynamic software analysis.
2.5.3.2.5.22 Instruction-Level Simulation
Tools Shall be provided to support instruc-
tional level simulation of the various target
computer architectures to be used in the
SSE.
2.5.3.2.5.23 Reusable Software Library
A Reusable Software Library (RSL) shall
be provided for storage of reusable project
application software, software tools, and
procedures. Software tools and procedures
shall be provided to support maintenance
and control of reusable software.
2.5.3.2.5.24 Document Support
The Document Support System shall sup-
port the generation and maintenance of all
project documents. Maintenance shall in-
clude adding, deleting, and modifying text
and graphics contained in the documents.
This tool shall provide support for:
a. Electronic reading, commenting (red
line), and approving all documents.
b. Author review of red-line comments
for possible inclusion into the docu-
ment.
c. Automatic generation of:
(1) Change bars
(2) Revision level of each page.
(3) A page classification level based
on the classification of its para-
graphs.
(4) Active record sheet.
d. Production of revised pages (SSE
added) when user directs.
e. Text editor for editing documenta-
tion.
f. Graphics editor for editing graphics.
2.5.3.2.5.25 Presentation Graphics
A colored presentation-graphics capability
shall be provided to support on-line
preparation of text and graphical material.
The tool shall support preparation of bar
charts, line charts, and pie charts and
overlays.
The tool shall support formatting of the
graphics for hardeopy devices.
The tool shall be capable of utilizing data
from other text and graphics tools.
The presentation graphics shall include a
spreadsheet tool with graphic capabilities.
2.5.3.2.5.26 Data Base Management
SSE shall provide a data base man-
agement capability. This capability shall:
a. Manage relational data.
b. Have an interactive query language.
c. Have a report generation capability.
This capability shall allow for textual
reports, and graphic representation
of data contained in the data base.
d. Have a form management capability.
This capability shall allow the user to
define forms and then use those
forms for entering data into the data
base.
e. Have a higher order language inter-
face to the data base. This language
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shall provide means so that SSE soft-
ware can be developed to interface
with the data base.
2.5.3.2.5.27 Software Configuration
Management
Tools shall provide for the control, identi-
fication, and monitoring of the software
configuration baseline. These tools shall
provide both software configuration man-
agement for the system software and soft-
ware configuration management for the
project-developed deliverable software.
The configuration management shall pro-
vide the following:
a.
b.
C.
d.
e.
Identification of configuration con-
trolled items.
Configuration change control.
Computer program library support.
Configuration status accounting.
Release-coordination support.
f. Query and report generation.
Model management tools shall be
vided for the user to:
(1)
(2)
(3)
pro-
Extract a working model (copy) from
the parent model held in configura-
tion management.
Merge, add. subtract, or compare
working models.
Replace a specified model held in
configuration management with an
approved updated model.
2.5.3.2.5.28 System Backup
The SSE shall provide the capability to
backup the mass storage file system.
2.5.3.2.5.29 Gateway
The SSE shall provide communication to
external systems via the gateway.
2.5.3.2.5.30 Security
In recognition of NASA/contractors secu-
rity requirements concerning the proprie-
tary nature of many embedded software
systems at NASA, SSE will implement a
multilevel security system as the technol-
ogy becomes available.
2.5.3.2.5.31 Operating System
The Operating System (OS) shall provide:
a. Resource management that shall:
(1) Manage SSE mass storage sys-
tem.
(2) Manage memory and processors
available to the system.
b. Manage peripherals attached to the
system.
c. Software tool execution control that
shall:
d°
(1) Control the execution of both in-
teractive jobs and background
jobs.
(2) Utilize user priorities assigned
for interaction, andbackground or
batch jobs.
Communications management that
shall:
(1) Manage the communication be-
tween all elements of the system
via the SSE network.
(2) Interconnect workstations, com-
puters, and terminals.
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(3) Transfer information between
similar and/or dissimilar comput-
ers within the same network.
(4) Transfer information between
similar and/or dissimilar net-
works at a minimum of 10 MBps.
(5) Transfer data files between simi-
lar and/or dissimilar computers
within the same network or
across gateways with no conver-
sion required by the sending or
receiving application program.
Any required conversion shall be
accomplished by the network
managers in each computer or
by the gateway between net-
works.
(6) Support interactive eommunica.
tions between workstations, ter-
minals and computers within the
same network.
e. Operating system security that shall:
(1) Require authorized users to enter
their unique user name and pass-
word to gain entry to their ac-
count on the system.
(2) Provide users of the SSE system
to gain access to other accounts
on the system if and only if the
owners of the accounts have
granted such privileges to those
users.
(3) Require each file on the system
be owned and controlled by a
specific account on the system.
f. Resource accounting tools that shall:
Provide statistics on:
(1) Provide statistics on: Sign,on fre-
quency by user ID including date and
time.
(2)
(3)
Provide statistics on: Frequency
of individual tool execution in-
cluding time of day and dura-
tion.
Provide statistics on: Memory
used, CPU used, disk I/Os, disk
storage and system response time
and system internal performance.
g. Relate resource use to individual
phases of the software life cycle.
2.5.3.2.5.32 Environmental Services
The environmental services shall provide:
a.
a)
b)
A common integrated data structure
for each project that shall:
(1) Represent the user's project
through the full software life cy-
cle.
(2) Include:
Manual interpreted data (e.g., text
and diagrams).
Software interpreted object sets
which are defined in classes.
c) Work space for individual users and
tools.
b°
C.
(3) Allow an entity to be stored in
only one home place in the data
base.
(4) A knowledge base for use by ar-
tificial intelligence tools (e.g., ex-
pert systems).
A uniform data base interface for all
software tools.
A uniform user to software tools in-
terface that shall:
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(1) Be standardized for COSTE and
all software tools.
(2) Utilize a control language that is
easy for the novice to learn and
use, as well as efficient for the
experienced user.
(3) Accept input from interactive de-
vices (e.g., keyboard, mouse, or
graphics tablet).
(4) Be able to accommodate selected
interactive technologies as they
become available.
d. Online help facilities that shall:
O) Have online help facilities for all
software tools and the environ.
ment.
(2) Provide users with online help
when requested before entering
any command.
(3) Provide access to an online cata-
log of available software tools.
(4) Provide access to an overview of
the SSE system and its compo-
nents.
2.5.3.2.5.33 Test Preparation
The Test Preparation Function consists of
tools to support test documentation and
test environment generation.
2.5.3.2.5.34 Test Documentation
Generation
These tools provide the capability to gen-
erate test plans, test descriptions, test pro-
cedures, and analyze these for test
sequence correctness, completeness and
provide traceability analysis. These tools
consist of the following:
a. The Test Plan Generator shall pro-
vide the user the capability to pro-
duce test plans and the module test
plan using the requirements, ICD's,
IDD's, and user input.
b. The Test Description Generator shall
provide the user the capability to
produce test descriptions using the
requirements,. ICD's, IDD's, test
plan and user input.
c. The Test Procedure Generator shall
provide the user the capability to
produce test procedures and using
the requirements, ICD's, IDD's, test
description and user input.
d. The Pre-test Analysis tools shall pro-
vide the user the capability to ana-
lyze the test plans, descriptions, and
procedures for completeness, test se-
quence correctness, and shall provide
traceability analysis.
2.5.3.2.5.35 Test Environment Generation
These tools provide the capability to create
test environment components and assem-
ble them into a test environment. These
tools consist of the following:
a. The Test Scenario Generator shall
provide the user the capability to
produce mission data that is external
to the operational software being
tested but which is necessary for per-
forming a simulated mission.
b. The Test Script Generator shall pro-
vide the user the capability to pro-
duce detailed instructions that
automate the control of the test using
the test procedures and user input.
c. The Test Support Data Generator
shall provide the user the capability
to produce data needed to support
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operation of the simulation environ-
ment and test scenario.
d. The Simulation Environment Genera-
tor shall provide the user with
modelbuilding tools to produce simu-
lation models, and tools for assem-
bling models, stubs and drivers to
produce an integrated simulation en-
vironment. The simulation models
will be stored and retrieved from the
Reusable Software Library.
e. The Assemble Test Environment soft-
ware shall provide the user the capa-
bility to produce integrated test
environments assembled from test
scenarios, test scripts, test support
data and the simulator environments
previously created.
2.5.3.2.5.36 Test Conduction
The Test Conduction Function consists of
software that supports execution of the
test in both the host and target systems.
This function consists of the following
software:
a. The Control Test Execution software
shall provide the overall control of
the test's execution. It shall be capa-
ble of executing a test defined by a
previously created test environment
or accept test instructions from the
user's console. The Control Test
Execution software shall also provide
a test log of test activities.
b. The Test Downloader software
shall download the testenviron-
ment, target code and test script.
c. The Test Instrumentation Control
software shall accept commands re-
ceived from the Control Test Execu-
tion software, process the command
and send the resultant command to
the test instrumentation.
d. The Test Instrumentation Monitor
software shall monitor the test instru-
mentation to receive status and test
data from the test instrumentation. It
shall provide status information to
the Control Test Execution software
and the test data to the Test Data
Collection software.
e. The Environmental Simulator Control
software shall accept commands re-
ceived from the Control Test E_ecu-
tion software, process the command
and send the resultant command to
the environmental simulator.
f. The Environmental Simulator Moni-
tor software shall monitor the envi-
ronmental simulator to receive status,
and test data from the environmental
simulator. It shall provide status in-
formation to the Control Test Execu-
tion software and the test data to the
Test Data Collection software.
g. The Target System Control software
shall accept commands received from
the Control Test Execution software,
process the command and send the
resultant command (target system
stimulus) to the target computer in-
strumentation.
h. The Target System Monitor software
shall monitor the target computer to
receive status, and test data (target
system responses) from the target
system instrumentation. It shall pro-
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vide status information to the Control
Test Execution software and the test
data to the Test Data Collection soft-
ware.
i. The Test Data Collection software
shall receive test data from the Test
Instrumentation Monitor software,
Environmental Simulator Monitor
software, and the Target System
Monitor software. It shall time tag
the test data and store it for later
use by the Post Test Evaluation
Function. It shall also provide, under
Control Test Execution software
command, selected data items to the
Output Test Data software.
j. The Output Test Data software shall
perform real-time reduction, and
analysis, and output selected test
data under Control Test Execution
software command.
k. Instructional level simulation of the
target systems shall be provided for
under Control Test Execution soft-
ware command.
1. Symbolic debuggers for the lan-
guages shall be provided for under
control Test Execution software com-
mand.
m. Source code debuggers for the lan-
guages shall be provided for under
Control Test Execution software
command.
2.5.3.2.5.37 Post Test Evaluation
The Post Test Evaluation Function consists
of tools required to reduce, analyze, and
evaluate the raw data collected from the
test. This function consists of the follow-
ing tools:
a. The Data Reduction tools shall pro-
vide the user with the capability to
reduce raw data collected from the
test.
b. The Data Analysis tools shall provide
the capability to analyze the reduced
test data based upon user specified
criteria.
c. The Data Evaluation tools shall pro-
vide the user with the capability to
evaluate the test data and verify that
the test meets the test requirements.
d. The Test Report software shall pr 0-
vide the user the capability to pro-
duce module and performance test
reports using the data evaluation re-
sults, test documentation, require-
ments, Interface Control Document
(ICD)'s, Interface Data Document
(IDD)'s, and user input.
2.5.3.2.5.38 Workstation
Workstations shall be available in two ge-
neric configurations consistingn of a
standard and a high performance configu-
ration respectively.
A standard workstation shall consist of:
a. An ergonomic work environment.
b. A microcomputer with access to IOM
bytes of private disk storage.
c. One bit-mapped graphics CRT that
shall have:
1. A color display.
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2. At least 12-in-diagonal screen
size.
3. At least 2300 displayable pixels
per square in.
4. The ability to display at least 80
columns by 24 rows of text.
d. A keyboard.
e. A hand pointing device (e.g., mouse,
graphics tablet)
f. Software support for both a mouse
and a graphics tablet.
A high-performance workstation shall
consist of the components of a standard
workstation with the following substitu-
tions:
g. The microcomputer shall have at
least 32-bit architecture with access
to 10M bytes of private disk storage.
h. The display shall be a text and
graphics video display.
1. At least a 12-in-diagonal screen.
2. At least 4600 displayable pixels
per square in.
3. The ability to display at least 80
columns by 24 rows of text.
2.5.3.2.5.39 Host Computer
The host computer shall:
a. Support intelligent workstations.
b. Be capable of supporting a distrib-
uted O/S.
c. Support specified performance re-
quirements.
d. Provide at least the capability of a
supermini.
e. Be the VAX and IBM computers.
f. Provide the capability to complete
complex processing tasks on a timely
basis, as well as function as a file
server, mail server, and interact gate-
way.
2.5.3.2.5.40 Output Peripherals
Output peripherals shall support:
a. Remote locations from workstations
and/or hosts.
b. Draft-quality and high-quality text
hardcopy.
c. High-resolution color graphics
hardcopy.
d. Intermixed high-quality text and
graphics hardcopy.
2.5.3.2.5.41 Test Hardware
The
a.
test hardware shall support:
A range of target systems from mi-
croprocessor to mainframe.
b. Real-time simulation of target sys-
tem environment.
c. Target system instrumentation to
monitor and control the target sys-
tem.
d. Test instrumentation to monitor tar
get system hardware performance.
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e. A test engineering workstation that
includes a workstation specified in
previous workstation section.
2.5.3.2.5.42 Hardware Operational Modes
The host and workstation environment
shall be configured for system perform-
ance and response.
2.5.3.2.5.43 Machine Concept
An object-oriented DOS shall be used to
provide the machine system for the SSE
System. An object contains the data struc-
tures, as well as instructions for operation.
The boundaries between different systems
shall be made transparent to the users.
2.5.3.2.5.44 Distributed Processing
Central processing unit resources shall be
shared using distributed processing.
Load balancing shall determine which ma-
chine will run a process.
2.5.3.2.5.45 Distributed Data Bases and
Files
The software data base and file system
shall be designed for meeting the system
response requirements.
2.5.3.2.5.46. Project Utilization
Large projects using SSE shall be able to
have a dedicated version of the SSE sys-
tem resident at the project site. Smaller
projects may use the SSE which is resident
in the Software Development Laboratory
(SDL). The SDL shall be able to support
multiple project users.
2.5.3.2.5.47 Network Characteristics
The system shall make use of networking.
A Local Area Network (LAN) shall be
used to interconnect the various equip-
ment in the system. Wide area networks,
and an internetwork shall be used to ex-
pand system capabilities as required. Sys-
tem networks shall be capable of
interconnects through gateways to other
networks. Networking shall be transparent
to the user. High-speed networking of
various bandwidths shall be employed in
the system. The standard seven-layered
model as determined by the International
Standards Organization shall be used.
2.5.3.3 Characteristics
2.5.3.3.1 Performance
For the purposes of evaluating system per-
formance, there shall be two types of com-
mands, process and interactive. Process
commands initiate the execution of a proc-
ess (i.e., task) and may or may not subse-
quently involve interactive commands.
Interactive commands establish a user-
computer dialogue once a process is
started.
A process command shall be responded to
or acknowledged within 0.5 seconds of in-
put. For an inherently long process, a fa-
cility shall be provided that allows users to
execute the process in a background
mode, even after it has started executing
in a foreground mode. Also, system statis-
tics shall be provided to users so that they
may gauge the progress of the process. In-
herently long is defined as a process re-
quiring more that 15 seconds to complete
when only one user is on the system.
For interactive commands, the system
shall respond to or acknowledge the com-
mand within 0.5 seconds. Interactive com-
mands that do not activate a process shall
be responded to within 0.5 seconds. Ac-
knowledgment is that the system displays,
or in some way indicates, that a command
was entered. System response is that the
system indicates that the command was
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accepted or rejected and prompts the user
for additional input.
2.5.3.3.2 Physical Characteristics
A well designed work environment shall
be an integral part of the total software
system environment.
Workstations shall be close and easily
available to system users. Printers, disk
drives and other peripheral equipment
likewise shall be easily accessible and not
adversely disturb the user's work environ-
ment.
2.5.3.3.3 Reliability
A reliability SSE system shall be achieved
by following the NASA software life cycle
practices. Additionally, there shall be tools
provided for assisting in predicting, identi-
fying, recording, reporting, and tracking
software and hardware errors and associ-
ated activities.
2.5.3.3.4 Maintainability
Software and hardware developed by SSE
personnel shall be maintained by NASA
personnel. Licensed software and pur-
chased hardware shall be an inherent part
of the SSE configuration definition. Pur-
chased software and hardware shall be
maintained by the companies from which
the software and hardware were pur-
chased unless otherwise negotiated.
2.5.3.3.5 Availability
The system shall be available 99 percent
of two working shifts during twenty-four
hour periods when the main power is on.
In this case, availability shall be defined
as access to all or any part of the system
that allows work to be performed.
2.5.3.4 Methodologies for Software
Development
2.5.3.4.1 Software Development Plan
The Software Development Plan (SDP) de-
scribes the comprehensive plan for the
Software End Item development. The SDP
includes a description of the development
organization, a description of the develop-
ment approaeh, milestones and schedules,
and resource allocation. Details can be
found in DR-16.
2.5.3.4.2 Software Test and Integration
Plan
The Software Test and Integration Plan is
an integral portion of the SDP and is the
overall plan for performance evaluation
testing of Software End Items. Perform-
ance evaluation tests are those tests that
are conducted to verify that a Software
End Item (computer program) satisfies the
requirements of the Software Require-
ments Specification (SRS) and Software
Implementation Requirements Document
(SIRE)). The plan describes facilities and
resources to be used; personnel require-
ments; test conduct, test control and test
reporting methods; and the tests to be con-
ducted.
2.5.3.4.2.1 Requirements
The Software Test and Integration Plan
shall include both functional and formal
tests. The following sections specify the
contents of the plan. The plan is not in-
cluded. It will be expected to be a C/D
product.
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a. Introduction
This section shall state the purpose and
scope of this test plan, and shall identify
the Software End Item to which it applies.
b. Applicable Documents
This section shall identify all documenta-
tion that was used as a basis for the test
plan, or that is required to support the
tests specified. Documents defining the
Software End Item configuration to which
the test plan applies shall be identified.
For existing documents, the title, version,
date of issue, and publisher shall be in-
cluded in each document. Unreleased
Boeing documents, such as the software
part drawing, should be so indicated.
c. Test Item Description
This section shall contain a brief func-
tional description of the Software End
Item and its external interfaces.
d. Test Levels
This section shall describe briefly the lev-
els of tests to be applied to the Software
End Item. Use a separate paragraph for
each level (module, computer program in-
tegration, functional, and formal). State
the purpose, responsibility and general
methods to be used at each level. Describe
the relationship among test levels and the
differences between functional and formal
tests. Make the descriptions specific to the
software under test; if there are conditions
that make it impossible to verify all speci-
fication requirements at the formal soft-
ware test level, so state.
e. Participating Organizations
This section shall list each participating
organization and its responsibilities and
tasks. This shall include: (1) the test or-
ganization, and (2) a listing of test person-
nel requirements by agency
organization.
or
Organizations responsible for test activi-
ties including overall test direction, test
conduct, test operation, data analysis, test
reporting, test witness or verification, test
configuration controls, and hardware and
software maintenance during test sahll be
identified.
Test Schedule and Location
This section shall identify the schedule
and location of the testing. The schedule
shall be established relative to milestones
in the overall software development sched-
ule. The schedule shall indicate time-
phasing of significant actions related to
preparation and conduct of the test, for
example: SRS and SIRD availability; com-
pletion and approval of test plan, test de-
scriptions, test procedures and test report;
Test Readiness Reviews; functional and
formal testing periods.
Test Support Requirements
This section shall include a description of
technical support for the test program, de-
scribe all facilities and equipment required
to support the test, describe all required
test support software, and describe all test
instrumentation requirements.
Security Requirements
This section shall identify all proprie-
tary equipment, software, procedures,
and documentation required for the test.
When proprietary data is involved, proce-
dures, for safeguarding this data during
the entire process shall be stated here.
Data Collection, Reduction, and Analysis
This section shall describe general proce-
dures for data handling and analysis of
test results. The procedures shall indicate
the following: (1) the procedures for col-
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lecting, labeling, storing, and distributing
data; (2) analysis methods; (3) require-
ments for data processing equipment (in-
cluding approximate computer time
required) and any Software End Items re-
quired for data collection and analysis;
and (4) organization responsibilities for
the above tasks.
Test Documentation
This section shall describe the require-
ments for preparing tests description and
test procedures for functional and formal
tests and for preparing test reports.
Test Control Procedures
This section shall specify requirements for
test control, including (1) Test Readiness
Review conduct; (2) configuration control
of test hardware and software; (3) test
procedure handwrite control; (4) test wit-
ness or verification; (5) maintenance and
test logs; (6) test progress control and re-
porting; (7) use of a company formal test-
ing and production record system; (8)
reporting of and resolution of discrepan-
cies; and (9) documenting and controlling
special tests.
2.5.3.5 Advanced Technologies
This section discusses areas of technology
that appear to be beyond the current capa-
bilities of industry and research. However,
the potential of each technology is such
that the SSE should track its development
for future inclusion of that tool. The areas
identified and described on the following
pages are:
a. Rapid Prototyping
b. Very High Order Languages
(VHOLs)
c. Cost Estimation
d. Reusable Software
e. Artificial Intelligence
2.5.3.5.1 Rapid Prototyping
One major problem in building acceptable
software systems is the current lack of
continuing communication between cus-
tomers and developers, which means that
only when the programmer has produced
something to look at can the customer de-
cide whether it is what was asked for. If
the customer's examination is delayed un-
til the software system is supposedly ready
for delivery, then much time may be
wasted if the system is unsatisfactory. The
user may reject software because a pro-
gram does not match its original specifica-
tions. Frequently, however, a finished
program may be rejected because the
original specifications were not a good de-
scription of what the customer wanted.
Rapid prototyping is one approach being
explored to get a good idea of how a pro-
gram should be designed before too much
effort has been expended in coding. A
rapid prototype is an executable model of
the intended system that shows in general
how the final system will look to the cus-
tomer and how it will function. The proto-
type may not have all the functionality of
the final system, but it will contain enough
of the customer's initial specifications for
the system to indicate whether major
changes should be made. Such a prototype
can also give the developer insight into
how the final system should be imple-
mented. It can be quickly changed until
both the developer and the customer agree
on its appearance, thus giving both parties
a better idea of how the final system
should look rather than if they were work-
ing from paper specifications. Having ful-
filled its purpose, the prototype should
generally be thrown away rather than be-
ing used as a base in developing the target
system.
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2.5.3.5.2 Very High Order Languages
(VI-IOI._)
Rapid prototyping will most likely utilize
very high order languages to accomplish
an increase in productivity. A VHOL will
incorporate another layer of leverage in
elevating the use of computers toward a
human level. The VHOL will increase
computer capabilities over a high order
language (HOL) just as the HOL has in-
creased capabilities over Assembly lan-
guages in the past. With each step, the
leverage increases by an order of magni-
tude to optimize:
- reliability
- productivity
- cost savings
The above factors present sufficient readi-
ness for pursuing the applicability of
VHOLs for the Space Station Project.
Such a VHOL will enable non-program-
mers to develop software for specialized
systems in a reliable and timely manner. It
will decrease the number of software engi-
neers needed for developing a program
which in turn simplifies and minimizes the
interfaces.
Having realized the enormous problems
involved with developing large, complex
software programs, Boeing has already be-
gun research and development efforts to
design and build a VHOL called an Appli-
cation Generator. With the time con-
straints associated with the Space Station,
such a VHOL may ultimately prove to be
a deciding factor of which functions will
appear at what level of implementation of
the Space Station.
Since the User interface language is the
most accessed language in any computing
system, heavy emphasis should be placed
on the capabilities incorporated into it. To
maximize the productivity of the users of
the computing system, state of the art hu-
man factors engineering should be a vital
factor in the design.
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3.0 CUSTOMER ACCOMMODATIONS
3.1 Purpose
The purpose of this section is to describe
the accommodations provided by WP-01
in the Space Station United States Labora-
tory (USL) module for its user.s. The term
'customer' is used in this context to de-
scribe any agency which expresses an in-
terest in the use of the USL microgravity
facility. The customers range from indi-
viduals and small corporations to govern-
ment agencies and large corporations both
within the USA and outside.
3.2 Approach
The Station Accommodations Test Sets
(SATS) are the basis for assessing the ca-
pability of the USL in meeting the pre-
dicted needs of the users. Where
additional technical data is available but
judged to be beyond the scope of this sec-
tion, references are provided. It is as-
sumed throughout this section that the
science accommodations include both ma-
terials processing and life sciences and
that, generally, "_'^ul_ same requirements
pertain to both.
3.3 The United States Laboratory
Module
The USL is a national resource providing
a working environment having very low
gravitational effects referenced to earth
surface levels. It has limited resources of
volume, dimension, electrical power, ther-
mal control, data management, experi-
mental equipment and life support
systems, etc.
3.4 Procedures for Customer Access
Figure 3.4-1 is a procedure flow chart il-
lustrating the individual steps necessary to
complete a customer/Space Station nego-
tiation and the successful completion of an
experiment/process cycle.
3.5 Space Station Initial Operating
Capability
Figures 3.5-1 and 3.5-2 illustrate the In-
itial Operating Capability (IOC) of the
Space Station. It shows a twin keel ar-
rangement with one habitat module, one
laboratory module, one logistics module
and two international modules installed
close to the Station center of mass. The
microgravity level in the vicinity of the
USL is shown in Figure 3.5-3. Electrical
power is derived from photovoltaic arrays
and solar concentrators delivered to the
modules as high voltage, high frequency
energy, reconverted and distributed to
each equipment rack interface panel.
Thermal rejection is provided by active
tower radiators via interface heat exchang-
ers on the module which are connected to
the USL water cooling loops which service
the racks.
3.6 Module Growth
USL growth will be provided through the
use of the basic resources such as power,
thermal rejection, data transmission etc.
up to the physical limits of USL capacity
and resources availability. Thereafter,
growth will be by the addition of more
modules. For example, during late IOC a
dedicated module for a four-meter diame-
ter centrifuge and/or other life sciences in-
stallation may be added.
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3.7 U.S. Laboratory Module 3.7.1.1 Classes of Payloads
3.7.1 Scope of Research and
Development Accommodated
The USL is intended to accommodate
as wide a range of R & D as is possible
within the constraints of STS launch, logis-
tics and on-orbit safety. The types of R &
D activities accommodated at the Space
Station are shown in Figure 3.7.1-1. This
model of the innovation process classifies
the purpose of a particular R & D project
and shows the role of that project within a
R & D program. Note that within each
phase of R & D, there are parallel activi-
ties under the categories of research, tech-
nology development and commercial
development. The U.S. Laboratory Mod-
ule can, if required by the industrial cus-
tomer, accommodate each step of R & D
activity in parallel with commercial devel-
opment activities on the ground. This
model provides a better picture of knowl-
edge and product generation than simply
classifying R & D as either basic (diver-
gent) or applied (convergent) research,
and promotes understanding among cus-
tomers as to the precise needs of any one
customer for the facilities provided at the
Space Station.
The diversity of R & D purposes among
USL customers requires careful use of
terms to describe a customer's activities
and property. 'Payload' is the general term
for the customer's property on-orbit. The
payload can be further described accord-
ing to its purpose, or in such equivalent
terms as experiment, lab bench-scale pro-
totype, testbed, etc. 'Facility', refers to a
provided apparatus or volume in the USL
where payload processes are performed.
There are at present two types of payloads
and are categorized as follows: I) the
STS-middeck-type of payload, which is
essentially self-contained, small, requires
little energy and manipulation by the crew,
and is therefore rather limited in scope; 2)
the Spacelab-type payload, which ap-
proaches the experimental flexibility of
laboratories on the ground but again has
obvious resource limitations.
3.7.1.2 Payloads Accommodated
Payload classes accommodated by the
USL will include those in paragraph
3.7.1.1, but only within a much broader
range of possible payload accommoda-
tions (Table 3.7.1.2-I).A USL-class pay-
load will include such additional
accommodations as direct access to the
core of the payload apparatus, either by
the crew or robotics.
3.7.1.2.1 Life Sciences
Life sciences includes biology, biomedi-
cine, exobiology and biospherics. The re-
maining disciplines are under materials
processing, including bioprocessing.
3.7.1.3 Station Accommodation Test
Sets (SATS)
Station Accommodation Test Sets are spe-
cific R & D missions compiled by NASA
from customer and other inputs. They are
not intended to exclude disciplines or pay-
loads. These SATS were selected to evalu-
ate designs of space station elements in
terms of the level of accommodation pro-
vided to a variety of payloads and disci-
plines. The full range of test sets is shown
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 65
R&D
Phase
' E
X
P
I
o
r
a
t
!
o
n
I
n
n
o
V
a
t
i
o
n
D I
|
i
f
f I
ul
$
i
o I
°1
IndustrJal/academ,c:
Research
_ Actlwtles on-orbit I
Industrial/academic:
Technology development
Divergent research Technical evaluation
Convergent research
Technology design I
Technology design I! Technology des!gn II
Support for technology
development
Production prototype
Inputs to technology
development
Support to marketing
and sales
Product=on adaptations
Prepare next generat,on
Ground
Industrial:
Commercial development
Identtfy market opportunity
Product specifications and
business plans
Preparation of marketing, sales
and service departments
Product intrOduction
Sales, market share, profits
FIGURE 3.7.1-1 TYPES OF R&D ACT/VITY PERFORMED AT TI_ SPACE
STATION
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 66
TABLE 3.7.1.2-I CLASS OF PAYLOAD ACCORDING TO PHYSICAL
CHARACTERISTICS: VAPOR PHASE CRYSTAL GROWTH
% :,,-_ :-/ [ -'_ORIGi_ +-,+.....
OE POOR QUALITY
Payload characteristic
Volume
Accommodation range
Less b More
Energy flow
Mater=als flow
0ata how
Conta=nment
Manmpulauon
Spacefhght
quahflcat=on
Need for lab
support equ=pment
• ' "ui : ....:; .... , .....::..,:: .;..:::.-.... :..:;- ,, |
Stowed within one rack Mounted in:one:;o_:.i::i!::;ii:.il;:.i::i;ili:.::i;;ili;;::.;:;
more 'rac:kS:.+:.:iiii:;.!iil;:i:i:;il;_i;ii::iii!iil.iii_iiii::.i;.i;iil.i!;:"i:i
: ..... ;. : ' ....: .:, • I
Less than one kW One to five kW ::::::::::::::::::::::::::;::::.:
•.:-; .:; . . i:i_.::.iii::.::::.i!.i.:!.:.:
Small quantit, es : ::_: ..i:_:i: i_::i. Supphed by customer
................ ' :: ::i .+.:/i?:.i!.'
:. : .......; ;: :: . =n replaceablecontamer£
.!:::- . ::..:...;.
Managed by customer
w,th,n payload
Acceptaole =n cabin
atmosphere, may reClu=re
controlled a=r flow
waste returned same way
Some interfaces with
on-orbst subsystems,
some use of on-orb=t
software foranalysis
Hard shell, t',vo-fault
tolerant contasnment
throughout functional flow
No d=rect access to
core apparatus
Mosl:of hardware is ::-i: .:.:
'..:i:'i.:;..
spacefhght,qualified ....!i:!::i i:::i::
... :.:.-.: ... ..:; .! .:. ::.::-..:.,,i--:
Seif-conta=ned
Automatmon and robot=c$
sufficient for all
mampulatlons
of core apparatus
About half of apparatus
consists of spacefight-
qualified hardware
SOree useof typical:::.:;.:!_i:::i::{i:!::::.
iaboratOr), instru me:rrCs:::i::::i!::::.i
andtoois::_::i:.:_:::_ii:ii:_:_:i;_ii!_iii:?::!i_:.::i_ii:_ii•
: . ..... :-... :.. :,... -.:;_-- :,:.,
Mounted in two or
more rack-equivalent
volumes
More than five kW
Managed by Space Star=on.
centrahzed dlstrmbut=on
and substant=al Iog=st=cs
up/down
Extens=ve data po=nts.
data storage, process=ng.
analys=s, rater faces and
downhnk
Kept =nsme a three-iault
tolerant container
on-orb=t, and used =n
small amounts
Omre_ access I_y crew
mem bets to core apparatus
.........i i : " :.. .- : • . . • .. . - : •
L=ttle or no hardware
prev=ously spacefhght-
quahfied
Numerous associated
processes wh=ch require
on-orbit support equipment
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in Table 3.7.1.3-I, without descriptions of
the codes assigned to specific missions; an
example of mission descriptions is pro-
vided in Table 3.7.1.3-II. The disciplines
listed in Table 3.7.1.3-111 are a subset of
SATS COMM1201 (materials processing)
and SAAX307 (life sciences).
3.7.2 Internal Environment
3.7.2.1 Dimensions
The overall dimensions of the USL are
shown in Figure 3.7.2.1-1. Figure
3.7.2.1-2 shows a cross-section of the
module indicating a 4-stand-off configu-
ration with floor, ceiling and wall racks in-
stalled. The rack envelope used for this
arrangement is shown in Figure 3.7.2.1-3.
The module hatch dimensions are shown
in Figure 3.7.2.1-4.
3.7.2.2 Atmosphere
The USL will be maintained at a comfort-
able "shirtsleeve" environment. Figure
3.7.2.2-1 shows the respirable atmosphere
and water requirements for the module.
3.7.2.3 Microgravity
Microgravity is a tangible resource of the
Space Station and is described later. There
are features of the Space Station operation
which affect the quality of the
microgravity environment as follows:
3.7.2.3.1 Effects of External Activities
3.7.2.3.1.1 Centrifuge Vibration
The science lab includes a variable-g cen-
trifuge for 1-g controls and various ex-
periments on effects of fractional and zero
gravity on living things. Centrifuge vibra-
tion, if the centrifuge is not vibration-free,
will affect several activities as noted on
the matrix. The centrifuge must be de-
signed to be nearly vibration-free by, for
example, being designed to rotate about
its center of mass using a magnetic rim
drive. Also, the centrifuge, unless its axis
of rotation is perpendicular to the orbit
plane, will introduce gyro torques unless
counter-rotating compensating mass is
used.
3.7.2.3.1.2 Incompatibilities Caused by
Satellite and Platform
Servicing
Microgravity disturbances will be handled
by scheduling. Refueling hazards and con-
tamination will be handled through suit-
able accommodations design and
operations planning.
3.7.2.3.1.3 Incompatibilities Caused by
Shuttle Operations
Periodic shuttle visits may introduce cen-
ter of gravity shifts, other microgravity
contamination, and release contaminants
due to operation of shuttle attitude control
and maneuver thrusters. Since the visits
are periodic, microgravity contamination
is subject to scheduling. The present space
station design places shuttle berthing close
to the c.g. in order to minimize steady-
state contamination of the microgravity
environment. This is particularly impor-
tant in the man-tended case. Maneuver
design and proximity operations planning
are expected to reduce thruster contamina-
tion to an acceptable level.
3.7.2.3.1.4 Incompatibilities Caused by
Large Space Structures
Technology Development
Operations
Severity of operations vibrations intro-
duced by these missions needs to be as-
sessed. Because these operations may be
of extended duration, scheduling is not
necessarily an appropriate mitigating strat-
egy. Large projects typical of "growth"
space station operations may introduce
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TABLE 3.7.1.3-1 NEAR-, MID-, FAR-TERM STATION ACCOMMODATION TEST
SETS (SATS)
Near-term SATS (IOC)
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set 5
COMM 1201 SAAX0307 SAAX0307 COMM 1201 SAAX0307
COMM 1202 COMM 1203 COMM 1202 COMM 1201
COMM1203 COMM1202
COMM 1203
ESA(Group 1) ESA (Group 2) ESA (Group 1) ESA (Group 2)
Japan Japan Japan Japan
US US US US US
Canada Canada Canada Canada
Mid-term SATS (Growth beyond IOC)
Set 1 Set 2 Set 3 Set 4 Set.5
COMM 1201 SAAX0302 SAAX0307 SAAX0307 SAAX0302
COMM 1202 SA,AX0303 COMM 1201 COMM 1201 SAAX0303
COMM 1203 COMM 1202 COMM 1202 COMM 1202 COMM 1201
COMM 1204 COMM 1203 COMM 1203 COMM 1203 COMM 1202
COMM 1206 COMM 1204 COMM 1204 COMM 1203
COMM 1206
ESA ESA ESA ESA
I=n=n I_n_n Japan Japan
US US US US US
Canada Canada Canada Canada Canada
Far-term SATS (Indefinite)
Common test set
COMM 1201 SAAX0302 ESA
COMM 1202 SAAX0303 Japan
COMM 1203 SA.AX030S US
COMM 1204 Canada
COMM 1206
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TABLE 3.Z1.3-1I CONTENTS OF NEAR-TERM SATS SET #1
COMM 1201 MPS Laboratory - Laboratory module for materials processing
science, applications and commercial research, development and
demonstration.
ESA missions (Group 1)
LIF111
LIF311
MAT 130
T0235
T0236
TO241
General purpose of Life Research Facility - Research will cover
cellular biology; plant physiology; human and animal (small
rodent) physiology; preliminary investigations in eclss;
preliminary feasibility demonstration of bioprocessing
techniques and protein crystal growth.
EXO- and Radiation Biology Development - A co-orbiting
platform covering the fields of exo-biology and radiation
biology; developmental and generic biology of plants, insects
and small organisms recurring very low g-levers, high volume
and variable radiation requirements.
Automated Materials Processinq - Production of industrial
materials.
Robotic Servicinq Experiment - To demonstrate validity of 2
European servicing concepts applicable in Columbus Phase 2: A)
Servicing of unmanned platform by a servicing vehicle mounted-
manipulator. B) Servicing of man-tended platform by a hermes-
type spaceplane-mounted manipulator.
Fluid Transfer Manaqement - To demonstrate validity of on-orbit
fluid transfer management system (FTMS) concept applicable in
Columbus Phase 2 and other future European space programs:
A) Transfer of storable and cryogenic propellants. B) Transfer of
pressurized gases.
Larqe Structure Oep/Ass. - To demonstrate validity of structural
concepts for large antennas, concentrators, supporting
structures including inflatable solar radiation concentrators,
inflatable antenna and primary structure.
Japanese missions
C-001 RF.JI- To provide design data of RFIfor the space station due to
the electro-magnetic transmissions from free flyers and ground.
L-O01
L-002
L-003
L-004
Biology and Medicine - To acquire the knowledge on the
subchronic and chronic effect of space environment on the living
organism, based on the information generated.
Space Medicine - To increase understanding of the effect of
space environment on the physiological, psycological and
behavioral performance of human beings.
CELSS - To develop fundamental knowledge on the physiology
of plants and algae under space environment.
Biotechnoloqy - To develop space manufacturing technology
based on the electrophoretic separation under microgravity
seeking possibilities to use biological processes for producing
valuable materials in space environment.
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TABLE 3.7.1.3-II CONTENTS OF NEAR-TERM SATS SET #1 (Cont'd)
Japanese missions
M-O01
M-O02
S-003
S-004
T-O01
T-005A
Material Science Experiment - To contribute to the promotion of
such basic material sciences as fluid dynamics, diffusion, chemical
reaction, solidification and deposition, with unique equipment.
Space Processing for Advanced M - Use space environments to
develop and establish space processing technology
Hicjh Enerqy Cosmic Rays - To detect high energy electrons (10 TM
EV) and high energy heavy nuclei in cosmic-rays with energies of
1013-1012 EV)
Cosmic Gamma Ray Bursts - To observe gamma ray bursts in
various energy regions.
Space Environment Test - To obtain basic engineering data of
materials, components and units applied in space to evaluate
their compatability required for design integrity.
Space Robotics - Step I - To develop and verify the technology
required for space robotics.
T-005B, 5C Space Robotics - Steps II and III - Same as T-O05A.
T-o0g Liquid Propellant Handlinq - Research and development in
fundamental behavior, functional and performance
characteristics of liquid propellant storage and refueling for on-
orbit transport vehicles.
US missions
SAAX0001
SAAX0004
SAAX0011
SAAX0012
SAAX0013
SAAX0016
SAAX0017
CRNE - To study the characteristics and distributions of galactic
cosmic ray propagation through interstellar space
Shuttle infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF) - 28.5 attached
mission: To conduct definitive high-sensitivity infrared
photometric and spectroscopic studies of a wide range of
astrophysical phenomena.
Advanced Solar Observatory (ASO) - 28.5 attached mission ASO
will carry individual instruments capable of examining solar
phenomena that can be pointed to regions of interest on the
solar disc or throughout its atmosphere. The ASO consists
Pinhole/Occulter, and the Solar Optical Telescope.
Hubble Space Telescope Servicing (ST)- 28.5 free flyer mission.
The objectives are to learn of the evolution of stars, of ours and
other galaxies, and to explore Quasars, Pulsars, Gas Clouds and
other planets.
Gamma Ray Observatory Servicing {GRO) - 28.5 free flyer
mission: To investigate cosmic sources of gamma rays in a
! survey and in special investigations.
Solar Sma!i Physical (SMM) - 28.5 free flyer mission: To
investigate causes and effects of solar flares.
Advanced X-Ray Platform (AXAF) Servicing - 28.5 free flyer
mission: X-ray astronomy research in the areas of Resource
Location and Structure Spectroscopy, Polarimetry, and Temporal
Behavior.
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TABLE 3.7.1.3-II CONTENTS OF NEAR-TERM SATS SET #I (Cont'd)
US missions
SAAX0022
SAAX0023
SAAX0026
SAAX0027, 28, 30, 31
SAAX0207
SAAX02S0
SAAX0251
TDMX2011
TDMX2132
TOMX2153
TDMX2311
TDMX2411
Space Station Spartan Platform 1 - For low cost astrophysics and
space science payloads to perform scientific investigations and
test new instruments and concepts. Low cost, minimum turn
around is a prime objective.
Space Station Spartan Platform 2 - Same as SAAX0022.
Leased Platform 1 (Explore) - Explorer missions are low cost for
special astrophysics, space plasma physics, and atmospheric
investigations from space. The first payload would be XTE.
Leased Platforms 2.3.5 and 6 (Explorer)- Same as SAAX002S
above.
Solar-Terrestial Observatory - 28.5 attached payload for space
station. The observatory objectives are to study Space
Plasma/Atmospheric interactions using observations of natural
and induced atmospheric emissions and to exploit the natural
plasma laboratory of space. The SPP Payload contains the
following instruments: Wave injection (WISP), SEPAC, Low Light
TV (AEPI), X-Ray Telescope (AXET), UV & Visible (ISO).
Subsetellites (PPOP) and Multiprobes (MP) are included. The
i integration hardware includes an active thermal control loop, a
sheff for mounting the SEPAC Electron Gun, MPO Arcjet, and
instruments, and a special structure for mounting the WISP
Oipple Antenna. The SPP is packaged on a Spacelab Pallet.
hitchhiker4-Earth Radiation - To sample the radiative output of
the tropics as a function of time of day.
Tropical Rainfall Explorer Pkg - Three measuring instruments.
Space Materials & Coatings - To provide a technology base for
the development of advanced structural and insulating
materials, optical, thermal, absorbing coatings, and diverse
hardware components for long-term use in the space
environment.
Advanced Radiator Concepts - To evaluate and technically assess
advanced radiator concepts with the test bed in actual space
environment under operating conditions.
Solar Dynamic Power - To provide a dedicated area on space
station for-flight evaluation and test operation of candidate
i solar dynamic power systems, subsystems, and components. The
flight evaluation work would be separate and apart from the
operational power systems providing power to the station.
Long-Term Cryoqenic Fluid Storage - Attached mission: To
i advance the technology base for fluid acquisition, gauging,
transfer and long term storage of both cryogens and earth-
storables under reduced gravity conditions. Also technology
i development to produce long-term cryogenic storage using
insulation and refrigeration/liquefaction systems.
Advanced Adaptive Control - Local Free-Flyer Mission. TO
develop and evaluate sensing strategies and mechanization for
performance and stability improvement; subroutines for control
gain update and reconfiguration schemes; adaptive control
algorithms to validate distributed control hardware, algorithms
and systems for active vibration camping, cooperative payload
pointing, modular control, control during deployment, and
precision point.g
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TABLE 3.7.1.3-II CONTENTS OF NEAR-TERM SATS SET #1 (Cont'd)
TDMX2421
TDMX2441
TDMX2472
TDMX2572
TDMX2573
US missions
Active Optic Technoloqy - Local Free-Flyer and Attached Mission:
To provide a technology base for the construction, operation and
control of large-aperture segmented mirrors having high surface
accuracy optical figure. Also to determine the feasibility of
controlling shape distortion by on-board heating.
Guided Wave Optics Data Sys Expt - To allow operation in a
realistic space environment the optical and opt-electronic
components of advanced high-data-rate fiber optic and
integrated optic data systems in order to establish space
worthiness of the technology, including data bus technology and
data transmission in the microwave bandwidth region.
Advanced Automation Technology - (to be defined)
Development of an expert system with applied AI technologies
for the automation of operational crew/payload interfaces.
Cryogenic Propellant Transfer/Stow/Reliquify - To test and verify
the hardware and techniques for reliquification of cryogenic
propellant boil-off and to establish an accurate data base for
performing reliquification over long durations in space.
OTV docking and berthinq - To provide a technology base for
dock and berth capability of a space-based OTV at a space
station.
Canadian missions
SAAX4002
SAAX4004
SAAX4006
POLCATS - To monitor firegin absorption agents near the space
station or space platforms. These agents may be caused by
material breakdown under solar radiation.
Lonq Base Line Array - An extension of Canadian long base line
array with a large space antenna to detect new astronomical
sources of radio emissions.
UV Atmospheric Limb Scanner - Quantrative measurement of
altitude profiles of aeronomically significant species by solar
occultation and/or atmospheric emission observations.
TDMX2400 Radars (Station) - Development of radar systems
TDMX4002 Sensor (Station) -Ice and Earth monitoring, radars, vir0
scatterometers, etc.
TOMIX4003
TDMX4004
TDMX4005
TDMX4006
Solid State Memory - Evaluation of damage to solid state
computer memories to develop radiation hardness computers
and hardware.
Solar Cells - Development of high power solar cells and
reconditioning tests.
Polymer Matrix Composites - To evaluate damage and
deterioriation of composite materials in the space environment.
Space Structures -To evaluate the deployment, cotnrol,
retraction and maintenance of such large space structures as
antennae.
TDMX4007 MappinQ Cameras (Station) - Develop tests of automatic
mapping cameras and film recovery procedures.
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TABLE 3.7.1.3-1I CONTENTS OF NEAR-TERM SATS SET #1 (Concluded)
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TABLE 3.7.1.3-I1/EXAMPLES OF EXPERIMENT THEMES, BY DISCIPLINE
Electronic materials
Aligned magnetic composites
Bridgman growth
Bulk crystal growth
Convenctionldiffusion transfer
Crystallization pheonomena
Directional solidification
Electroepitaxial crystal growth
Float zone crystal growth
Float zoning of II-IV materials
Float zoning of III-V materials
Float zoning of silicon
Gradient band-gap semiconductor materials
Gradient index materials
Growth of II-VI crystals
Growth of III-V crystals
Hg-Cd-Te casting
Layered systems/phase separation composites
Liquid phase epitaxy
Magnetic composites
Organic conductors
Other alloy type semiconductor casting
iSemiconductor production
Solution crystal growth
Supercooling phenomena
!Synethesis of silicon diahalides
iSynethesis of silicon suboxides
Ternary semiconductors
Thin film crystal growth
Vapor phase crystal growth
Biomedicine
Metabolic balance for Ca and other bone-related constituents
Bone density measurements
Measure of renal stone risk factors
Effect of microgravity on skeletal growth
Full assessment of the hemodynamic alteration
Dysrhythrnia assessment
Measurement of inflight neuromuscular activity
Measurement of neuromuscular potential output during spaceflight
Determination of neuromuscular fatigability of muscles during spaceflight
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK" NOT FILMED
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FIGURE 3.7.2.1-1 USL MODULE DIMENSIONS
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FIGURE 3.7.2.1-2 USL MODULE CROSS-SECTION
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3.7.2.1-3 STANDARD RACK DIMENSIONS
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Dimensions in _15 (ins)
FIGURE 3.7.2.1-4 USL HATCH DIMENSIONS
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PARAMETER
CO2 PARTIAL
PRESSURE
TEMPERATURE
DEW POINT (2)
PORTABLE WATER
HYGIENE WATER
WASH WATER
VENTILATION
Oz PARTIAL
PRESSU RE (4)
TOTAL PRESSURE (5)
DILUTE GAS
TRACE
CONTAMINANTS (8)
UNITS
N/m2
*K
*K
kg/man-day
kg/man-day
kg/man-day
m/see
N/mZ x 103
N/m 2 x 103
mg/m3
OPERATIONAL
400 max
291.5-297.1
277.6288.8
3.1-3.7 •
5.44 (3)
12.7 (3)
.076/.203
19.5-23.1
99.9-102.7
N2
TBD
90-DAY
DEGRADED
(1)
1013 max
288.8-302.6
273.9-294.3
3.1 (3)
2.72 (3)
6.35 (3)
.051/.508
16.5-23.7
99.9-102.7
N2
TBD
28-DAY
EMERGENCY
1600 max
288.8-305.4
273.9-294.3
3.1 (3)
1.36 (3)
0
.025-1.016
15.8-23.7
99.9-102.7
N2
TBD
MICRO-ORGANISMS CFU/m3 (6) 500 (7) 750 (7) 1000 (7)
NOTES:
(1) Degraded levels need "fail operational" criteria
(2) Relative humidity shall be within the range of 25-75 percent
(3) Minimum
(4) In no case shall the 02 partial pressure be below 15.0 N/M2 (2.3 psia) orthe Oz
concentration exceed 23.8 percent of the total pressure at 14.7 psia or 30 percent of the
total pressure at 10.2
(5) All systems shall be compatible with both 10.2 and 14.7 psia total pressure
(6) CFU - Colony Farming Units
(7) These values reflect a limited base. No widely sanctioned standards are available
(8) Based on NHB 8060.1B (J8400003)
FIGURE 3.7.2.2-1 RESPIRABLE ATMOSPHERE/WATER REQUIREMENTS
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e.g. shifts as well as large changes to sta-
tion inertial properties. Consequences are
not well defined. Crew hazards
derivingfrom assembly operations will be
controlled by mission/payload and support
equipment design and operations plan-
ning.
3.7.2.3.5 Summary
Suitable design, operational, and schedul-
ing strategies have been identified to miti-
gate the effects of mission and operations
incompatibilities except in the ease of
large space structures missions where in-
formation is presently insufficient to ob-
tain meaningful results.
3.7.2.4 Noise, Vibration and Lighting
There are a variety of design requirements
which must be met by the final design of
the USL interior, for the benefit of the
crew inhabiting the Space Station. These
requirements will define the ambient envi-
ronment of the USL interior. The USL
might also have a set of windows to space
at one end of the module.
A_mbient lighting and noise do not present
a substantial problem for the customer
who wishes to control the noise and light
levels inside their rack. Vibration is an is-
sue for customers who require isolation of
a sensitive payload.
3.7.2.5 Radiation
Module hull material and thickness, equip-
ment rack density, orbital inclination and
Space Station altitude will determine the
astronaut exposure to radiation from the
sun, the Van Allen belt and deep space.
Astronaut exposure data provide a meas-
ure of exposure to plants, animals and
payloads inside the module. The primary
contribution to the radiation environment
inside the USL will be the constant flux of
protons trapped within the Earth's mag-
netic field which are most concentrated
when the Space Station orbits through the
South Atlantic Anomaly. This anomaly in
the Earth's magnetic field results in a
closer sweep of the main stream of fluxing
protons towards the Earth's surface. Any-
thing on an orbital path through this area
is exposed to a much higher concentration
of protons. Typically, in an orbit having a
30 degree inclination, the object will spend
about 15 minutes per orbit inside the
anomaly, for four orbits out of each six-
teen. Trapped electrons are also more
densely concentrated in the anomaly but
will not penetrate into the module. Elec-
trons are also trapped in the Earth's mag-
netic field and are encountered in the
anomaly region. Electrons are encountered
in orbits that are nearly equatorial but are
present at greater densities in the more
polar inclinations which pass through .the
auroral zones. Electron bombardment can
affect externally exposed electronic com-
ponents but do not affect life inside the
module.
The Space Station will orbit far below the
Van Allen radiation belts. Cosmic radia-
tion is attentuated by the Earth's magneto-
sphere. Solar cosmic rays fluctuate with
burst activity on the surface of the sun and
during a solar flare will penetrate the
Earth's magnetosphere. Radiation dosage
requirements are designed to protect crew
members at Space Station and can also be
used to assess effects upon payloads.
3.7.3 External Environment
Features of the external space environ-
ment that might be of some concern to
customers with plans for exposure of a
payload item to this environment are as
follows: 1) material corrosion by atomic
oxygen, 2) bombardment of electronics by
low-level electrons, and 3) orbital debris.
Atomic oxygen is generated by the bom-
bardment of oxygen molecules in the
Earth's atmosphere. At 440 km (240 nau-
tical miles) altitude atomic oxygen is pre-
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sent at concentrations between a minimum
of 107 and a maximum of 109 atoms per
cubic centimeter. This would be a very low
density except that objects moving at or-
bital velocities react with enough atomic
oxygen at significant energy to result in
degradation of certain materials. Orbital
debris from human activities is expected
to increase through the next decade and is
present in greater densities than meteor-
oids. The probability of impact by pani-
cles between one and ten cm has been
considered in the design of Space Station
and there are crew response procedures in
the event of an impact.
3.7.4 Resources
3.7.4.1 Volume Restraints
The basic element of the available volume
in the USL is the standard equipment
rack. The shape of the customer payload
is determined by the rack dimensions and
the requirements of EIA-STD-RS310C,
which defines the 19 inch panel arrange-
ment which is an element of rack design.
Customer payloads which do not adapt to
standard racks will be accommodated pro-
vided that modularity in terms of rack ba-
sic dimensions are maintained. For
payloads which do not meet the modular-
ity requirements, a waiver from space sta-
tion management will be required. In
addition to the provision of rack space for
customer payloads, volume will be pro-
vided for storage. All customer payloads
will comply with the standard rack inter-
face requirements.
3.7.4.2 Environment
The USL environmental control and life
support system provides the crew with a
habitable environment which will support
eight members in a "shirt sleeve " atmos-
phere. The USL will provide temperature
and humidity control, atmosphere control
and supply, atmospheric revitalization,
fire detection and suppression, potable
water recovery and management and con-
tamination (trace gases, particulates, and
fluid droplets) control and monitoring for
the work volume. The temperature and
relative humidity of the USL atmosphere
during normal operation will be main-
rained between 18 and 27 degrees C and
25 to 75 percent relative humidity respec-
tively, and will not be adjustable for ex-
periment purposes.
3.7.4.3 Standard Racks
Standard racks also provide a set of utili-
ties (or their provisions) which are inter-
faced through the rack connector plate
which is located at every double rack in-
crement (i.e., every 42 inches, nominal).
These utilities include: 1)electrical power,
2)thermal rejection, 3)data management,
4)avionics cooling air, 5)fluids supply,
6)audio/visual communications, 7)vacuum
process materials management.
3.7.4.4 Electrical Power
Space station electrical power at IOC is
limited to 50kW for all customer require-
ments including line and conversion
losses. Refer to appendix B for a descrip-
tion of the USL electrical distribution sub-
system.
3.7.4.5 Microgravity
There are two steady-state, residual
sources of acceleration on the USL which
forms part of the Space Station orbiting at
250 nm altitude in an earth-pointing atti-
tude:
a. The gravity gradient which is a
function of the distance from the
center of the earth and center of
gravity of the Space Station.
b. Aerodynamic drag
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(of which the gravity gradient is the larg-
est)
The 3-dimensional form of the gravity
gradient acceleration level is an elliptical
cylinder which is centered at the Space
Station center of gravity and open along
the flight path. Gravity cancels the cen-
trifugal acceleration along the line repre-
sented by the orbital trajectory of the
Space Station center of gravity.
There remains a steady-state acceleration
level at the center of gravity which is the
minimum acceleration level available as a
resource to the USL. The USL module is
located close to the center of gravity to
take advantage of this resource.
In addition to the steady-state accelera-
tions, random or periodic, low frequency
accelerations are imposed on the USL
through such actions as crew activity, ro-
tating machinery, reboost and shuttle
docking.
To alleviate the problem of low-frequency
accelerations, it may be necessary to place
those experiments requiring very low lev-
els of gravity on a free-flying platform
outside the influence of such accelera-
tions.
3.7.4.6 Thermal Control
The rejection of waste heat from customer
payloads will be accomplished by one or
more of several means. The three princi-
pal methodstaht will be employed are:
1)liquid coolant loops, 2)avionics air cool-
ing and 3)cooling by consumables.
3.7.4.7 Data Management
The USL data management system will
provide such things as:
1) data distribution, 2) man-machine
interfaces, 3) status displays, 4) data stor-
age and retrieval, 5) data acquisition,proc-
ess and control and 6) caution and
warning annunciation.
3.7.4.8 Laboratory Support Equipment
As a part of the resource provisioning of
the USL, certain items of support equip-
ment will be manifested according to the
needs of the mission payload set. This
equipment will be selected from the list of
requirements provided by the USL and
customers from their functional analyses.
Where items of equipment are of such a
general nature and in frequent demand,
they will be installed as part of the USL
baseline configuration and although sub-
ject to change-out as circumstances dic-
tate, will remain a permanent part of the
USL. An example is the glove box.
Other items that are in less demand but
required by and shared by a number of
users, will be provisioned and changed out
according to the mission schedule. Where
support equipment is of a specific nature
and peculiar to single customers, it will be
provided by that customer and installed to
support his immediate needs.
3.7.4.9 Crew Time
Crew time at IOC will be the most impor-
tant and limited resource available for the
conduct of experiments. Customers should
expect that with the variety and number of
facilities requiring crew time at IOC and
in subsequent mission sets, that their pro-
cedures and troubleshooting documents
should be written to a level that is easily
read by laboratory technicians.
3.7.4.10 Vacuum
A low-level vacuum is provided for gen-
eral customer use and is a closed-end sys-
tem employing pumps and storage tanks.
It offers the means of moving waste gases
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 83
from payload cavities and the provision of
insulation in jacketed devices such as fur-
naces. Vacuum levels in excess of the
milli-torr provided by this resource will be
the responsibility of the customer. The
connection of customer facilities to outer
space vacuum will be for emergency pur-
poses only or by special dispensation of
the Space Station m_inagement.
3.7.4.11 Process Materials Management
The Process Materials Management Sys-
tem (PMMS) is provided to ensure the
safe handling, processing and transporta-
tion of all materials used by the customers
in the operation of their equipment. The
design of equipment and processes will
include the requirements and limitations
set by the PMMS so as to ensure the safety
of the crew and the space station.
3.7.4.12 Stowage
A portion of the USL volume is set aside
for the purpose of storing items which are
not normally required to be placed in ex-
periment or subsystem racks. These items
will include such things as wipes, syringes
and other consumables. Spare parts and
inert supplies for experiment equipment
are provided for in general storage accom-
modations. Special storage for experiment
samples and supplies will be provided by
the refrigerator and freezer, EMI-shielded
lockers and other facilities as necessary.
The need for storage and the ease of ac-
cess will be identified in the functional
analysis of the customer experiment.
3.7.4.13 Audio/Visual Communications
The USL will provide users with two-way
audio and visual communication between
the module and other space station ele-
ments, within the module, and between
the module and earth terminals. Standard
TV transmission will be provided for up
and down-linking video data.
will be made to store audio
data.
Provision
and visual
3.7.4.14 Fluids
Certain fluids and gases will be provided
for users of the USL.
3.7.5 Safety
The intent of this section is to emphasize
payload safety and assist the payload de-
veloper in achieving compliance with the
payload safety requirements of NASA.
The USL will support many different types
of payloads which will use the Space
Transportation System (STS) as the car-
rier into space. For the mutual benefit of
all organizations using the Space Station/
USL/STS, it will be necessary that all ex-
periment equipment, including new
design, existing design (reflown equip-
ment) and Ground Support Equipment
(GSE) meet documented, specified re-
quirements to ensure operational safety.
The purpose of the Safety System Program
is to control or eliminate hazards to crew
and equipment during integration during
both flight and ground operations.
3.7.5.1 Safety Requirements
The Safety Requirements apply to experi-
ment design and operations during flight
and ground activities including transporta-
tion, test and checkout, installation and re-
furbishment. The NASA Headquarters
document "Safety Policy and Require-
ments (SP&R) for Payloads Using the
Space Transportation System (NHB
1700.7A)" establishes the official set of
basic safety requirements for all payloads
using the USL/STS. The thrust of the
SP&R is to minimize USL/STS involve-
ment in the payload design process while
maintaining the assurance of a safe opera-
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tion. The SP&R provides overall safety
policies and requirements that must be
complied with while allowing flexibility in
the implementation approach.
3.7.5.2 Safety Management System
There are two distinct aspects of the
Safety Management System; first, ensur-
ing and certifying that each item of experi-
ment is safe for flight, and second,
ensuring and certifying the safety of the
integrated laboratory.
Experiment Equipment - Safety concerns
are precipitated by integrating and operat-
ing an entire laboratory. The experiment
developer has the responsibility for equip-
ment safety which extends from the manu-
facturer through flight test and cannot be
delegated. All equipment suppliers will be
required to certify safety compliance of
their equipment to the USL integrator.
However, to assist him, the USL integrator
will review the design packages during
scheduled design reviews to verify that the
safety requirement provisions are incorpo-
rated into all End Item Specifications, Sys-
tem Specifications, Test Plans and
procedures. Any safety requirements des-
ignated by NHB 1700.7A or the laboratory
integrator that cannot be met shall be
documented on a waiver request form and
submitted to the USL integrator for dispo-
sition.
Laboratory Integration - The USL integra-
tor shall be responsible for overall safety
compliance. To ensure the integrated labo-
ratory meets the overall station safety
compatibility, a series of integrated labo-
ratory reviews will be conducted. Overall
experiment safety is an integral part of
these reviews. The data required for these
reviews include a hazard analysis per-
formed by each experiment supplier, an
assessment of these analyses and an inte-
grated hazard analysis performed by the
laboratory integrator.
3.7.5.3 Safe Haven Provisions and
Procedures
Emergencies are classed as (1) immedi-
ately life-threatening, (2) not immediately
life-threatening, and (3) not life-threaten-
ing. Class 1 requires an immediate retreat
from module affected by fire, explosion,
hazardous chemical release or loss of
pressure. Containment of the hazard and
damage repair occur later. Class 2 might
require retreat to a safe haven over a pe-
riod of time in response to a loss of
power, thermal control, ECLSS or a leak
or other malfunction involving a non-toxic
chemical. Loss of communications, data
management or related emergencies
(Class 3) might not require retreat to a
safe haven.
Resources available during an emergency
include a shower, about 120 gallons of
water, habitable volume for seven crew
members and a reserve supply of oxygen.
The shower is designed to accommodate
impaired function (blindness, other injury)
during operation and can be activated by
one person.
Each module provides low-level monitor-
ing of habitability. Detection of contami-
nant levels is possible after module
systems shut-down during an emergency
or during systems start-up of a new mod-
ule, before occupation by crew members.
3.7.5.4 Customer Responsibilities
Submittal of Safety Data - The experi-
ment developers shall furnish safety data
in support of their hardware acceptance
reviews and the integrated laboratory re-
views which shall be commensurate with
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the experiment hardware maturity at the
time.
3.7.5.4.1 Experiment Requirements Re-
view
Submission of the following data is re-
quired at the Experiment Requirements
Review.
• Equipment descriptive material (nar-
rative descriptions, sketches, block
diagrams, etc.)
• A complete safety matrix for each
item of equipment.
• A complete hazard list for each sub-
system checked on the safety matrix.
• A list of metallic (critical structures
only) and nonmetallic materials.
Experiment Final Design Review - Sub-
mission of the following data is required
at the experiment Final Design Review.
• A complete hazard report for each
hazard title by subsystem with a
unique sequential number for each
report with attached description ma-
terial such as block diagrams, sche-
matics, etc.
• All descriptive material available for
reconciliation of the hazard shall be
attached to and submitted with the
hazard report.
• Final plans for the verification and
reconciliation of all hazards shall be
indicated in the "Safety. Verification
Method" block of the hazard report.
• The supplier shall submit a final
safety data pack, which contains all
test data, analyses, operations plan-
ning, or schematics required to close
all hazards as designated in the con-
trois and verification blocks and the
applicable data specified in para-
graph 305 of NI--IB 1700.7A.
The developer/supplier shall execute
the required certification form and
forward it with the final safety sub-
mittal. All required updates to previ-
ously submitted data will be
included.
3.7.5.4.2 Hazards Containment
It shall be a design requirement of the
USL that hazardous materials not be ad-
mitted to the module environment. All po-
tential hazardous materials shall be so
contained that any plusible sequence of
failures will not result in releasing them
into the USL atmosphere or into any other
piece of equipment not intended for that
purpose. Containment designs shall in-
clude active monitoring devices to alert
the crew of such failures.
The Safety System Program provides ge-
neric guidelines that will assist payload de-
velopers in the design and operational
safety of their equipment.
Most of the hazard potential is related to
the movement and storage of various liq-
uids and gases needed for or generated by
experimental processes. Oxygen under
pressure presents a severe fire hazard re-
quiring flow-limiting orifices and emer-
gency shutoff valves to control leaks and
line ruptures. All of the gases will be
stored on the outside of the USL. Tank
size is limited to one cubic meter. Tanks
will be designed to leak before rupture.
Hydrogen would also be stored under
pressure and therefore not be a continual
storage hazard during the IOC. Hydrogen,
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oxygen and inert gas storage pressure
(6,900 kPa = 1,000 psi) is one-half the
standard for industrial storage. Nitrogen
and helium are the only process fluids that
will be stored cryogenically. Cryogenic
storage and distribution is more difficult
and complex than storage of gas and
therefore presents "a greater likelihood of
failures. A primary hazard that accompa-
nies 1.242 or LHe storage is the displace-
ment of oxygen in the USL atmosphere in
the event of a pipeline leak or rupture. Ac-
cumulations of liquid wastes not re-used
at the Space Station will be small and will
be returned to Earth during IOC. Liquid
wastes not rendered non-reactive will in-
clude a wide variety of compounds and
therefore include a wide spectrum of haz-
ards in the event of storage or distribution
failure.
Solvents and reagents stored prior to use
consist of a wide variety of materials in
quantities of less than about two liters
each. These will be stored separately ac-
cording to incompatibilities, in lockers
kept at a slight negative pressure by a
regulated vent to the outside of the USL.
Removing these materials from the lockers
presents a hazard especially if a leaking
container is not detected before opening of
the locker.
3.7.5.5 Process Hazards
Process fluids will be used inside
gloveboxes (single containment) similar in
design to those in Earth laboratories. A
glovebox/work bench will be used for cut-
ting, grinding and other processes that
generate dust or particulates. Failure of
the seal or gloves would contaminate the
cabin atmosphere with hazards ranging
from nuisance to extreme danger, depend-
ing upon the material involved.
Wastes generated during the conduct of
experiments and related processes will be
vented to the process materials manage-
merit system, where subsystems will sepa-
rate such material as gases (propulsion
system) and water (depyrogenizer before
re-use), and reduce the reactivity of sub-
stances that cannot be re-used. Until these
waste rendering processes occur, there are
hazards related to the proper sequencing
of the various experimental processes. In-
compatible chemical wastes entering the
waste vents at the same time could result
in explosion, fire or failure of seals and
valves.
3.7.6 Customer Relationships
A "USL User's Handbook" will be pre-
pared to ensure that customer coordina-
tion is accomplished in a comprehensive,
expeditious and "user-friendly" manner.
As part of this process, the Space Station
designers will provide such tools as mock-
ups, system simulation layouts, trades and
analyses, crew skill assessment and ex-
periment functional analyses. Cooperation
with User Advisory Groups and other
groups representing the interests of the
community will be maintained to ensure
the optimum design for the USL and its
procedures for operation.
The close proximity of customer payloads
and the limited resources of the space sta-
tion will require a high degree of coopera-
tion among the participants. Resources
such as electrical power,thermal rejection
and data management are finite in nature
and will be time-lined so as to provide the
maximum efficiency of operation while
maintaining a degree of flexibility. For
these reasons, control of the conduct of
experiments will be vested in the module
management by means of the software
provided for this purpose.
The provision of support equipment is
done on the basis that, where possible, it
will be shared by as many customers as
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possible which will reduce the cost of op-
eration for both the Space Station and its
customers. Unscheduled operations will be
at the discretion of the Space Station
management.
3.7.6.1 Proprietary Operations
The reciuirements for protecting the pro-
prietary rights of Space Station users are
defined in the document titled, "Space
Station Proprietary Operations Analysis".
The primary purpose of that document is
to define requirements for protecting pay-
load proprietary rights of Space Station
commercial customers. These protection
requirements encompass both ground and
on-orbit operations. Analyses have been
conducted to develop options for satisfying
the proprietary requirements and resolving
the issues identified.
3.7.6.2 Access to Resources
Access to resources will be through the
USL data management system. This is
necessary because of the complex nature
of resource requirements and availability.
The DMS will sequence the application ac-
cording to the mission schedule and the
types and rates of application of resources
needed to complete the operation of cus-
tomer payloads. Intervention in the se-
quence of events will be under the control
of Space Station management.
3.7.6.3 International Participation
Where agencies outside the United States
participate in the Space Station program
and require accommodations from the
USL, the necessary revisions to this docu-
ment will be made. It is assumed that the
requirements and provisions made herein
apply to all participants but as acceptable
changes are identified they will be made
accordingly.
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4.0 WP-01 TEST AND VERIFICATION PROGRAM
4.1 Overview
The WP-01 project for the Space Station
Program is a multi-unit design and pro-
duction program, with outfitting of the
modules to unique end-item configura-
tions. For the SDR definition of the IOC
program, end item elements will be pro-
duced and outfitted as follows:
• United States Laboratory (USL) Module
• Habitat Module
• Logistics Elements, comprised of
• Pressurized Module
• Dry Cargo Unpressurized Carrier
• Fluids Carrier
• Propellants Carrier
• Airlocks, comprised of
• Airlock
• Hyperbaric Airlock
• Resource Nodes
These element responsibilities are based
on WP-01 assignment of the pressurized
volume.
4.1.1 Verification Program lntorfaces
The overall scenario for producing, inte-
grating, and verifying the modules is as
shown in Figure 4.1-1. From the figure, a
typical DDT&E flow is shown (top of
chart). The chart shows the simultaneous
parallel tasks for development of (1) mod-
ule systems, (2) outfitting systems, and (3)
payload systems (development is assumed
to be by the user community, and integra-
tion with the laboratory module to be in-
cluded in WP-01 tasks). It is apparent that
the program is complex in that a number
of organizations have tightly interrelated
tasks. It is assumed that control of these
development roles and relationships will
require highly disciplined specification
and ICD practices over the whole pro-
gram.
4.1.2 Planning Precepts
The principal requirements for the WP-01
verification program are extracted from
the specific requirements cited in PDRD
JSC 30000 and SRD 0001.
a. Design verification requires hardware
and software certification/qualifica-
tion and also system verification. See
also item (e).
b. Use protoflight philosophy when
practical.
c. System verification includes interface
verification, hardware/software com-
patibility, system integration testing,
prelaunch testing, and maintenance
testing.
d. Acceptance testing requires hardware
and software testing to verify that
they are built to design, performance
is acceptable, and they are free from
manufacturing defects.
e. Verification systems and tasks in
space is a significant non-recurring
requirement that overlays initial op-
erations.
f. Verification of the self-test and self-
monitoring capability that automates
the station systems and frees the
crew for productive user support
tasks.
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Features of the WP-01 test program that
are planned in response to the above re-
quirements are shown in Table 4.1-I.
4.1.3 Protoflight Philosophy
Implementation of the protoflight philoso-
phy is a program requirement aimed at
significantly reducing the test program's
costs by reducing dedicated test articles.
The use of protoflight philosophy implies
that the traditional roles between design
criteria and test criteria are conservatively
adjusted so that testing for qualification
(overstress testing) can be done on flight
hardware without degrading its flight wor-
thiness - but testing cannot be pushed to
failure, so analytical means are required
to determine the ultimate characteristics
of the design. In order to have credible
analytical capability, the models must
have been previously verified. This can be
done by examining comparable conditions
on previous programs and filling in any
open areas by testing on development
hardware and selected test articles. Since
model verification must precede its use
with flight hardware, it is planned to begin
early in Phase C/D with prototype hard-
ware.
Boeing's general approach is to apply
protoflighting at the element and/or the
rack level. Hardware to be installed in the
rack (ORUs, components, etc.) would be
qualified to worst case (stringent) per-
formance and environmental levels. Racks
would be grouped into typical families for
protoflight qualification testing on a one-
time basis. After protoflight testing is
completed, the hardware is refurbished
(instrumentation removal, cleaning, etc.)
as required to restore it to flight configura-
tion and acceptance tested. Subsequent ar-
ticles would be tested to acceptance levels.
4.1.4 Maintainability Demonstration
The following discussion outlines the pre-
liminary maintainability verification, dem-
onstration, and evaluation plan.
4.1.5 Maintainability Verification
The maintainability verification and dem-
onstration for Space Station equipment is
to be performed as part of and in coordi-
nation with system test and evaluation.
Maintainability verification and demon-
stration will be conducted on the ground to
the maximum extent possible and will
make maximum practical use of analysis,
vice physical test. The maintainability
demonstration plan will be responsive to
the Space Station Program Level B Main-
tainability Program Plan, maintainability
requirements, the maintenance concept
and maintenance environment, the
planned skill levels, and the levels of
maintenance to be demonstrated.
The verification and demonstrations con-
ducted as part of, or in coordination with,
development testing will be conducted at
the contractor's facilities using contractor
personnel and resources. Formal main-
tainability demonstrations conducted on
pre-production or prototype hardware will
be accomplished at either government or
contractor facilities, using either customer
or contractor personnel and resources, as
deemed most appropriate for a given test.
The contractor will assume the responsi-
bility for planning, monitoring, data col-
lection and analysis, and reporting; the
government will monitor all activities.
4.1.5.1 Demonstrations
Demonstrations are normally carried out
under actual operational conditions, or
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TABLE 4.1-I KEY WP-01 VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS AND CONCEFrS
Requirements
Design Verification
Protoflight Philosophy
System Verification
Interface Compatibility
Hardware/Software
Compatibility
Verification of Tasks in
planned
Ground Verification of
Interfaces with Flying
Hardware
Self-Test and Automated
Operations
Features
Qualification of LRUs and ORUs
Test articles repaired for downstream
use in SIL Analysis required to evalu
ate performance
Applied at element and task level Re
duces dedicated test articles Tests are
on flight hardware Complimentary
analytical verification required
Emphasis on simulators and tooling
Verify simulators against flight
articles
Systems integration laboratory
(SIL)
Articles from other tests used
Software compatibility an
objective
Effective ground verification Space
Results incorporated in basic design
Previously verified simulators are
a key to follow-on verification
Built-in testability.
Embedded instrumentation
Automated fault detection and
redundancy management Use
self-test capability for ground C/O
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 92
conditions which simulate closely the op-
erational maintenance environment to the
degree possible. For verification and dem-
onstration of selected on-orbit mainte-
nance tasks, test bed/mockups, zero-G
aircraft, water tank, or STS flights may be
needed in the conduct of the tests.
4.1.5.2 Test Sites
.Specific locations for verification and
demonstrations will be identified during
detailed test planning. Sites will include
the various contractor's plants, the NASA
interface simulators and subsystem test
beds, element mockups, and government
and contractor software development fa-
cilities. Analyses to support maintainabil-
ity evaluations will be conducted at the
Boeing plant in Huntsville.
4.1.5.3 Facility Requirements
No new or dedicated (long term) facilities
are planned specifically to support main-
tainability verification, demonstration and
evaluation. Of existing government facili-
ties, the MSFC Neutral Buoyancy Facility
will be useful for development and dem-
onstration of EVA maintenance proce-
dures. Requirements for such facilities as
zero-G aircraft and the STS will be
avoided in favor of less costly alternatives.
4.1.5.4 Participating Agencies
Participation in demonstrations will in-
clude, as a minimum, Boeing and hard-
ware/software vendors, MSFC technical
and/or administrative personnel, and flight
and/or ground operations _presentatives
from other NASA centers. Customer par-
ticipation, where appropriatn, will be ar-
ranged by the test directar through
coordination with MSFC. Other partici-
pants or observers may be included at the
discretion of the government and the test
director.
4.1.5.5 Interfaces
The ILS elements to be considered will in-
clude maintenance planning, support and
test equipment, supply support, transpor-
tation, handling and storage, technical
data, facilities, and personnel training.
4.1.5.6 Maintenance Demonstration
Conduct
The following items will be documented
for each maintenance demonstration
planned for the Space Station Program:
a. Test objective
b. Test schedules
c. Test method, including accept/reject
decision criteria, risks, etc.
d. Data acquisition and analysis meth-
ods and procedures
e. Specific data elements/maintenance
tasks
f. Units of measurement
.
h.
Type and schedule of reports
Test team - Description of assigned
responsibilities with qualifications,
quantity, sources, training, and in-
doctrination requirements of team
personnel will be provided for each
major test activity. The test team or-
ganization will consist of the Test Di-
rector, technician personnel,
maintenance personnel, operations
personnel, and quality assurance per-
sonnel.
4.2 Verification Requirements Derivation
Requirements for WP-01 CEI elements
are provided by the SRD, the CEIs, and
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the ICDs. These presently exist in pre-
liminary form that contain Section 3 per-
formance requirements. Verification
requirements allocation methodology is to
be per Appendix C, Part 4.1, Section 3,
of SS-SRD-0001 which specifies the
Verification Cross Reference Index
(VCRI) formats for flight system specifica-
tions and for GSE specifications.
A systematic methodology for making the
allocation to Phase/Level/Method per Ap-
pendix C and a coordinated allocation to
the hardware level of assembly is shown
in Figure 4.2-1. The initial requirements
task is that of determining allocations for
VCRI (Bubble A). From the figure, the
technique involves use of a Verification
Allocation Work Sheet (Bubble B) to
break each phase down for unique consid-
eration. The formats for the VCRI and the
worksheet are shown in Figure 4.2-2. To
make these allocations in a configuration-
specific way that considers the subsystem
designer's role, a subsystem DDT&E Flow
and an Indentured Equipment List (in pre-
liminary form if still in work) is used.
An example of the subsystem DDT&E
Flows (for Internal TCS) are shown in Fig-
ure 4.2-3. Essentially, they show the de-
signer's theme of subsystem design and
verification, with the relationships between
tests and analysis. The flow treats sepa-
rately the phases of development, qualifi-
cation and acceptance - both installation
and checkout and final buy off. With this
information and an Indentured Equipment
List, the designer, test engineer, and tech-
nical staff analyst can readily reach a con-
sensus on verification by analysis versus
test, the level of assembly for qualification
testing, the criticality of the various items
of hardware (which identifies key develop-
ment testing requirements. The outputs of
this are used in two ways: (1) entries in
the VCRI (that are backed up by Verifica-
tion Allocation Worksheets) and (2) en-
tries in the Equipment Test Requirements
Matrix (see Figure 4.2-4). Additionally,
when the designer uses mature hardware
(already qualified and off-the-shelf),
verification by similarity requires (per
SRD 0001, Part 4.1, paragraph 3.4.4)
documentation of a comparison between
Space Station requirements and previous
qualification conditions. If modification
and/or additional qualification is required,
the determination between delta quale or
complete qualification shall be made from
assessments of cumulative or interactive
effects of added performance and environ-
mental conditions on the device.
From this requirements baseline (VCRI
and Equipment Test Requirements), the
planning of the tests, analyses, etc., pro-
ceeds in the groups that receive the assign-
ments. There is a joint task between the
designer, test engineer, and analyst to
specify test requirements in terms of ob-
jectives, success criteria, conditions, pa-
rameter specification/limits, etc. From
these, test engineering proceeds to work
through a test team to carry out the test-
ing.
4.3 Design Verification
Protoflight element and rack level tests are
conducted on production-configured hard-
ware to demonstrate that the designed and
manufactured hardware conforms to
specification requirements. In addition,
planned qualification tests are conducted
at component level and subsystem level.
Together, these tests qualify the end item
elements for operation, generally to envi-
ronments that exceed maximum predicted
levels within the specified environments.
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The element design will provide adequate
margins that allow the element to survive,
to continue functioning (or to start up and
function) and to complete the designated
mission even though expected environ-
merit levels are exceeded. The environ-
mental test levels for qualification testing
will be established based on these design
margins, expected mission levels, and the
variations in hardware.
Those units selected for Space Station that
have been previously qualified and flight
proven are not requalified unless the de-
fined mission environment is more severe.
All modified hardware requires re-
qualification. The decision process to de-
termine the requirements for qualification
testing is shown in Figure 4.3-1. Qualifi-
cation test requirements for certifying can-
didate units for flight are met either by
conducting tests on identical or similar
units, or by analysis based on previous
hardware usage.
The qualification status of all WP-01
hardware is displayed in the Verification
Data Base which provides the qualification
requirements of each hardware item plus
its current test level parameters and
status, (i.e., previously qualified, flight
proven, partially qualified or unqualified).
4.3.1 System Integration Testing
System integration testing is concerned
with integration of the subsystems hard-
ware and software over the span of the
program. It begins in the development
phase with breadboard hardware and is
used for design validation with early ver-
sions of software so that applications soft-
ware with an operating system is defined
that can be baselined and produced. Typi-
cal development issues include system tes-
tability investigations, redundancy
management investigation, beginning the
development of the human factors data
base, packaging investigations, mainte-
nance investigations, etc.
Software development and testing is
planned under DR-16. Those tests are ex-
pected to be conducted on a computer
based SSE, and are assumed to cover veri-
fication of software parameters against a
computer generated system simulation.
Hardware-software compatibility will be
verified by conducting tests of the sys-
tem's operating sequences against a hard-
ware simulation of the system while under
software control. This testing would in-
clude the automated and commanded test
and functional operations of a set of stan-
dardized mission sequences. Subsystem
test articles will be integrated into the
common module configuration in a Sys-
tem Integration Laboratory (SIL) facility.
Objectives of testing in a SIL facility
would include:
a. Demonstrate that signal interfaces
are within design margins for signal
and noise.
b. Verify subsystem operating ranges,
tolerances and performance under
parametric input variations.
c. Verify component interfaces and
compatibility.
d. Verify inter-subsystem interfaces.
e. Verify redundancy management ca-
pability.
f. Demonstrate satisfactory operation
under identified contingency or fail-
ure modes.
g. Validate power quality and consump-
tion analysis.
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h. Verify automatic power down and
load management capability.
i. Verify automatic self-initiation se-
quences.
From the design and development period,
the SIL would transition to support of ele-
ment checkout, interface verification, out-
fitting checkout, payload hardware
integration, and then support of the opera-
tions phase. This transitioning role is
shown in Figure 4.3-2. The configuration
of the hardware used as test articles in the
SIL will also be evolutionary. The systems
can largely be built up from hardware re-
sources of the development and qualifica-
tion test program in lieu of procuring a
dedicated set of components and subsys-
tem hardware. Simulations of element in-
terfaces to other elements and the NSTS
Orbiter would be needed. Refer to Figure
4.3-3 for SIL configuration evolution
phases.
The SIL provides a capability that also
supports module functional test and check-
out, 'during both qualification and accep-
tance. External interfaces with other
related areas permit support of training
and simulations, payload and experiment
integration and verification; and through
the mission support complexers, on-orbit
support is provided when needed. Figure
4.3-4 depicts the various SIL interfaces. A
preliminary projection of requirements for
the WP-01 SIL is shown in Table 4.3-I.
4.3.2 Element Protoflight Tests
CEI element level certification testing is
conducted on flight elem¢nts on a
protoflight basis. See the verification flow
shown in Appendix B. Static load qualifi-
cation is performed on the structure.
These tests use flight structure with mass
simulated components. A static test load
to exceed working loads will be applied to
verify load paths through the trurmions for
Orbiter installation, and through the berth-
ing interfaces for station installation. Pre-
ceding these tests, the pressure shell will
be proof tested, and then the leak rate test
will be conducted to verify the integrity of
the pressure vessels.
Functional tests are performed on the full
flight element with live electronics. The
vehicle is subjected to a series of func-
tional, leak and mechanical tests. An
acoustic test will be conducted to survey
internally generated noise.
4.3.2.1 Element Functional Test
The element functional test is a system
segment level test of the module to verify
that: (1) all functional interfaces are cor-
rect; (2) interactions between system (ele-
ment, interconnects, orbiter, if required,
and ground support interfaces) are proper;
and (3) element system level performance
requirements are met.
The test will consist of using a checkout
station and interface simulators to cycle
the element systems through their total
range of operation including the launch,
orbiter pre-deployment, and post-orbiter
assembly into the station, activation and
operations. All mission functions are exer-
cised in normal mission sequences via
commands, data transmission, etc., in-
cluding verification of housekeeping data,
system control functions, user accommo-
dation interfaces, etc. All operating modes
are exercised during the test.
The test configuration will be as close to
flight as practical, i.e., minimum STE at-
tached and high-fidelity simulators used.
Preliminary plans are that the checkout
station interfaces with the element through
an umbilical interface. The use of "test
only" umbilicals is discouraged in keeping
with the general philosophy of using flight
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FIGURE 4.3-4 SIL INTERFACES
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Mission:
equipment and outfitting checkout."
Facility Requirements:
Two parallel module test stations
7,500 sq ft each
Module transporter access
Roadway
Doors
Overhead bridge crane with 40' hook height
Single hook lift, or
Double hook lift
Contamination control
2 ea class 100,000 clean tents, 80 ft x 65 ft x 30 ft
Computer area for GSE,
Simulators, checkout control station, etc..
Industrial utilities
Lighting
Power Clean dry compressed sasses
TABLE 4.3-I PRELIMINARY SIL FACILITY REQUIREMENTS
Module acceptance test and checkout, plus installation of outfitting
15,000 sf
24 ft high x 20 ft wide
1 @ 30 tons or
2 @ 20 tons
3,000 sf
" Area estimates for payload
integration, experiment verification
& software lab not included
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interfaces for tests whenever possible. A
payload simulator is to simulate typical
user accommodation interfaces that are
monitored or commanded through the ele-
ment including power status and control
and data stream functions. Electrical
power is to be provided from a ground
power supply unit connected through the
umbilical.
A functional test is performed to verify the
operation of the umbilical mechanism.
The umbilicals are physically separated
and then manually reconnected. The sys-
tems are then functionally checked out in
the automatic mode monitored with the
checkout station as previously described.
The element system functional test is
planned to be performed at key points dur-
ing protoflight processing (e.g., before and
after outfitting and payload integration)
and provides, in addition to basic system
performance, data indicative of any sig-
nificant changes in performance which
show undesirable trends.
4.3.2.2 Electromagnetic Compatibility
(EMC) Test
The EMC certification test uses the com-
bined module systems with outfitting and
payload equipment installed. Electromag-
netic tests are performed to verify that lev-
els electromagnetic interference between
systems and components are acceptable
and to ensure that the modul¢_ element is
not adversely affected by external sources
of RF radiation. It is to be conducted in
accordance with MIL-E-6051D require-
ments. When element schedule require-
ments are clear, tests may be combined
for more efficient operation when practi-
cal.
4.3.3 Qualification Tests
4.3.3.1 General
Planning for environmental qualification
tests will generally follow the guidance of
MIL-STD-1540A and/or MIL-STD-810.
Specific test levels are to be confirmed
through developmental testing and by the
thermal and dynamic analyses. Qualifica-
tion test levels will be chosen to exceed
the expected flight levels to ensure that
environmental exposure of production
hardware during the missions are within
design margins. These levels will be based
on values including the boost phase plus
composite values for extended orbital ex-
posure in the environment that the Space
Station is to be flown and operated in.
Therefore, simulated space environments
during qualification exceed the worst case
temperature extremes and include power
on, power off, depressurization, repres-
surizati0n, and restart as required. Simu-
lated launch tests such as vibration,
acoustic and acceleration will include the
highest dynamic loads from the NSTS or-
biter launch environments.
Electronic Orbital Replaceable Units
(ORUs) are required to have successfully
completed a functional checkout and ac-
ceptance test with burn-in prior to being
subjected to qualification testing. ORU
component level qualification is generally
completed prior to start of the protoflight
testing at higher levels of assembly.
Vehicle level certification testing on the
flight elements is accomplished on a
protoflight basis, using flight electronic
units, not the ORUs used during compo-
nent qualification.
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 107
If a test failure occurs during qualifica-
tion, the test is terminated, cause of the
failure determined, corrective action com-
pleted and the test restart determined. If
the cause of failure is due to the test setup
or to a failure in the test equipment, the
test being conducted at the time of the
failure may be continued after the repairs
are completed, provided the failure did
not result in an overstress test condition. If
the cause of the problem is determined as
a failure in the unit under test, a prelimi-
nary failure analysis and appropriate cor-
rective action is completed and the test
restart determined. The qualification test
in which the failure occurred, and any pre-
vious test that could have induced the fail-
ure, or whose validity was compromised
by the corrective action, will be repeated.
The amount of re-test required after the
qualification test failure is determined by
a Material Review Board (MRB) consisting
of Boeing Engineering, Boeing Ouality
Control and Customer Ouality Control
representatives. Success criteria to be ap-
plied to aIl qualification testing is as fol-
lows:
. Equipment must survive or operate
(as appropriate) at the environmental
extremes without experiencing a fail-
ure. Performance parameters must
remain within the qualification speci-
fication limits although these limits
may be wider than those for accep-
tance testing.
. No intermittent failures shall occur
while the equipment is in, or is being
sequenced through, operational
modes during environmental expo-
sure. All electrical and electronic
equipment is energized and critical
circuits are monitored during this se-
quencing.
3. Complete successful functional tests
before and after environmental expo-
sure, with all commands issued and
responses verified to assure no per-
formance degradation has occurred
during environmental exposure.
4.3.3.2 Certified Hardware List
The end product of certification is the es-
tablishment of a certified hardware list.
This list of certified items will provide the
basis for declaring the design as certified
for its intended use. The contractor will
complete and submit to MSFC Reliability
and Quality Assurance Office a Certificate
of Qualification (CO0), MSFC Form 511,
for each item that has completed qualifi-
cation, and when the COQ is approved,
will update the certified hardware list.
Certification status of all certified Space
Station WP-01 flight hardware will be
published on the Certified Hardware List
and listed in the Certification Status Re-
ports.
Specific qualification test requirements
are design-specific and will be contained
in the Phase C/D test plans for each of the
elements. It should be noted that prelimi-
nary planning for the WP-01 flight ele-
ments was provided in the preliminary
DR-04 submittal dated February 20, 1986.
References are as follows:
D483-50023-1, Space Station WP-01 Sys-
tems Test and Verification Plan, Volume 1
D483-50023-2, Common Module Systems
Test and Verification Plan, Volume 2
D483-50023-3, Manufacturing and Tech-
nology Laboratory Module Systems Test
and Verification Plan, Volume 3
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D483-50023-4, Logistics Module Systems
Test and Verification Plan, Volume 4
D483-50023-5, Propulsion and Vehicle
Accommodations System Test and Verifi-
cation Plan, Volume 5
4.4 Hardware Verification
WP-01 element acceptance tests are
conducted on production hardware to
demonstrate that the designed and manu-
factured hardware conforms to specifica-
tion requirements. When the elements
are to be subjected to protoflight certifi-
cation testing, the acceptance testing fol-
lows the refurbishment of the element
after protoflight testing.
Acceptance tests detect deficiencies in
workmanship, material, and quality. An
acceptance team of customer and Boeing
representatives will review and ensure the
overall completeness and acceptability of
data acquired before WP-01 equipment is
delivered. Control and verification of the
acceptance process is an integral part of
the quality assurance program.
Production acceptance tests use proce-
dures, facilities, and support equipment
produced and verified during the develop-
ment and qualification tests. When envi-
ronmental tests are required, they will be
conducted at levels commensurate with
expected flight levels.
4.4.1 General Acceptance Test
Requirements
Environmental acceptance tests are
planned using MIL-STD-1540A as guid-
ance. Specific test levels equal expected
operating levels. As in the qualification
test program, these levels are based on
composite values for typical mission con-
ditions for more than one configuration.
These missions require extended opera-
tions in low earth orbit. Therefore simu-
lated space environments during
acceptance exceed the worst case tem-
perature extremes. Simulated launch tests
such as vibration, acoustic, and accelera-
tion include the highest dynamic loads an-
ticipated.
If a test failure occurs, the test is termi-
nated, cause of the failure determined,
corrective action completed, and the test
restart determined. If the cause of failure
is due to the test setup or to a failure in
the test equipment, the test being con-
ducted at the time of the failure may be
continued after the repairs are completed,
provided the failure does not result in an
overstress test condition. If the cause of
the problem is determined as a failure in
the unit under test, a preliminary failure
analysis and appropriate corrective action
are completed and the test restart deter-
mined. The test in which the failure oc-
curs, and any previous test that could have
induced the failure, or whose validity was
compromised by the corrective action, are
repeated. The amount of retest required
after a test failure will be mutually deter-
mined with the procuring agency.
4.4.2 Element Acceptance Tests
Element acceptance test activities and pro-
cedures are planned to be validated during
certification tests for the Boeing in-plant
activities and for the element tests for
KSC; followed by initial processing of the
elements at KSC. In a typical element flow
acceptance-type functional testing (in
process) is planned to be performed in
progressive stages: after installation and
checkout of system racks; after installation
and checkout of outfitting system racks;
and after installation and interface verifi-
cation of payload accommodations hard-
ware that is furnished by the customer
community for integration into the mod-
ules (this is expected to primarily apply to
the USL Module).
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4.4.3 FSE Acceptance Tests
The ASE acceptance tests are planned to
be conducted with the same production
FSE which was used for qualification test-
ing, except that the qualification LRUs are
replaced with flight LRUs. The tests are
FSE only, that is, not in combination with
the vehicle. The FSE acceptance tests ver-
ify compliance with the requirements of
the FSE product fabrication specification.
4.4.4 Subsystem Acceptance Tests
There are no subsystem acceptance tests
planned at this time for the WP-01 ele-
ments.
4.4.5 Component/ORU Acceptance Tests
Component acceptance testing is con-
ducted using MIL-STD-1540A for guid-
ance by the prime contractor and all
subcontractors. Prior to these standard
tests, each electrical LRU/ORU is sub-
jected to a power-on screening vibration
test in each of six axes. A functional test
is required before and after the screening
vibration test.
4.4.6 Ground Support Equipment
Acceptance Tests
Acceptance tests for all WP-01 element
GSE (before its use with airborne equip-
men0 involve continuity, proof load, inter-
face verification and functional operation.
Operational integrity is sustained through
periodic calibration and inspection. GSE
scheduled for KSC undergoes factory ac-
ceptance testing prior to delivery and after
final installation at KSC.
4.5 Space Station Ground Systems
Verification
4.5.1 Ground Support Equipment
Verification
Testing will be performed for verification
of both electrical and mechanical ground
support equipment. The electrical support
equipment will be built up, integrated, and
tested in the factory testing area. Testing
of the software programs for subsystem
checkout will be conducted to verify that
input signals to the flight hardware are
properly displayed and stored, the output
commands from these signals are gener-
ated, verified, and stored, the peripherals
are properly controlled, the post data proc-
essing functions operate properly and the
ability of the support equipment to gener-
ate, accept, and react to input test scenar-
ios.
The transportation container, module
dolly, and supporting ground handling
equipment will be subjected to a series of
transportation and handling tests which
will provide verification that ground han-
dling environments are less severe than
the corresponding flight environments.
These tests will accomplish the following:
a. Conduct static load qualification
tests.
bo Verify the interface compatibility and
operation of the ground handling
slings, assembly fixtures, and work
stands.
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C.
d.
Develop handling and assembly pro-
cedures which will provide the basis
for handling, servicing, transporta-
tion, and assembly procedures for
launch site operations.
Subject appropriate hardware simula-
tions in their shipping containers
(i.e., modules, racks, etc.), to "over-
the-road" transportation tests. These
tests will use the same transportation
modes as will be used for shipment
to launch site and will be instru-
mented for dynamic environmental
measurements.
4.5.2 Launch Readiness Verification
The operations at the launch site which
provide for servicing and deservicing of
elements and user equipment will also in-
clude verification that systems are launch
ready. The testing to be done while mated
to the STS, prior to launch, will be con-
strained by limitations and reasonableness
of interfaces such as power and fluid sup-
plied and access. Planned launch readi-
ness testing should be minimized to the
extent necessary to validate the general
health of the element.
4.6 Test Planning and Conduct
Boeing uses an established systematic ap-
proach to test planning on major pro-
grams. The customer and all organizations
within the project participate in the test
flow as shown in Figure 4.6-1 This flow
also shows where specification require-
ments and test command media enter the
test process. The flow is typically imple-
mented through the following steps:
1. Development of a coordinated, ap-
proved test plan.
2. Correlations between requirements
and tests through a System Specifica-
tion Verification Traceability Matrix
and Element Specification Verifica-
tion Traceability Matrix deliverable
CEI elements (to be a function of
the VDB).
3. Documentation of coordination and
incremental testing by approved Test
Sequence Documents (a top-level
procedure).
4. Test procedures prepared by the con-
ducting organization and approved by
the Test Readiness Review.
5. Test readiness reviews and post-test
analyses, with customer participation.
.
.
Test operations conducted with close
quality assurance and configuration
control under an approved Quality
Assurance Plan.
Follow Closed-Loop test verification
logic to ensure requirements and
specification compliance.
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5.0 PRODUCT ASSURANCE
This section summarizes the Safety Analy-
sis and the Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis as performed to support the
WP-01 SRR Space Station configuration
assessment of Elements/Subsystems as
identified in SOW.
5.1 Summary of Safety Analysis
Findings
The hazardous conditions identified by the
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) as
presented in DR-11 are recorded on the
worksheets included in this paragraph,
and specific suggestions for hazard control
are provided therein. As noted earlier, the
more lengthy hazard control rationales are
simply referenced on the worksheets and
provided as separate appendices for the
convenience of the reader. Worksheet ele-
ment/subsystem categories are as follows:
a. Common Module
b. ECLSS
c. Fluid Management
d. Manufacturing and Technology Labo-
ratory
e. OMV Accommodations
f. Operations
The PHA identified 18 different hazardous
conditions associated with the Common
Module, 10 concerning the ECLSS, and 1
pertaining to OMV Accommodations. For
the MTL, a total of 29 hazardous condi-
tions concern the introduction and dis-
posal of hazardous materials needed to
conduct experiments. Of the 16 hazardous
conditions identified in the Fluid Manage-
ment PHA, 14 address the same concerns
involving Fluid Management functions that
were addressed in the Common Module,
MTL, and OMV Accommodations PHAs.
One of the concerns unique to Fluid Man-
agement is the local contamination of the
Space Station's external atmosphere. The
other unique Fluid Management concern
deals with external leaks of pressure ves-
sels and pipes and their effect on the Sta-
tion's attitude control system, as does the
hazardous condition identified for OMV
Accommodations. The WP-01 Operations
PHA identified seven generic hazardous
conditions associated with WP-01 assem-
bly operations. Thus, the PHAs identified
a total of 40 unique hazardous conditions
associated with WP-01 elements and sys-
tems, plus their interfaces and assembly
operations.
The hazardous conditions reported in this
document do not reflect any risk assess-
ment; establishment of a qualitative risk
determination is premature when applied
to the conceptual phase of a design. Refer-
ences to probability of debris impact to
the module and the attendant statements
or hazard control adequacy are based on
NASA published data of the debris flux
estimated to be present in 1992. Estimates
of module wall and debris protection bar-
rier thicknesses are based on current test;
however, the test program is not yet com-
plete. Reference to adequacy of the ioniz-
ing protection strategy is based on current
knowledge of ionizing radiation effects on
humans and NASA radiation exposure
limits. These limits are currently being re-
viewed by NASA.
The hazardous conditions have been as-
sessed to determine whether the hazard
control strategy suggested can be imple-
mented within current state-of-the-art
technology. For implementing the postu-
lated hazard control strategies, the follow-
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TABLE 5.0 WORK PACKAGE RESPONSIBILITY ASSESSMENTS
Element/Subsystem
I. Common Module
2. Manufacturing & Tech.
Laboratory
3. Habitation/Station
Operations Module
4. Japanese Experiment
Module (JEM)
5. Experiment Logistics Mod.
6. Columbus Lab Module (ESA)
7. Logistics Elements
B. Airlocks
g. Interconnects
10. Remote Payload Accom.
11. OMV Accommodations
12. Servicing Facility
13. MSC
14. Solar Power Mod.
15. Truss Element
16. Polar Platform
17. Co-orbiting Platform
18. Propulsion Element
wP-ol
X
X
X
X
X
X
Work Package Responsible:
WP-O_[ WP-03 WP-04
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
INT.
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Overall Architecture Responsibility For Distributed Subsystems:
Electrical Power Sys.
Thermal Control System
SSIS
Comm. & Tracking
GN&C
ECLSS
EVAS
Fluid Mgmt.
Man Systems
X
X
X
X
X
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ing areas require research efforts to be
funded by the Space Station Program:
1. Contamination of internal environ-
ment.
2. Toxicity.
3. Microbiological growth within mod-
ule.
4. Airborne microbiological control
method.
5. Leak-proof connectors and leak
monitors.
5. Metal joining other than riveting in
orbit.
7. High expansion ratio nozzles for safe
disposal of gaseous wastes in orbit.
As derivatives of these identified technol-
ogy gaps, certain activities currently
funded by NASA require prompt comple-
tion. These activities are:
I. Promulgation of the maximum allow-
able concentration (MAC) specifica-
tion for long-term Space Station
environmental contamination.
2. Development of a test protocol for
uniform testing of long-term material
outgassing characteristics.
3. Establishment of the allowable exter-
nal contamination level based on
each user-equipment contamination
effect.
Some hazardous conditions are identified
as being the responsibility of all NASA
Centers and international parmers. These
may best be coordinated by the issuance
of Level B standards. Additional analysis
information is included in D483-50073-1,
Space Station Preliminary Safety Analysis
(DR-11), dated June 23, 1986.
5.2 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
results provide information for identifying
single failure points, formulating redun-
dancy strategies, designing caution and
warning systems, defining maintenance re-
quirements, and spares provisioning; and
providing confidence on risk acceptance
decisions. The FMEA activities during the
definition and preliminary design effort
supported the SRR Space Station Configu-
ration and were presented in DR-12.
The FMEAs were performed by BAC-
Huntsville, and subcontractors during defi-
nition and design activities for the manned
and man-tended station.
The initial FMEA effort employs a top-
down approach to evaluate the criticality
of individual functions/subfunctions to
safety and mission.
Specifically the FMEAs start with a func-
tion and trace the effect of the lack of
function; the presence of the function
when not required, and the absence of the
function when required through the de-
sign.
The FMEAs are performed to the subsys-
tem level as defined in the DR-02 Prelimi-
nary Analyses and Design Documents.
Components and/or subsystems below the
subsystem level analyzed are treated as
"Black Boxes" that provide and receive
data, i.e., input and output data to and out
of the "Black Boxes." Mechanical, electro-
mechanical, and electric subsystems are
considered black boxes. However, the
function of the black box is described in
sufficient detail so that the reader can un-
derstand the operation of the entire system
Rev D483-501 t5-2 Sheet 115
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without the need to refer to other docu-
ments. Complete description of the sys-
temand subsystems are provided in the
DR-02 End Item Data Books and are not
duplicated in this document.
The effect of modes of functional failures
(fail open, fail close/short, non-operation,
premature operation, and out of sequence
operation) of mechanisms, subsystems,
systems and control schemes for mecha-
nisms, subsystems, and systems are corre-
lated to higher assemblies until the effect
of the assumed failure on the Space Sta-
tion is identified.
Structural elements, which by definition
are single-failure points (common mod-
ule pressure vessel, secondary structures,
pipes, wires, etc.), are not subject to re-
dundancy screening; however, some of
these elements have been addressed in the
FMEA process to cover failure modes that
could cause loss of crew or stations.
Items classified as criticality 1 and 2 in the
FMEA, automatically generate a corre-
sponding Hazard Report Form. The Haz-
ard Report Form tracks, in addition to
safety issueS, criticality 1 and 2, items
until resolution and/or hazard risk accep-
tance by NASA/MSFC (Level C) and/or
NASA (Level B) is obtained.
The FMEA effort will initially focus on
identified mission and personnel safety
critical systems with speoial attention
given to failure effects at the interfaces of
subsystems to subsystems, subsystem to
systems and work package to work pack-
age.
The systems identified for initial study
are:
- ECLSS including Thermal Control
- Electrical Power Distribution
- Propulsion
- Laboratory Module and External Pay-
loads
- DMS Distribution Control
- OMV and OTV Accommodations
- Mission and Safety Critical Systems
unique to the Logistics Module
Additional systems/subsystems will be
added when it is determined that their
functions have critical influences on
safety, mission or customer access. This
information will guide the establishment
of redundancy requirements within the
system/subsystem or the development of
alternate design strategies.
The initial FMEAs will be converted to a
bottom-up approach when the level of de-
sign detail warrants that conversion. The
bottom-up analyses will focus attention on
the defined ORUs and will, in general, not
go below that level. The results of these
more detailed analyses will further refine
redundancy, maintainability, sparing and
other design selection requirements.
The initial FMEA used a "single thread"
(0-failure tolerant) approach to determine
criticality category. This method of analy-
sis obviously results in all items being
classified as category 1, 2, or 3 (no redun-
dancy). Thus, the criticality categories 1R
and 2R become a design requirement until
such time that the drawings/hardware can
be inspected. An additional note concerns
the capability for the hardware to be:
a. checked or detected during pre-
launch operations or on-orbit,
b. restored on-orbit, and
c. becoming a criticality category 1 dur-
ing periods of removal/replacement.
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Answers to these points will be deter-
mined as the design, logistics, support and
maintenance concepts become finalized.
The completed FMEAs consist of six (6)
volumes which are dated June 23, 1986.
These volumes are:
1. D483-50045-1, Space Station-
Work Package 01 Summary - Pre-
liminary Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis - Volume 1.
2. D483-50045-2, Space Station-
Work Package 01 Propulsion System
Preliminary Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis - Vol 2 (WP-02 responsibil-
ity).
3. D483-50045-3, Space Station-
Work Package 01 OMV and OTV
Accommodations Preliminary Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis - Volume
3.
4. D483-50045-4, Space Station-
Work Package 01 Common Module -
Preliminary Failure Mode and Effect
Analysis - Volume 4.
5. D483-50045-5, Space Station-
Work Package 01 Logistic Module
-FailureMode and Effect Analysis -
Volume 5.
6. D483-50045-6, Space Station -
Work Package 01 Material Technol-
ogy Laboratory Module and External
Payloads Preliminary Failure Mode &
Effect Analysis - Volume 6.
NOTE: The Common Module volume,
D483-50045-4, contains the structures/
mechanisms, ECLSS, Thermal Control,
Communication, Electrical Power, Fluid
Management, and Data Management Sub-
system. Within the Data Management sec-
tion there is a section on application
software.
Each of the six volumes titled according to
the contract top level Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS) is shown in Figure 5.2-1.
Each volume is divided into systems and
subsystems shown in Figures 5.2-2
through 5.2-7. The FMEA Summary vol-
ume summarized the criticality 1 and
criticality 2 failures types. The FMEAs for
each system and subsystem in volumes 2
through 6 are preceded by a summary de-
scription of the system or subsystem ana-
lyzed. Where the system complexity
allows, the FMEA of the system is com-
bined with that of the subsystem.
The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Format was established in a joint meeting
between MSFC SR&QA, Boeing Aero-
space and Martin Marietta. The FMEA
data is accessible to MSFC to read only
either directly or through tapes or disks.
The data is presented in data blocks ar-
ranged to fit a report on 8 x 11 paper -
instead of the traditional FMEA matrix
format. The documentation of the FMEA
is accomplished by using a menu driven
R:BASE Series 5000 Computer routine on
the IBM PC XT. R:BASE is a fully rela-
tional data base management system that
allows comparison, combinations and ma-
nipulations of all or part of any relation
stored in the data base. The routine is ac-
cessible to the data base input system that
resides on the VAX machine and is com-
patible with RIM. Appendix A to this
document contains specific instructions for
conducting the FMEA. Appendix B con-
tains instructions for entering the data
base.
Boeing Aerospace Company document,
schematic, drawing and revision num-
bering system are used to uniquely iden-
tify each FMEA. The FMEA numbering
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system is tied directly to the above men-
tioned systems. The selected MEA num-
bering systems is as follows:
Two numbers are used to identify each
FMEA. The FMEA number is user gener-
ated, broken down by Logistics Support
Analysis Control Number (I.,SACN), sys-
tem, subsystem, assembly and subas-
sembly. Top level LSACN, through
fourth-level are assigned by the Level-B
Logistics Integration Center.
The structure number records the path
that identifies the position of the FMEA
record in the FMEA-tree structure. The
FMEA-tree structure is a level by level
breakdown of parts (or functions) and
their associated components (or subfunc-
tions) until the last known component can
be identified. The path is selected from
menus that exist within the FMEA applica-
tion program. Data entries into the FMEA
process are defined in Table 5.2-I.
5.2.1 Criticality 1 Items
This paragraph contains the items that are
categorized as criticality 1. Single-failure
points are identified in the hatch-track
mechanism, hatch rollers, hatch seals, and
module utility penetrations. All of the
other single-failure points are leakage fail-
ure modes in the ECLSS and MTL outfit-
ting subsystems. Leakage modes can
cause shorting of life-control components
and/or cause electrical shock to the crew
members. The resolution of this failure
mode is:
a. Provide reasonable precaution against
leakage into electrical devices, elec-
trical connections and components
of life-critical components, or those
capable of resulting in crew elec-
trocution.
b. Provide absorbent wraps for connec-
tions made at panel service ports.
e. Minimize plumbing/component leak-
age potential.
1. Use sealed (brazed, etc.) joint in
plumbing; runs.
2. Specify 0.01 ee/b_r, maximum
leakage rate on all fluid compo-
nents.
Preliminary summaries of Criticality 1
items are provided on sheets 155 through
173.
5.2.2 Criticality 2 Items
This paragraph contains the items that are
categorized as criticality 2 with the propul-
sion system excluded. A single thread
analysis was used in developing the pro-
pulsion system FMEAs and does not re-
fleet the redundancy requirements noted
in other volumes.
Preliminary summaries of Criticality 2
items are provided on sheets 174 through
198.
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TABLE 5.2-1 FMEA DESCRIPTION OF ENTRIES
LOCATION
NUMBER
1
LOCATION
TITLE
FMEA NO.
Example: LB15B-13-1.10.1
DATA REQUIRED
The FMEA number is user generated, broken
down by Logistics Support Analysis Control
Number (LSACN), the system, and (if applica-
ble) the assembly, and the subassembly. An
example of the numbering system is shown:
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
DATE
MISSION
PHASE
REVISION
NUMBER
DATE
ELEMENT
SYSTEM
SUBSYSTEM
Record the date of initial FMEA preparation.
Record the point in the Space Station-life
cycle being considered. Each mission phase
checked must be considered while performing
the analysis.
Record the appropriate revision number as
assigned by Product Assurance.
Record date revision is prepared.
Record the major WP-01 element being consid
ered i.e., Common Module, Propulsion, OTV/
OMV, Laboratory, Logistics Module or Ground
Support Equipment.
Record the system within the element being con
sidered, e.g., within the Common Module, the
ECLSS.
Record the subsystem within the system being
considered e.g., within the ECLSS CO2
removal.
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LOCATION
NUMBER
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
TABLE 5.2-1 FMEA DESCRIPTION OF ENTRIES (Cont'd)
DATA REQUIREDLOCATION
TITLE
DRAWING
NUMBER
BLOCK
DIAGRAM
NUMBER
LSACN
NUMBER
ITEM
NUMBER
ITEM
NOMENCLATURE
FUNCTIONAL
DESCRIPTION
FAILURE
MODE
Record the drawing/sketch/layout number
of the subsystem being evaluated.
Record the functional block diagram
number of the subsystem being evaluated.
Logistics will add this number at later
phases of the program as part of the Logistics
Support Analysi process. LSACN (Logistics
Support Analysis Control Number).
Usually entered as 1; each item number
(and those following sequentially),represents a
breakdown of the current system, subsystem, or
assembly level to one level lower only.
Record the technical description of the
item/function in sufficient detail to understand
what item or function is e.g., Valve mixing,
switch, DPDT.
Record the operating characteristics of
the item identified in location 13 and describe
its function within the sub system being
assessed.
Consider each of these five failure
modes in turn. 1) Fail open, 2) Fail short/
closed, 3) Fail to operate, 4) Premature opera
tion and 5) Out of sequence operation. Each
applicable failure mode should be evaluated.
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 150
LOCATION
NUMBER
16
17
TABLE 5.2-1 FMEA DESCR/FHON OF ENTR/ES (Cont'd)
DATA REQUIREDLOCATION
TITLE
CRITICALITY
CATEGORY
FAILURE
CAUSE(s)
Record the appropriate criticality
category based on the following:
Category Definition
1 Could result in loss of Station, Station
element, or flight or ground crew.
2 Could result in loss or suspension of
mission operations capability. For
Ground Support Equipment (GSE),
category 2 is loss of Space Station
subsystem.
3 All others.
1R Redundant hardware elements the
loss of which could result in loss of
flight or ground crew, Station, or Sta-
tion element.
2R Redundant hardware elements the
loss of which could result in loss or
suspension of mission operations
capability.
For additional information see
location description 21
Describe the condition(s)
that could result in the failure mode
(reference location number 15) being
considered. These may include
simple wear-out or breakage, over-
stressing, inadvertent commanding or
lack of command. Sufficient detail
should be provided so that the failure
mechanism can be understood.
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LOCATION
NUMBER
18
19
20
21
22
23
TABLE 5.2-1 FMEA DESCRIFrION OF ENTRIES (Cont'd)
LOCATION
TITLE
FAILURE
EFFECTION
FUNCTION
FAILURE
EFFECT ON
NEXT HIGHER
ASSEMBLY
FAILURE
EFFECT ON
SYSTEM/
ELEMENT
FAILURE
EFFECT ON
MISSION/
CREW
FAILURE
DETECTION
METHODS
DETECTION
TIME
DATA REQUIRED
Describe the effect of the failure on
the function/subsystem discounting any
redundancy or availability from other sources.
Describe the effect(s) of the failure on
the system discounting any redundancy
or function availability from
other sources.
Describe the effect(s) of the failure
on the element discounting any
redundancy or function availability
from other sources.
First, describe the effect(s) of the
failure on the mission/crew discounting
any redundancy or function availability
from other sources. Second, justify the assign
merit of criticality category 1R and 2R in terms
of redundancy, success paths remaining and
function avail ability from other sources. This
information provides the basis for the retention
of 1R and 2R items.
Describe parameters that will indicate
function/item failure and location.
These will be used as inputs to failure monitor-
ing systems including the crew.
Record time interval from failure until
the parameters identified in location 22 will
manifest in themselves, i.e., How long before
the monitoring system or crew knows a failure
has occurred and the failure location.
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LOCATION
NUMBER
24
25
26
27
TABLE 5.2-I FMEA DESCRIPTION OF ENTRIES (Cont'd)
LOCATION DATA REQUIRED
TITLE
TIME TO
REPAIR
REPLACEMENT
LEVEL
REMARKS/
CORRECTIVE
STRUCTURE
NUMBER
Two pieces of data are required. First,
how quickly must the failure be corrected for
reasons of operational criticality. Second, how
long will the corrective action take based on
tasks to be done. These two pieces of data will
initially be based on best engineering judgment
and will be refined as WP-01 and other Space
Station elements definitions mature.
Describe the most logical "break points"
in the subsystem for failure correction, e.g.,
card, module, entire subsystem, etc. The data
combined with other maintainability and logistic
inputs will be used to aid in defining ORUs.
Record any clarifying comments or
assumptions that apply to data at any FM&EA
worksheet location. Additionally, describe the
approach to be used to resolve problems such as
missing data or category 1 or 2 type failures.
The structure number is an FMEA database
System-generated number that records the path
to identify the position of the FMEA tree struc-
ture. The FMEA tree structure is a level-by-
level breakdown of parts (or functions) and their
as sociated components (or subfunctions) until
the last known component can be identified.
The path is selected from menus that exist
within the FMEA appli cation program. The
structure number has a format of numbers
seprated by dots or periods.
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LOCATION
NUMBER
28
TABLE 5.2-I FMEA DESCRIPTION OF ENTRIES (Concluded)
DATA REQUIREDLOCATION
TITLE
INTERNAL
PART
NUMBER
(INTRN N)
The internal part number is an internal
counter within the FMEA application program
that sequentially counts each entry of each
particular FMEA number. It gives number of
the occurrence under the same FMEA number.
The INTRNLPN is used in printing reports, sort-
ing and other internal process only.
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SYSTEM: PRIMARYSTRUCTURE SUSSYSTEH:STRUCTURES/BECHANISBS
F_A No: ST02-1-_ NONEliCLATURE:Seal Hatch CRITICALITY ID: 1
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN //MISSION:
Loss of crew end .issiont depending on Leak rate and Location of hatch.
FAILUREBODE
Fails to function.
FAILURECAUSE
Bechaniczl damagedue to rupture, shockicoilision, deterioration.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TMO/ONEFAULTTOL[RANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIBI_TION RECOM_NOATION)
Replace damagedseal. e_ Per NASAdirection_
criticality category I failure iteu must be 2 - fault tolerant. ,ee
SYSTEM: PRIMARYSTRUCTURE SUBSYSTEB:STRUCTURESIME_HANIS_5
FMEANo: ST06-1-6 NOMENCLATURE:itatcb Track CRITICALITY ID: 1
HAZARDOESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREii i/BIESION:
Could trap cvH depending on hatch location.
FAILUREMOUE
Fail to operate.
FAILURECAUSE
Oe_or#ed track race or damaqed/ja,meO rollers.
NAYLS)OF HAZARD_NTROL: (TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE_COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOBMENDATIDN)
Alternate hatch available _or escape to adjoining module (2 - #null tolerant). Realign track strucLureirepiace _amage_ track
as required. Single failure point in oarlock.
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SYSTEfl:
FMEANo:
PRIMARYSTRUCTURE SUBSYSTEM:STRUCTURES/HECHANISRS
STOY-I-6 NONENCLATURE:RoLlers_ Hatch
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREN /INISSION=
CouLdtrap crew depending on hatch location.
CRITICALITY ID: !
FAILUREXODE
Fail to operate.
FAILURECAUSE
Nechanical dNageldeforlation.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTULERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIBINATION RECOMHENDATION)
Alternate hatch available to escape to adjoining nodule (2 - failt tolerant).
see Per NASAdirection, criticality category l failure itees oust be 2 - fault tolerant. Single faille point.
SYSTEII: ITTLOUTFITTING
FHEANo: LALOF-L3-I. tO
SUBSYSTEm:INTERNALLAB
NOlf.NCLATUREzTubing and Fittings
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREH /IBISSION:
Loss of MTLoperations requiring process fluid.Leakage nail pose hazard to trey.
CRITICALITY IO: i
FAILUREMODE
Internal leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
HechanicaZ snuck, aishandling or abuse.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERHEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOH_NDATION)
Repair/replace danaged component. Use double nailed insulated carrier. * T.o fault tolerance is required.
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SYSTEM: NTL OUTFITTIN6
F_A No. LBI2F-13-%. 10
SUBSYSTEn:INTERNAL_B
NOMENCLATURE:Tubing _d Fittings
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONON S.S./CRE# //MISSION:
Loss of MTL operations requiring process fluid. NULl pose hazard Lo tree.
CRITICALITY IO: 1
FAILUREMODE
Internal Leakage.
FAILORECAUSE
Mechanical shock, mishandling or abuse.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCEtCOUNTERBEASOREORELIMINATIONREC_t_cNOATION)
Could cause fire hazard. Use sealed (brazed joints) in plumbing runs. Specify 0.01 cc/hr eazioum leakage rate on all fluid
components. Use double ,all insulated carrier, e T,o TaulL
tolerance is required.
SYSTEM: MTLOUTFITTING
FMEANo: LBI4E-[]-l.IO
SUBSYSTEN:INTERNALLAB
NOMENCLATURE:Tubing and Fittings
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREW /INISSIDN:
Lose MTL operations needing process Tluid.Internal Leakageposes hazard to crew.
CRITICALITY IO= I
FAILUREMODE
Interna|iExternal leakage
FAILURE CAUSE
Mechanical shock, mishandling or anuse.
WAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/OliEFAULT TOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASURED ELIMINATIONRECOHMENOATION)
Repair/replace damageditem. * Use sealed (brized) joints in plumbing runs. Specify O.OL ccthr maximumleakage rate on aIi
fluid components. * Tie fault tolerance is required.
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SYSTEN: _L OUTFITTING
F_A No: LBL_-I3-1.12
SUBSYSTEH:INTERNALLAB
NO,"_NCLATURE:Storage Tank
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREM I/MISSION:
PnssLble eiectrocutin of cre..Lose functiom of NTL eater processes.
CRITICALITYI9: I
FAILUREMODE
Ezternal leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Hechanical shock;misbandIing or abese.
HAY(S) OF HAZAROCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERHEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECO_HENDATION)
I_nor repiir by crH_otberuise repair/repLace at 90 day res_ppIy (ORU). _se sealed (brazed) joints Ln plumping run.
Specify 0.01 cclhr Hxi_ leakage rate on all fluid components.
fault tolerance is required.
Txn
SYSTEm: HTL OUTFITTIN6 SUBSYSTEM:INTERNALLAB
FREANo: LB131-13-I.12 NOMENCLATURE:Tubings and Fittings CRITICALITY I9: I
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREit /IRISSION:
CouLdbe hazardous to crew. Lose fuecLioo of RTL _ter processes.
FAILURE BODE
External leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Hechanical shock;mishandling or abuse.
WAY(S)OF HAZAROCONTROL:(TWOIDNEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTER_ASUR(ORELIMINATIONRECOMMENORTION]
Repairtreplace damageditem. * Tin fault tolerance is required.
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EYSTF._: MTL OUTFITTIN6
F._EANo: LBLg6-1_-I.13
SUBSYSTEM:INTERNALLAB
NOflENCLATURE:Tank, Uater Supply With Bladder
HAZARODESCRIPTIONONS.S./CRER IIBISSION:
Oependin9 on location, could cause incapacitation oT crN.
CRITICALITYID: I
FAILUREBOOE
Internal/External leakage
FAILURECAUSE
Piece part structural (a/lure.
NAYIS) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE_COUNTERMEASUREO LIBINATION RECOBBENOATION)
Replace detective item. Requires special desiqn zttentiun_ ie._ brazed joints, specify .OL/hr. leak rate criteria.
* Tun Tault tolerance is required.
SYSTEM: NTL OUTFITTIN6 SUBSYSTEM:INTERNALLAB
FMEANo: L32_F-L_-l.6 NOMENCLATURE:PumpPackage AssHbly CRITICALITY [D: i
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN//MISSION:
Incapacitation oT ere. and or damageto BTL nodule.
FAILUREMOOE
Internal/External leakage
FAILURECAUSE
Loss of input.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOMMENOATIDN)
Upon(a/lure detection,turn oft power to puup pzckage_ snitch to redundant pumpiT required. Inspect to see iT the problem is
electrical or eechanical. Look for leaks at the pumpzsseubly. Reeove the pulp pckg Trou uount and disconnect OO's on both
inlet/outlet.Replace u/new unit.* require 2 FT.
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SYSTEM: NTL OUTFITTIN6
FMEANo" LB2Mt-I_-I._
SUBSYSTEM:INTEP._ALLAD
NOMENCLATURE:Rack Nater Flo, Control Valve.
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CRE] /IMISSIONI
Possible multiple experiment shutdom.
CRITICALITY I_: I
FAILUREBOOE
External/internal leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece part structural failure, vibration I high pressure,
WAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERARCEICOUNTERREASUREOR_ININAT[ON RECOM_EI_ATIGN)
,, Detection method continued tt Nater Tlow rate to eacb rack will be deLected. Nater temperature and pressure at inlet and
outlet to each rack uilI be detected. Upon detection,shut off valves upstream and doxnstreu of leak_ resove and replace
pipe. * Two fault tolerance is required
SYSTEM: NTE OUTFITTIk_ SUBSYSTEM:INTERNALLAB
F_A No: LDt70-IZ-I.8 NO_NCLATDRE:Pipe. CRITICALITY I9: i
HAZARDOESCRIPTiONONS.S./CREM /IMISSION:
Oaeage to the station in nodule overpressurization.
FAILUREBODE
Internal External leakage
FAILURECAUSE
Bishandling or abuse.
_AY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(T_O/ONEFAULT TOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIBINATIONRECOMBENOATION)
* Two_auLt tolerance is required, t Use double isolated Nailed carrier. * Specify 0.01 cclhr maximumLeakage rate on all
fluid ¢oeoonents.
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 160
SYSTEM: MTL OUTFITTIN6
FREANo: LBL7E-13-L.8
SUBSYSTEM:INTERNALLAB
NOMENCLATURE:InterTace, BuLkheadFeed Thru
HAZARDOESCRIFTZONONS.S.ICRElt /INISSION:
Cre, must evacuate HTL.
CRITICALITY IO: !
FAILURERODE
External leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Nishandling, abuse, loss oftimproper input.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TdOIONEFAULTTO_LEIblNC[,COUNTERBEAS_EORELIBINATION RECONMENOATION)
, Two_ault tolerance design is required, e Caution and warning systee shall monitor pressure and temperature o_ the vital
area o_ the vacuumvent system, e Need to provide an IIF BTL OMSsystem in order to control user access to the vent svstee.
SYSTEm: _L OUTFITTING SUBSYSTEM:INTERNALLAB
FREANo: LB16E-L3-I.9 NOMENCLATURE:Interface, Rulkhead Feed Thru CRIUCALITY !_: !
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN //MISS[I)N:
Creu must evacuate MTL.
FAILUREMODE
EzternaI Leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Mishandling, abuse_ Loss ofiie_roper input.
_AY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNOIONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNT_P£ASUREORELIMINATION RECDMMENDATION)
* Two_ault tolerance is required, t Caution and warning system shall ionitor pressure and Le_oerature o_ t_e vital ir_i _f
the vacuumvent systes. * Need to provide an ]IF MTL_S systes in order to control user access to the vent system.
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SYSTEn:
FREANo:
ELECTRIC_ POW_ OISII_ISUTION SUBSYS_M: DISTRIBUTION_UIPRE]iT
EPOI-4-Z NOP_NCLATIJRE:Po,er Penetration
HAZARDOE_RIPTION _ S.S.ICREW IIRISSION:
Possible loss of crH due to loss oF c=hin pressure.
CRITICALITYiD: 1
FAILUREMOOE
InternallExternzleakage
FAILU_ CAUSE
Bishandlingor _use and/orpiece-partstructuralFailure.
WAY(S)OF HAZAROCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRE£OMMEWOATIGN)
Primary po,er penetration-ltoduIe depressurization and repressurization with EVA required.
e two Fault tolerance is required.
THERMALCONTROL SUBSYSTEM:H_T _DUISITION BANSPORT-IN_RNAL
TCOIA6-5-I.I NOFENCLATUEE:Accumulator
HAZARODESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREW //MISSION:
Possible crew electrocution_ equipeent shorting.
CRITICALITYID: I
FAILURE MOOE
Fail to operate.
FAILURECAUSE
Internalor external ieaklge.
WAY{S)OFHAZARDCONTROL:(llIO/ORE FAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREORELInINATION RECOM_NDATION)
internal/External-Leakage indication on OMSCRTdisplay. Reolace pumppackage.
,e Two Fault tolerance is required.
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SYSTEH: ECLSS _BSYSTEH" ATMOSPHERECONTROL_ SUPPLY
FHEANo: [C07A-7-2.4.2 NGHENCLATURE:OxygenFlow Control System CRITICALITY I0: L
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONON S.E./CREH //MISSION:
Possible change to degraded level atmosphere of control.
FAILUREflODE
InteroaliE_ternal leakage
FAILURECAUSE
High pressure, part faiIure.
NAY(G} OF HAZARDCONTROL:(THO/ONEFAULTTOLERAHCEtCOUk_ERHEASUREORELININATIDHRECDI'IHEHOAT]ONi
Redundant Installation. • Twofault tolerance is required.
SYSTEH: ECL_S SUDSYSTEH:ATNGSPHEREREVITALIZATION
FHEANo: ECO5-7-3.3.L NOHENCLATURE:DxygenGeneration Systn CRITICALITY iD: I
HAZAP_DESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREH IIH|SSIOH:
Supply of 02 could degrade to hazardous levels resulting in safe haven.
FAILURECAUSE
Part structural failure.
HAY(S} OF HAZARDCONTROL:(THOtoNEFAULTTDLERANCEtCOUNTERHEASUREORELIHIKATIONRECOHHEHGATIOH)
Redundant instaLlatLon.Loss of this system breaks the life support cycle and stops CO2reduction which is oependent on the
hydrogen produced in this step. This stoppage in turn iJmacts the potable ,ater supply. H T,o fault
tolerance is required.
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SYSTEK: ECLSS SUBSYST_: NATERRECOVERY; _NA6EMENT
F_A No: EC156-7-5.1.1 NOMENCLATURE:Plubinq_ Urine Collection CRITICALITY IO: 1
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN //MISSION;
Electrocution, electricz] equipRnt shorting.
FAILURECAUSE
PiKe-part structural faiJore.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOL.F._NCE_COUNTERNEASUREONELIHINATIONRECOMIIENDATIONi
Electrical interrupt bolD, danger level. Repair or replace (aulty components. ** T.o fault
tolerance is required, e Use sealed (brazed) joint in plumbing run. Specify 0.01 cc/hr maximumleakage rate on all Tail
components.
SYSTEM: ECLSS SUBSYSTEM:MATERRECOVERY& MANA6EflENT
FMEANo: ECI_-7-5.I.2 NOIlENCLATURE:vaporative Mater Processing Unit CRITICALITY IO: 1
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN //MISSION:
Electrocution. Electrical equipment shorting.
FAILUREBODE
Leakage.
FAILURE CAUSE
Piece-part structural failure.
NAY(S) OF HAZAROCONTROL:(T_O/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE_COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOMMENOATION)
Electrical interrupt, s.itch to redundant system on other module, repair or replace faulty component.
4, T,o faulL tolerance is required. * Use sealed (brazed) joint in plumbing run. Specify 0.01 cc/hr maximumleaLaqe rate on
all fail components.
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SYSTEH: ECLSS SUBSYSTEM:lATER RECOVERYk BANAGEIF.JIT
F_A No: ECIEK2-7-5.1.3 NOI_iCLATURE: Urine later Ouality _nitor CRITICALITY Ill: I
HAZARDOESCRIPTIONONS.S.latEN //MISSION:
Possible crew poisoning, electrocution_ equipment shorting.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece part structural failure.
lAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNOIONEFAULTTOLF.R_ICE,COUNTER_ASUREORELIMIHATIORRECOfl_ENDATIONI
Switch to redundant next level higher systn, patch or replace faulty cunponent.
* Tun fault tolerance is required. * Use sealed (brazed) joint in plusbing run. Specify O.OL ccihr uuisus leakage rate on
all fail cospununts.
5YST_: ECLSS SUBSYSTEM:lATER RECOVERYL BANA6_ENT
F_A No: EC1804-7o5.2.1 NOIF.ICJ.ATURE:CondensateCollection Tank CRITICALITY ID: I
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREil //MISSION:
Crem electrocution or electrical equipment shorting.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part structural failm'e.
NAY(S) OF HAZAROCONTROL:(TNOIDNEFAULTTOLERANCE,CGUNTERBEASOREELIMINATIORRECOMMENDATION)
Electrical interrupt below danger level.Redundant sysLu in other module takes over. Removeand replace leaking Lank.
H Tmo fault tolerance is required. _ Use sealed (brazed) joint plumbing run. Specify O.OI cc/hr mazinun ]eakaQe rate on all
fail conponent.
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SYST_: ECLSS SUBSYSTER:lATER RECOVERY& MNA_NENT
FMEAlle: ECIRLI-7-5.2.2 NOMENCLATURE:_ltifiltration Unit CRITICALITY ID: I
HAZED DESCR[PTIONONS.S./CREi /IBISSION:
Electrocution of crn. Electrical equipRnt shorting, cabin contamination.
FALLUREMODE
Leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part str_tural failure.
lAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCEtCOUNTERMEASUREO ELJB[NATIONRECOflMENOATION)
S,itch to redundant systee, patch or replace faulty cozponent. _ Twofault tolerance is required.
* Use sealed (brazed) joints in piuibing rues. Specify 0.01 cclhr euil.,, leakage rite on all fail coeponents.
SYSTEH: ECLSS SUBSYSTEH:lATER RECOVERY_ BAI_SEMENT
FHEANo: ECISM2-7-5.2.3 NOMENCLATU_:later Quality Monitor CRITICALITY IO: 1
HAZARDDESCR[PTIONONS.S./CREi //MISSION:
Possible poisoning.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part structural failure.
gAY(S) OF HAZAROCONTROL:(TtOIONE FAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTEAMEASUREO ELIHINATIONRECOHBENDATION)
S.itch to redundant next Level higher systee. Patch or replace faulty cooponent.
T_o fault tolerance is required, t Use sealed (brazed) joint in pLunbing rue. Specify 0.01 cc/hr naxitun ieakage rate on
all fail coaponents.
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SYSTEM:
FMEANo:
ECLSS SUBSYSTER:MATERRECOVERYk I_NAGFJIENT
ECLB06-7-5.2.¢ NOMENCLATURE:Potable mater Storage Tanks
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN IINISSlON:
Electrocution of crn, equipment shorting.
CRITICALITY ID: I
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part structural failure. (plumbing, tankage.)
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(THO/OREFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIRINATIORRECOM_NOATION;
Electrical interrupt beIo, danger level. S,itch to redundant system in other nodule_ repair or replace Taulty component.
• TNo fault tolerance is required.• Use sealed (brazed) joint in plumbing run. Specify 0.01 cclhr maximumleakage rate on
all fail components.
SYSTEM: ECLSS SUOSYSITM:HATERRECOVERY_ flANAG£MENT
FMEANo: ECIOO5-7-5.2.5 NOMENCLATURE:Potable Water Resupply System CRITICALITY ID: 1
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREN //MISSION:
Electrocutionof crew equipment shorting.
FAILURE MODE
Leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
PiKe-part structuralfailure (plumbing, tankage)
WAY(S)OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNOIONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNT_MEA_UREORELIMINATIONRECOMHENOATION)
Electrical interrupt below danger threshold. B_ckup supplied by emergencypotable mater supply. Removeand replace (aulty
component or patch. * Tun fault tolerance is required.* Use sealed (brazed) joints in plumbing run. Specify 0.01
cc/hr maziaum leakage rate on all fail components.
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SYSTE._: ECLSS SUBSYSTEM;WATERRECOVERY_ RARA6E_IENT
Flf.A No: ECIBO-7-5.2.6 NOMENCLATURE:Potab]e ilJtnr Distribution Syston CRITICALITY ID: 1
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREil IIBZSSION:
Electrocution of cre._ equipeent shortinq.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part structural failure.
MAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TiiO/ONEFAULTTOLERATE, COUNTERNEASUREO ELIBINATIONREC_MENOATIOND
Electrical interrupt below danger level. Sxitch to redundant syston in other aodule or bypass faulty component. Repair or
replace lenity cmq_onent, e Tim fault tolerance is required. _se shied (brazed) joint in pluabin 9 run. Specify
0.01 cclhr eaxilue leakage on all fa3L co_onents.
SYSTEN: ECLSS SUBSYSTER:WATERRECOVERYk RAMA6E/_ENT
F_A NO: ECIflS8-7-5.2.7 IIOE_Cl.A11JItE:Oral Hygiene Station CRITICALITY iD: I
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREil IIMISSION:
Electrocution of cree_ electrica! equipment shorting.
FAILUREBODE
Leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part structural failure.
MAY(S) OF HAZ_O CONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTEPdIEASUREO LIMIMATIONRECOBMENDATION]
Electrical interrupt beJol da_ger level. Use unit in other nadule_ repair or replace. Repair fauity equipment.
,e Twofault tolerance is required. • Use sealed (brazed) joints in pluebing run. Specify 0.01 cclhr maxisumLea[age rate on
eli fail conponents.
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ECLSS SUBSYSTE]I:NATE]_RECOVERYk HAHAGEHEN
EC1802-7-$.3.1 NOIENCLATU_: Vaste Collection Tank
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN /INISSION:
Electrocution of trey, electrical equipamnt shorting_ cabin contamination.
CRITICALITY iO: !
FAILUREBOOE
Leakage.
FAILURE CAUSE
Piece-part structural Failure.
NAY(S) OFHAZARDCONTROL:(TNOIONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COLJNTERBEASLIREORELZMIRATIONRECOMMENDATION)
SmUtch to redundant syston in other eeduJe_ repair by patching or replacing Taulty conponent. Electrical interrupt below
danger threshold, e Two _ault tolerance is repuired.e Use sealed (brazed) joints in plumbing run. speciTy
0.01 cc/hr naximm leakage em all T_il co_onents.
SYSTEM: ECLSS _SSYSTEH: MAT_ RECOVERYANDHANASE_NT
FHEA.No: EC18012-7-5._,2 NONENCLATURE:Plumbing, Hygiene Nater. CRITICALITY [O: l
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREii/IHISSION:
Electrocution oT cron, electric equiponnt shorting, cabin contasination.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part structural failure.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTEP_EASUREORELIMINATIONRECOM_NDATZON)
Electrical interrupt helD, danger threshold. S,itch to redundant svstes in oLher nodule, repair by oatching or replacing
_aulty component, e TmoTault tolerance is required. * Use sealed (brazed) joints in plaubing run. _;ecify 0.01
cc/hr eaxieua leakage on all Tail components.
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SYSTEH:
F_A No:
ECI.SS SUBSYSTEM:NATERRECOVERYANGMHA6E_ENT
ECIBLI-7-5.3.3 NOMENCLATURE:BultiTiItration _it
HAZARDDESCRIPT]ONONS.S./CREii //MISSION:
Electrocution_ eIectricaJ equipeent sburting_ cabin contamination.
CRITICALITY IO: 1
FAILURENODE
Leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part structural failure.
NAYIS) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TiiO/ONE FAULTTOLERANCE_COUNTERBEASUREORELIHIHATIONRECORMENDATION)
Electrical interrupt belo, danqer level.
ee T.o fault tolerance is required H.
SYSTEM: ECLSS SUBSYSTEM:WATERRECOVERY_ _NAGEMENT
FMEANo: EC18L2-7-5._.4 NOMENCLATURE:Hygiene Nater Ouality P_nitur CRITICALITY IO: 1
HAZARODESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN IINISSION:
Electrocution of crew, equiplent shorting.
FAILURE MOOE
Leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece part structural Tailure.
NAY(S) OF HAZARUCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOBBENDATIGN)
Electrical interrupt belo, danger level. S.itch to redundant next leyel higher systee, patch or replace faulty coeponent.
* Tuo Tault tolerance is required. * Use sealed (brazed) joints in plumbing run. Specify 0.01 cc/hr aaxi|u| lea_age on ail
fail coeponents.
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ECLSS SIJBSYSTER:NATERRECOVERY_ MNAGEMEMT
EC16OZ-7-5._.5 NOI_NCI._TURE:Hygiene Mater Storage Tanks
HAZAROOESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREM IIHISS[ON:
Electrocution of crew_ equJpi@nt dauge.
CRITICALITY ID: I
FAILUREMOUE
Leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part structural failure [pie#bang.tankage).
NAY(S) OF HAZAROCONTROL:(TWO/OREFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIHINATIONRECORKENOATION)
Electrical interrupt belo, danger threshold. Seitcb to redundant systn in other eodule_ repair or replace Taulty coeponent.
H T,o fault tolerance is required. * Use sealed (brazed) joints in plubing rues. Specify O.Ol cc/hr maxieu leakage rate
on all fail cosponents.
SYSTEm: ECLSS SUBSYSTEM:MATERRECOVERYk NANAGEIIENT
FMEANo: ECISO-7-5.Z.6 NOMENCLATURE:Hygiene later Oistributiun System CRITICALITY ID: 1
HAZARODESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN IIBISSIOR:
Electrocution oT creu, equipunt shortiog.
FAILUREMUOE
Leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part structural failure.
NAY(S) OF HAZAR_CONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECON_NOATION)
_,itch to redundant systu in other module or bypass taulty coeponent. Repair or replace Taulty coeDonent. Electrical
interrupt helo, danger levels. * Two#ault tolerance is required, e Use sealed (brized) joints in plubing runs. Speci÷?
0.01 cclhr eaxi_m leakage rate on all Tail couponeets.
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SYSTEllx ECLSS
FMEANo: ECIOSI-7-5.Z.7 NOMENCLATURE:Shoeor
HAZARODESCRIPTIONONLq./CRE)I //NISSION:
Electrocution of cre,,eLectricaL equipment shorting.
SUBSYSTDI:lATER RECOVERYH IANAGEBENT
CRITICALITY I9: I
FAILUREHODE
Leakage.
FAILIJRECAUSE
Piece-part structural 4ailure.
UAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE0 COUNTERItE_UREORELIHIIATION RECO,_,_F.NDATION)
Electrical interrupt balD1 dangor threshold. Take spongebaths and repair. H Two fault
tolerance is required. * Use sealed (brazed) joints in piubing run. Specify 0.01 _ximu Leakage rate on all fail
coapononts.
SYST_: ECLSS SUBSYSTER:LATERRECOVERYt MALA6ERENT
FREANo: ECLBSS-7-5.3.8 NORENCLATURE:Haedusb CRITICALITY ID: [
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONON S.S./CREN /IBISSION:
Electrocution, electrical equipment sbortin 9.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part structural failure,
_AY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TiiO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTER_ASUREORELIMINATIONRECOMMENDATION)
Use redundant unit and repair. Electrical interrupt below danger level.
_* Two fault tolerance is required, t Use sealed (brazed) joints in piuebinq run. Specify O.O! cclhr eaximuw Leakage on ali
fail coaponents.
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SYSTE]t: ECLSS SURSYSTEll:iiASTEIIANAGEBENT
FlEA No: EClbA-7-6. !. ! NOHENCLATURE:Urinal CRITICALITY ID: L
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREN //RISSION:
Electrocution of cPM, electrical shorting.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part structural failure.
HAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(THO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOHHENDAT]ON)
Clean up leakage_ suitcb to redundant systee_ repair or replace. Electrica! interrupt beIo" danger level. _ T,o TauJt
tolerance is required. * Use sealed (brazedi joints in plulbing run. SpeciTy 0.01 cc/hr eaxieue leakage rate on aii Tail
coaponeuts,
SYST'_: ECLSS SUDSYSTEH:HASTEHAHA6_ENT
F_A No: EC1801-7-6.4.! liOBENCUITUR[:Urine Brine Storage Tank CRITICALITY ID: I
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREH /IHISSION:
Electrocution oT cro"_ electrical equipeent shorting.
FAILURECAUSE
Piece-part structural Tailure.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/OREFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELZB[NATIONRECOHMENDATION)
Repair leak_ electrica3 interrupt be]o. danger level, t Two fault to|erance is required.
(brazed) joints in pluabing run. SpeciTy 0.0! cc/hr Hxinue leakage rate on all Tail conponents.
Use setled
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SYST_:
F_A No:
PRIMARYS11_UCTURE SUBSYSTEJI:STRUCTURES/MECHANIS_
STOI-I-6 NOMENCLATURE:Plate Hatch (Primary Structure)
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREM //MISSION:
Limits mission and imposes repair time on crn.
CRITICALITYI0:2
FAILURE MOOE
Fails to operate.
FAILURECAUSE
Bechanica] damon due to rupture, shockicollision.
NAYiS) OF HAZAROCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,CGUNTERBEASU_OR ELIMINATIONR_ONMENOATION)
Alternate hatch available for escape to adjoining Iodule (1- fault tolerant) Repair structural damageFrom collision or
material rupture. He Primary Structure failure 1-2
fault tolerant _ived in SOW2.1.10.1 ,a
SYSTEM: PRIMARY STRUCTURE SUBSYSTEM:STRUCTURESI_CHANIS_
FBEANo: ST12-I-6 NOMENCLATURE:Shutter 20 Inch Diameter Nindox CRITICALITY iD: 2
HAZAROGESCRiPTIONONS.S./CREW //MISSION:
Restriction of operations.
FAILURE MOOE
Fails to operate.
FAILURECAUSE
Mechanical Failure.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE_CDUNT_ASURE ORELIMINATIONRECOHMENDATION)
Shuttle OMV/OTVdocking may inhibited, and the mission delayed or aOorteo (O-Fault tolerant).
**_ Per NASAdirection, criticality category 2 failure items must be I - FauJt tolerant.
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SYSTEM: PRIHARYSTRUCTURE SUDSYSTEH:STRUCTURES/HECHANISJ_
FNEANo: STL3-1-6 NOMENCLATURE:Mechanisev 20 Inch OiaNtor Shutter CRITICALITY ID: 2
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREH //HISSION:
Restricts operatioo.
FAILURE MODE
Fails tn operate.
FAILURE CAUSE
Hechuica] daage due to shock collision.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE1COUNTERP_ASUREORELIMINATIONREC'_NOATION)
Shuttle, OHVIOTVdocking may he inhibited, tH per NASAdirectinn_ criticality category 2 failure
items must he 1 - fault tolerant, eH
SYSTEM: PRIMARYSTRUCTURE SIJBSYSTEN:STRUCTURESIHECHANIS_
FHEANot ST14-1-6 NOHEHCLATURE:Panel_ Hetenrnid Debris CRITICALITY I_: Z
HAZARGOESCRIPTIONONS.S,iCREH /INISSIONs
Impnses unscheduled maintenance in crem.
FAILBREMODE
Fail to operate.
FAILURECAUSE
Mechanical damageaue to shock collision.
NAY(S) OF HAZAROCONTROL:(TNOIONEFAULTTOLERAlCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIHIHATION RECDHBENOATION)
Reolace damagedpanels. He detection time is immediate upon EVA or Closed Circuit TV (CCTV) t_
e, Per NASAdirection, criticality catsoorY 2 ÷allure items must be I - _ault tolerant. _t,
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PRIMMY STRUCTURE SUBSYSTEH.STRUCTURESIMECHANISNS
ST15-1-6 NOI_NCLATURE:Gauge, Pressure
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONON S.S./CREIi IlflXSSIOR:
Impose unscheduled uintnance on crH.
CRITICALITY iO: 2
FAII.{J_nOOE
Pressure reading error.
FAILURECAUSE
Nchanical duqe due to sheet collision.
NAY(S) OF HAI_O CONTROL:(TIIO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERI_ASUREOR ELIRINATIORREC_BENDATION)
Replace gauge assembly. * One fault tolerance is required.
SYSTEM:
FMEANo:
PRIMARYSTRUCTURE SUBSYSTEM:STRUCTURES/MECHANISMS
STL6-1-6 NOMENCLATURE:Valve, Equalization
HAZAROOESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN //MISSION:
Imposes unscheduled maintenance requirements on creu.
CRITICALITYID: 2
FAILURE MODE
Fail ooen.
Fail closed.
FAILURECAUSE
Defective valve.
Shock/collision.
NAY(S) OF HAZAROCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOMMENOATIONi
Replace valve assembly. _* One fault tolerance is required.
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SYSTEM: - _L _TFITTI_
FM_ No: _IOB-I;3-l.lO
SU.YST_: INTERNALLAB
NOMENCLATURE:Ouic_ Disconnects
HAZARODESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREW IIHISSION:
Reduced MTL operations requiring process fluid.
CRITICALITYIO: 2
FAILURE RODE
Piece-part structural failure.
Fails to open/close.
_ternai leakage.
FAILURE CAUSE
Mishandling or abuse_ mechanical shock.
flishandling or abuse; mechanical shock.
Nishandling or abuse;Mechanical shock.
WAY(S)OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERI_:ASUREORELIMINATION_CORM_OATION)
Replace Ouick disconnect hose. o One fault tolerance is required.
SYS_M: MTL OUfflTTIN6
FM_ No: LBI_-IZ-I.IO
SUBSYSTEM:INTERNALLAB
NOMENCblTUEE:Tubing and Fittings
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREN //MISSION:
Loss oT MTLoperations requiring process (laid.
CRITICALITYID: 2
FAILURENODE
Structural failure.
External leakage.
FAILLE CAUSE
Mechanical shock_ mishandling or abuse.
Mechanical shock_ mishandling or abuse.
WAY(S} OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOMMENDATION}
Repair/replace damagedcomponent. • OneTault tolerance is required.
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GYSTEH" RTL OUTFITTIH6
FHEA No: LDI1C-13-I. 10
SUSSYSTEH:IHTERNALLAB
HOHENCLATURE:Quick Oisconnect
HAZARDOESCRIPTIOHONS.S./CREH IIHISSION:
Reduced HTL operations requiring process fluid.
CRITICALITY IO: 2
FAILUREHODE
Physical binding/jamming.
Fails to open/close.
External leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Hishendling or abuse;eechanical shock.
Hishandling or abuse;mechanical shock.
• shandling or abuse;uchanicaL shock.
HAY(S) OFHAZARDCONTROL:(THOIONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUHTERltEASUREORELIHINATIOHRECOHHEHI}ATION)
Replace Ouick disconnect hose or assembly, a Ont fault tolerance is required.
SYST_: _L OUTFITTI_
F_A He: _lI[-13-1.I0
SUBSYSTEH:INTERNALLAB
NOItENCLATURE:Tubing and Fittings
HAZARDOERCRIPTIOHONS.S./CREH IIHISSIUN:
Loss oT HTL operations requiring process fluid.
CRITICALITYID: 2
FAILURE HODE
Structural failure.
Internal leakage.
External leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Hechanical shock;mishandling or abuse,
HechanicaIshock_ mishandling or abuse.
Hechanscal shock;mishandling or abuse,
HAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(THO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERflEASUREORELIMINATIOHRECDHF£NDATION)
• Damaged. ** _e double mall insulated vail vessel/tubing. * One fault tolerance is required,
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SYSTEN: HTL OUTFITTI_
F_A No: LBI2B-I_-I.%0
SUgSYS_N: INTERNALLAB
NOMENCLATURE:Quick Oisconnect
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREli //MISSION:
Reduced MTL operations requiring process fluid.
CRITICALITYIO: 2
FAILUREHODE
Physical binding/jamming1 fails to open/clnse_ external
FAILURECAUSE
Mishandling or abuse; Nechanica] shock.
WAY(S)OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULT TOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONREC_NDATION)
Rep|ace Ouick disconnect hose. t One fault tolerance is required.
SYSTEM: MTL OUTFITTING
FMEANo: LBL2E-I_-I.IO
SUBSYSTEH:INTERNAL.LAB
NOMENCLATURE:Storage Tank
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREW //MISSION:
Loss of MTLoperations requiring process Fluid.
CRITICALITYI_: 2
FAILUREMODE
Structuralfailure,externa!leakage.
FAILL_E CAUSE
Mechanical Shock; mishandling or abuse
WAY(S) OF HAZARD CONTROL: (TWO/ONEFAULT TOLERANCE,CDUNTERHEASUREOR ELIMINATIONRECOM_ATIONI
Oam_ed tank not repairable in orbit, replace at next logistics cycle. Use do,hie uall insulated carrier vessel.
* One fault tolerance is required.
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SYST_: MTL OUTFITTIN6
FliBI Not _l_-13-1. I0
SUDSYSTEI_:INTERNALLAB
NOflENCLATURE:Tubing and Fittings
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREM /IRISSION:
LHs oT llTL operations requiring process +luid.
CRITICALITY ID: 2
FAILURENODE
Structural Tailure.
External leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Nechanical shock; mishandling or abuse.
Bechanica] shock, mishandling or abuse.
NAY(S) OF HAZED CONTROL:(11lOirE FAULTTOLERANCE,COUNT_ASURE ORELIMINATIONR_DMMENDATIGN}
Double sail insulated carrier. * One Tault tolerance is required.
SYSTEM: MTL OUTFITTING
FMEANo: LBL4D-LZ-I.IO
SU_YSTEM: INTERNALLAB
NUNEJICLAT_: Stor_e Tank
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREil IIMI_ION:
Loss of MTLoperations requiring process Fluid.
CRITICALITYID: 2
FAILU_ BODE
StructuralFailure.
Externalleakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Mechanical shock;mishandling or abuse.
Mechanical shock;mishandling or anuse.
WAY(S}OF HAZAROCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULT TOLERANCE,COUNTERBEASUREO ELIMINATION RECOMMENDATION)
Damagedtank not repairable in orbit; replace at next logistics cycle.
tolerance waived IAN SON2.l.lO.l(In accordance with IAW.)
* One fault
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SYSTEM: NTL OUTFITTIN6
Flea No: LBI4E-13-t. 10
SUDSYSTER:INTERNALLAB
NOIIENCLATURE:Tubing and Fittings
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREIi //MISSION:
Loss of MTL operaLions requiring process fluid.
CRITICALITY IO: 2
FAILUREMODE
SLructural failure.
FAILURECAUSE
_chanicaI shock, mishandling or abuse.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIBINATIONRECOMBENOATION|
Repair/replace dauged itn. * One Tault tolerance is required with uanual
override.
SYSTEH: NTL OUTFITTIN6 SIJBSYS_M:INTERNALLAB
_MEA No: LBISB-l_-I.ZO NOMERCLATURE:Ouick Disconnects CRITICALITY ID: 2
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN 11_ISSION:
Reduced MTL operations requiring process liquid.
FAILURE MODE FAILURE CAUSE
External leakage, external leakage, fails to openlclose. Mishandling or abuse;Mechanical shock.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNOIONEFAULT TOLERANCE,COUNTER_ASUREORELIMINATIONRECOMMENDATION)
Replace quick disconnect hose. * One fault tolerance is required.
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5YSTEII: HTL OUTFITTI;m
FMEA No: LBISF-13-1.10
SUBSYSTEH:INTERNAL LAB
NOMENCLATURE:Tubing and Fittings
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONE.S.ICREN IIIIISSION:
Loss M HTL operations requirinq process fluid.
CRITICALITY ID: 2
FAILURERODE
Structural (a/lure.
Internal/External leakage
FAILURECAUSE
_cbaniczI shock, sishzndling or abuse.
Hechanical shock_ uishandling or abuse.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIHINATIONRECOHRENDATION)
Repair/replace d_ged itu. , One (iult tolerance is required.
SYSTER: NTL OUTFITTING
FMEANo: L@28A-I_-I.11
SUBSYSTEM:INTERNALLAB
NOHENCLATUAE:Application Soft,are
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CRER //MISSION:
Degraded HTL perforu.cn.
CRITICALITYIE: 2
FAILURERODE
Erroneous and/cation, _ails to stzrtistop, erroneous
FAILURECAUSE
Tenperature (hiDh/lo.) , procedural error, loss of iaproper Znout
WAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULT TOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOHMENDATION)
Uplink he, soft,are. * One Tault tolerance is required.
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SYSltM: ffrL OUTFITTIN6
FPrcANo: LBI3H-I3-1.12
SUBSYSTEfl:INT_IL_._B
NOMENCLATURE:Ouick Disconnects
HAZARD_ESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN IIMISSION:
Reduced_TL operations requiring process uater.
CRITICALITY IO: 2
FAILUREBODE
Physical binding/jamming, fails to openiclosev external
FAILURECAUSE
Bechanical shock;mishandling or abuse.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERHEASUREO ELIBI_TION RECOBMENOATION)
Replace Ouick disconnect hose. * One fault tolerate is required.
SYSTEH: HTL OUTFI_IN6
FHEANol LDI_I-LZ-I.12
SUBSYSTEM:INTERNALLAB
NOMENCLATURE:Tubing and Fittings
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREg/IRISSION=
Reduced or eliminated MTL operations requirin 9 process ,ater.
CRITICALITYiO: 2
FAILURE MODE
SkructuraI fail,re.
FAILURECAUSE
Mechanical shock;mishandLing or abuse.
WAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULT TOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOMBENOATION)
Repzirirepiace damageditem. e One fault tolerance is required.
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SYSTEN: MTL OUTFITTI_
FtIEANo: LBL?C-I_-I. 13
SUBSYSTEI'i"INTERNALLAB
NOI_4CLATUR(:Sho.er Enclosure
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./ERBI IIHISSION.
Reeoves safety feature.
CRITICALITY IO: 2
FAILUREHOE FAILURECAUSE
Structural fai|urelPhysicz] bindinDlabuse, Tails to open. Bish_dlinglabese
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE1COUNTERMEASLmEORELININATZONRECOMNENDATiON)
Replace defective item. * I Tault tolerance is required.
SYSTEM: BTL OUTFITTING
F_A No: LSL?O-L_-I.1_
SUBSYSTEM:INTERNALLAB
NOHENCLATURE:Hand HeLdSprayer
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREil /IMISS|ON:
RMoven safety TeaLure.
CRITICALITY ID: 2
FAILURE BODE
InternaL/Externa3 leakage,Tails to open.
FAILURECAUSE
Mishandling/abuse.
NAYiS) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE1 COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATION_ECOMMENOATION)
RepLacedetective itn. * One _ault tolerance is required.
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SYSTEM: ItTL OUTHTTIN6
FI[A No: LBIgE-I_*1.13
SUBSYSTElt:INTERNAL
NOIRNCLATURE:Sas Charge Tank _or Shemer Enclosure
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREN IIIt]SS[ON.
Removessa_ety _eature.
CRITICALITY IO: 2
FAILUREBODE
Fails to supply, internaliezternal Leak.
FAILURECAUSE
flishandlinglabuse.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNFcRIF.ASUREORELIfllI_TION RECOMHERDATIDN)
Replace de{active SLam, *One fault tolerance is required.
SYSTEM: MTLOUTFITTIN6
F_EANo: LBI?6-1_-I.13
SUBSYSTEM:INTERNALLAB
NOMENCLATURE:Tank, later Supply Math Bladder
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREil /INIBSION:
Removessa÷ety feature.
CRITICALITY IN: 2
FAILUREHODE
Fails to supply.
FAILURECAUSE
Mishamdling/abuse.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOMMENDATION)
Replace aefective item. * One fault tolerance is required,
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SYSTEH: IITL OUTFITTING
Flea No: LDLgJ-IZ-I. 1_
SUBSYSTEM:INTERNAL AD
NOPENCLATURE:VacuumAttachment
HAZARD5ESCRIPTIONON S.S./CREW /IHISSION:
Possible contamination of shout area.
CRITICALITY IO: 2
FAILUREBODE
F_L to operates Fail to open.
FAILURECAUSE
Hishzndlinglabuse_ piece-part structural failure.
lAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(THO/GREFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIHINATIONRECOHIIEN1)ATION)
Replace detective item. * One TauLt tolerance is required.
SYSTEH: HTL OUTFITTING
FHEANo: LB2?A-[_-I.L4
SUBSYSTEH:INTERNALLAB
NOHENCLATURE:Teleemerated Robotic Device
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICRE1 IIHISSION:
Possible loss oT meaningTul HTOmission (no crew).
CRITICALITYID: 2
FAILURE BODE FAILURECAUSE
Erratic operations physical binding/jamming, fails out o_ Loss o# proper inputs_ temperature (high/lo=)_ mishandling or
_AY(S) OFHAZARDCONTROL:(THO/ONEFAULT TOLERANCE1COUNTERHEASUREORELIHINATIONRECOHHENOATION)
BTOteleoperated/robotic device's compatible .ith crew. * One fault tolerance is required.
Lime Lo repair - Necks, next orbiter.
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SYSTEH: NTL OUTFITTIN6
FHEANo: LB2_L-I)-I.6
SUBSYSTElt:INTERNALLAI
NO_NCLATURE:Flez Hoses
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREii IIHISSION.
Imposes unscheduled maintenance on crN.
CRITICALITY iO: 2
FAILUREHOOE
Physical bindinq/jaminq.
FAILURECAUSE
Hishandling/abuse.
WAY(S) OF HAZAROCONTROL:(TWOIOIEFAULTTOI.ERARCE,COUNTERHEASUREO ELIHINATIONRECP._I_ATIONI
U_on fault detection_ shut of_ the valves upstream and do,nstreae of the leak.
* One Tault tolerance is required.
5YSTEH: HTL OUTFITTIN6
FHEA No: i.BI7A-L_-I.B
SUBSYSTEM:INTERNALLAB
NOIIENCLATURE:_in Shut _Ff Valve (Electrical)
HAZARDOESCRIPTIONORS.S./CREN I/HISSIOIh
Ouage Lo NTL nodule in overpressurization.
CRITICALITYID: 2
FAILURE BODE
Internal/External Leakage
FAILURECAUS[
Hishandling or abuse_ loss of/improper input.
WAYiS) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERHEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOMHENn_TIGN)
* One _ault tolerance is required.
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SYSTE]I: BTL OUTFITTING
FHEAIio- LJI_-I_-I.9
SIJBSYSTEH:INTERNAl.LAB
NOl_dICLAI1JRE:Masts StorageTank
HAZARDDESCIt[PTIONONS.S.ICREH IIHISSION:
Imposes unscheduled naintenance on crew.
CRITICALITY ID: 2
FAILUREBODE
Internal/External |eakage
FAILURECAUSE
Bishand|in9 or abuse_ piecelpart structural fai]ure.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(I"dOIONEFAULTTOLERANCEtCOUNTERMEASUREO ELIiIINAT[ON RECOIglENDATZON)
On orbit repairablelrepJacsable by out_itting tree. Repair time: EVA - 6 hours_ next resupply.
t One fault tolerance is required.
SYSTEM: ITrL OUTFITTIN6
FMEANo: LBI8J-L_-l.12
SIJSSYSTEB:INTERNALLAB
NOItENCLATURE:Haste Storage Tank
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN IIMISSION:
Restrict experiment operaLions.
CRITICALITY ID: 2
FAILURE BODE
lnternal/_ternal leakage
FAILURE CAUSE
Bishzndling or abuse.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:C_OlONE FAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERBEASUREORELIflINATION RECO_MEHDATIOH)
On orbit repairable/replaceabLe by outfitting crew. * One fault tolerance is required,
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SYSTER:
FltEANo:
ELECTRICALPOWERDISTRIBUTION SUBSYSTEH:HIRE BIJNOLESANDCONNECTORS
EPIO-4-I NOItENCLATURE:Hire Bundles and Connector Equipant
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREll /IHISSION"
The erect on oissiun is dependent upon the pouer users functional criticality
CRITICALITY IO: 2
FAILURE HODE
Shorted.
Open (electrical}.
Leakage (electrical).
FAILURECAUSE
Bishzndling or abuse and/or piece-part Tailure.
Hishandling or abuse and/or piece-part failure.
I_shzndling or abuse and/or piece-part _ailure.
WAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TilO/ONE FAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIRIRATIONRECONHENDATION)
Removefaulty cable and strin 9 a replacement cable. ** One fault tolerance is required.
ELECTRICALPOWERDISTRIDUTION SUSSYSTEH:HIRE BUNDLESANDCONNECTORS
EPll-4-I NOREliCLATURE:Secondary Cable
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREW ilHISSION:
The eHect on hiss/on is dependent upon the power users functional criticality
CRITICALITY ID: 2
FA[LUREHODE
Shorted.
Open (electrical)
FAILURECAUSE
Hishzndling or abuse and/or piece-part Tailure.
Hishandling or abuse and/or piece-part failure,
WAY,S)OF HAZARD CONTROL: {TWO/ONEFAULT TOLERANCE,COUHTERHEASUREOR ELIHIHATIONRECQ_MENOATiON)
Removefaulty cable and string a replacement cable. * One _ault tolerance is required.
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SYSTER:
F_A No:
ELECTRICALPOWEROZSTRIBUTION SUBSYSTEM:NIRE _RJNOL_SANOCONNECTORS
EPI2-4-1 NOMENCLATURE:Load Cable
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREM /InISSION:
The effect on cession is dependent upon the power users functional criticality
CRITICALITY iO: 2
FAILUREMODE
Shorted.
Open (electrical).
Leakage (electrical).
FAILURECAUSE
Bishandling or abuse and/or piece-part failure.
flishandling or abuse andior piece-part failure.
_shindling or abuse and/or piece-part failure.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TMO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERBEASUREO ELIBINATIONREC_NOATIGN)
Reoove faulty cable and string replacenent cable. * One fault tolerance is required.
SYSTEM:
FMEANo:
ELECTRICALPONEROISTRIBUTION SUBSYSTEB:NIRE BUNOLESANDCOiINECTORS
EPI3-4-1 NQIENCLATURE:htter_Cable
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN IIBISS[ON:
The effect on session is dependent upon the power users functiona! criticality
CRITICALITY ID: 2
FAILUREMOOE
Shorted.
Open (electrical).
Leakage (electrical).
FAILURECAUSE
Mishandling or abuse and/or piece-part failure.
Bishandling or abuse and/or piece-part failure.
Nishandling or abuse and/or piece-part ÷a/lure.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOBMEk_ATION)
Reuove faulty cable and string a rep|aceeent cable. * One fault tolerance is required.
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SYSTEM:
FMEANo.
ELECTRICALPOWERDISTRIBUTIOI SUBSYSTEM:MIREBUNDLESANDCOMECTORE
6o[4-4-1 NOMENCLATURE:Lighting Cable
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREli ilNISSION:
The effect on mission is dependent upon the poner users functional criticality
CRITICALITY ID: 2
FAILUREBODE
Leakage (electrical).
FAILURECAUSE
Bishandlin 9 or abuse and/or piece-part failure.
WAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERBEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECUM_NDATION)
Removefaulty cable and string a replaceeent cable. * One fauJt tolerance is required.
ELECTRICALPOM_qOISTRIBUTION SUBSYSTEN:#IRE BUNDLESANDCONNECTORS
EP15-4-1 NOMENCLATURE:Bulkhead Feed Thru
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CRBi //MISSION:
The effect on mission is dependent upon the porter users functional criticality
CRITICALITY10:2
FAILURE MODE
Shorted.
Open telectrical).
Leakage (electrical).
FAILURECAUSE
Mishandling or abuse andior piece-part failure.
Mishandling or abuse andior piece-part failure.
Mishandling or abuse and/or piece-part ÷a/lure.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOMMENDATION)
Removefaulty cable and string a replacement cable. • One fault tolerance is reauired.
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SYSTEH:
FIF.A No"
THERBALCONTROL SU_SYSTEn:HEATACGUISITIOWTRANSPORT-INTERNAL
TCO;A7-5-1.1 NOBENCLATURE:Ouick Disconnect Coupling {Self Sealing]
HAZARDOESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN //NISSION:
Cra discoefort. ;aposes unscheduled uintenance on tree.
CRITICALITY |0:2
FAILUREMODE
F_! to operate.
FAILURECAUSE
Sticking valve, stickinq or .orn coupling eechuniu.
lAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNOIONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTER_ASUREORELININATION RECOBBENDATION)
Requires shutdown of eluent to replace coupling. H One fau|t tolerance required.
SYSTEM:
FREANo:
THERBALCONTROL SUBSYSEM:HEATREJECTION- INTERNAL
TCOIH-5-Z NOIEJtCLATURE:AmmouiaInterface Heat Exchanger
HAZARDOESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREW IIBI_[OIh
Lose experieent, ere1 discnmfert.
CRITICALITYiD: 2
FAILURECAUSE
Corrosion or metal fatigue, eicroesteoroid puncture.
WAY{S}OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,CGUNTERHEASUREORELIMINATIONRECOMMENDATION)
Requires EVA to replace. Requires redundant unit or HI ,ith redundant passages.
H One fault tolerance is required.
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THERMALCONTROL SUSSYSTEN:HEAT REJECTIONEXTERNALE/CHANGERS
TCOZE-5-4.1 NO_NCLATURE:Heat Exchanger
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREt IIHISSZON:
Increase in cabin tezperature.
CRiTiCALITY I_: 2
FAILUREMODE
External leak.
Internal leak.
FAILURECAUSE
Cracked heal exchanger skin, cracked eaniTold.
Cracked fin.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TIO/ONE FAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOMMENOATION)
Smitch to redundant eystee, et One fault tolerance is required.
SYSTEM:
FMEANo:
THERMALCONTROL SUBSYSTEM:HEATREJECTIONEXTERNALEICHAR6ER
TCOZDl)-5-4.3 NOMENCLATURE:Pl,,.bing Asseebly FCA
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREi //MISSION:
CrH discomfort due to loss of temp reg Uncontaminated freon external to module.
CRITICALITY In: 2
FAILURE BODE
Leaks.
FAILURECAUSE
Loose _ittings_ cracked fittings, cracked lines.
WAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERNEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOMMENOATION)
Reolace Tlo. control assHbly and recharoe systen. S,iLch to redunoant loop.
t, One fault tolerance is required.
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SYSTEH:
FlEA Not
THERHALCONTROL SUBSYSTEM:HEATREJECTIONEXTERNALEXCHANGER
TCOZD-5-4.3 NOP_HCLATURE:Single Pass FLuid Disconnect
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN IIHZSSION:
Loss of temperature regulation M cabin.
CRITICALITY IO: 2
FAILURE MODE
Fail to operate.
FAILURECAUSE
Sticking va3ve _roz corrosion, sticking or .orn coupling
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREORELIMINATIONRECOHBENOATION)
RepLace fin. control assembly. S.itcb to redundant f]ou contro] assNbly.
l, One fault tolerance is required.
SYSTEM:
FlEA No:
THERMALCONTROL SUBSYSTEM:HEATRE_ECTIONEITERNALEICHANGER
TCOZAA-5-4.4 NOIF.NCLATURE:Freon 21 Pump
HAZARDOESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN /IHISSION:
Increase in cabin temperature.
CRITICALITY ID: 2
FAILURErODE
External leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Loose seals_ or cracked puep _rom natal fatigue, corrosion.
NAY(S) OFHAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE_COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECOM_NDATION)
5,iLch to redundant system. H One fault tolerance is required.
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SYSTEH.
F_A No:
THERMALCONTROL SUBSYSTEI_:HEATREJECT]ONEZTERNALEICHANSEit
TCO_AB-5-4.4 NOBENCLATURE:Freon 2! AccuuIator
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREN IIHZSSZON:
Increase in cabin tNperature.
CRITICALITY ID: 2
FAILURE HOOE
Ezterna] leakage.
FAILURECAllS[
Loose seals,or cracked accumulator due to metal _atigue,corroston.
NAY(S) OF HAZAROCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE1C_NTERREASUREORELIRINATIONRECOMI,_'dtOATION)
Switch to redundant systn. H One _zult tolerance is required.
SYSTEM:
F_A No:
THERMALCONTROL SUgSYSTEN:HEATREJECTIONEXTERNALEZCHANSER
TCOZAC-5-4.4 NOMENCLATURE:NanifoId Assembly, PumpMounting
HAZAROOESCRIPTIDNONS.S./CREN t/BISSION:
Increase in cabin temperature.
CRITICALITY IO: 2
FAILUREMODE_
Ezterna! leakage.
FAILURECAUSE
Loose seals, cracked manifold.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TWO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE_COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECORP_NOATIGN)
Szitch to redundant system. ** One fault tolerance is required.
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SYST_: ECLSS
F_EA No. ECOLT-7-!. 3. !
SUBSYSTEM:TEMPERATURE,HUMIDITY_ VENTCONTROL
NOtENCLATURE:Refrigerator
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREil IIHISSION:
Limited ere, food supply.
CRIT;CALITY 10:2
FAILURE MODE
Fail Lo operate.
FAILURECAUSE
Pover bus short or open.
NAY(S) OFHAZARDCONTROL:(TWOiONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERBEASUREORELLBINATIONRECOBBENDATION)
Food transfer beL,een units maybe possible, t One Tault tolerance is required.
SYSTEM: ECLSS
FMEANo: ECOIU-7-1.].2 NOMENC_TURE:Freezer
HAZARDDESCR[PTIONONS.S./CREN IIR[SSIONs
Limited crew food supply.
SUBSYSTEM:TEIIPERATLIRE,HLgIIDITY_ VENTCONTROL
CRITICALITY NO: 2
FAILURE BODE
Fail to operate.
FAILURECAUSE
Po,er bus open or short.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TNO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE,CDUNTERREASUREORELIMINATIONRECOMRENDATIDH)
Lieited Toed transfer between units aay be possible. * One _;uLt tolerancz is required.
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SY_TF.H: ET.4.SS
Flea No: EC1_-7-2.3.2
SUBSYSTElt:ATROSPfl_ECONTROl.k _IPPLY
NO_NC_TURE: Liquid and Gaseous OxygenTanks
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONDN S.S./CREil //MISS[OR:
Possible change to degraded level of control.
CRITICALITY ID: 2
FAILURE MODE
External Leakage, restricted floe_ fail open.
Loss of or impartial output.
FAILURECAUSE
High pressure, piece/part failure, inadvertent operation.
Jemued_ electrical faJlure_ hlockage_ part failure_ contuinztLon,
HAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(T'dOIONEFAULTTOLERANCE_COUNTERMEASUREORELIMIMTION REC_BENDATION)
Single tank no redundancy. Loss eliminates backup system for eoduJe air makeup but has no immediate impact on cabin
survival. * One fault tolerance is required.
SYSTEH: ECLSS SUBSYST_: EVA SUPPORT
F_A No: EC11-7-7.1.1 NOIIENC1.ATURE:F.JIUService Assembly CRITICALITY IO: 2
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S.ICREN IIRISSION:
Cancel EVAactivity.
FAILUREMODE
FazL to operate.
Fails to open.
FAILURECAUSE
Loss of poemr.
Valve failed to open.
WAYIS) OF H_ZARDCONTROL:(TgOIONEFAULTTOLERANCE,COUNTERMEASUREORELIBINATION RECOBMENDATION)
Not canabIe of providing oxyqen supply required for delivery to EHO_mirlock and hyperbaric chamber.
, One fault tolerance is required.
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SYSTEN: (CLSS
No, ECI2-7-7.2. I
SUBSYSTEM:EVA SUPPORT
NOMENCLATURE:_qU Service Assembly - N2 Recharge
HAZARDDESCRIPTIONONS.S./CREU llnISSION:
Restriction on EVA range (No propulsion available.)
CRITICALITY ID: 2
FAILUREBODE
Fail to operate.
Fails to open.
FAILURECAUSE
Loss of pont.
Valve fail to open.
NAY(S) OF HAZARDCONTROL:(TUO/ONEFAULTTOLERANCE1COUNTERMEASUREO ELIMINATIONRECONMENDATION)
Not capable of providing nitrogen supply required for delivery to M_I_ as nell as airlock and hyperbaric chamber makeupgas.
_* _re from detection method. Sensor data is also used to detect B_ supply level. *H * One (ault
tolerance is required.
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6.0 CONCEPTUAL DESIGN
The conceptual design discussed in this
section parellels the description of the sta-
tion found in paragraph 2.4.6. A narrative
summary description is found here in.
6.1 Configuration
The Space Station will be a highly capable
multipurpose vehicle located in Low Earth
Orbit (LEO). It is expected to operate year
round for thirty years. The Space Station
is to provide:
- A laboratory in space for conducting sci-
entific research and for developing new
technologies and related commercial prod-
ucts.
- A permanent observatory for both Earth
and stellar viewing.
- A servicing facility where payloads and
spacecraft are resupplied, maintained, up-
graded and repaired.
- A transportation node where payloads
and vehicles are stationed, processed and
then propelled to their destinations.
- An assembly facility where large struc-
tures are assembled and checked out.
- A manufacturing facility where human
resourcefulness and the servicing capabil-
ity of the Station combine to enhance com-
mercial opportunities in space.
- A storage depot where payloads and
parts are kept on orbit for subsequent de-
ployment.
- A staging base for future endeavors in
space.
The Station, shown in Figure 6.1-1, and
-2, will be an inertially balanced structure
in a 28.5 degree, nominal 250 nautical
mile altitude Earth orbit adjusted for at-
mospheric variation. The Station will con-
tain an environmentally controlled
manned core. The core structure will in-
itially accommodate eight crew and will be
located near the Station's center of grav-
ity. The core will consist of six pressurized
modules, two resource interconnects, and
two airlocks as shown in Figure 6.1-3.
The pressurized modules include a U.S.
supplied Habitat Module, a U.S. supplied
Laboratory Module, A Japanese Experi-
ment Module, a Japanese Experiment Lo-
gistics Module, an ESA supplied
Laboratory Module, and a U. S. supplied
Logistics Module. There will also be a
number of unmanned platforms suitable
for scientific and commercial activities.
One or more of these platforms will be
co-orbiting with the manned base. One or
more will be in a polar orbit. The plat-
forms will be tended by an Orbital Maneu-
vering Vehicle (OMV) which will be
ground based and fueled, deployed from
the NSTS orbiter, and accommodated at
the station. Eventually one or more of the
OMV's is expected to be kept at the Space
Station base.
The Space Shuttle Orbiter will be the pri-
mary transportation system for the Space
Station. The Orbiter will initially be used
to carry the various components aloft and
for the assembly and checkout of the Sta-
tion. After the initial assembly, the Orbiter
will transport scientific and commercial
payloads to the Station for processing and
then return the materials made
6.2 Common Module (Core)
Subsystems
The requirements and baseline design
Configuration of the Common Module
subsystems are covered in Sections 3.1
through 3.9 of Boeing Document
D483-50022-2. Rev C (DR-02).
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6.2.1 Structures and Mechanisms
6.2.1.1 Performance Requirements,
General
Total atmospheric leakaqe from each pres-
surized module shall not exceed 0.227 Kg
(0.5 lbs) per day maximum. As a design
goal, leakage shall not exceed 0.045 Kg
(0.1 lb) per day.
Berthing ports and hatches shall be sized
and shaped by Extravehicular Activity
(EVA) requirements, packaging dimen-
sions and hatch thruway limitations. They
shall be no less than 1.27 m (50 inches)
square with 305 mm (12 inch) radius in
the corners.
6.2.1.2 Operational Criteria
a. Service Life Objectives - The Com-
mon Module structural system shall
be designed for a 30 year life,
through periodic inspection, mainte-
nance, replacement of components,
reconfiguration on orbit and refur-
bishment.
(1) Design Approach- The Common
Module structural system will be de-
signed to minimize risk and the com-
bined cost of design, development,
verification test and launch as a pri-
mary objective. Specific steps to be
taken to minimize risk and cost will
include the following:
Design to resist yielding or buckling
at 2.05 times the required static test
loads and avoid the cost of a dedi-
cated test article.
(2) Maximum Weight Launch :
18,595 kg (41,000 lb.)
(3) Maximum landing Weight :
12,78D kg (32,000 lb.)
(4) Abort Landing :
18,595 kg (41,000 lb.)
Environmental Criteria
(1) Natural Environment - The following
natural environmental criteria per
JSC 04400 Vol. XIV and JSC 30000
will be considered in the design of
equipment.
c. Applied Loads Criteria - Applied
loads shall not exceed design limit
loads criteria for the Common Mod-
ule, nor shall they exceed the allow-
able interface loads specified for
integrated shuttle cargo bay and
Space Station configurations.
d. Pressurization - The pressurization
requirements criteria presented here
shall apply to all modules or portions
of modules, compartments and inter-
connection elements to be pressur-
ized and manned on orbit.
(1) Launch and On Orbit - Internal pres-
sures will be maintained at 101.36 +
3.45kPa (14.7 + 0.5 psia) during
launch and delivery to orbit.
e. Structural Dynamics Criteria
(1) Loads - Dynamic loads shall not ex-
ceed design limit loads criteria for
the Common Module, nor shall they
exceed the allowable interface loads
specified for integrated shuttle cargo
bay and Space Station configurations.
be
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(2)
Common Module component dy-
namic characteristics shall be com-
patible with the integrated Space
Station dynamics and shall not con-
tribute to any Space Station instabili-
ties or degradation below required
criteria for controlability, energy
management, and mission perform-
ance.
Dynamic responses (including fre-
quencies, mode shapes, damping,
transmissibility, displacements, ve.
locities, and accelerations) shall not
exceed specified criteria or other ac-
ceptable characteristics for crew effi-
ciency, crew comfort, and system
performance. Responses in the inte-
grated STS transport and Space Sta-
tion configurations shall not exceed
allowable interface envelopes.
Verification - Verification of accept-
able dynamic responses and resultant
loads shall be accomplished by ap-
propriate methods of structural dy-
namic analyses and subsequent test
programs aimed at verifying methods
and measuring response to known
excitations. Both component and in-
tegrated analyses and tests shall be
utilized where feasible to improve
level of confidence. Types of testing
to consider shall include static influ-
ence coefficient tests, Ground Vibra-
tion Test (GVT), acoustic chamber
testing, and shuttle flight testing in
cargo bay configuration. Experiences
of similar shuttle payload verification
programs such as IUS will be utilized
in the development of the Common
Module verification plan.
(3) Success Criteria - The primary
measure of success will be verifica-
tion of analytical predictions of
modes, and responses under lg Earth
atmosphere conditions. Subsequent
test correlations and analysis refine-
ments will be used to verify that re-
sults meet criteria and requirements
specified. Use of test bed programs,
trade studies, and accumulated space
operational experience will be re-
quired to establish appropriate crite-
ria in unproven areas. Extension or
extrapolation to space environment
will be attempted where data and
methods permit. Integrated shuttle
cargo bay loads and responses must
meet ICD 2-19001 Shuttle Orbiter/
Cargo Standard Interface require-
ments.
f. Drive Mechanisms Criteria TBD
g. Structural Temperature Criteria 70°F
h. Electromagnetic Compatability and
Interference Criteria per MIL-STD-
461B.
i. Materials and Processes Criteria per
JSC document 20149, MSFC-
SPEC-522A.
j. Structural Allowable Criteria MSFC
per- HDBK-505A.
6.2.2 Baseline Structural Description
The basic structural concept is an all-
welded pressure shell with internal pay-
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load support structure, using an external
shield and multi-layer insulation for mete-
oroid and debris protection. Structural re-
quirements are listed in Table 6.2.2-I. A
Common Module weight statement is in-
cluded in Table 6.2.2-11.
6.2.2.1 Primary Structure
The pressure shell is a 45 ° waffle stiff-
ened, welded aluminum alloy 2219 struc-
ture with conical bulkheads. The overall
structural arrangement is shown in Figure
6.2.2.1-1.
The shell has a pressure carrying skin
which is .32cm (.125 in) thick. The ribs
are .23cm (.09 in) thick and 2.22cm (.875
in) high. They are optimally space to carry
the appropriate loadings. The shell panels
are rolled before welding into a 90" seg-
ment of the skin. Four of the 90 ° seg-
ments are welded longitudinally to form a
cylindrical section.
Primary rings made from roll forgings are
welded integrally into the pressure shell.
Two of the primary rings form the junc-
tion at the bulkhead-to-shell joint. The
primary rings have external flanges that
provide attachment points for thermal and
meteoroid protection panels and payload
support structure.
Trunnion and keel pin fittings for attach-
ing the module within the orbiter payload
bay are located on primary rings as shown
in Figure 6.2.2.1-1. Designs of the trun-
nion and keelpin assemblies are shown in
Figures 6.2.2.1-2 through 6.2.2.1-4.
The module has two berthing ports, at op-
posite ends on each conical bulkhead.
Each port has an inward opening closure
hatch. The opening is 1.3M (50 inches)
square with 0.3M (12 inches) comer ra-
dius. The berthing ring is shown in Figure
6.2.2.1-5. The hatch design is shown in
Figures 6.2.2.1-6 through 6.2.2.1-8.
The Common Module window, shown in
Figure 6.2.2.1-9, consists of three panes
of glass, attachment rings, and seals. The
outer pane assembly consists of a redun-
dant pane and a pane for meteoroid pro-
tection. An inner assembly consists of the
primary pane.
The window panes will be limited to mini-
mal light degradation oaf 65 percent of the
total range, 400 to 700nm after infrared,
ultraviolet, and antireflection coating. The
sealing material will be RTV 566. The me-
teoroid protection and the redundant pane
assembly will be removed and replaced by
EVA. The primary pane assembly will be
removed and replaced by IVA. Both the
primary and redundant panes will with-
stand the internal pressure loads individu-
ally.
6.2.2.2
tection
Meteoroid/Debris Radiation Pro-
The meteoroid, debris, and radiation pro-
tection subsystem shown in Figure
6.2.2.2-1 combines functional elements of
the thermal protection and structural sub-
systems. The 3.18mm (0.125 in.) pressure
shell, 30 layers of multi-layer insulation,
and 1.Omm (0.04 in.) aluminum shields
protect the cylindrical portions of the mod-
ule from meteoroids, debris, and radia-
tion. The structural design provides a
114.3mm (4.5 in) standoff distance be-
tween the shield and pressure shell.
6.2.2.3 Payload Support Structure
The internal payload support structure,
common for the floor and ceiling, provides
positioning, attachment, and support func-
tion for equipment racks, housekeeping
equipment, utility services, and the sub-
system packages. The floor and ceiling
structure are identical and are composed
of two 90" support beams. These beams
are supported by brackets which are
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TABLE 6.2-I A COMMON MODULE STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS
Factors of safety
A. Design ultimate pressure
1. Shell = 2.67 x max expected operating pressure (MEOP)(15.2)
2. Windows, doors, hatches = 3.00 x MEOP
B. Design yield pressure = 2.20 x MEOP
C. Proof test pressure -- 2.00 x MEOP
II Fracture mechanics criteria
A. Leak before rupture/no leak (fail safe/safe life)
Ill Damage tolerance
A. 95% probability of no shell penetration in 10 years
B. Catastrophic failure at limit load would not occur as a result of the loss of any single
ring or stiffener and adjacent skin
IV Cycles and life
A. 1,000 pressure cycles minimum x factor of 4 on life = 4,000
B. IO-year service life
V Launch loads, abort landing, orbital return, docking loads
VII Stiffness, acoustic response
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TABLE 6.2.2-II COMMON MODULE WEIGHT STATEMENT
CYLINDER LENGTH
8.88 METERS
(29.1 FEET)
ITEM
MASS PER BASELINE MODULE
KG (LB)
0699)PRESSURE SHELL- CYLINDER 1678
PRESSURE SHELL- BULKHEAD (30") 285 (628)
RING FRAMES (4) 539 0188)
KEEL & SIDE TRUNNIONS & SUPPORT 139 (306)
GRAPPLE & SUPPORTS 19 (42)
HATCHES, RINGS & MECHANISM (2) 675 (1488)
WINDOW (3) - (INCL. CLOSEOUT PLATE 306 (675)
52.8" X 42.1")
DEBRIS SHIELD & SUPPORTS 919 (2025)
4 STANDOFF STRUCTURE & CABLETRAYS 1116 (2461)
STABIUTY RING (1) 15 (33)
EQUIPMENT RACKS - GENERAL (15) 1357 (2992)
IVA & EVA HANDRAILS & FOOT RESTRAINT 112 (247)
RIGID BERTHING MECHANISMS (2) 272 (600)
TOTAL 7432 (16384)
Sheet 207Rev D483-50115-2
FIGURE 6.2.2.1-1 COMMON MODULE STRUCTURAL ARRANGEMtENTS
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FIGURE 6.2.2.1-2 TRUNNION AND KEEL PIN ASSEMBL/ES
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FIGURE 6.2.2.1-3 TRUNNION AND KEEL PIN ASSEMBLIES
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 210
• Qe
l _l lI
-- ,
i i,
: _,:
t il _i
c £ : :: ..
(1 0
>.>- I
I
..
I
!
i
!
i?
oo
• • e •
il Ii
•., ee
oe oe
H #
om o •
• • oe
°" _
, _ -- /,',>H,_,I ; ÷ ÷1 "'x
_ l i I --
FIGURE 6.2.2.1-4 TRUNNION AND KEEL PIN ASSEMBLIES
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 211
IB
_=Tx_A- A
Note: See 18 January 1987
DR-02 Submittal for
Reference Layout No.
483-96404
FIGURE 6.2.2.1-5 BERTHING RING
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FIGURE 6.2.2.1-6 HATCH DESIGN
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FIGURE 6.2.2.1-7 ROTARY FEED THROUGH MECHANISM
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FIGURE 6.2.2.1-8 HATCH DESIGN
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FIGUR]E 6.2.2.1-9 COMMON MODULE WINDOW
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FIGtrRE 6.2.2.2-I METEOROID/DEBRIS, RADIATION AND THERMAL
PROTECTION
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attached to the primary pressure shell.
The structure is flexible to accommodate
different payload arrangements. The sup-
port structure is shown in Figure
6.2.2.3-I. The equipment racks will con-
sist of single and double wide (528.4mm)
(20.8 in) and I066.8mm (42.0 in slide
mounted racks that conform to the enve-
lope shown in Figure 6.2.2.3-2. The basic
structure and attach mechanisms will be
common. However, the racks can be tai-
lored using optional add on parts to meet
any specific requirements imposed by the
subsystem or payload being housed. Utili-
ties will be front attached.
Conventional riveted construction with
aluminum alloy 7075-T73 is the baseline,
but composites are in consideration due to
their weight advantage.
6.2.3 Electrical Power Subsystem
6.2.3.1 Power System Design
The Electric Power Distribution System
0EPDS) discussed in the following para-
graphs represents the design synthesized
by Boeing, Martin-Marietta, and Marshall
Space Flight Center.
6.2.3.1.1 General
The concept of a Common Module is to
establish a basic unit that can, by simple
modifications, be configured for all Space
Station activities requiring "shirt sleeve"
environment. This approach fosters sim-
plified maintenance and low life cycle cost
through similarity of layouts and com-
monality of housekeeping and resource
units. Since electric power is one of the
basic resources, commonality and versatil-
ity are primary considerations.
6.2.3.1.2 Primary Power Interface
This discussion considers the interface be-
tween the Common Module (WP-01) and
the Power Generation and Storage System
(WP-04) as all electric power items
mounted on the Space Station structure.
These items are part of and will be con-
trolled by WP-04. All electric power items
mounted on the Common Module are part
of and will be controlled by WP-01. Thus
the transmission lines, main power switch-
ing unit and feeders, all external to the
Common Module are WP-04 responsibili-
ties.
Each Common Module EPDS receives pri-
mary power at two (redundant)
penetrators from the Power Generation
and Storage System. These penetrators are
separated as far apart as practical in order
to minimize the potential that any one ac-
cidental event will damage both sources of
power to the Common Module.
IOC primary power will provide 87.5kW
of 440 volts, single phase, at 20K Hz. As
discussed later, a transformer attached to
the outside of the penetrator will provide
electrical isolation for each Common Mod-
ule and reduce the voltage internal to the
Common Module to 208 V., single phase,
20K Hz.
The transformers, penetrators, and feed-
ers will be protected from overload by re-
mote bus isolators in the Main. Bus
Switching Assembly. The transformers,
penetrators, and feeders shall be isolated
for maintenance by a manually operated
circuit isolator in the Main Bus Switching
Assembly.
The transformers, penetrators, and feed-
ers shall be designed for 50 kW capability.
The quality of the power from the Power
Generation system has not yet been
defined. Voltage regulation and response
to transients is of great concern. Until fur-
ther information is obtained the qualities
of the 20K I-Iz single-Phase source, as in
MIL-STD-7040 will be used.
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6.2.3.1.3 Secondary Power
There are indications that certain users de-
sire power types other than the utility
power of 208V, single phase, 20K Hz. In
general the conversion to the desired
power type is to be included in the user
rack. The converter may be supplied by
the outfitter (NASA) or the user. If there
is sufficient demand for a particular power
type a large convener will be installed
with that power type distributed to a lim-
ited number of racks.
6.2.3.1.4 Safehaven
All electrical loads in the Common Mod-
ule are controlled by the autonomous con-
trol system through circuit breakers and
switches. The autonomous control system
schedules loads in accordance with prede-
termined priorities and available power.
Under safe haven conditions the autono-
mous control system sheds loads in accor-
dance with the predetermined schedule to
meet the available power.
6.2.3.1.5 Safety and Fault Tolerance
The utility power to be distributed in the
Common Module is 208V single phase
20K Hz. This voltage is considered lethal.
As a consequence, the EPDS shall be de-
signed to prevent, to the greatest extent
practical, the exposure of the Space Sta-
tion personnel to the utility voltage. All
utility power receptacles shall be dead
faced and/or interlocked to prevent switch-
ing of power to the receptacle without a
cable/load being attached. Also each re-
ceptacle shall have overload protection
which will automatically disconnect the
power from the receptacle should the cur-
rent exceed a prede- termined safe value.
Each circuit shall also be protected by a
ground fault isolator.
Each subsystem and load shall adhere to
the single point ground guidelines and be
designed to meet the requirements of a
bonding specification of MIL-B-5087B.
Each cabinet containing components of
the EPDS shall be dead-front and dead-
face when opened for maintenance of Or-
bital Replacement Units (ORUs). A means
of disconnect and lock-out to isolate each
circuit for maintenance or repair shall be
provided.
The lock-out method shall provide a read-
ily visible mechanical signal to indicate
that the circuit is isolated and safe to work
on.
Noncritical loads shall be fail-safe/res-
torable. In general this means that in the
event of a failure, such as the loss of
power, the load will not present a hazard
to the Space Station or personnel. A fail-
ure in the power distribution that resulted
in the loss of power to a load shall be res-
torable by replacement of an ORU. If the
load requires a soft shutdown in order to
store toxic materials or prevent a fire it
must supply the soft shutdown capability
or arrange for redundant power connec-
tion for that purpose.
Critical loads shall be fail operational/fail
safe/restorable. In general fail operational
means that in the event of a failure, such
as the loss of power, a redundant power
connection shall be provided to maintain
the function of the critical load. In order to
assure fail safe performance on a second
failure, the specific load, its relationship
to the EPDS and the repair time line shall
dictate the specific approach.
6.2.3.1.6 Grounding
All circuits shall be designed in accor-
dance with the single point ground guide-
lines. All units shall be designed in
accordance with a grounding specification
such as MIL-B-5087B.
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6.2.3.1.7 Uninterrupted Power 6.2.3.1.10 Power Distribution
Power interruptions due to switching shall
not exceed TBD milliseconds. In general
the systems or loads that require uninter-
rupted power shall supply the necessary
stored energy within their system to supply
the power required during switching tran-
sients. Under some circumstances uninter-
rupted power can be obtained by the use
of two AC to DC converters on redundant
lines with diode isolation.
6.2.3.1.8 Depressurization
Experimental data indicates that the co-
rona onset voltage at reduced pressure, is
230V RMS for 60 to 440 Hz and 320 VDC
at 23"C. The voltage in any equipment
that must operate during pressurization or
repressurization of the Common Module
shall have a maximum value of 200V
RMS or 250 VDC.
These voltage limits shall be reduced for
higher frequency and higher temperature.
6.2.3.1.9 Maintenance
All components of the EPDS shall be de-
signed to be Orbital Replaceable Units.
All cables shall have connectors on both
ends so that each end may be discon-
nected and the cable removed and re-
placed. All trays and passage ways
through which the cable is fed shall be de-
signed to permit easy passage of the con-
nectors during cable removal and
replacement.
Switches, circuit breakers and other EPDS
components shall be designed to be read-
ily replaced without requiring disconnec-
tion or connection of individual power
lines. This can be accomplished by the use
of connectors and plug-in units.
Primary Power is supplied to the Common
Module through the two (redundant)
penetrators. An isolation transformer is
mounted outside the module adjacent to
each penetrater. The isolation transformer
may also serve to reduce the voltage as
necessary to prevent corona during
depressurization. The primary distribution
assembly which contains the primary bus
circuit breakers are located adjacent to the
transformers. These circuit breakers con-
trol and protect the power to the port in-
terface and the secondary power
distribution assembly. These circuit break-
ers are rated at 25 kW each. The secon-
dary power distribution assemblies are
located in the same rack as the primary
distribution assemblies. The secondary
power distribution assemblies contain the
switches that control the receptacles.
These switches are rated at 3 kW each and
have overload protection for the circuit
and receptacle. Four receptacle positions
will be possible at each double rack posi-
tion along the walls. While all the recepta-
cle positions are not wired in all the
modules, it will be possible to wire the re-
ceptacles to provide as much as 12 kW to
any double rack position, or redundant
power sources for critical loads.
The secondary distribution assembly also
distributes power to the loads along the
floor and ceiling and provides redundant
power to critical housekeeping loads.
Figure 6.2.3.1.10-1 illustrates the func-
tional block diagram for Common Module
power distribution. Figure 6.2.3.1.10-2 il-
lustrates the power distribution layout.
The EPDS illustrated has an estimated
weight of 489.02 kg.
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6.2.4 Data Management Network
Distribution System (DMNDS)
The Data Management Network Distribu-
tion System (DMNDS) consists of the ele-
ments of the Space Station Data
Management System which are common
to both the Habitat and Laboratory mod-
ules. WP-01 responsibilities include design
of the DMNDS, installation and integra-
tion of DMNDS components, testing and
check out of the DMNDS. The compo-
nents which will make up the DMNDS are
designed by the Data Management Archi-
tectural Center, WP-02.
The DMNDS, when integrated into the
Common Module will provide the follow-
ing services:
1)Crew Workstation Services, 2)Network
Communication Services, 3)Instrumenta-
tion, 4)Data Transport Services, 5)Data
Processing and Storage Services, Data Re-
trieval and Distribution Services 6)Com-
mon Module Subsystem Fault Detection
/Isolation/Repair/ Services, and 7) Com-
mon Module Subsystem Test and Verifica-
tion Services.
The DMNDS will be built from hardware
components available from WP-02; these
components include the following:
Global Core Network - GCN
Star Coupler - SC
Bridge - BR
Module Network - MDB
Standard Data Processor - SDP
Embedded Data Processor - EDB
Local Data Bus - LDB
Multiplexer/DeMu!tiplexer - MDM
Mass Memory Unit - MMU
Fixed Multipurpose Applications
Console - FMPAC
Portable Multipurpose Applications
Console - PMPAC
Gateway
Network Interface Unit
- GW
-NIU
Bus Control Unit
- BCU
Bus Interface Adapter - BIA
6.2.4.1 Baseline Configuration
The Common Module DMNDS will be a
distributed processing environment that
will allow for the fault tolerant manage-
ment of the attached subsystems. The net-
work will be configured in a hierarchical
fashion using multiple layers of networks
to attach the differing layers of proces-
sors. The layers of the DMNDS are de-
scribed in the following sections
(reference Figure 6.2.4.1-1 for a sche-
matic of the DMNDS layout).
6.2.4.1.1 Global Core Network
The GCN will provide the communications
media between the Common Module and
other elements in the habitable section of
the Space Station. The media will be capa-
ble of supporting data rates of at least 300
megabytes per second (Mbps) and will
connect to the elements in the Common
Module via a BR.
There will be one redundant GCN passing
through each Common Module.
6.2.4.1.1.1 Star Coupler
The SC will be a common interface point
for the GCN and any other fiber optic net-
works on the Space Station.
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FIGURE 6.2.4.1-1 DMNDS LAYOUT
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6.2.4.1.1.2 Fiber Optic Cable
The cabling used for the GCN will be fiber
optic in order to handle the high data rates
required while maintaining a low weight
and volume.
6.2.4.1.2 Bridge
The bridge will provide for the transparent
passage of data from the Common Module
to the GCN and the other elements at-
tached to it. Data transfer protocol will not
be changed in the bridge. There will be
one redundant set of BR's in the Common
Module.
6.2.4.1.3 Module Network
The MN will provide a single common me-
dia for all processing elements in the
Common Module such as the SDP and the
EDP. The MN will transfer data using the
same protocol as the SDP to assure com-
monality of services and transparency to
the software. The MN will be capable of
data rates of at least 100 Mbps. There will
be one redundant set of MN's in the Com-
mon Module for housekeeping functions.
6.2.4.1.4 Processing Elements
The processing elements in the Common
Module will provide for the distributed
management of subsystems through a
common programming environment. A
family of processing elements will be
available with varying processing capabili-
ties within the family. All family members
will run the same software, only at differ-
ent speeds. By placing the processing ele-
ments in a distributed environment, tasks
can be broken up to run on multiple proc-
essors concurrently to handle jobs too
large or time consuming for even the larg-
est of the processing family.
These processing elements will be capable
of floating point mathematics, have a
minimum of 1 Mbyte of RAM (expand-
able to at least 16 Mbytes), a 32 bit data/
instruction/address path, and a virtual
memory architecture.
6.2.4.1.4.1 Standard Data Processor (SDP)
The SDP is a family of processing ele-
merits with a processing range of from ap-
proximately 1.0 to 4 MIPS (12 MIPS for
growth to use of AI software) for complex
instructions (i.e., not RISC). These proces-
sors all share a common architecture, in-
struction set, and operating system, and
are constructed from a similar mix of
ORU's common memory boards and com-
munications devices) although processors
of course be different. There will be re-
dundant SDP's in the Common Module for
housekeeping functions.
6.2.4.1.4.2 Embedded Data Processor
(EDP)
The EDP is a low end family member of
the SDP that will allow for its integration
into a subsystem that needs closely cou-
pled processing. The performance of the
EDP will be at least 0.5 MIPS and it will
have at least 0.5 Mbytes of RAM on
board.
6.2.4.1.5 Local Data Bus
The LDB will provide the common com-
munication media between the processing
elements and the MDM's. The transfer
protocol will be a subset of that used in
the higher layers of the networking in the
DMNDS that will be specifically tailored
to handle real-time, burst data. The LDB
will be capable of handling 10 Mbps data
rates. There will be one redundant set of
LDB.s for housekeeping functions within
the Common Module.
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6.2.4.1.6 Multiplexer/DeMultiplexer
The MDM will provide the interconnection
to the subsystems that are monitored and
controlled by the DMNDS. The MDM will
be capable of handling a mix of analog
and discrete/digital signals.
One MDM will be located in each rack
within the Common Module to allow for
management of resources within that rack
(a minimum of 10 data and control
points). The MDM's I/O will be expand-
able to accommodate a much larger num-
ber of data and control points for the
management of any other subsystem or
outfitted hardware within the same rack.
One MDM will be able to access a mix of
subsystems' data, allowing data acquisi-
tion to be managed by location rather than
by subsystem. This feature will reduce the
number of MDM.s required by providing
for a truly distributed processing env-iron-
merit. Additional MDM's may be included
within a rack if data acquisition rates are
needed to be higher than what one MDM
can provide.
Two important features of the installation
of the MDM are the use of a single LDB
for all housekeeping functions (i.e., a truly
distributed environment, not subsystem
specific) and no discrete cabling being run
between racks of equipment except for the
LDB. These features minimizes The num-
ber of connections at the interface plate to
a single connector per bus (i.e., two in the
case of a redundant system) which:
a. Reduces weight and volume require-
ments
b. Simplifies and standardizes the de-
sign of the interface plate
C. Increases the hardware reliability by
reducing the number of physicalinter-
connects within the module.
Note that the requirements to place an
MDM in each rack dictates that the MDM
be a very low power device (there are 44
racks in each Common Module). The ac-
tual number of MDM's required and their
configuration are yet to be determined.
6.2.4.1.7 Mass Memory Unit
The Mass Memory Unit will be a read/
write random access device capable of
storing at least 300 MBytes of volume
shadowed data. This device will connect
via a standard peripheral bus to two SDP's
that will redundantly control the mass
storage requirements of the Common
Module. There will be one MMU per
Common Module for housekeeping func-
tions.
6.2.4.1.8 Fixed MPAC
The FMPAC will provide the user inter-
face to the Common Module DMNDS
processing systems. Services provided by
the FMPAC will include the following:
1)Command entry, Voice synthesis/recog-
nition, 2)Keyboard, 3)Six degrees of free-
dom analog controllers, 4)Status display,
5)Textual history, 6)Graphical history,
7)Hard copy of text and graphics, 8)
Video display w/overlaid computer graph-
ics 9)Crew caution and warning, 10)De-
cated switches/displays, 11) General
purpose keyboard/display and 12) Audio
Terminal Unit.
There will be one FMPAC per Common
Module
6.2.4.1.8.1 Portable MPAC
The PMPAC will provide most of the serv-
ices of the FMPAC, but will be mounted
in a portable housing. Cabling to the
PMPAC will be minimized to a simple
data bus connection and, possibly, power
(internal battery power would be pre-
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ferred). Thermal dissipation will be de-
signed to be radiative, obviating any
requirement for conductive cooling. The
following services will be provided by the
PMPAC: 1)Command entry, 2)Keyboard
Status display, 3)Textual history, 4)
Graphical history, 5)Crew caution and
warning, and 6)General purpose keyboard/
display
There will be one PMPAC per Common
Module; data bus interconnects for the
PMPAC will be strategically located
throughout the module.
6.2.4.1.9 Gateway
The Gateway is an outfitted element which
will be a special interface between the MN
and any outfitted or customer supplied
data processing equipment that does not
conform to the DMNDS data transfer pro-
tocol on the SDP and MDB. The Gateway
will allow full duplex, bidirectional, trans-
parent communications between the outfit-
ted equipment and the Common Module
systems.
6.2.4.1.10 Network Interconnect Devices
The devices described in the following sec-
tion will allow for connection to the differ-
ent data busses on the Space Station.
6.2.4.1.10.1 Network Interface Unit
The NIU will provide a common interface
from the Common Module processing ele-
ments to the SDP, MN, and LDB. There
will be one NIU for each SDP or EDP in
the Common Module.
6.2.4.1.10.2 Bus Control Unit
The BCU will provide specialized serial
and/or parallel data transfer protocols
from a data bus to stand alone hardware
elements in the Common Module. The
BCU is an outfitted element.
6.2.5 AudioNideo Distribution Systems
(AVDS)
6_2.5.1 AVDS Baseline
The AVDS consists of the equipments re-
quired to provide audio and closed circuit
video communications within the Pressur-
ized Module.
6.2.5.1.1 Description
The function of the AVDS is to generate,
display, record, and transfer video data
within the Pressurized Modules and to pre-
sent and receive data through a C&T Inter-
face with the ground and other Space
Station interoperating elements. The
AVDS also generates, records, controls,
routes, and converts audio information
within the Pressurized Modules. External
audio communications will be through a
C&T interface.
6.2.5.1.2 AVDS Elements
The following is a list of ORU candidates
for the AVDS: 1)Audio Bus, Station, 2)
Audio Bus, Log Module, 3)Transceiver,
Crew, 4)Charger, Battery, Transceiver, 5)
Audio UF Unit, 6)Headset, 7)Recorder
Assy, Audio, 8)Speaker Microphone Unit,
9)Wireless Audio Detector, 10)Wireless
Interface Unit, l l)Video Cable Assy, Log
Module, 12)Video Cable Assy, Hab Mod-
ule, 13)Video Cable Assy, Lab Module,
14)Video Cable Assy, Intermodule, 15)
Camera, Body, Internal, 16)Camera, Lens,
Internal, 17)Pan/tilt, Unit Internal, 18)
Camera, Body, Portable, 19)Camera,
Lens, Portable, 20)Monitor, Viewfinder,
21)Attachment Assy., Video Camera,
Portable, 22)Switch Assy., Video, 23)
Sync. and Test Signal Generator, 24)Proc-
essor, Special Effects, and 25) Video Re-
corder.
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6.2.5.1.3 AVDS Configuration
6.2.5.1.3.1 HSO AVDS
The communications systems in the HSO
module consists of an internal audio and
video system. These systems are described
in the following sections.
6.2.5.1.3.1a HSO Audio System
The audio system in the HSO module,
consists of several C&T rack mounted
components which control the audio sys-
tem, and distributed elements in the work-
ing areas of the module.
The C&T rack mounted components are
the audio controller, wireless interface
unit, and audio interface unit. The audio
controller is the interface to the control
and monitoring system which issues com-
mands to the audio system, for such things
as caution and warning messages, and re-
ceives status information about the audio
system. The wireless interface unit is the
wireless portion interface to the end-to-
end audio system. It allows crew members
to communicate via the wireless system to
any part of the station or to the ground.
The audio interface unit is the interface to
the external C&T equipment which allows
crew members in the Habitat Module to
communicate to the ground or to other SS
elements.
The distributed elements of the audio sys-
tem in the Habitat Module are the speaker
microphone, audio recorder, and the crew
transceiver. The speaker microphone, lo-
cated in the bulkheads, crew quarters,
health maintenance facility, wardroom,
galley, and MPAC, is the element by
which crew members access the audio sys-
tem. It consists of a speaker, microphone,
keypad, (to select the various operational
modes) and an operational jack for using a
headset. From the speaker microphone a
crewmember can access any internal sta-
tion location or the ground. The audio re-
corder is located in the Habitat HSO
MPAC and is available via MPAC control
to record two channels of audio communi-
cations upon demand. The crew Trans-
ceiver are used to access the wireless
communications system. From the crew
Transceiver a crew member can access
any internal station location and the
ground.
The elements of the audio system are in-
terconnected by a station audio bus. These
buses run through out the station allowing
intermodule audio communications. The
bus switching unit, located at either end of
the Habitat Module allows the module to
be isolated from the rest of the station in
case of a failure.
6.2.5.1.3.1b HSO Video System
Operation of the video system in the HSO
Module is similar to operation of a broad-
cast studio. At the heart of the system is a
32 x 16 baseband video switch. This
switch operating under control of the Con-
trol and Monitor subsystem establishes
proper interconnection of sources and
sinks. Possible sources in the HSO include
a video camera located at each end of the
module on the endcone, two video record-
ers located in the MPAC, TBD sources
from structure mounted cameras, TBD in-
puts from WP-02 RF links, and 8 sources
from the interconnects (this includes inter-
module baseband sources).
Possible sinks include 2 video monitors
and two video recorders in the MPAC,
TBD outputs to the WP-02 RF links, one
monitor in the galley, and 8 sinks to the
interconnects (this includes intermodule
baseband sinks).
There will also be ten reconfigurable I/O
ports evenly spaced throughout the mod-
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ule. These will be used for portable cam-
eras or monitors at various places
throughout the module.
Cameras will have the capability of gener-
ating a test signal to test the signal charac-
teristics of the path between the camera
and any sink location. There will also be a
test signal generator in the C&T rack used
to test the signal path from the switch out-
puts to the sink devices and to the ground.
A sync. signal will be generated and sent
to each camera to allow mulitscreen dis-
plays as well as limit crosstalk. Special ef-
fects for multiscreen display will be
generated in the C&T rack and looped
back to the video switch for distribution to
the selected sink device. Graphics overlay
of the video will occur in the MPAC.
6.2.5.1.3.2 USL AVDS
The communication systems in the USL
consist of an audio and video system.
These systems are described in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
6.2.5.1.3.2a USL Audio System
The audio system in the USL module con-
sists of several C&T rack mounted compo-
nents which control the audio system, and
distributed elements in the working areas
of the module."
The C&T rack mounted components are
the audio controller, wireless interface
unit, and audio interface unit. The audio
controller is the interface to the control
and monitoring system which issues com-
mands to the audio system, for such things
as caution and warning messages, and re-
ceives status information about the audio
system. The wireless interface unit is the
wireless audio portion interface to the
end-to-end audio system. It allows crew
members to communicate via the wireless
system to any part of the station or to the
ground. The audio interface unit is the in-
terface to the external C&T equipment
which allows crew members in the USL
Module to communicate to the ground or
to other SS elements.
The distributed elements of the audio sys-
tem in the USL Module are the speaker
microphone, audio recorder, and crew
transceivers. The speaker microphone, lo-
cated in the bulkheads, electronic worksta-
tion, and MPAC, is the element by which
crew members access the audio system. It
consists of a speaker, microphone, keypad
(to select the various operational modes)
and an optional jack for using a headset.
From the speaker microphone a crew-
member can access any internal station lo-
cation or the ground. The audio recorder
is located in the USL MPAC and is avail-
able via MPAC control to record two chan-
nels of audio communications upon
demand. The crew transceivers are used to
access the wireless communication sys-
tem. From the crew transceiver crew
member can access any internal station lo-
cation and the ground.
The elements of the audio system are in-
tercormected by a station audio bus. These
buses run through out the station allowing
intermodule audio communications. The
bus switching unit, located at either end of
the USL module allows the module to be
isolated from the rest of the station case
of a failure.
6.2.5.1.3.2b USL Video System
Operation of the video system in the USL
is similar to operation of a broadcast stu-
dio. At the heart of the system is a 32 x 16
baseband video switch. This switch operat-
ing under control of the Control and Moni-
tor subsystem establishes proper
interconnection of sources and sinks. Pos-
sible sources in the USL include a video
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camera located at each end of the module
on the endcone, two video recorders lo-
cated in each MPAC, TBD sources from
structure mounted cameras, TBD inputs
from WP-02 RF links, and 8 sources from
the interconnects (this includes inter-
module baseband sources).
Possible sinks include 2 video monitors
and two video recorders in each MPAC,
TBD outputs to the WP-02 RF links, one
monitor in the Electronics Workbench,
and 8 sinks to the interconnect (this in-
cludes intermodule baseband sinks).
There will also be ten reconfigurable I/O
ports evenly spaced throughout the mod-
ule. These will be used for portable cam-
eras or monitors at various places
throughout the module, as well as experi-
ment support (the current design does not
accommodate high resolution video).
Cameras will have the capability of gener-
ating a test signal to test the signal charac-
teristics of the path between the camera
and any sink location. There will also be a
test signal generator in the C&T rack used
to test the signal path from the switch out-
puts to the send devices and to the ground.
A sync. signal will be generated and sent
to each camera to allow mulitscreen dis-
plays as well as limit crosstalk. Special ef-
fects for multiscreen display will be
generated in the C&T rack and looped
back to the video switch for distribution to
the selected sink device. Graphics overlay
of the video will occur in the MPAC.
6.2.6 Common Module Thermal Control
System (TCS)
6.2.6.1 TCS Configuration
The TCS Configuration is a low-cost,
minimum risk design that meets the re-
quirements. This design was developed
through trade studies and analyses that
considered technology readiness and em-
phasized minimum system complexity and
maximum use of flight-proven hardware
to evolve a minimum-cost design.
The Common Module TCS consists of
three standard elements found in each
module: a subsystem loop, an interconnect
support loop and passive thermal control.
The subsystem TCS consists of a single-
phase, pumped-water loop that absorbs
waste heat from the module interior and
transfers it to the station central heat re-
jection system through external interface
heat exchangers. A portion of the heat is
rejected to both the 35* and 70*F central
thermal utility buses. The subsystem loop
provides coolant to life-critical module
loads such as ECI_S, DMS, EPDS and
avionics air cooling. The thermal transport
capacity of the subsystem internal loop is
25 kW. The TCS includes a subsystem
controller with manual override that auto-
matically maintains coolant and flow and
interfaces with the DMS. A single-phase
water loop satisfies cabin safety and mini-
mum development cost considerations.
Two-fault tolerant (fail-operational/fail-
safe) requirements are satisfied by redun-
dant plumbing/pumping systems. TCS
components are designed for on-orbit
service, replacement, repair and minimum
noise generation. Quick disconnects are
provided at component interfaces to facili-
tate maintenance. The subsystem TCS bs a
closed coolant loop and, during normal
operations, does not require expendable
resupply.
The interconnect and resource node sup-
port loops are also a single-phase,
pumped-water loop that services the logis-
tics module and the airlock. The loop
pump package and controls are located
within these modules. Piping in the inter-
connects connect the pumping station to
the logistics module and airlocks attached
to the interconnect berthing ports. The
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waste heat is tranfered to the station con-
trol heat rejection and transport system via
externally mounted interface heat ex-
chaangers. The transport capability of this
loop is 25kw. All pressurized modules are
wrapped with 30-layer MLI blankets to
thermally decouple the module from ex-
ternal environment changes.
6.2.7 Crew Systems
The following paragraphs summarize
Space Station - Related Crew Systems Re-
quirements.
6.2.7.1 General Requirements: and
Philosophies
Table 6.2.7.1-1 is a list of Crew Station
Design philosophies which the Crew Sys-
tems group is implementing. Philosophies
regarding the design of human interfaces
to Space Station software systems appear
in Table 6.2.7.1-II.
6.2.7.2 .Specific Requirements
The major sources of specific Crew Sys-
tems Requirements are listed below:
a. Human engineering literature -
sources such as original research re-
ports, handbooks, standards and ref-
erence documents. Typical are:
b. NUL-STD-1472
c. MIL-STD-512
d. JSC Ref. Doc 1024
e. "Human Engineering Guide to Equip-
ment Design," VanCott, Kinkade,
U.S. Government Printing Office,
1972.
f. Requirements contracts - Contracts
whose purpose is to generate and
compile Space Station-specific de-
tailed human engineering require-
ments are in progress. The major
contracts of this type are:
(1) Human Productivity (JSC)
(2) Advanced EVA Systems (JSC)
(3) Manned Systems Integration Stan-
dards (MSFC/JSC)
These requirements are communicated to
the design organizations in the form of de-
signer-oriented guidelines, memoranda
and direct consultation with Crew Sys-
tems.
6.2.7.3 Derived Requirements
Most Crew Systems analyses are devoted
to Deriving Requirements in the following
areas some of which are: 1)Work Station
Vision analysis, 2)Crew Activity defini-
tion, 3)Data Entry/display device trades,
4)Anthropometric non-modeling, 5)inter-
nal arrangements, 6)Anthrophometric data
base and 7)crew station anthropometeric
guidelines.
6.3 Environmental Control Life Support
System (ECLSS)
6.3.1 Requirements
6.3.1.1 Functional Requirements
ECLSS functions include atmosphere con-
trol and supply, module temperature and
humidity control, atmosphere revitaliza-
tion, fire detection and suppression, water
recovery and management, waste manage-
ment and EVA support. Figure 6.3.1.1-1
illustrates a functional distribution concept
of the ECLSS for the Space Station. Major
subsystem elements will be located in the
two U.S. Modules. The ECLSS shall
accommodate the phased evolutionary
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TABLE 6.2.7.1-I CREW STATION DESIGN PHILOSOPHIES
• Visual and aural clutter
• Include only controls/displays required by task
• Minimize clutter
• Control/display location
• Co-locate related controls and displays
• Group functions
• Eye Reference Point (ERP)
• Establish a single ERP
• Design controls and displays to be operable from ERP
• Body restraints
• Make body restraints adjustments such that all crew members can locate their eyes
to ERP
• Utilize foot restraints (preferred by astronauts)
• ERP indicator
• Provide means for the crew member to determine when his/her body is located at
ERP Use simple graphics or hardware
• Head/eye rotation
• Locate controls/displays in reach/viewareas
• Locate most critical control/displays in easiest reach/view areas
• Symbology readability/viewability
• State reouirements in terms of angles subtended by symbols
• Control standardization on following areas:
• Shapes
• Sizes
• Coding standardization in following areas:
• Visual
• Tactile
• Shape
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TABLE 6.2.7.1-11 INFORMATION SYSTEM PHILOSOPHIES
• Ensure attention-getting characteristics of annunciations
• Categorize annunciations according to urgency of response
• Avoid overloading crew member with information he doesn't need
• Provide crew member with easy access to information he does need
• Minimize memory items
• Use read/do procedures for less time critical annunciations
• Use memory procedures where fast response is critical
• Use aurals for getting attention
• Use visual annunciation for providing details regarding the annunciation
• Combine aurals, text, control lighting, and dedicated lights in a logical system using
each medium for what it does best regarding human interface.
• Integrate annunciations with simplified procedures
• Provide controlled annunciation cancellation capability
• Minimize number of annunciations
• Keep system quiet, dark
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growth of the Space Station. The ECLSS
shall embody regenerative concepts to
minimize the use of expendables. The fol-
lowing is a brief description of the ECLSS
functions:
a. Atmosphere control and supply. At-
mospheric pressure and composition
control functions shall provide a
method of monitoring and regulating
the partial and total pressure of gas-
ses in the module atmosphere.
Makeup gas for pressurized volume
leakage and airlock losses shall be
provided.
b. Module temperature and humidity
control. The temperature and humid-
ity shall be controlled in each pres-
surized module. These control
systems shall provide ventilation
throughout all areas of the pressur-
ized modules.
c. Atmosphere revitalization. Atmos-
pheric revitalization systems shall re-
generate the module atmosphere, as
necessary, to provide a safe and hab-
itable environment for the crew.
Monitoring and control of odor and
contaminants defined in paragraph
2.2.10.2.2 of Section 3, Rev. A of
JSC 30000 shall be provided.
d. Fire detection and suppression. A
means of fire detection and suppres-
sion shall be included in each mod-
ule, for fires internal to the Space
Station.
e. Water management. The collection,
processing, and dispensing of water
to meet evolving Space Station crew
and experimental needs shall be ac-
commodated. Pretreating of waste
water to prevent chemical breakdown
and microbial growth prior to proc-
essing shall be provided. Post treat-
ment systems and a monitoring
system to ensure proper water qual-
ity shall also be provided to control
and monitor contaminants prior to
water use.
f. Waste management. A means of col-
lection and processing of Space Sta-
tion waste products (e.g., metabolic
waste, food/packing, regenerative
process effluents, hard copy waste,
etc.) for conversion to useful prod-
ucts or return to Earth shall be pro-
vided.
6.3.1.2 Design and Performance Re-
quirements
The design and performance requirements
for the ECLSS are outlined below.
a. Atmosphere control and supply
(1) The Space Station shall provide an
internal environment adequate to
support and maintain crew comfort,
convenience, health and well-being
through all operational phases.
(2) The ECLSS shall have the capability
to accommodate atmospheric leakage
of each module up to 0.23 kg/day
(0.5 Ib/day) with a maximum of 2.3
kg/day (5 lb/day) for the total Space
Station pressurized volume.
(3) The capability shall exist for dump-
ing the atmosphere of a pressurized
module overboard in the event of
contamination or fire within that vol-
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ume. For sizing the ECLSS, a single
repressurization from zero to Ix105
N/M2 (14.7 psia) shall be accommo-
dated for a single module within a
logistics resupply cycle.
b. Temperature and humidity control.
(I) The respirable atmospheric composi-
tion, temperature/humidity variation,
and ventilation levels provided by the
ECLSS shall meet the requirements
in Tables 6.3.1.2-I and 6.3.1.2-II.
(2) Crew members shall be able to se-
lect the module temperature within
specified ranges inside the individual
modules.
(3) The ECLSS shall interface with the
Thermal Control Subsystem (TCS)
for removal of waste heat from the
pressurized modules.
(4) The ECLSS shall provide the capa-
bility to cool avionics equipment via
air cooling flow.
c. Atmosphere revitalization.
(I) Oxygen shall be supplied by a proc-
ess that does not require continuous
resupply from the ground.
(2) A supply of nitrogen shall be avail-
able to provide makeup gasses and
an initial supply for pressurization as
required.
(3) The Space Station shall use a regen-
erative process for CO2 removal and
subsequent processing.
(4) Planned overboard venting of gasses
shall be limited to those gasses that
will not degrade the performance of
either subsystem components ex-
posed to Space or user facilities and
experiments. Gas venting that is per-
mitted shall be minimized, controlled
and nonpropulsive.
d. Fire detection and suppression.
e. Water management.
(1) Potable, hygiene, and waste water
shall be provided.
(2) Drinking water shall be provided by
a closed-loop recovery process.
(3) A recovery process for hygiene
water shall be provided with the fol-
lowing capacity:
Handwash/hygiene wash
Shower
Laundary
Dishwasher
1.8 kg/man/day
3.6 kg/man/day
12.5 kg/man/day
5.4 kg/man/day
(4 lb/man/day)
(8 lb/man/day)
(27.5 lb/man/day)
(12 Ib/man/day)
(4) The ECLSS shall provide potable
and hygiene water at controlled tem-
perature for distribution throughout
the Space Station pressurized areas.
f. Waste management. Waste manage-
ment shall be provided to meet man-
systems requirements and interfaces.
Methods to efficiently process the
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TABLE 6.3.1.2-I RESPIRABLB ATMOSPHERE/WATER REQUIIR_EMENT$
(CUSTOMARY UNITS)
PARAMETER
COz Pardai Pressure
Temperature
Dew Point (2)
Potable Water
Hygiene Water
Wash Water-
Ventilation
Oz Pardal Pressure (4)
Total Pressure (5]
Dilute Gas
_Trace Contaminants (8)
Micro-organisms
UNITS OPERATIONAL
mmHg
deg F
deg F
Ib/man-day
Ib/man-day
Ib/man-day
ft/min
psia
psia
m_rm 3
CFU/m3(63
3.0 max
65-75
40-6O
6.8-8.1
12(3)
28 (3)
15-40
2.83-3.35
14.5-14.9
NZ
TBD
so0 (7)
gO-DAY
DEGRADED
(1)
7.6 max
6O-85
35-70
6.8 (3)
6(3)
14(3)
10-100
Z4-3.4S
14.5-14.9
Nz
TBD
750 (7)
28-DAY
EMERGENCY
12 max
60-90
35-70
6.8 (3)
3 (3)
0
5-200
z3-3:4s
14.5-14.9
NZ
TBD
1000 ('7}
NOTES:
(1) Degraged levels meet "fail operational" criteria
(2) Relative humidity shall be within the range of 25-75 percent
(3) Minimum
(4) In no case shall the O2 partial pressure be below 15.0 N/MZ (2.3 psla) orthe Oz
concentration exceed 23.8 percent of the total pressure at 14.7 psia or 30 percent of the
total pressure at 10.2"
(5) All systems shall be compatible with both 10.2 and 14.7 psia total pressure
(63 CFU - Colony Forming Units
(7) These values reflect a limited base. No widely sanc_Joned standards are available
(8) Based on NHB 8060.18 (J8400003)
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TABLE 6.3.1.2-I[ RESPIRABLE ATMOSPHERE WATER REQ_S (SI UNITS)
PARAMETER
CO 2 Partial Pressure
UNIT_
N/mZ
Tempe._ure
Dew Point (2)
Potable Water
Hygiene Water
Wash Water
Vendladon
qc
"K
kg/man-day
kg/man-day
k_man_ay
m/see
02 Par_al Pressure (4)
Total Pressure (5)
Dilute Gas
Trace Contaminants (8)
Micro-organisms
N/mZ x 10_
N/mZ x.103
me.j'm3
i C_J/m3 (6)
_IOTES:
(1) Oegraged levels meet "fail operational ° criteria
OPEP_TIONAL
90-DAY
DEGRADED
(1)
2E-DAY
EMERGENCY
4100max
291.._297. I
277.6-288.8
3.1-3.7
5.44(2)
12.7 (3)
.076-.203
19.5-23.1
99.9-102.7
NZ
TaD
500 (7)
1013 max
288.8-302.6
273.9-29,e,.3
3.1 (3)
7-72 (3)
6.35 (3)
.05;-.508
16.5-23.7
99.9-107-7
NZ
TaD
750 (7)
1600 max
288.8-305.4
273.9-2°4.3
3.1 (3)
1.36 (3)
0
.025-I.016
15.8-23.7
99.9-102.7
N2
TaD
1000 (7)
(2) Relative humidity shall be within the range 0f25-75 percent
(3) Minimum
(4) In no _=se shall the Oz partial pressure be below 15.0 N/MZ (2.3 psia) or the 02
concentration exce._i 23.8 percent of the total pressure at 14.7 psia or 30 percent of the
total pressure at 10_
(5) All systems _hal! be compatible with both 10_ and 14.7 psia total pressure
(6) _=U - Corony Forming Units
(7) These values reflect a limited base. No widely sanc_oned standards are avaffable
(8) 8as_-=don NHB 8060.18 (J8400003)
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solid wastes into inert products for
easy disposal or processing also shall
be provided. A minimum of two in-
dependent waste collection systems
(for both fecal and urine collection)
shall be provided. These provisions
shall be private and designed to be
easily and conveniently cleaned and
maintained. The systems shall not
contaminate the cabin atmosphere
with waste material, bacteria, toxi-
cants, or noxious odors.
g. Safe haven. The ECLSS shall accom-
modate the safe haven requirements
in Paragraph 2.1.11.2.2 of JSC 30000
Section 3, REV A.
6.3.2 ECLSS Baseline Design
The Environmental Control and Life Sup-
port System (ECLSS) provides life critical
support for the crew and cooling for elec-
trical equipment. The ECLSS is important
to crew comfort, safety and productivity. It
significantly affects power consumption
and logistics.
6.3.2.1 Baseline Configuration
The baseline ECLSS primarily provides
four, four-man ECLSS systems, 2 per
U.S. module, to support a crew of eight
with dual redundancy and safe haven ca-
pability. Most of the ECLSS functions are
provided in all U.S. elements in varying
degrees of completeness/complexity. Ref-
erence Figure 6.3.1.1-1 for the ECLSS
functional distribution. Any man tended
option would require less ECLSS than the
baseline configuration.
6.3.2.2 ECLSS Technical Description
The ECLSS is composed of the subsys-
tems listed below. A working description
of each subsystem is presented in this sec-
tion.
a. Temperature and Humidity Control
(THC) - Air Temperature Control,
Humidity Control, Ventilation, Equip-
ment Air Cooling, Common Module
Services
b* Atmosphere Control and Supply
(ACS) - O2/N2 Pressure Control
Vent and Relief O2/N2 Storage and
Distribution.
c. Atmosphere Revitalization (AR) -
CO2 Removal, CO2 Reduction, 02
Generation, Contamination Control
and Monitoring
d. Fire Detection and Suppression
(FDS)
e. Water Recovery and Management
(WRM) - Urine Processing Hygiene,
Water Processing, Potable Water
Processing, Water Storage and Distri-
bution, Water Thermal Conditioning,
Common Module Water Services
fo Waste Management (WM) - Urine
Collection Return Waste Storage, Fe-
cal Collection and Processing, Trash
Collection and Processing, General
Housekeeping
6.3.2.3 Temperature and Humidity
Control (THC)
The Space Station (SS) THC provides
module temperature and humidity control,
intermodule ventilation, avionics cooling
and module services (refrigerator/freezer,
and freezer). The respirable atmospheric
requirements include operational ranges
for module temperature, dew point, venti-
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lation flow and contamination levels. The
operational parameters along with the air
thermal loads determine the design re-
quirements for the THC subsystem.
The Space Station THC subsystem con-
sists of separate assemblies for each func-
tion for simplifying thermal control and
minimizing off-gassing concerns. All ma-
jor THC components are of conventional
design and the overall system is similar to
that flown on the Orbiter.
6.3.2.3.1 Module Temperature and
Humidity Control
The module THC assembly includes sub-
assemblies for module THC, module ven-
tilation and air distribution ducts. The
module air temperature is regulated by
varying the air supply temperature in re-
sponse to the Module Air Temperature se-
lector settings. Warm moist module air is
drawn in the THC by a fan. A portion of
the entering air is passed through a con-
densing heat exchanger where it is cooled
and partially dried. The water condensed
from the air is removed by water separa-
tors and delivered to the Water Recovery
and Management (WRM) subsystem. The
cooled air is mixed with the remaining
portion of the entering air, that has by-
passed the heat exchanger, and returned
to the module. The module air dew point
and temperature control are interdepend-
ent. The temperature controller adjusts the
air flow through the heat exchanger and
the air bypass loop to maintain the module
temperature at the desired set point and
provide humidity condensate to the water
separator. Temperature and dew point
sensors monitor the input and output air
flow to provide inputs to the temperature
controller for its control functions. The
THC fan package has two axial fans. One
fan operates continuously and the other
provides redundancy. The fan circulates
module air through the heat exchanger
and back into the cabin. A discharge
check valve is provided with each fan to
prevent back flow. Silencers in the air in-
take and discharge ducts reduces fan
noise. The air flow in the ducts is 20 ft/sec
which minimizes air flow noise.
The air/water mixture from the condens-
ing heat exchanger is removed by a slur-
per and sent to a centrifugal water
separator package. This package has two
units. One water separator operates con-
tinuously and the other provides redun-
dancy.
The THC is designed to remove a maxi-
mum of 6500 watts of heat from the mod-
ule air. This includes both module sensible
and latent heat loads. The THC design
dewpoint is 50°F with a latent heat load
peak of 1.6 Kg (3.5 Ibs)/hour.
The water removal capacity of the THC is
a function of the sensible heat removal.
The cooled dry air from the THC heat ex-
changer is supplied through ducts for ven-
tilation of the module and breathing by the
crew. The Air Revitalization System
(ARS) removes 30 SCFM for CO2 re-
moval and exhausts the output of the CO2
removal system into the THC return duct.
The contamination controller receives 4
CFM of this air for removal of airborne
contaminants.
The ventilation flow path is from the ceil-
ing to the floor. This provides a convective
flow around the crew and assures that
loose items "fall" to the floor. Ten ceiling
mounted air diffusers with 7.6 induction
ratios provide thermal velocities of 150 ft/
rain at 59" to give 20 ft/min average in the
module. Two ventilation makeup fans in
the ceiling supplement the THC airflow to
cool the crew and maintain uniform distri-
bution of the air.
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High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA)
filters are located in the 8 THC return
vents to maintain class 100,000 clean air
environment. The combined filter volume
of 5.8 fta was determined by the steady
state bacteria or colony forming unit con-
trol requirements for a crew of 4/module,
paniculate loading on pressure drop and
change out period.
6.3.2.3.2 lntermodule Ventilation
Intermodule ventilation is provided to all
pressurized SS elements to supply the
crew with fresh processed air for breath-
ing regardless of their location with re-
spect to the module ARS and to transport
the CO2 produced by the crew to the oper-
ating ARS. The airflow operates with any
or all hatch doors opened or closed, mod-
ules isolated, or dead ended modules in
place or removed.
The process air flow required for re-
source node to maintain the CO2 partial
pressure to less than 3 mm Hg is 10-20
CFM per crew member. The CO2 air flow
requirements is greater than that for Hu-
midity and O2 concentration control, the
process air flow rate is 140 CFM. This re-
quires a duct size of 4.7 inch diameter at
20 CFM.
Isolation valves are located on both sides
of all hatches to direct air flow and isolate
SS elements when necessary. Process air
from adjacent resource node is fed into
the module THC ventilation return duct
upstream of the THC fan package. This
fan pulls the air from the resource node
and feeds it through the module condens-
ing heat exchanger and ARS into the THC
ventilation supply duct which supplies the
process air to the next resource node. The
head rise for the process air flow is pro-
vided by the THC fan in each module.
6.3.2.3.3 Avionics Cooling
The Avionics cooling assembly includes
subassemblies for avionics cooling and
avionincs air distribution. The Avionics
Cooling Assembly removes heat from the
module equipment racks by supplying cool
air to and removing heated air from each
rack. This assembly also supplies Fire De-
tection Suppression (FDS) air flow to each
powered equipment rack and to each stor-
age rack containing combustible material.
The heated air and FDS air is drawn into
the Avionics Cooling Assembly by a fan
which sends it through a sensible heat ex-
changer and cooled.
The Avionics Cooling subassembly is de-
signed to remove 10.0 Kw of sensible heat
from the module equipment racks. The
airflow provided by the fans through the
heat exchanger to the air distribution sys-
tem is constant. The airflow to each rack
is adjustable to provide the air cooling re-
quired by the equipment in the rack. The
minimum air cooling supplied to any sin-
gle equipment rack (SER) is 1.5 Kw and
3.0 Kw to any double equipment rack
(DER). The minimum airflow to any SER
is 13.5 CFM and 27 CFM to any DER for
FDS.
The air flow distribution divides the mod-
ule into 8 zones of 11 SER (5 1/2 DER)
each. These zones are composed of racks
forward and aft of the module crossover
racks located in the center of each wall.
The maximum cooling to any one zone is
5.0 Kw. The 8 zones are further divided
into 2 sides of 4 zones each. The four
zones in each side are in parallel and the 2
sides are in parallel, the maximum power
available to any one side is 7.0 Kw.
The air flow to an individual rack is ad-
justed automatically by air flow valves in
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each rack. The Data Management System
(DMS) senses the power being supplied to
the rack and sends this data to the ECLSS
Standard Data Processor (SDP). the SDP
calculates the required air flow rate, con-
trol valves area and valve position. The
SDP then sends a signal through the DMS
to the valve actuator to drive to the calcu-
lated position. Using the rack power infor-
mation rather than the rack exit
temperature prevents control loop oscilla-
tions.
The equipment and storage racks to be air
cooled are enclosed to maintain the con-
cept for separate module THC and avion-
ics cooling environments. There will be
some air interchange between the two en-
vironments over the life of the station.
Contamination from off-gassing and
smoke will be controlled by the contami-
nation controller and HEPA filters.
6.3.2.3.4 Refrigerator/freezer, freezer
The galley is required to provide refriger-
ated and frozen food storage to supply
food for 8 crew members for 14 days. The
logistics module requires 31 ft3 of refrig-
erated food and 63 ft3 of frozen food for
each resupply interval of 90 days for a
crew of eight. These requirements coupled
with varying resupply intervals, crew sizes
and Space Station growth scenarios deter-
mines the optimum packaging of a refrig-
erator/freezer to be in a single equipment
rack (SER) with a freezer volume of 10 ft3
and refrigerator volume of 15.6 ft3. The
freezer is also in a SER with an internal
volume of 25.6 ft3. The IOC prime con-
figuration has one refrigerator/freezer in
the HAB and two in the Logistics module.
The vapor compression technology is the
selected concept for the refrigerator/
freezer and freezer. The design is based
upon proven technology and is the most
efficient system to operate. The design in-
corporates double containment of the
freon loop to prevent leakage into the at-
mosphere. Liquid to liquid heat exchang-
ers will remove heat from the units. Each
unit (rack) is supplied with avionics cool-
ing air, fire detection and suppression ca-
pability, data management system and
power interfaces and instrumentation for
control and monitoring.
6.3.2.4 Instrumentation Requirements
A sensor list for ECLSS has been pre-
pared using the IOC Prime configuration
based on preliminary requirements for
control and monitoring. Table 6.3.2.4-I,
lists the major ECLS subsystems and their
distribution in each module. The data for
the summary was obtained from mechani-
cal schematics and equipment lists sup-
plied by manufacturers of ECI_S
subsystems.
Data contained in these Tables will change
as the EC_S configuration and equip-
ment selection change. This preliminary
information points to the magnitude and
complexity of the control, monitoring and
fault isolation requirements of the ECLSS.
The sensors and subsystems for control/
monitoring the ECLSS shall be selected
from commonality items where possible to
minimize the qualification of components
and reduce inventory. Other sensors and
subsystems will be selected based upon
the measuring application, performance
requirements, reliability, maintainability,
safety and cost.
Sensors in mission critical subsystem shall
be designed such that no single failure
shall cause the loss of a redundant path.
The control/monitor instrumentation sys-
tems will be designed for automatic proc-
ess and control and shall provide
monitoring and control functions; subsys-
tems mode transition; fault diagnostics
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including fault prediction, fault detection,
fault isolation, fault correction and fault
correction instructions.
6.3.2.5 Sizing for Normal and Safe
Haven Operation
The distributed components of the Com-
mon Module atmosphere management
subsystem are designed for a normal
four-person loading and can accommo-
date overloads resulting from crew con-
centration in a particular area or local
high activity levels. Inequalities in load be-
tween modules are smoothed out by
forced intermodular ventilation. The tem-
porary loss of a unit is not significant be-
cause the distributed configuration is
inherently redundant and most units can
exceed nominal performance for short pe-
riods.
The hygiene water management subsystem
is sized for four persons in each Habitat
Module but can accommodate eight crew
members with more frequent filter
change. Intermodule lines between module
storage tanks permit usage of all stored
water from a single module. The potable
water management subsystem is sized for
four persons in each module but can ac-
commodate eight crew members. Inter-
module lines permit usage of stored water
from other modules. The waste manage-
ment system in each Module is sized for
four crew members but can accommodate
all eight crew members with more fre-
quent changeout to waste storage.
For safe haven or temporary contamina-
tion conditions, the ECLSS readily accom-
modates eight crew members within one
habitable module if the two becomes unin-
habitable. Furthermore, the stored oxygen
and potable water supply of the one rood-
ule meet safe haven requirements if power
for 02 generation or water processing is
limited.
6.3.2.6 Man-Tended Option
The man-tended ECLSS provides the fol-
lowing services:
a. 02/N2 supply and control
b. Ventilation
e. Temperature and humidity control
d. C02 removal and storage
e. Trace contamination control
f. Oxygen generation
g. Trash collection
h, Avionics cooling
i. Fire detection and suppression
j. MMU N2 compressor
No food, water, waste management or
safe haven capabilities are provided since
all of these services are provided by the
shuttle.
6.3.2.7 Major Analyses and Trades
All process and component trades and
analyses are supported by additional data
from subcontractors in ECLSS. Hamilton
Standard, Garrett-Air Research, and Life
Systems have Statements of Work encom-
passing evaluation of virtually the entire
ECLSS. Other subcontractors will provide
support in specific ECLSS areas.
The Boeing Parametric Cost Model (PCM)
is used to compare life cycle costs for al-
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ternative technologies
trade studies.
6.3.2.8 Automation
compared in the
6.3.2.8.1 Partitioning of Man/Machine
Roles
ECLS subsystems have already evolved to
configurations which are highly automated
and which require a minimum of crew in-
volvement.
The "machine" performed functions are
more properly defined as "automatic"
rather than "robotic" in that they consist
primarily of the sequential/adaptive actua-
tion of electrical devices such as valves,
fans, pumps, heaters, etc. based on condi-
tion monitoring by status sensors and in
response to controller/driver signals. Sin-
gle (non repetitive) crew involvement at
the initialization of subsystem operation
(Or related/integrated group of subsys-
tems) is considered to be within the defini-
tion of automatic.
Man involvement (Column B) exists under
two separate headings: those in which
man is an integral part of the function and
which are unlikely to ever change signifi-
cantly, e.g., hygiene functions; and those
such as filter changes, tankage replace-
ment, which are infrequent and which
might be further automated (or robotized)
based on weighing factors in further
trades.
6.3.2.8.2 Technology Availability
The "automation", as described above, is
fully supported by presently available
equipment. Although there may be im-
provements over time in the efficiency/re-
liability of sensors and actuators and in
the capacity/size of microprocessors, there
are no manual tasks attributable to limita-
tions in automation technology. Robotics
technology has not been assessed at this
stage in system definition although
manned tasks which have been acceptable
in laboratory prototype equipment or short
term flight programs (Shuttle) will be con-
sidered further based on such factors as:
o contamination/safety risks
o task/skill/cost factors, man vs. ma-
chine
6.3.2.8.3 Artificial Intelligence/Expert
Systems
This terminology is viewed as an advance-
ment in the degree of inter-package and
overall system control integration. The
ECLSS functions are not dependent on
such advancement for fundamental opera-
tion. Advancement in the degree of cen-
tralized monitoring/control is viewed more
as further reducing the already minimal
crew load rather than in increasing system
performance efficiency.
6.3.2.8.4 Technical Content and
Performance Capabilities
The initial approach to subsystem control
automation described above will require
individual preprogrammed microproces-
sors at each subsystem or small groupings
on integrated/interacting subsystems. This
will allow each subsystem or group) to be
operated independently with a few simple
start/stop/mode selection commands for
checkout and test, as well as being inde-
pendent of any overall system controller
problems. This does not preclude integra-
tion into a total (vehicle) data manage-
ment system for monitoring/coordination.
The degree of such involvement and the
details of the system architecture will be
defined as system definition progresses.
6.3.2.9 Technology Assessment
An evaluation study was conducted to de-
fine the technology status of regenerative
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ECLSS hardware. The evaluation consid-
ered candidate subsystems concepts which
satisfy the major functions of ECI_S. The
technology assessment reflects a review of
information from,
a. Current and planned NASA Ad-
vanced Development Programs,
ECLSS Test Bed Program,
b. Subcontractor development and IR&D
projects and results of in-house on-
going IR&D programs.
The evaluation utilized the standard
NASA defined levels of technology. The
evaluation was conducted by reviewing the
information available for each candidate
processing subsystem with emphasis being
placed on candidates for IOC station.
Based on the data reviewed, each process-
ing subsystem was assigned a level of
technology maturity. Details can be found
in Paragraph 6.5.2.9 of D483-50022-2
Rev C (DR02).
Past flight programs such as Apollo, Sky-
lab and Orbiter have incorporated subsys-
tem candidates applicable at Space
Station.
NASA research and development contract-
ing has resulted in the development of re-
generative process concepts to the
breadboard and prototype levels identified
by maturity levels of 5 and 6.
In the era of regenerative process subsys-
tems such as CO2 removal, CO2 reduc-
tion, oxygen generation and water
recovery, there are competing candidates
at equal or nearly equal levels resulting
from NASA development contracts. The
significance here being the flexibility
available to the ECLSS designed during
Phase CfD. The current technology status
of ECLSS incorporates alternate options
of nearly tghe same technology status in
the event the initial Phase C/D selection
proves unsatisfactory.
In reviewing the overall technology status
of ECLSS, processes were identified that
were in earlier stages of development and
as such were not applicable to the cost
constraints placed on IOC station develop-
ment. Assessment indications are that the
overall technology status of the ECLSS is
sufficiently advanced to meet IOC cost
constraints.
6.3.2.10 Atmosphere Control and Supply
(ACS)
The ACS must perform the following
functions:
Oxygen Supply
Nitrogen Supply
Atmosphere Pressure Control
Module Repressurization
Hyperbaric Chamber Pressurization
Emergency Venting
a. Oxygen Supply - The oxygen supply
is continuously generated and added to the
cabin atmosphere via the process air sys-
tem. Control of this process is maintained
by continuously analyzing the cabin at-
mosphere for oxygen and adjusting the
generation rate based on long term trends
of the change in oxygen concentration.
The oxygen level will be maintained near
the high end of the allowed range to pro-
vide greater survival time for the crew. Be-
cause of the mass of oxygen present on
station fast response times are not neces-
sary. Averaging effects can be utilized to
simplify the control system and to reduce
the equipment requirements. All oxygen is
supplied from the 02 generation system
except for the HAB and repressurization
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requirements. The following oxygen re-
quirements are met by on-station genera-
tion:
metabolic
leakage
EVA
airlock losses
Although no oxygen storage is planned for
normal station operation, a distribution
system is planned for emergency use.
b. All nitrogen requirements will be
supplied from storage. Two types of
storage are planned.
A high and low pressure distribution sys-
tem is shown for the supercritical liquid
feed system. The liquid will be boiled off
at 870 - 1000 psia and can be distributed
to any pressurized module independently
of what is being provided to the other vol-
umes. After the pressure is reduced, the
line penetrates the bulkhead and is distrib-
uted internally throughout the station at a
pressure of 100 psia. This distribution sys-
tem provides low pressure gas to each
pressurized volume through the N2 control
valve. Since the planned rate of addition is
only 3.8 pounds per day, the nitrogen will
be added through only one N2 valve for
normal operation. This location will be
varied on a regular basis to verify that all
valves are operational. Nitrogen will be
supplied to EVA support which will com-
press the gas to the desired pressure.
C. Atmosphere Pressure Control - The
PDRD specifies the monitoring and
control of the partial pressure and
total pressure of the atmosphere
components.
(1) Monitoring will be provided by a
small mass spectrometer which will
continuously analyze the cabin at-
mosphere for the following:
Oxygen
Nitrogen
Carbon Dioxide
Methane
Hydrogen
This system provides a direct readout for
each gas which is being controlled in the
station atmosphere as well as other gases
which represent specific hazards to the
station. The output signal will be propor-
tional to the amount present and will be
used for control of the station atmosphere
and for an interface with the caution and
warning system.
(2) Control of the makeup gases to the
cabin atmosphere is based on the
Major Constituent Analyzer output
which will be controlled by the DMS
on a continuing basis. A running av-
erage will be maintained of the con-
centration of O2 and N2 and control
will be based on the change in the
running average. This approach takes
advantage of the station capacitance
to simplify the control of the makeup
gases. Nitrogen and oxygen will be
added as previously defined.
(3) Total pressure will be monitored di-
rectly by a sensor and indirectly by
summation of the individual compo-
nent partial pressures as measured
by the Major Constituent Analyzer.
If the total pressure exceeds the set-
points, one and only one of the high
pressure relief valves will relieve the
pressure to space. This valve will be
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rotated through the station relief
valves on a regular basis. Pressure
control is maintained by makeup
through only one valve and relief
through only one valve to avoid the
situation where the system would be
supplying and exhausting simultane-
ously. Also, by separating the two
functions at the opposite end of the
station, a pressure wave can be
avoided which might trigger a relief
valve by adding makeup gas in the
same module.
Module Repressurization - Repres-
surization is an action which follows
the emergency venting of a module
for some reason such as shell pene-
tration, fire or chemical leak. The
repressurization system has the ca-
pacity to recharge any single module
to normal atmospheric pressure once
in any 90-day period. This system
consists of high pressure nitrogen
and high pressure oxygen tanks per-
manently maintained on orbit with
the station. These tanks are kept at
3000 psia and are external to the
station. Both gases are connected to
the internal distribution system for
02 and N2 by penetration through
both the U.S. HAB and Lab mod-
ules. Pending further direction it has
been assumed that the repressuriza-
tion will take one hour for the full
size module.
Hyperbaric Chamber Repressuriza-
tion - This gas supply is included in
the high pressure storage previously
described in the module repressuriza-
tion system. The hyperbaric chamber
must be rapidly pressurized to 6 at-
mospheres in a life threatening situ-
ation, this gas will be transmitted via
the internal distribution system.
f. Emergency Venting :
The ACS provides:
• Emergency release of the module
atmosphere
• Negative pressure relief
• Pressure Equalization
in addition to the positive pressure relief
previously described.
(1) Emergency release of the module at-
mosphere is provided by valves
mounted on the bulkhead in each
pressurized volume. These valves can
be operated either manually or auto-
matically and will dump the module
atmosphere in less than five minutes.
(2) Negative pressure relief is required
during launch or reentry should a
module have to be returned to earth.
A negative pressure relief valve is
installed on the bulkhead in each
pressurized volume.
(3) Pressure equalization valves are in-
cluded on each hatch and are used
to equalize pressure between pressur-
ized volumes prior to opening the
hatch.
g. System Control - All control of the
ACS is through the Standard Data
Processor (SDP) in the DMS. All
valves are automatic/manual and can
be actuated from the SDP. Key
valves such as the emergency vent
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and the O2/N2 control valves can be
activated by an astronaut in EEU.
6.3.2.11 Atmosphere Revitalization
System (ARS)
The table presented below provides in
summary of ARS functions and
coresponding equipment.
FUNCTION
02 Supply
CO2 Reduction
CO2 Removal
Trace Contaminant
Control
EQUIPMENT
KOH Static Feed
-Water electrolysis
-Bosch
-Four bed molecular
Sieve
-Charcoal filters
-Specific sorbents
-Catalytic oxidizer
-Contamination Monitor
Chromatograph/
Mass Spectrometer
CO monitor
Odor Control
Particle counter
-Selective Adsorbers
6.3.2.11.1 Static Feed Water Electrolysis
The subsystem consists of three main
components: an electromechanical mod-
ule, a Coolant Control Assembly (CCA)
and a Pressure Controller. The CCA and
Pressure Controller are special compo-
nents developed for use with a static feed
system.
The module consists of a series of individ-
ual electrochemical cells stacked fluidi-
cally in parallel and connected electrically
tin series to form _h,. Static Feed Water
Electrolysis Module (SFWEM). Oxygen
and hydrogen are generated in the
SFWEM from water supplied by the water
supply tank.
a. The CCA supplies a constant flow of
controlled, variable temperature liquid
coolant to the SFWEM, (1) proportions
the coolant flow between a bypass and a
liquid/liquid heat exchanger, and (2) ac-
commodates temperature induced volume
changes in the coolant.
b. The Pressure Controller maintains the
absolute pressure of the subsystem, (1)
controls the pressure differential required
to establish and maintain liquid/gas inter-
faces within the individual cells, and (2)
controls pressurization and depressuriza-
tion of the subsystem during mode transi-
tions (e.g., start-ups and shutdowns).
As electrical power is supplied to the elec-
trodes, water is electrolyzed from the cell
matrix creating an electrolyte concentra-
tion gradient between the water feed cav-
ity electrolyte and the electrolyte in the
cell matrix. Water vapor diffuses from the
water feed matrix into the cell matrix due
to this gradient. Consumption of water
from the water feed cavity results in its
static replenishment from an external
water supply tank,
6.3.2.11.2 Carbon Dioxide Removal and
Collection
Approximately 17.6 pounds of carbon di-
oxide (CO2) are generated per crew day.
A closed environment such as a Space Sta-
tion will reflect this added CO2 as in-
creased partial pressure at a rate
dependent on the face value. Active CO2
removal subsystems must be employed to
maintain partial pressure within tolerable
limits, presently set at a maximum of 3
mm Hg.
6.3.2.11.3 Molecular Sieve
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CO2 removal from the cabin atmosphere
is accomplished by the preferential ad-
sorption of CO2 by a material classified as
zeolites and referred to as molecular
sieves because of their affinity to remove
molecules of a given size (i.e., 4 Angstrom
size molecules).
Cabin air is chilled and the condensed
water is removed. The air is then pumped
at a rate of about 8.4xl0-Im3/min. (30 ft3/
rain) through the molecular sieve beds on
side A. The 13X bed, is designed to pref-
erentially remove moisture from the in-
coming air, allowing CO2 to be adsorbed
on the 5A bed downstream. CO2 depleted
air is then heated and passed through the
13X bed on side B to remove adsorbed
moisture and prepare the bed for use as a
desiccant. The 5A bed containing ad-
sorbed CO2 is isolated from the air stream
and regenerated by heating and pumping
of the evolving CO2 gas by two stage vac-
uum pumps. The initial ullage inside side
B5A bed, consisting of oxygen and nitro-
gen, is pumped back to the cabin. When
the absolute pressure in the bed is suffi-
ciently low, the relatively pure (90-95 per-
cent) CO2 is pumped into a storage tank.
The collected CO2 will be used to feed the
carbon dioxide reduction subsystem.
d. Carbon Dioxide Reduction
The Bosch concept is the current baseline
process for reducing CO2.
The Bosch reaction occurs in the range
800 to 1OOOOK (980 to 13400F)in the
presence of an iron catalyst. Carbon diox-
ide combines with H2 and produces car-
bon and water vapor as indicated in the
overall reaction:
CO2 +2H2=C+2H20+Heat
One mole of CO2 combines with two
moles of H2 to form one mole of carbon
and two moles of water vapor. In practice,
single pass efficiencies through the Bosch
reactor are less than 10 percent. Complete
conversion is obtained by recycling the
process gases with continuous deposition
of carbon and removal of water vapor.
The recycled gas mixture contains CO2,
H2 water vapor, carbon monoxide (CO)
and methane (CH4). These components
are formed by intermediate reactions,
such as:
CO2 + C = 2 CO
CO2+H2--CO+H20
CO + H2 = C + H20
2 H2 + C = CH4
An equilibrium condition for the gas mix-
ture is reached based on the specific oper-
ating temperatures, pressures, and relative
proportions of the primary reactants, CO2
and H2.
The BCRS operation is described herein.
Gases are continuously circulated through
the recycle loop by a compressor. The
gases leaving the compressor pass through
the regenerative heat exchanger/reactor
combination. The gases are preheated in
the regenerative heat exchanger prior to
entering the reactor. Within the reactor
CO2 and H2 react over an iron catalyst in
the volumetric ratio of 2:1 (H2:CO2) to
form carbon and water vapor. The recycle
gases, partially depleted in CO2 and H2
leave the reactor at a temperature near
9220K (12000F) to exchange heat with the
incoming gases in the regenerative heat
exchanger. The mixture then flows
through the valves to a condensor/separa-
tor where the water vapor is condensed
separated, and collected. The recycle loop
gas mixture then returns to the compres-
sor.
The feed gases (H2 and CO2) are added to
the loop upstream of the compressor. This
allows the feed gas pressure to remain at a
minimum. For practical applications the
ratio of recycled gas flow rate to feed gas
flow rate is in the range of about 15-20 to
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1, indicating that conversion efficiency per
pass through the reactor is about 6 per-
cent.
6.3.2.11.4 Trace Contaminant Control
Trace contaminants are controlled by the
use of specific sorbents and a non
regenerable carbon bed which is replaced
every 90 days and a high temperature
catalytic oxidizer. Additional control is
provided by module leakage of atmos-
phere to space and condensation of or-
ganics in the humidity control system.
Specific sorbents will be used to control
ammonia, carbon monoxide and hydrogen
(low temperature catalyst) and acid gases.
6.3.2.11.5 Atmospheric Monitoring
Two different problems exist for atmos-
pheric monitoring. They are: 1) Trace
contaminant analysis and 2) major con-
stituent analysis. Although these two func-
tions may be combined in one instrument,
two separate analytical systems will be
provided to meet these needs.
6.3.2.11.6 Trace Contaminant Analysis
The trace contaminant analysis baseline is
currently a gas chromatograph mass spec-
trometer (GCMS) combination analytical
system. This system is an accepted ana-
lytical technique for separation and analy-
sis of complex mixtures of organic
compounds. The GCMS provides good
mixture separation and positive identifica-
tion capability by utilizing the strengths of
each analytical technique. By careful
evaluation of the expected contaminants,
the gas chromatograph (GC) can be speci-
fied to provide separation of organic com-
pounds into specific categories such as
alcohols, aldehydes and ethers. Once
separated, the mass spectrometer (MS)
performs the analysis to determine the
concentrations present in the atmosphere.
This equipment can provide analytical ca-
pability for any number of organic com-
pounds. The only drawback being
separation time in the GC and relative
complexity of the MS to provide the ex-
panded analytical capability. One advan-
tage provided by the Data Management
System is the library for unknowns can be
ground based. If an unknown is detected,
the information from the GCMS can be
transmitted to the ground and a detailed
evaluation conducted there utilizing the
experise of ground based analytical chem-
ist. The station equipment can continue
the scheduled analy-sis and extensive on-
board computer capacity is not required to
maintain an analytical chemical file. The
biggest drawback to performing extensive
analyses of this type is speed. The ex-
pected analytical cycle with current tech-
nology is 60-90 minutes.
This slow analytical time does not repre-
sent a major risk to the crew. Sources of
contaminants will be primarily metabolic
and off .gassing of chemicals from the
various plastics and coatings used on the
station.
There is no reason to expect any of these
chemical concentrations to suddenly in-
crease. Upset conditions such as a chemi-
cal spill or a laboratory operational
problem can be countered by providing an
override capability in that area for the
GCMS or by using less sophisticated but
faster response time analytical techniques
such as color change "sniffer" tubes for
specific chemicals. The baseline for the
GCMS is one unit in each of the Habitat
Modules. This redundancy means that nor-
mal analytical capability exists even if one
unit should be committed to a specific
analytical problem. The capability to pro-
vide specific component monitoring capa-
bility on an emergency basis does not exist
in the present design and would add to the
complexity of the GCMS.
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6.3.2.11.7 Major Constituent Analysis
The preferred technology, gas analyzer
mass spectrometer (GAMS) was devel-
oped for Skylab and monitors hydrogen,
water vapor, nitrogen, oxygen, carbon di-
oxide and methane.
6.3.2.12 Water Recovery and
Management System (WRMS)
The Space Station Water Recovery and
Management System (WRMS) shall ac-
commodate the collection, processing, and
dispensing of water to meet evolving
Space Station crew and other potential
needs. Pretreatment of waste water to pre-
vent chemical breakdown and microbial
growth prior to processing shall be pro-
vided. Post-treatment systems and a moni-
toring system to ensure proper water
quality shall be provided to control and
monitor contarnints prior to water use. Po-
table hygiene, and wash water shall be
provided.
6.3.2.12.1 Water Collection
Water collection is accomplished by air
transport through equipment to air/water
separators or by receiving a water stream
from the associated subsystem. Water for
potable use is collected from the following
systems humidity control and CO2 reduc-
tion system. Water for hygiene use is col-
lected from the following systems:
,1)hygiene and hand wash station, 2)waste
potable water, 3)galley, 4)dishwasher,
5)shower, 6)laundry and 7)processed
urine.
6.3.2.12.2 Potable Water
Potable water is generally described as
that which is "suitable for drinking."
Space Station potable water is used to sup-
ply both drinking requirements and the
preparation of food. Therefore, potable
water is to be considered that which will
finally be ingested by the crew.
a.
b.
Potable Water Sources - Potable
water will come from three sources:
condensate from the atmosphere,
C02 reduction water, and resupply.
Potable Water Processing - There
were three processes under consid-
eration for potable water processing.
The three processes were: hyperfiltra-
tion, multifiltration and reverse os-
mosis.
Multifiltration is recommended for potable
water processing.
6.3.2.12.3 Multifiltration
The multifiltration treatment method con-
sists of four stages of treatment. The first
is a roughing filter to remove large par-
ticulate matter. The second stage is an ad-
sorption bed, which holds a specially
selected granular activated carbon in
which the pore structure has been con-
trolled to include a wide range of pore
sizes which can capture and retain mole-
cules of the lightest charged organic mate-
rial. The third stage is an ion exchange
state, where a specially selected blend of
deionizing resins. The last stage of treat-
ment is a sterilization filter.
After processing, potable water will be
checked by an on-line water quality moni-
tor that will be discussed later. Then water
that passes is transfered to storage and
biological testing.
6.3.2.12.4 Potable Water Storage
Potable .water that has been recovered and
treated to meet use requirements is to be
stored in tanks that can be assured to be
maintained biologically acceptable.
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After passing the on-line water quality
monitoring tests a potable water stroage
tank is filled. When that tank is full a sam-
ple is drawn and tested for bacteria prior
to the use of the water.
With one potable water processor in each
module and two "clean" potable water
tanks in each module a fill, test, stand by,
use scenerio can be implemented. This is
accomplished by starting with module one
having one tank filling and the other in
standby mode and module two having one
tank in use and the other being tested.
When the test tank finishes and passes the
bacterialogical test it becomes standby,
the fill tank goes to test when full, the use
tank goes to fill when empty and the
standby becomes the use. The cycle con-
tinues with the orginal use tank eventually
becoming the use tank again.
6.3.2.12.5 Hygiene Water
Hygiene water is water that is processed to
meet standards as required and may come
in contact with crewmembers. Hygiene
water is also considered acceptable for use
as a source for electrolysis or other sub-
systems that may require purified water.
Wash water will be added to the hygiene
water eliminating the need for a seperate
wash water system.
6.3.2.12.5.1 Hygiene Water Sources
Hygiene water will come from the follow-
ing sources: hygiene and.hand wash sta-
tions, waste potable water, galley,
dishwasher, shower, laundry, processed
urine, excess potable water production,
and resupply.
6.3.2.12.5.2 Hygiene Water Processing
There were three processes considered for
hygiene water processing. The three proc-
esses were the same three as for potable
water processing; hyperfiltration, multi-
filtration, and reverse osmosis. Multifiltra-
tion is recommended for hygiene water
processing.
6.3.2.12.5.3 Hygiene Water Storage and
Supply
Recovered hygiene water is stored in two
tanks. These tanks are used to supply
water used for O2 generation, Extrave-
hicular Mobility Unit (EMU) require-
ments, urine flush, shower, hygiene and
hand wash, dish washer, and laundry.
Processed Hygiene water is monitored by
a water quality monitor (WQM) and io-
dine test unit. Failure to meet specification
in pH, conductivity, Total Organic Carbon
(TOC), or iodine, will cause the water to
be returned to the waste holding tank for
reprocessing or to before the microbial
check valve for iodine dosing.
6.3.2.12.6 Urine Treatment
Urine is received from the Waste Manage-
ment System for water recovery. Three
methods of water recovery from urine
were considered. These methods were: air
evaporation (wick evaporation), Thermo-
electric integrated Membrane Evaporation
System (TIMES), and Vapor Compression
Distillation (VCD). Air evaporation is rec-
ommended for water recovery from urine.
After water has been recovered from the
urine the recovered water is transferred to
the hygiene water processing system for
further processing and the residual brine
is transferred to the Waste Management
System for storage and final disposal.
6.3.2.12.6.1 Pretreatment
Chemical pretreatment is necessary to sta-
bilize the urine, preventing enzymic break-
down to ammonia, and providing
continuing inhibition of bacterial growth.
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A recent study by NASA includes data on
three methods that have evolved in the last
several years. In all methods, sulfuric acid
is used to lower pH to between 2 and 4
which stabilizes ammonia as ammonia sul-
fate. Along with sulfuric acid, a biologi-
cally active chemical is added to control
bacterial growth.
The oxone formulation proved to be the
best long-term urine stabilizer a 34 day
test with oxone added at varying levels
shows a complete control of bacterial ac-
tivity with 5 milligrams oxone per cc
urine. Additional test work was conducted
on the foaming characteristics of
pretreated urine. Some urine processing
subsystems operate at reduced pressure,
causing dissolved gas products to evolve,
forming a foam. As in the case of vacuum
compression/distillation concept, excessive
foam would cause carry over of undesir-
able materials into the product water con-
densate. Tests showed that control of
foaming could be accomplished with small
doses of antifoam. Long duration testing
must be conducted on specific waste re-
covery subsystems with pretreated urine to
verify total compatibility of the chemical
additives with the operation equipment.
6.3.2.12.6.2 Air Evaporation (Wick
Evaporation)
Closed Cycle Air Evaporation. This con-
cept uses a recycled gas atmosphere to
evaporate water from a wicking material
saturated with pretreated waste water. The
atmosphere is the same as cabin atmos-
phere and is contained in a closed system
to preclude direct contamination of the
cabin. When solids have built up on the
wicking material causing reduced effi-
ciency, the wick is allowed to dry, the wick
replaced, and flow directed to the fresh
wick bed. The saturated dry wick is stored
for disposal.
Initial concepts used heating and cooling,
with minor heat recovery, in the loops. Ex-
cellent water is produced by this method,
but additional development has not been
conducted. Regenerative heat exchange
can be configured into this concept using
heat pumps to reclaim heat from the air
stream, this reclamination of heat reduces
the power required by the Air evap Unit.
There are potintial further savings by
scavanging heat from the thermal control
system istead of reclaiming heat internal
to the system.
6.3.2.12.6.3 Water Quality Monitoring
(WQM)
Water quality is monitored on a continu-
ous basis to determine suitability of recov-
ered water for reuse. Overall water quality
can be determined by measuring pH, con-
ductivity, total organic carbon (TOC) and
bacterial content.
In addition to chemical analysis is the re-
quirement for determination of microbial
level. No subsystem has been developed to
date to automatically measure microbial
activity.
a. Water Quality Monitor 1 - An auto-
mated WQM has been tested by NASA
and although the unit does work, the
maintenance and standardization of the
unit under continuous use is found exces-
sive.
A peristaltic pump delivers the sample,
supplied at 5 psia, two reagents and peri-
odically, two standardizing solutions to the
sensing manifold which contains the flow
through sensors for conductivity, TOC,
pH, and NH3. Prior to entering the peri-
staltic pump, the sample is divided into
two streams, the acidic stream and the ba-
sic stream.
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The TOC and conductivity measurements
are made on the subsystem acidic stream.
The sample is pumped directly through
the conductivity sensor. This sensor con-
sists of two 0.24 inch lengths of 0.03 inch
I.D. thin walled platinum tubing, which
are epoxy cast into an acrylic block. Sam-
ple fluids flow in series through the plati-
num tubes, which act as conductivity
electrodes. After the sample exits the con-
ductivity sensor, a reagent consisting of
sulfuric acid.and an oxidizing agent (po-
tassium monopersulfate) is added. The
acid reagent converts all the inorganic car-
bon (carbonates, etc.) in the sample to
free dissolved CO2. In the stripper, the
dissolved CO2 diffuses through a mem-
brane to the basic stream where the CO2
is fixed as carbonate. After removal of the
inorganic carbon, oxidation of organic car-
bon is accomplished by exposing the sam-
ple with oxidizing agent to ultraviolet
light. The TOC measurement is deter-
mined by a CO2 sensor mounted on the
sensing manifold. The CO2 sensor con-
sists of a capillary pH electrode, which is
in contact with an aqueous sodium bicar-
bonate electrolyte. The electrolyte and
capillary are separated from the ultraviolet
irradiated TOC sample by a silicone rub-
ber membrane. Equilibrium of the sample
CO2 with the reservoir across the mem-
brane results in an electrode output pro-
portional to the logarithm of the CO2
concentration. The CO2 concentration
measured, directly correlates to the TOC
in the water sample.
The pH and NH3 measurements are made
on the WQM basic stream. A capillary pH
electrode, geometrically identical to the
CO2 sensor but without a membrane, is
used for the pH sensor. After the sample
exits the pH sensor, it is combined with an
alkaline (sodium hydroxide) solution and
thoroughly mixed by a magnetic mixer
unit. The mixer ensures complete conver-
sion of NH4+ to free dissolved NI-I3 prior
to making the ammonia measurement.
The mixed basic sample is the routed
through the sensor manifold to the NH3
sensor. Construction of the NH3 sensor is
mechanically identical to the CO2 sensor
but uses an ammonium chloride electro-
lyte and a microporous Teflon membrane.
The alkaline solution is then used as the
CO2 stripping reagent for TOC sensing as
previously mentioned. After passing
through the stripper, the basic sample
stream is joined with the acidic sample
stream downstream of the sensors and is
sent to waste water treatment.
The subsystem was designed for manual
or periodic automatic calibration using two
standardizing solutions. During calibra-
tion, the standardizing solutions take the
place of the water sample in the input
stream. All four measurement parameters
can be calibrated with the two standardiz-
ing solutions.
b. Water Quality Monitor 2 - This Water
Quality Monitoring System consists of two
commercially available water quality
monitors. One senses the level of Total
Organic Carbons in the water and the
other senses pH, conductance, and six
specific ions. Samples are automatically
taken every 5-10 minutes from each of
four sample ports. A sample from each
port is injected into each analysis cell. Af-
ter analysis (3-5 minutes per sample) the
samples are returned to waste water stor-
age. One of the advantages of this system
is that no chemicals are added to the
water and the spent samples can be re-
turned to the water supply.
These two water quality monitors measure
certain water quality parameters directly
such as pH, conductance, and specific ion
contents. Microbial growth will be meas-
ured, by incubation of samples, prior to
use as potable water and in conjuctions
with use as hygiene water. Other parame-
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ters are inferred from changes in Totat Or-
ganic Carbon, pH, and conductance.
Periodic checks on the inferences made by
the Water Quality Monitors would be
made by crew members on a periodic ba-
sis using the characterization equipment
available in the laboratory modules and
returning samples to earth for complete
analysis.
6.3.2.12.6.4 Crew and Equipment Wash
and Utilities
Provision for washing and personal
hyeiene are supplied by the module outfit-
ters.
6.3.2.12.6.5 Safe Haven
For safe haven, water will be supplied by
varying" methods all requiring power, ther-
mal rejection and DMS. The first mode is
normal operation with a suspension of 48
hour holds on potable water. In the event
that a unit fails it will be repaired and op-
eration continued. The following assump-
tions are made for this mode of operation:
Potable and hygiene water can be supplied
from either hygiene or potable water proc-
essors; and Urine can only be processed in
a Phase change processor. In this case the
potable and hygiene processors back each
other up and redundant urine processors
are installed for failure tolerance in both
normal operation and safe haven. To ac-
complish safe haven it is necessary that a
potable and hygiene system each be in-
stalled in at least two separate pressurized
volumes and that there be two urine proc-
essors in each pressurized volume contain-
ing waste management facilities.
6.3.2.12.6.6 Man-Tended
At the present time the man-tended water
management requirements are to be sup-
plied by the Space Shuttle during tending
and there are no further ECLSS/water re-
quirements for untended modes.
6.3.3 Waste Management Systems (WMS)
The Space Station Waste Management
System performs the following functions:
1)collection urine, feces, and vomitus;
2)collection and processing of trash;
3)general housekeeping; and 4)storage of
wastes for return to Earth and/or final dis-
posal.
6.3.3.1 Urine Collection
Urine collection is to be accomplished in a
manner similar to the methods presently
used on Space Shuttle. Once the urine is
separated from the air entrainment it is
delivered to the Water Recovery and Man-
agement System (WRMS) for water reCov-
ery. After reclamation of water from the
urine the resultant brine and/or solids are
delivered to the WMS for waste storage
and return to disposal. Present recommen-
dation is for two urinal commode combi-
nations in two seperate pressurized
volumes.
6.3.3.2 Feces and Vomitus
Collection and Processing
Feces and vomitus will be collected from
the crew members in an as Earth-like as
possible manner by air transport and sub-
sequently processed by the same unit.
Boeing has four subcontractors investigat-
ing four different collection and process-
ing options. The subcontractors and the
options they are investigating are as fol-
lows:
a. Fairchild-Republic - Compactor with
replaceable cartridges
b. General Electric - Bag collection with
air drying
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c. Hamilton Standards Division -
Biodegradation cup
d. Teledyne Brown Engineering - Bag
collection with mechanical transfer
The General Electric concept has been
chosen for the Space Station commode/
urinal.
This concept utilizes current shuttle tech-
nology in combination with design im-
provements dictated by crewmembers
comments and extensive testing. It is an
intergrated system which is based on
proven components and techniques. Pro-
posed enhancements include increased ca-
pacity, containerization, and increased
odor/bacteria filter capacity. Performance
improvements are air drying and assembly
replacement of critical components.
Additional capacity can be derived by en-
larging the shuttle commode container
within the proposed envelope. Compaction
methodology within the holding tank is
presently under evaluation. Capabity is
also increased by the removability of the
container.
The basic requirement for containerization
of waste products is that the container be
non-premeable to microbes. In order to
effectively provide microbial protection
and facilitate crew servicing, a non-
woven, hydrophobic, soft bay system is
proposed. This concept offers waste re-
moval and handling when incorporated
with a split, hindged commode tank.
Redundancy is provided within the com-
mode/urinal unit for comfort and con-
vience of crew members. These are dual
fan separator units which can be operated
singularly of in parallel to provide com-
mode/urinal air flow. These fan separator
units are identical and replaceable in
space by crewmembers
A single urinal hose is provided with the
commode/urinal unit which provides re-
dundancy in that it can be plugged into
receptables which are internally plumbed
to either one of the fan separtors. There-
fore, if a problem exists with one separa-
tor,- the other can be selected by
connecting to the alternate receptacle. Re-
dundancy is provided for urinal cups in
that each crewmember has his own indi-
vidual unit and spares provided should
they be needed.
The commode waste collector is a replace-
able which provides microbial integrity
during the removal cycle. The commode
waste collector is replaced periodically as
the need exits for capacity.
Dual ordor/bacteria filters are provided.
One filter is in the air discharge from each
fan separator which protects the crew
from noxious odors and provides backup
for the commode bacteria filters.
Operation of the commode/urinal is simi-
lar to the present Shuttle commode, ex-
cept for simplification and the removable
bag container. Since air drying is utilized,
the valving is greatly simplified and cer-
tain switching can be eliminated. Fecal air
drying with a small air fan which operates
continuously is provided, eliminating over-
board vacuum venting. Containerization is
accomplished by a removable bag. In op-
eration the bag container would be capped
on top and bottom when removed. The en-
tire container would be then placed into a
trash compactor and a replacement in-
stalled into the commode. The urine sys-
tem is enhanced by newly designed
individual cups which provide optimum air
flow, separation and last drop collection.
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6.3.3.3 Collection and Processing of
Trash
Trash collection is presently considered to
be bag collection with continuous air flow
for drying and containing the trash in the
unit when the unit is opened. Periodically
the bags are removed and placed in the
trash compactor. The compactor will re-
duce the volume with a compaction ratio
of approximately 20:1. Trash collectors
are allocated to all modules except the lo-
gistics module. A trash compactor is in the
Habitat Module.
6.3.3.4 General Housekeeping
Equipment for housekeeping will include
wet/dry vacuum cleaners, wipes, biocide,
and cleaners. These items will be used in
every day cleaning of the Space Station,
including vacuuming of air intake filters at
regular periods. The vacuum cleaner is to
be designed as a wet/dry vacuum cleaner
to assist in containing and cleaning up on
liquid spills in the Space Station. Vacuum
cleaners will be allocated to both U.S.
Modules with the remainder of the items
to be allocated to all modules except the
Logistics Module.
6.3.3.5 Waste Storage and Disposal
At the present time, all nonrecyclable
wastes are to be stored for return to Earth.
This storage will be in the Logistics Mod-
ule in solid, liquid and gas form. The sol-
ids will be stored in compacted form in
lockers. Liquids and gases will be stored
in appropriately designed tanks.
There are two possibilities to minimize re-
turn weights and volumes. One possibility
is the use of waste fluids in the Space Sta-
tion propulsion system to augment the
thrusters thereby minimizing quantities
stored and returned to Earth. The other
option is the destructive reentry of wastes
both solid and liquid to eliminate waste re-
turn.
6.3.3.6 Safe Haven
Safe haven waste management will be pro-
vided in two modes. The first mode is nor-
mal operation and will depend on
availability of power, thermal rejection
and access to the normal waste manage-
ment system. The second mode will be the
emergency backup mode currently used on
the Space Shuttle for emergency back up
with some modifications possible.
6.3.3.7 Man-Tended
At the present time, man-tended waste
management requirements are to be sup-
plied by the Space Shuttle during tending
and there are no further requirements for
ECLSS untended modes.
6.3.4 Fire Detection and
Suppression
The Fire Detection and Suppression (FDS)
subsystem provides the sensors for detect-
ing a fire and the suppressants to extin-
guish the fire. Each module has its own
FDS subsystem that detects the presence
and location of a fire condition within the
module. The output of each module FDS
is inputted to the module data bus to pro-
vide an annunciated and visual alarm to
all Space Station modules. The fire sup-
pressant system is designed for manual or
automatic operation as determined by the
crew. The FDS subsystem includes smoke/
fire sensors, fire suppressant extinguishers
and distribution, and emergency breathing
packs.
FDS will be supplied to each powered rack
and to each storage rack containing com-
bustable material. Fire Detection (FD)
sensors are provided that will detect a fire
in all stages of combustion to give early
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warning of fire buildup conditions as well
as actual fires. Ionization and thermal sen-
sors are located in each rack to identify
the rack in which a fire occurs. Ionization
sensors are located in the Module Tem-
perature and Humidity Control and Avion-
ics Cooling air return ducts that detect the
presence of aerosols from a group of
racks. Infrared sensors monitor the mod-
ule aisles for fires. Both the thermal and
ionization detectors require an air flow
rate through each rack to be monitored.
The Fire Suppression (FS) system consists
of a centralized CO2 storage tank with dis-
tribution to each rack through valves acti-
vated by the FDS controller. The rack
valves can be operated automatically or by
the crew through the Module Caution and
Warning system. Each automatic opera-
tion is timed to release a predetermined
amount of CO2. The capacity of the tank
is 50 lbs of CO2. A typical fire in a rack
would require approximately 0.5 lbs of
CO2 per 10 ft3 of free air space to be sup-
pressed.
The status of the fire detection sensors
is monitored by the FDS controller
through the rack Multiplexer/Demul-
tiplexer (MDM). When a rack fire indica-
tion is received, commands are sent to the
rack that shut off the Avionics air supply
and return to the rack, energizes the CO2
release valve and turns on a light on the
rack FDS Panel. The FDS Controller also
sends a signal to the Module Caution and
Warning System to alert the crew that a
fire extists in the module/rack location.
Portable CO2 fire extinguishers are avail-
able for local suppression in each Space
Station element. These extinguishers are
sized for 5 lbs of CO2. Each rack provides
an access port for manual insertion of
CO2. Emergency breathing packs are pro-
vided in all Space Station elements to al-
low the crew sufficient time to leave an
area in which a fire occurs. These packs
are sized for 12 minutes of normal breath-
ing.
6.4 Laboratory Module Outfitting
"U.S.Laboratory Outfitting" in this section
will be limited to discussing general con-
figurations and unique areas. Obtained
data is continuous in Boeing document
D483-50022-3, Rev C (DR02) October
31, 1986. Further, Section 3.0 of this
document contains a description of "Cus-
tomer Accommodations".
6.4.1 Configuration
The USL configuration is driven by a wide
range of Materials Processing Science and
Life Science user requirements which vary
greatly both between potential USL users
as well as between station evolutionary
scenarios. The capability and require-
ments of the USL experiments typify 1995
era operation. The equipment compliment
in the point design is driven by the selec-
tion of a set of experiments to be flown.
6.4.2 USL Module
6.4.2.1 Design Approach
The envelope dimensions of the USL are
shown in Figure 6.4.2.1-1. The internal
architecture of the USL will incorporate a
horizontal orientation with four (4) longi-
tudinal utility trays, Figure 6.4.2.1-2, and
locations for forty-four (44) standard dou-
ble racks, Figure 6.4.2.1-3.
The next step was to further refine the
racks and payload containers which opti-
mally fit into the chosen internal architec-
ture. Defining rack requirements was a
key element in determining the preferred
internal arrangement, but these basic
building blocks are even more impor-
tant in determinin.g utility layouts,
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secondary structure definition, and the
other lower level module outfitting defini-
tion.
The racks must be responsive to the user
requirements of equipment mass, height,
width, and depth; and they must fit within
the prescribed envelopes. User payload
equipment mass will have a 350 kg (771.6
Ib) single rack limit and a 700 kg (1543.2
lb) double rack limit for ground and
launch operations. The mass can be in-
creased on-orbit to the limit afforded by
the rack user volume. Incorporation of
EIA Standard RS-310 (Racks, Panels, and
Associated Equipment), will enable us to
accommodate a majority of rack mounted
equipment. The experiment data base
shows that a 914.4mm (36 in) deep rack
with 152.4mm (6 in) for utility distribu-
tion and secondary structure (thus 762
mm (30 in) left for payload) and front
panel protrusions will capture 90 percent
of all rack mounted equipment depths.
Rack interchangeability with the interna-
tional modules is a requirement, but this
requirement should be applied on a func-
tional basis. The international technical
groundrules state the requirement for in-
terchangeable ORUs and payload ele-
ments. Figure 6.4.2. I-4 shows a
methodology for defining rack envelope
dimensions, as a function of degree of
commonality. This methodology was used
to baseline the envelopes shown in Figure
6.4.2.1-5. These envelopes are responsive
to hatch size, payload requirements, inter-
nal architecture, and the other constraints
mentioned above. These rack envelopes
are used in following configuration de-
scriptions and are also the subject of the
following comments and concerns:
a. ESA and Japan module diameters
are smaller than the US module di-
ameters. This drives the requirement
for the small 1892.3mm (74.5 in)
high rack for intermodule interchan-
geability. A complete level A trade
study, comparing the impact of re-
quiring that all module diameters be
the same as the current US diameter
vs. the impact of the smaller stan-
dard equipment rack, has not been
done. Rack user volume and capture
percentage impact, along with logis-
tics volume impact, are prime con-
terns.
b. Given the premise that the
1892.3mm (74.5 in) high rack is re-
quired, then all racks and "functional
units" should be the same height.
The comfort impact for the anthropo-
morphic units should be traded
against the impact of two rack/unit
sizes on the logistics module and on
the utility run/standoffs of the HAB
and USL modules.
c. Given the premise that two module
diameters are required and two rack/
unit heights are required, then:
(1) These functional units should be in-
terchangeable between the habitation
and U. S. Logistics Modules, using
mounting interfaces common or com-
patible with the standard rack mount-
ing accommodations.
(2) Non-anthropomorphic racks that are
not required to be interchangeable
between the US, ESA, and Japan
modules may comply with the 2032
mm (80 in) high functional unit en-
velope, instead of the 1892.3mm
(74.5 in) high rack envelope. USL
module subsystems, unique sub-
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systems, logistics supply racks and
some storage racks would benefit
from this increased size.
After the overall architecture and the rack
envelopes were defined, we began to iden-
tify the details of orienting and plumbing
the racks, allowing wall and utility access,
and accommodating special user or crew
needs such as isolation, hazardous materi-
als handling, special utilities, and lighting.
Defining these details involved optimizing
for several desirable attributes; lowest
weight, least complexity, greatest flexibil-
ity, most room and growth and recon-
figurability, easiest maintainability, and
lowest IOC and recurring costs. The pre-
cise volume required for the utility trays
continued to be defined as more informa-
tion was forthcoming from the user groups
and subsystem designers. One method of
utility distribution optimization involved
grouping payloads using "special" utilities
such as high power/thermal or vacuum
vent into zones within the module. Such
zoning techniques save utility weight and
reduce volume requirements.
The following pages describe the USL
SDR Configuration. This design represents
LaRC data base entries COMM 1201
AAX0907, and SAAX0401, and utilized
the equipment and experiment require-
ment data base generated by the MMPF
study (NAS8-36122).
6.4.2.2 USL Equipment Description
The USL will provide and maintain a shirt
sleeve environment within the prescribed
limits of pressure, atmospheric composi-
tion, temperature and humidity. The basic
subsystems resources such as electrical
power, thermal control, environmental
control, communications, both audio and
video, and data management through a
multipurpose applications console will be
provided. Any additional or supplemental
subsystems and laboratory equipment will
be the responsibility .of the outfitter.
6.4.2.2.1 Experiment Types
The MMPF and Mission Requirements
Data Bases (MRDB) have identified the
following experiment disciplines as being
appropriate for inclusion in the USL:
a. Biotechnology
b. Crystals
c. Glasses and ceramics
d. Combustion
e. Fluids and transport phenomena
f. Metals/alloys
g. Membranes/polymers
h. Animal life science
i. Plant life science
j. Human life science
6.4.2.2.2 Experiments
The USL will accommodate the individual
requirements of the following experiments
defined by the data bases:
a. Catalyst production
b. Collagen processing
e. Continuous flow electrophoresis
d. Directional solidification
e. Droplet burning
f. Electroepitaxial crystal growth
g. Electromagnetic containerless
processing
h. Eutectoid alloy solidification
i. Free surface phenomena
j. Membrane production
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k. Monodisperse latex spheres
1. Protein crystal growth
m. Solid surface burning
n. Solidification of immiscible al-
loys
o. Solution crystal growth
p. Thermophysical properties
q. Thin film crystal growth
r. Transerystallization in ther-
moplastics
s. Undereooling/EM effects
t. Vapor phase crystal growth
u. Life sciences as defined by the
red book
6.4.2.2.3 Experiment Facilities
Experiment facilities listed below are re-
quired to perform the experiments shown
above.
a. Combustion tunnel
b. Directional solidification furnace
c. Droplet combustion facility
d. Electromagnetic containerless
processing
e. Electrophoresis facility
f. Free surface apparatus
g. Isothermal furnace
h. Langmuir-Blodgett facility
i. Latex reactor system
j. Protein crystal growth facility
k. Solution crystal growth facility
1. Vapor crystal growth furnace
m. Plant holding facility
n. Animal holding facility
o. 1.Sm diameter centrifuge
6.4.2.2.4 Laboratory Support Equipment
The USL will provide the following labora-
tory support equipment for the IOC con-
figuration:
Accelerometer unit, 3-axis recording
Automated cutting/polishing unit
Battery charger
Cage cleaner
Cameras and camera locker
Centrifuges
Chemical supply storage facility
Cleaning equipment
Digital multimeter
Digital pressure transducer
Digital recording oscilloscope
Digital thermometers
Electrical conductivity probe
EM-shielded storage locker
Environment monitoring system (dy-
namic, passive dosimeter, ere)
Etching equipment
Film locker
Fluid handling tools
Force measuring device
Freezers (including cryo)
Freeze drier
General purpose hand tools (includ-
ing soldering)
Glovebox Incubator
Kits (sample prep, dissecting, blood,
etc)
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 275-
Mass measuring device, (small and
micro)
Metallographic microscope
Microtome
Microwave steam autoclave
Optical microscope and supplies
PH meter
Refrigerators
Stereo maeroscope
UV/VIS/NIR spectrometer
UV sterilization oven
Video cameras and recorders
Workbench
X-ray diffraction unit
X-ray facility, general purpose
6.4.2.3 Equipment Integration
6.4.2.3.1 USL Layout Methodology
The rationale and methodology used in
placing the equipment within the module
are listed below:
a. Equipment requiring high power (5
kW ) are grouped in one area of the
module.
b. USL unique power subsystem equip-
ment is located near the high power
equipment area to reduce lengths of
cables made from heavy gauge wire.
c. Experiment facility equipment is
grouped by discipline.
d. General work area is located in the
center of the module.
6.4.2.3.2 USL Equipment Layouts
The equipment layout for the 44 rack USL
is shown in Figure 6.4.2.3.2-1.
6.4.3 Process Materials Management
The Process Material Management System
(PMMS) is the integration of all of the ma-
terials handling systems which are re-
quired by the USL experiments for their
operation. The PMMS encompasses the
following subsystems; Process Fluids (de-
livery of fluids to the experiments for con-
sumption), Hazardous Waste Removal
(removes experiments waste, separates,
and channels waste fluid to reclamation
units), Vacuum Vent, (provides the ex-
periments with an access to a vacuum),
and Ultra Pure Water (reclaims and puri-
fies water for experiment consumption).
Descriptions of these subsystems along
with their interfaces with the Common
Module (core) and the customer are de-
fined in the following subsections.
6.4.3.1 Process Fluids
6.4.3.1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this subsystem interface
description is to define the USL process
fluid distribution subsystem and its inter-
faces with the customer.
6.4.3.1.2 Scope
The following paragraphs, first, describe
all requirements, assumptions and ground
rules for the process fluid distribution sub-
system. Secondly, the detailed subsystem
configuration is summarized.
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 276
ORIGINAl. PAGE t_
OF POOR QUALITY
/
Ceiling
(ZENITH)
Wall
CI C2 (3 C4 C_ _ ,,'7 CB c_ CI0 C'S C12 C13 Cla CtS C111 c17 C111 C19 C2O (3s C:22
uo Ii,:._l,__l o..no. I,_, I_o.o,i-,I_,,,,oi- I._._i,,o,i
I I"-I I !I I '! ! ! I I !
_ md_aouow_
51 S| S] |4 || S| $7 S8 _J 510 $11 512 |13 |14 SiS qJt6 |17 _18 S|9 |20 |21 _2
| _ i Animal i Plant I e,,,g I ._. G_,_o. _ ,-,-
I i i N'_ I Gr_m | "s'_ i_'m" MP'_C I _' I I c"=m I '"m I I
\
Floor
(NAOIR)
FI F2 F",J F4 FS Fii F? FII F9 FIO Fll F12 F13 FI4 F15 FI& ICl? F18 F19 F20 F21 F22
i
.ms waste = _ = 3
Wail
\
Pl P| Pl P4 PS Pli F'/ PS M PIO Pll P12 Pl] P14 PtS P16 P17 Plll PlcJ P20 P21 PZ2
,_ "-"" I '::_ I _ IXl _:::I__12:::,I _';2_12:21 _2 I
I '° ! V Xl ! _! I I I I
Hand Wash lye Wash Ormkmg Foun¢_n /
FIGURE 6.4.2.3.2-1 USL CONFIGURATION
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 277
6.4.3.1.3 Assumptions and Ground Rules
The following ground rules and assump-
tions have been utilized.
a. Baseline Common Module length is
44.5 feet including end cones.
b. The outfitted USL module will con-
tain 44 equipment racks.
c. 90 day resupply cycle.
d. Equipment design and installation
will readily support on-orbit recon-
figuration or on-orbit initial instalh-
tion.
e. Process fluid feed throughs are lo-
cated at one end of the module.
f. External or internal storage of haz.
ardous material shall be based on
toxicity, corrosiveness, quantity and
pressurization levels.
6.4.3.1.4 Requirements
6.4.3.1.4.1 Space Station General
a. Determine fluid quantity in the stor-
age system and during transfer operations.
b. Acquire and transfer fluids independ-
ent of gravitational environment and
specific orientation of any interfacing
element.
c. Minimize fluid losses due to venting,
boil-off, leakage and during perform-
ance of subsystem maintenance.
d. Utilize standardized fluid interface
components to maximize com-
monality of fluid-handling hardware.
Transfer interface hardware shall be
designed to preclude mating to the
wrong fluid system.
e. Preclude any unacceptable motions
and/or moments between the fluid
servicing facilities and the Space Sta-
tion and/or interfacing element which
may result from fluid storage, trans-
fer dynamics and venting.
f. Comply with EVA/IVA subsystems
and capabilities when crew activity is
utilized for fluid transfer and han-
dling operations.
g. Incorporate an operational monitoring
capability with appropriate controls
and status monitoring features that
can function in either an automatic
or semi-automatic mode during all
fluid system operating phases.
h. Incorporate design features that will
provide inherent growth capability of
the fluid storage and transfer system.
i.
j°
k.
As a design goal, the USL design
shall be integrated with the Space
Station design to minimize the num-
ber of unique fluids to be resupplied.
Provide a unified approach to han-
dling leaks, spills and associated
cleanup.
These facilities shall include resupply
systems which are permanently space
based and systems that are trans-
ported to required on-orbit locations.
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I. Drains, vents and exhaust ports shall
prevent fluids, gases and/or vapors,
and flames from creating hazards to
personnel, vehicles or equipment.
6.4.3.1.4.2 Laboratory General
The process fluid distribution subsystem
shall consist of the necessary facilities to
store, transfer, manage and service fluid
consumables.
6.5.3.1.4.3 Laboratory Functional
Process fluids shall be made available to
multiple users within the USL. Therefore,
the distribution system should incorporate
maximum flexibility to supply process flu-
ids to all rack locations.
6.4.3.1.4.4 Laboratory Derived
Process fluids for the USL shall consist of
gaseous hydrogen, gaseous argon, liquid
nitrogen, gaseous nitrogen, water, gaseous
oxygen and gaseous helium.
6.4.3.2 Configuration Description
6.4.3.2.1 Subsystem
The USL provided experiment consum-
able fluids shall consist of the following
1)gases; argon, carbon dioxide, helium,
hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen; 4)liquids;
nitrogen and water. Hydrogen and carbon
dioxide shall be stored in bottles as com-
pressed gases until those bottles are at-
tached to the user racks. All plumbed
fluids except water, shall be supplied from
externally mounted replaceable/recharge-
able tanks. Water shall be stored inter-
nally, either in the nodes or a USL rack.
Distributed systems for each of the six
plumbed experiment process fluids are de-
picted in Figures 6.4.3.2.1,-1 through
6.4.3.2.1-6.
Insulated tubing shall be used to pipe all
fluids, except liquid nitrogen, which re-
quires vacuum jacketed cryogenic tubing.
After leaving the tank the fluids will first
pass through a shutoff valve followed by a
pressure regulator. This regulator will step
down the pressure; the shutoff valve will
provide an external cutoff point. Both
components will be controlled automati-
cally with manual override capability. The
regulator will be followed by a check valve
which will prevent evacuation of the inter-
nal lines should the external tank fail. Fi-
nally, the fluid piping enters the USL
Laboratory through a pressure hull pene-
tration.
Upon entering the USL Laboratory the
fluid will pass through a second shutoff
valve that provides an internal cutoff
point. This valve shall be controlled auto-
matically with manual override. The pri-
mary internal and external shutoff valves
provide a dual capability to shut down
flow. After the valve, each gas line shall
contain a filter to remove particulates.
Next, a regulator shall further step down
the pressure. Following the regulator the
gaseous fluid lines break into two line, one
routed down each side of the laboratory,
except for helium which shall be routed
down only one side of the module. To per-
mit branch isolation, shutoff valves shall
be included in both distribution system
branches. Equally spaced keyed quick dis-
connect outlets shall be available from
each branch. Check valves, immediately
upstream of the quick disconnects, shall
prevent contamination of the fluid lines by
users.
Liquid nitrogen shall be distributed in a
similar manner to the gases described in
the preceding paragraph. However, it shall
not require a fluid filter nor the additional
internal pressure regulator, and shall only
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be distributed down one side of the labora-
tory module.
6.4.3.2.2 Components
6.4.3.2.2.1 Oxygen, Argon, Helium
and Nitrogen Compressed Gas
Tanks
The tanks shall be insulated, spherical, re-
placeable/rechargeable containers for ex-
ternal storage of compressed gasses.
They shall be designed to leak-and-not-
burst if over-pressurized.
6.4.3.2.2.2 Liquid Nitrogen Tank
The tank shall be an insulated, spheri-
cal, cryogenic, replaceable/rechargeable
container for external storage of liquid
nitrogen. It shall be designed to leak-
and-not-burst if over-pressurized.
6.4.3.2.2.3 Water Tank
The tank shall be an insulated, spherical,
replaceable/rechargeable container for ex-
ternal storage of water. It shall contain an
internal bladder which shall be kept pres-
surized by compressed gas and shall be
designed to leak-and-not-burst if over-
pressurized.
6.4.3.2.2.4 Relief Valves
The relief valves shall be preset mechani-
cal valves designed to vent automatically
when the fluid tank or lines are over-pres-
surized. Tank valves shall vent to space
and the internal line relief valves shall
vent to the Waste Management System.
6.4.3.2.2.5 External Shutoff Valves
These valves shall provide an external
point for isolating the external storage
tanks from their associated distribution
system. They shall be automatically con-
trolled with a manual override capability.
6.4.3.2.2.6 External Pressure Regulator
These shall be high pressure regulators de-
signed to step-down the pressure of their
associated storage tank. They shall be
automatically controlled by the USL.
6.4.3.2.2.7 High Pressure Transducers
These transducers shall be designed to
measure the high pressure levels of the ex-
ternal storage tanks.
6.4.3.2.2.8 External Check Valves
These valves shall be spring loaded, in-
stalled externally and used to prevent
evacuation of the internal distribution sys-
tem should the external tank or lines
depressurize.
6.4.3.2.2.9 Internal Low Pressure Regula-
tor
These regulators shall reduce distribution
feed line pressure to the internal operating
levels. They shall be automatically con-
trolled by the USL.
6.4.3.2.2.10 Internal Shutoff Valves
Internal shutoff valves shall provide fluid
shutoff in the distribution systems. One
shutoff valve shall be placed immediately
following the USL hull penetration. This
valve shall provide the capability to isolate
the internal portion of the distribution
system from the external portion. Addi-
tional valves shall be used to provide iso-
lation capability for the various branches
of multipath distribution systems.
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6.4.3.2.2.11 Particulate Filter
These filters, with replaceable elements
shall remove particulate matter from the
process fluids.
6.4.3.2.2.12 Pressure Transducer
These transducer shall measure the pres-
sure levels of the fluid distribution lines
and external tanks.
6.4.3.2.2.13 Internal Check Valves
These valves shall be spring loaded and
installed just upstream of the quick dis-
connects in the fluid distribution lines.
They shall prevent experiment back pres-
sures from contaminating the fluid distri-
bution system lines.
6.4.3.2.2.14 Quick Disconnects
Quick connect/disconnect couplings, ex-
tending from the fluid distribution subsys-
tem lines, shall provide an attach point for
the user. Only the female half shall be
provided by the USL. The male half shall
be provided by the user.
6.4.3.2.2.15 Temperature Transducer
These transducers shall measure the tem-
perature of the fluids in the distribution
system.
6.4.3.2.2.16 Distribution Piping
Insulated piping will be used to transfer
process fluids from the external storage
tanks to the internal quick disconnects.
6.4.3.2.2.17 Cryogenic Tubing
Insulated metal piping shall be used to
transfer liquid nitrogen from its external
storage tank to the internal quick discon-
nects and the conversion unit. 6.4.3.2.3 In-
terface to Customer
The only interface with the customer for
all fluids except for hydrogen shall be
through the quick disconnects in the USL
floor. The user shall be responsible for
providing the mating half for the quick
disconnects and the flex line to get the
fluid from the disconnect to the rack. The
interface for hydrogen shall consist of a
hard mounted sealed connector attached
directly to the user rack.
6.4.3.3 Mass Properties
Subsystem components and their masses
are shown in Table 6.4.3.3-I.
6.4.3.3.1 Requirements Versus Design
Accommodations Evaluation
The process fluid distribution system ac-
commodates all defined requirements.
First, the system is designed for growth
and flexibility in meeting USL process
fluid requirements. Second, a set of con-
sumables which meets the requirements of
a broad set of users is provided. Third,
fluid quantities in the storage system are
monitored and quantity data are provided
to the USL data management system.
Fourth, the resupply and fluid transfer
concepts comply with Space Station EVA/
IVA capabilities. Finally, all safety re-
quirements for the system shall be met.
6.4.4 Emergency Shower
6.4.4.1 Introduction
Safety has established requirements for a
USL provided system which will remove
contaminants from a crew persons exte-
rior in a quick and safe manner. As a
result of these requirements a concept
has evolved for an emergency full body
shower.
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TABLE 6.4.3.3-I PROCESS FLUID DISTRIBUTION SUBSYSTEM WEIGHTS (kg)
UNIT TOTAL
QTY MASS MASS HEIGHT WIDTH
(kg) (kg) (m) (m)
CARBON DIOXIDE
BOTTLE, GAS STORAGE 3 2.3
GASEOUS HELIUM FILTER I 0.5
QUICK DISCONNECT 4 0.9
REGULATOR, PRESSURE 2 0.3
SENSOR, PRESSURE 6 0.1
TANK, STORAGE I 25.9
TUBING I 3.0
VALVE, CHECK 5 0.1
VALVE, RELIEF I 0.2
VALVE, MANUAL
OVERRIDE SH 3 0.3
FITTING, UNION TEE 5 0.1
FITTING, ELBOW 3 0.1
FIl-rING, UNION 14 0.0
FITTING, CONNECTOR 28 0.1
FITTING, BULKHEAD UNION 1 0.1
GASEOUS ARGON
FILTER, FLUID I 0.5
QUICK DISCONNECT 8 0.1
REGULATOR, PRESSURE 2 0.3
SENSOR, PRESSURE 7 0.1
TUBING I 5.3
FITTING, UNION TEE 7 0.1
FITTING, ELBOW 4 0.1
FITTING, UNION 21 0.0
FITTING, CONNECTOR 42 0.1
VALVE, TWO WAY
LATCHING S 2 0.2
VALVE, MANUAL
OVERRIDE SH 3 0.3
VALVE, CHECK 9 0.1
FITTING, BULKHEAD UNION I 0.1
VALVE, RELIEF I 0.2
TANK, STORAGE I 25.9
GASEOUS OXYGEN
FILTER I 0.5
QUICK DISCONNECT 8 0.9
SENSOR, PRESSURE 7 0.1
TANK, STORAGE I 8.6
TUBING I 5.3
VALVE, CHECK 9 0.1
VALVE, RELIEF I 0.2
VALVE, TWO WAY 2 0.2
LATCHING 2
FITTING, UNION TEE 7 0.1
FITTING, ELBOW 2 0.1
FITTING, UNION 21 0.0
FITTING, CONNECTOR 42 0.1
DEPTH
6.8 0.13 0.13 0.13
0.5 0.05 0.05 0.03
3.6 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.7 0.11 0.03 0.03
0.4 0.03 0.03 0.05
25.9 O. 48 O. 48 O. 48
3.0 0.01 0.01 34.00
0.5 0.01 0.01 0.04
0.2 0.02 0.02 0.10
0.8 0.07 0.11 0.04
0.5 0.03 0.06 0.02
0.2 0.04 0.04 0.02
0.3 0.02 0.02 0.03
1.5 0.02 0.02 0.04
0.1 0.02 0.02 0.06
0.5 0.05 0.05 0.05
0.7 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.7 0.11 0.03 0.03
0.5 0.03 0.03 0.05
5.3 0.01 0.01 45.00
0.7 0.03 0.06 0.02
0.3 0.04 0.04 0.02
0.5 0.02 0.02 0.03
2.3 0.02 0.02 0.04
0.4 0.05 0.08 0.03
O.B 0.07 0.11 0.04
0.9 0.01 0.01 0.04
0.I 0.02 0.02 0.06
0.2 0.02 0.02 0.10
25.9 0.07 0.07 0.07
0.5 0.05 0.05 0.03
7.2 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.5 0.03 0.03 0.05
8.6 O. 23 O. 23 O. 23
5.3 0.01 0.01 45.00
0.9 0.01 0.01 0.04
0.2 0.02 0.02 0.I0
0.4 0.05 0.08 0.03
0.7 0.03 0.06 0.02
0.1 0.04 0.04 0.02
0.5 0.02 0.02 0.03
2.3 0.02 0.02 0.04
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TABLE 6.4.3.3-1 PROCESS FLUID DISTRIBUTION SUBSYSTEM WEIGHTS (kg)
(Cont'd)
VALVE, MANUAL 3 013 0.8 0.07
OVERRIDE SH
REGULATOR, PRESSURE 2 0.3 0.7 0.11
FITTING, BULKHEAD UNION 1 0.1 0.1 0.02
GASEOUS HYDROGEN
BOTTLE, GAS STORAGE 2 6.8 13.6 0.20
GASEOUS NITROGEN
FILTER, FLUID 1 0.5 0.5 0.05
QUICK DISCONNECT 8 0.9 7.3 0.01
REGULATOR, PRESSURE 2 0.3 0.7 0.11
SENSOR, PRESSURE 7 0.1 0.5 0.03
TANK, STORAGE 1 34.4 34.4 0.88
TUBING 1 5.3 5.3 0.01
VALVE, CHECK 9 0.1 0.9 0.01
VALVE, RELIEF 1 0.2 0.2 0.02
VALVE, TWO WAY 2 0.2 0.4 0.05
LATCHING S
FITTING, UNION TEE 7 0.1 0.7 0.03
FI1-FING, ELBOW 2 0.1 0.1 0.04
FITTING, UNION 21 0.0 0.5 0.02
FITTING, CONNECTOR 42 0.1 2.3 0.02
VALVE, MANUAL 3 0.3 0.8 0.07
OVERRIDE SH
FITTING, BULKHEAD UNION I 0.1 0.1 0.02
LIQUID NITROGEN
REGULATOR, CRYOGENIC I 1.0 1.0 0.14
PRESSURE
SENSOR, CRYOGENIC 3 0.I 0.2 0.01
PRESSURE
TANK, CRYOGENIC EXTERNAL 1 17.2 17.2 0.50
TUBING, CRYOGENIC 1 3.2 3.2 0.01
VALVE, CRYOGENIC CHECK I 0.2 0.2 0.03
VALVE, CRYOGENIC RELIEF 2 0.4 0.7 0.04
VALVE, CRYOGENIC 4 1.0 3.8 0.11
MANUAL 0
FITTING, ELBOW 3 0.1 0.2 0.04
FITTING, UNION 8 0.0 0.2 0.02
FITTING, CONNECTOR 16 0.1 0.9 0.02
FITTING, BULKHEAD UNION I 0.1 0.1 0.02
VACUUM JACKETING I 1.0 1.0 0.01
SUBSYSTEM TOTAL 209.7
0.11
0.03
0.02
0.20
0.05
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.88
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
O.02
0.11
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.50
0.01
0.03
0.04
0.08
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.04
0.03
0.06
0.20
0.03
0.10
0.03
0.05
0.88
45.00
0.04
0.10
0_03
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.03
0.04
0.50
27.00
0.04
0.10
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.06
7.00
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6.4.4.2 Scope
The USL Emergency Shower defined shall
require interfaces with several other USL
subsystems and shall be centrally located
in the laboratory in the area of most prob-
able use.
6.4.4.3 Reference Documentation
The following documents were used in the
preparation of this document.
a° N/A" Microgravity and Materials
Processing Facility (MMPF) Study
Data Release, June 1986"
b. SS-SRD-0001 "Space Station Pro-
gram Definition and Requirements
Document"
6.4.4.4
c. SS-SPEC-0002 "Contract End Item
Specification for the Space Station
United States Laboratory Module"
d. SS-IRD-0200 "Interface Require-
ments Document Customer to U.S.
Laboratory for IOC Station"
e. NASA "Technical Memorandum Life
Sciences Space Station 89188 Plan-
ning Document: Ref. A Payload for
the Life Sciences Research Facility"
Groundrules and Assumptions
The following list of groundrules and as-
sumptions were used in the development
of the data contained in this document:
a.
b.
c.
After IOC the resupply cycle will oc-
cur at 90 day intervals.
Subsystem power shall be supplied
and distributed by the USL.
Subsystem cooling shall be provided
as required by the USL.
d. The subsystem's gas pressures and
activation status shall be monitored
by the Caution and Warning System.
6.4.4.5 Requirements
6.4.4.5.1 Laboratory General
An emergency shower shall be included in
the USL outfitting.
6.4.4.5.2 Laboratory Functional
An USL Emergency Shower shall provide
the means of a quick and safe removal of
hazardous materials from a crew person's
body in the event of a laboratory accident.
6.4.4.5.4 Laboratory Derived
The following are derived requirements .
a. The shower shall be located to maxi-
mize crew access.
b. The shower shall be operating in 5
seconds or less after initial activa-
tion.
c. The shower shall be configured such
that an injured crew member may be
aided by another person.
d. The shower shall be interfaced with
the Caution and Warning System in
order to monitor operational readi-
ness/activation.
e. The shower shall be capable of deliv-
ering a minimum of 6 liters of pota-
ble or standard wash water at any
time.
f. The shower shall be sized to contain
water around the body of a 95 per-
cent USAF male whose hip flexion
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angle is approximately 90 degree (in-
jured crew member).
g. The shower shall be capable of to-
tally flushing a human body in 180
seconds after operation begins.
h. The shower facility shall be config-
ured for reuse after each operation.
6.4.4.6 Configuration Description
6.4.4.6.1 Subsystem
These arrangements permit easy and quick
access to the shower, removal of harmful
contaminants, and access to the contami-
nated individual in the shower.
The shower bag is housed in its storage
box until the door is opened, Figures
6.4.4.6.1-1 and 6.4.4.6.1-2. When acti-
vated by opening the door, the bag fills
with air from the avionics system. A dou-
ble, reinforced, overlapping slit in the side
of the bag allows entry. Breathing air and
water are activated when the breathing
mask/eye wash is removed from the wall
mount. Breathing air is supplied by the
USL Avionics Air System and water is
supplied by a three-liter storage tank. A
vacuum port shall be available to clean up
the shower and aid in its stowing. Figure
6.4.4.6.1-3 depicts the activation sequence
for these concepts.
The shower enclosure is housed in the
ceiling, Figure 6.4.4.6.1-4. The gas charge
is released, deploying the enclosure when
the hand-held shower sprayer is removed
from its mount. At the same time avionics
air is circulated in the enclosure, from the
ceiling down. When the button on the
hand held sprayer is pressed, rinse water
is emitted and the vacuum inlets are con-
nected to the waste removal system. The
vacuum inlets in the sprayer shall also be
used for clean-up and aid in stowing the
shower. Figure 6.4.4.6.1-5 depicts the ac-
tivation sequence for this concept.
In all three concepts, when the emergency
shower is initially activated the caution
and warning system is also activated in or-
der to alert other crew members of emer-
gency shower deployment.
6.4.4.6.2 Components
Table 6.4.4.6.2-I is a listing of the compo-
nents used in the USL Emergency Shower.
6.4.4.6.3 Interface to Common Module
The Common Module shall provide inter-
nal hard points for mounting the emer-
gency shower storage container and supply
lines.
6.4.4.6.4 Interface to Customer
None
6.4.4.6.5 Interface to Other Systems
Listed below are the interface require-
ments to other systems required for the
USL Emergency Shower:
a. The USL shall provide interface con-
nections from the Avionics Air Sys-
tem.
b. The USL shall provide interface con-
nections from the Waste Removal
System.
C. The caution and warning system
shall monitor pressure and activation
status of the USL Emergency
Shower.
d. The USL shall provide an interface
with the USL Electrical System.
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TABLE 6.4.4.6.2-I EMERGENCY SHOWER COMPONENTS
Component
Tubing/Ffttings
Pressure Sensor
Water Filter
Quick Disconnect
Shower Enclosure
Water Tank W/Bladder
Ducting
Butterfly Valve
Trigger Valve
Manual and Electric Valve
Gas Charge Tank
Hand Held Sprayer
Description
Stainless steel (3/8 in.)
Provides .ability to monitor pressure
Removes particulate matter from water
Interface valve w/thumb wheel shut offs
in each half to prevent leaking when
connection is broken (3/8 in.)
Flight qualified plastic tube w/air
pockets built in for inflation
Vessel w/separating wall for retaining
water under pressure (4 liter)
Aluminum walled tube, provides air flow
(3 in.)
Isolates air flow (3 in.)
Automatic opening valve when activated
Isolates system flow (3/8 in.)
Vessel for retaining nitrogen under
pressure (I liter)
Dispenses water and provides mild
vacuum removal of water
(Rinse-Vacuum Concept)
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6.4.4.6.6.6 Functional Block Diagram
The general concepts of the USL Emer-
gency Shower are shown in Figures
6.4.4.6.1-3 and 6.4.4.6.1-5.
6.4.4.6.7 Mass Properties
System components and their masses
are shown in Tables 6.4.4.6.7-I and
6.4.4.6.7-II.
6.4.4.6.8 Requirements Versus Design
Accommodations Evaluation
No restrictions identified.
6.4.5 Laboratory Support Equipment
As a part of the resource provisioning of
the USL, certain items of support equip-
ment will be manifested according to the
needs of the mission payload set. This
equipment will be selected from the list of
requirements provided by the USL and
customers from their functional analyses.
Where items of equipment are of such a
general nature and in frequent demand,
they will be installed as part of the USL
baseline configuration and although sub-
ject to change-out as circumstances dic-
tate, will remain a permanent part of the
USL. An example is the glovebox.
Other items that are in less demand but
required by and shared by a number of
users, will be provisioned and changed out
according to the mission schedule. Where
support equipment is of a specific nature
and peculiar to single customers, it will be
provided by that customer and installed to
support his immediate needs.
6.4.5.1 Equipment Sources
Where a decision is required to determine
the provisioning responsibility, costing,
pricing, etc., for a particular piece of
equipment, a method for determining
these is shown in Figure 6.4.5.1-1.
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TABLE 6.4.4.6.7-I EMERGENCY SHOWER MASS PROPERTY - CONCEPT l&2
EMERGENCY SHOWER SUBSYSTEM
ITEM
QUICK DISCONNECTS
SENSOR, PRESSURE
FILTER, POTAB LE WATER
SHOWER BAG
I
STRUCTURE
TANK, WATER W/B LADDER
TUBING/FI't-riNGS
TU BING/Fri-rlNGS AIR
DUCTING
VACUUM ATTACHMENT
VALVE, BUTTERFLY
VALVE, TRIGGER
VALVE, TWO WAY SHUT OFF
AIR MASK/EYE WASH
CONTAINER, STORAGE
DESICCANT CARTRIDGES
EMERGENCY WASH SHOWER
SUBSYSTEM
HEIGHT
0.07
0.04
0.2
1.8
1.0
0.01
0.01
0.06
WIDTH
0.07
0.04
0.55
0.9
DEPTH
0.16
0.11
0.55
0.9
0.01
0.06
0.03 0.03
0.1S 0.08
0.07 0.05
0.02
0.13
0.06
0.21
0.91
0.1
0.46
0.03
MASS
(KG)
1.0
0.5
18.1
4.9
22.6
6.2
2.2
1.0
4.5
0.02 2.5
0.09
"0.06
0.04
0.09
0.2
0.03
1.1
6.1
3.2
1.5
34.0
7.6
119.3
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TABLE 6.4.4.6.7-11 EMERGENCY SHOWER MASS PROPERTY - CONCEPT 3
EMERGENCY SHOWER SUBSYSTEM
ITEM
QUICK DISCONNECTS
SENSOR, PRESSURE
Fi LTER, POTAB LE WATER
SHOWER ENCLOSURE
STRUCTURE
ITANK, WATER W/B LADDER
TU B INCv'Fi'i'i'INGS
TUBING/FI'I'FINGS AIR
DUCTING
VALVE, 8UT'i'ERFLY
VALVE, TRIGGER
VALVE, TWO WAY SHUT OFF
HAND HELD SPRAYER
TANK, GAS CHARGE
EMERGENCY WASH SHOWER
SUBSYSTEM
HEIGHT WIDTH D EPTH
MASS
(KG)
0.07 0.07 0.16 1.8
0.04 0.04 0.11
0.2 0.55 0.55
2.13 1.07 1.07
1.0
0.01
1.0
0.01
0.01
0.06
0.08
0.01
1.0
0.5
18.1
3.9
0.06
0.15
11.3
6.2
2.2
1.8
4.5
0.09 1.1
0.06 6.10.07 0.05
0.06 0.02 0.04 3.2
0.3 0.15 0.12 0.9
0.02 0.1 0.1 3.9
0.1 0.03 0.03 7.6
65.5
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6.5 INTRODUCTION
The Logistics Elements consist of four
types of carriers to transport equipment
and fluids to the Space Station. They are a
common module derived pressurized mod-
ule, an unpressurized cargo pallet, propel-
lant carrier and an unpressurized Fluids
Carrier. The pressurized module is de-
signed to accommodate resupply and re-
turn of consumables and user hardware
and to provide ready on-orbit access with-
out Extravehicular Activity (EVA). The
pressurized module will maintain a habit-
able environment for crew activities while
providing a benign storage facility fol; user
equipment. The Fluids Carrier is designed
to accommodate Space Station ECLS and
other user fluids to the extent of their
compatibility. The propellant carrier will
provide a resupply capability for all on
station propellants. An unpressurized
cargo pallet provides the capability to
transport both fluids and dry cargo which
will be utilized external to the modules.
The pressurized Logistics Module (LM)
will be capable of docking at two center
node earth side ports of the Space Station
(SS). Space Station resources will be pro-
vided to the Pressurized Logistics Module
via this interface, which will be tailored to
provide specific logistics module interface
capability. Other LM/SS interfaces include
the Mobile Service Center (MSC) for han-
dling and transfer, a docking area for the
propellant carrier, an interface for propel-
lant transfer, a docking area for unpres-
surized cargo pallet, docking area for the
fluids carrier and an interface for fluid
transfer.
6.5.1 Requirements
System Requirements for the Logistics
Elements are contained in SS-SRD-0001.
Logistics Elements to cargo interface re-
quirements are contained in SS-IRD-300,
Logistics Elements to Space Station Inter-
face requirements in SS-IR -301, and
Logistics Elements to NSTS Interface Re-
quirements in SS-IRD-302. The major de-
sign requirements are summarized in the
following paragraphs for reference only.
6.5.1.1 General Requirements
The integrated logistics system shall sup-
port all program phases for both on-orbit
and ground operations and shall provide
the following:
a. The ability to transport cargo which
requires a pressurized environment.
b. The ability to transport cargo in an
unpressurized environment.
c. The ability to transport fluids.
d. The ability to transport propellants.
e. Provisions for the supply and control
of electrical power, thermal control,
information and data management
and communications services to
specified cargos.
f. Inventory Management System for
manifesting, ORU life cycle analysis,
and C.G. calculations.
g. Supply support of unmanned space-
craft (platforms).
6.5.1.2 System Design Requirements
The logistics system shall meet the follow-
ing design requirements:
a. Elements shall have the ability to re-
main operational for the minimum of
10 years or 40 flights through peri-
odic inspection, maintenance, refur-
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6.5.1.3
bishment and/or replacement of
components.
b. Elements gross weight and overall
dimensions will not violate shuttle
and payload bay constraints.
c. Provide meteoroid/debris protection
at a 95 percent probability of nothav-
ing a penetration for 10 years.
d. Provide docking/berthing capability to
the Space Station Nodes.
e. Impose structural ultimate factors of
safety for structural design an-
danalysis.
(1) Factor of safety of 2.0 for pressure
loading.
(2) Factor of safety 1.5 for mechanical
and thermal loading.
Pressurized Module
The Pressurized Module shall be a modi-
fied common module and shall meet the
following requirements:
a. Launch configuration of the pressur-
ized module shall fit within con-
strained volume of orbiter bay.
Provide trunion and keel fittings for
transport in the orbiter payload bay.
Provide internal volume which is op-
timized for utilization of STS lift ca-
pability.
Primary structure shall resist damage
from external sources.
b°
C°
d°
e. Provide one axial port.
f. Provide two grapple fixtures.
g. Be compatible with Space Station In-
terconnects.
h. Provide flexible outfitting.
i. Utilize standard interfaces between
cylinder and end domes and between
primary and secondary structure.
j. Utilize self extinguishing interior
walls and secondary structure.
k. Secondary structure shall resist dam-
age from internal forces.
I. - Provide one hatch capable of opera-
tion from either side.
m. Provide strength and life integrity to
sustain a manned shirt sleeve-envi-
ronment of 14.7 psia in the pressur-
ized element.
n. Provide adequate internal attachment
structure for pressurized element out-
fitting.
o. Provide an opening to accommodate
pass through of a standard rock in
any of three axle. This opening shall
be sealed with a closure which is re-
movable for ground processing.
6.5.1.4 Unpressurized Cargo Pallet
The unpressurized cargo pallet shall util-
ize common module structure to the maxi-
mum extent consistent with good design.
In addition, it shall meet the following re-
quirements:
a. Provide one grapple fitting.
b. Provide internal attachment structure
for outfitting.
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6.5.1.5 Propellant Carrier
The propellant carrier shall be capable of
transporting and storing the platform pro-
pellants and shall meet the following re-
quirements:
a. Provide trunion and keel fittings for
transport in the STS and for attach-
ment to the Space Station tower
structure.
b. Provide one grapple fitting.
c. Provide plumbing with quick discon-
nects for servicing tanks and for
transfer of propellants on station.
d. Provide storage for pressurant gas
for propellant transfer.
6.5.1.6 Unpressurized Fluids Carrier
The unpressurized fluids carrier shall pro-
vide the following:
a. It will provide compartment to sup-
port ECLSS pressurizing tanks.
b. It will provide tank support hard-
ware.
c. It will provide support brackets for
plumbing.
6.5.1.7 Subsystems
All Logistics Element subsystems shall be
common module systems to the maximum
extent consistent with good design. The
Logistics Elements subsystems shall meet
the following requirements.
6.5.1.7.1 Environmental Control and Life
Support System (ECLSS)
The ECLSS shall provide a shirt sleeve en-
vironment in the Pressurized Module suit-
able for occupancy by a two-man crew. It
shall interface with the Space Station
ECLSS as specified in the Logistics Mod-
ule to Space Station Interface Require-
ments Document. Specific performance
parameters are given in the SS-
SPEC-0003 Logistics Elements Contract
End Item Specification.
A refrigerator/freezer will be provided for
storage of food, user equipment and speci-
mens.
6.5.1.7.2 Thermal Control System
Thermal control shallbe provided to
maintain structures, subsystems, compo-
nents and customer payloads within the re-
quired temperature. Both active and
passive systems shall be provided in the
pressurized module. The active systems
shall use a water loop with cold plates
and/or heat exchangers to provide cooling
to selected equipment. Passive thermal
protection shall be provided to minimize
temperature changes during unpowered
periods while the pressurized module is
detached from the station or orbiter. Ther-
mal control of the unpressurized cargo
carrier will be provided by Multi-layer In-
sulation (ML/) only with no active sys-
tems. The active system in the pressurized
module shall interface with the Space Sta-
tion Thermal Control System as specified
in SS-IRD-301 and to the NSTS per SS-
IRD-302.
6.5.1.7.3 Electrical Power System
The pressurized module electrical power
system shall be capable of receiving and
distributing 20 KH power to selected rack
locations. In addition, the system shall be
capable of converting 28 VDC received
from the orbiter or from onboard batteries
to 20 KHz AC for distribution within the
module. The fluids carrier and the propel-
lant carrier shall be capable of receiving
20 KHz AC or 28 VDC for distribution to
status indication systems and to propellant
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heaters. The unpressurized cargo pallet
will not require electrical power. A single
point ground system shall be provided on
all powered elements. Detailed system re-
quirements are included in SS-
SPEC-0003.
6.5.1.7.4 Communications
The pressurized module communications
system shall support the transmission, re-
ception, distribution, signal processing,
and controlling of audio, commands, and
video. Multiple duplex voice channels are
required between the pressurized module
and ground facilities. The module shall
have internal wireless voice communica-
tions. Video monitoring of crew operations
within the module will be provided. The
Communications design shall provide the
capability to record, process, amplify,
mix, recognize, synthesize, switch and dis-
tribute voice and/or audio to/from internal
locations.
6.5.1.7.5 Data Management System
(DMS)
The pressurized module DMS shall pro-
vide Logistics System status information
to the Space Station through the Multipur-
pose Applications Console. Systems to be
monitored include:
a. Inventory Management System
b. ECLSS
c. TCS
d. Power
e. Customer Payload Sensors
The DMS shall also provide status infor-
mation to the STS during launch opera-
tions. The system shall use a
user-friendly, general-purpose program-
ming language with the capability to inter-
face between man and machine for
communications, display generation,
monitoring, checkout, and control. Capa-
bility shall also be provided for automatic
ground checkout.
6.5.1.8 Cargo
The 90 day resupply cargo requirements
are given in Figures 6.5.1.8-1 through
6.5.1.8-9.
6.5.1.9 Interfaces
Requirements for Interfaces of the Logis-
tics Elements to other Space Station Pro-
gram Elements are given in the following
documents:
a.
b.
SS-IRD-300, Logistics Elements to
Cargo
SS-IRD-301, Logistics Elements to
Space Station
c. SS-IRD-302, Logistics Elements to
NSTS
6.5.1.10 Reliability
Reliability programmatic requirements
shall be as specified in Space Station Pro-
gram (SSP) (J8400001), "Product Assur-
ance Requirements for the Space Station
Program." Reliability design requirements
for the logistics module are as follows.
6.5.1.10.1 Failure Tolerance
Safety critical and mission critical subsys-
tems are those whose function, if lost,
would produce a condition endangering
on-board personnel or prevent the accom-
plishment of a critical mission objective.
Safety and mission-critical subsystems
shall be designed to be fail-operational/
fail- safe/restorable, as a minimum (ex-
cept primary structure and pressure
vessels in rupture mode and premature fir-
ing of pyrotechnics). This criteria applies
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FIGURE 6.5.1.8-1 90-DAY REQUIKEMENTS-CREW SUPPORT-DRY CARGO-UP-
IOC PRIME (PRESSURIZED MODULE AND UNPRESSURIZED DRY CARGO
CARRmR)
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FIGURE 6.5.1.8-2 90-DAY REQUIREMENTS-CREW SUPPORT-DRY CARGO-
DOWIN-IOC PRIME (PRESSURIZED MODULE AND UNPRESSURIZED DRY
CARGO CARRIER)
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FIGURE 6.$.1.8-3 90-DAY REQUIREMENTS-STATION SUPPORT-DRY CARGO-
U-P-IOC PR.EvfF:. (PRESSUPJZED MODULE AND UNPRESSURIZED DRY CARGO
C__)
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 308
¢ ,,4'
ORIGINAL P,AGE I5
OF POOR QUALITY
FIGURE 6.5.1.8-4 90-DAY REQUIREMENTS-STATION SUPPORT-DRY CARGO-
DOWN-iOC PRL-'v_, (PRESSURIZED _''-''-'r' = _ cr 7=m,.,_ _,- ANq3 b%rPRESoUrRI-.,.D DRY CARGO
CARRIER)
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FIGURE 6.5.1.8-5 90-DAY REQUIREMENTS-CUSTOMER SUPPORT-DRY CARGO-
UP-IOC PRIME (PRESSURIZED MODULE AND UNPRESSURIZED DRY CARGO
CARRmR)
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FIGURE 6.5.1.8-6 90-DAY REQLTIREMENTS-CUSTOMER SUPPORT-DRY CARGO-
DOWN-IOC PRIME ('PRESSURIZED MODULE AND UNPRESSURIZED DRY CARGO
CARRIER)
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FIGURE 6.5.1.8-7 90-DAY REQUIREMENTS-STATION SUPPORT-FLUIDS-UP-IOC
PRIME (ECLSS AND LAB FLUIDS AND PROPELLANTS CARRIERS)
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FIGURE 6.5.1.8-8 9 0-DAY REQUIR.EMEN'rS-CUSTOMER SUPPORT-FLUIDS-UP-
!OC PRLM_ ('ECLSS AND LAB FLUIDS AND PROPELLANTS CARRIERS)
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FIGURE 6.5.1.8-9 90-DAY REQUIREM]ENTS-CUSTOMER SUPPORT-FLUIDS-UP-
IOC PRLM_E 0ECLSS .AND LAB FLUIDS AND PROPELLANTS CARRIERS)
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during all operational phases except initial
assembly and maintenance. For applicable
subsystems, some degraded performance
following the first failure is not precluded
by the fail-operational/fail- safe require-
ment. During assembly and maintenance,
critical SSPE subsystems shall be fail-safe
as a minimum. Other SSPE subsystems
and ground support hardware shall be de-
signed to be fail-safe/restorable. Subsys-
tems in pressurized modules shall be able
to return to normal operation after the
module has lost pressure on-orbit and
been repressurized.
6.5.1.10.2 Redundancy
a. Redundancy verification
Redundant functional paths of subsystems
shall be designed to permit verification of
their operational status in flight without
removal of Orbital Replacement Units
(ORUs).
b. Redundancy management.
SSPE subsystems design shall provide re-
dundancy management and redundancy
status to the flight or ground crew, as ap-
plicable. Safety and mission critical sub-
systems shall be designed such that no
single instrumentation failure shall cause
the loss of a redundant functional path.
6.5.1.10.3 Failure Propagation
Subsystem design shall be such that one
failure does not cause additional failures.
6.5.1.10.4 Separation of Redundant Paths
Alternate or redundant functional paths
shall be separated or protected such that
any event which causes the loss of one
functional path will not result in the loss
of the alternate or redundant functional
path(s).
6.5.1.11 Safety
The safety programmatic requirements
shall be as specified in "Product Assur-
ance Requirements for the Space Station
Program," (J8400001). The SSPEs and
ground systems shall meet the safety de-
sign requirements specified herein.
The following safety requirements are ap-
plicable to all SSP systems, subsystems,
and operations. These requirements apply
under worst-case natural and induced en-
vironments.
6.5.1.11.1 Order of Design Precedence
The Space Station design shall reflect the
following order of precedence: (1) elimi-
nation of hazards by removal of hazardous
sources and operations by appropriate de-
sign measures; (2) prevention of hazards
through the use of safety devices or fea-
tures; (3) control of hazards through the
use of warning devices, special proce-
dures, and/or emergency devices; and (4)
minimization of hazards through a main-
tainability program and adherence to an
adequate maintenance and repair sched-
ule(s).
6.5.1.11.2 Margin/Factors-of-Safety
All structures of the SSPE shall have the
positive margins of safety (MS) for all
load conditions. The following relation De-
fines MS:
allowable load
MS -- -1.0
Limit Load x Factor of
Safety (FS)
Factors of safety are assumed multiplica-
tire constants applied to maximum ex-
pected or limit loads that occur during any
phase of the hardware from manufacture
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throughout its operational life to account
for uncertainties in load definition, mate-
rial properties, dimensional discrepancies,
etc.
The design of structure of the SSPE shall
use the appropriate factors of safety de-
fined in Table 6.5.1.11.2-I.
6.5.1.11.3 General Safety Requirements
6.5.1.11.3.1 Sating
The following capabilities shall
vided by the Space Station:
a.
be pro-
Detection, containment and control
shall be provided for emergencies
such as fires, toxic contamination,
depressurization, malfunction of me-
chanical systems and rotating equip-
ment, or structural damage. Specific
procedures shall be provided for
each emergency to restore a safe op-
erating condition.
b. Isolation of any module containing
confined hazardous or toxic materials
from the remainder of the Space Sta-
tion. Emergency conditions requiring
isolation of a module shall be de-
fined on a case-by-case basis.
6.5.1.11.3.2 System failure notification
All failures of critical SSPE systems
shall be annunciated to the flight
and/or ground crew.
6.5.1.11.3.3 Pressure vessels
a. Storage containers
Potentially explosive containers shall
be located outside of habitable areas,
shall be isolated and protected so
b*
C.
d.
e,
that failure of one will not propagate
to others, and shall be designed to
leak-before-rupture. Specific safety
requirements and handling proce-
dures shall be provided for all poten-
tially hazardous materials.
Pressurized modules - All pressur-
ized modules shall be designed to
leak-before-rupture criteria. A wall
puncture due to an accident or colli-
sion shall not result in rupture. Con-
servative factors of safety shall be
provided where critical single- fail-
ure-point modes of operation cannot
be eliminated.
Pressurized lines and fittings - Pres-
surized lines and fittings shall meet
specified ultimate factors of safety.
Other pressure system components
not considered pressure vessels,
lines, and/or fittings shall have an
ultimate factor of safety equal to or
greater than 2.5.
Accessibility - All walls, bulkheads,
hatches, and seals where integrity is
required to maintain pressurization
shall be accessible for inspection,
mfiintenanee, or repair by shirt-
sleeved crewmembers.
Depressurization capability - Sys-
tems, Subsystems, or equipment lo-
cated in Space Station pressurized
volumes designed to withstand de-
compression and repressurization
shall be capable of tolerating the dif-
ferential pressure and depressurized
condition without resulting in a haz-
ard.
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TABLE 6.5.1.11.2-I FACTORS OF SAFETY
Components
General structure
Pressurized manned compartments
Pressure vessels
Pressurized lines and fittings
Less than 1.5-in. -diameter
1.5-in. -diameter or greater
Tempered or mechanically precompressed Initial FS panes
Mininum
Factors of Safety
(FS) Ultimate
1.5"
2.0
1.5
4.0
2.0
.0 e
General structure shall be designed with a yeild factor of safety
(FS) no less than 1.1. Protoflight hardware must be designed to
not yeild when subjected to validation loads.
Glass shall be designed such that the limit tensile stresses on the
glass do not exceed the surface compression of the glass, and
thus glass does not lose strength with time.
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6.5.1.11.3.4 Hazardous Accumulating of
Fluids
Provisions shall be made to prevent haz-
ardous accumulations of gases or liquids
within the Space Station. Detection, moni-
toring, and control of hazardous gases or
vapors shall be required in critical areas
and closed compartments.
6.5.1.11.3.5 Drains, Vents, and Exhaust
Ports
Drains, vents, and exhaust ports shall pre-
vent fluids, gases and/or vapors, and
flames from creating hazards to person-
nel, vehicles, or equipment.
6.5.1.11.3.6 Propellants
Safety requirements applicable to the on-
orbit servicing of solid propellant upper
stages, reaction control systems using
monopropellants, other hyperbolics, and/
or cryogenics are under development and
will be provided during the system defini-
tion phase.
6.5.1.11.3.7 Exposed surface temperatures
Exposed surfaces within modules shall not
exceed a temperature of 450C (l130F)
(with a design goal of 420C (1050F) and a
low temperature less than 160C (610F).
6.5.1.11.3.8 Explosive devices
Provisions shall be made for arming ex-
plosive devices as near to the time of ex-
pected use as feasible. Provisions shall be
made to promptly disarm explosive de-
vices when no longer in use. All pyrotech-
nic devices shall meet the design
requirements specified in the document
"Space Shuttle System Pyrotechnic Speci-
fication", JSC-08060 (J8400004).
6.5.1.11.3.9 Battery Location Design
Batteries shall be isolated and/or provided
with safety venting systems and/or explo-
sion protection. In addition, thermal con-
trol and charging/discharge protection for
batteries shall be provided, where applica-
ble.
6.5.1.11.3.10 Exposed Power Leads
The crew shall not be exposed to electrical
power leads. Ground-fault protection shall
be provided for circuitry or power distribu-
tion busses directly accessible by the flight
crew.
6.5.1.11.3.11 Fire Suppression
Capability shall be provided for detecting
and extinguishing any fire in Space Station
habitable volumes. Interior walls and see-
ondary structures shall be self-extinguish-
ing. Fire extinguishers shall be compatible
with the ECI_S and shall be non-toxic
and not produce toxic by-products.
6.5.1.11.3.12 Spacecraft with RTGs
Design of SSPE subsystems shall safely
accommodate the assembly, storage and
servicing of spacecraft which have Radio-
isotope Thermoelectric Generators
(RTGs).
6.5.1.11.3.13 Emergency equipment
Emergency life support, damage assess-
ment, and medical equipment shall be
readily accessible to the crew.
6.5.1.12 Materials
The Space Station materials requirements
for hazardous materials, flammability and
offgassing are as follows:
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a. Hazardous materials.
(1) General. The use of hazardous
materials shall be minimized;
those used shall meet the appli-
cable requirements specified in
NHB 8060.1B, "Flammability,
Odor, and Offgassing Require-
mcnts and Test Procedures for
Materials Used in Environments
that Support Combustion"
(38400003).
(2) Material radiation effects. Mate-
rials and components subject to
insidious degradation in the
Space Station ionizing environ-
ment shall not be used where
that degradation can cause or
contribute to any crew hazards.
(3) Mercury. The use of mercury or
its compounds shall be restricted.
b. Habitable volume materials which
are used in habitable volumes of the
Space Station shall meet the require-
ments of NHB 8060.1B (J8400003).
The SSP requirements for materials
and process control will be estab-
lished by NASA prior to Contract
Start Date (CSD). In the interim,
SE-R-0006, "General Specifications,
NASA JSC Requirements for Materi-
als and Processes" (J8400016) and
Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC) Document 57D506B, "Stan-
dard Materials and Process Control"
(J8400041) shall be utilized for the
appropriate requirements.
c. Flammable materials exposed to the
ambient atmosphere of Space Station
habitable volumes shall be separated
to prevent flame propagation paths.
Similarly, separation of flammable
d.
e.
materials from potential ignition
sources is required to the maximum
extent possible. Minimizing the use
of flammable materials shall be the
preferred means of hazard reduction.
Materials are considered to be non-
flammable or self-extinguishing if
they meet the applicable flammability
requirements of NHB 8060.1B
(J8400003). Reference(s) for flamma-
bility testing and material selection
guidelines shall be provided at CSD.
Materials used in Space Station hab-
itable volumes shall meet the re-
quirements of NHB 8060.1B
(J8400003) for toxic outgas constitu-
ents in the lowest operating pressure
to which they may be exposed.
Equipment or materials sensitive to
contamination shall be handled in a
controlled environment. Fluids and
materials shall be compatible with
the combined environment in which
they are employed.
(1) Materials exposed to space vac-
uum shall meet the requirements
of SP-R-0022A (J8400042) for
vacuum outgassing.
(2) Metallic materials which are ex-
posed/used in the habitable vol-
umes shall be selected and
controlled by the criteria of
MSFC Spec. 522A "Design
Guidelines for Controlling Stress
Corrosion Cracking" (J8400043).
(3) Exterior materials shall consider
atomic oxygen effects.
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6.5.1.13 Malfunction Control
Override capability - the crew must be
able to override any automatic safing or
switchover capability of functional paths.
All overrides shall be two-step operations
with positive feedback to the initiator that
reports the impending results of the over-
ride command prior to the acceptance of
an execute command. Separable func-
tional paths shall be used to prevent single
failures from causing both an unintended
auto switchover and the inability to over-
ride it.
6.5.2 System Configuration
The Logistics System consists of four ma-
jor elements. These are a Pressurized
Module, an Unpressurized Cargo Pallet, a
Propellant Carrier and an Unpressurized
Fluids Section. A brief description of each
of the elements follows.
The Pressurized Module is fabricated from
Common Module hardware. It has the
same skin, support rings, internal payload
support structure, body mounted meteor-
oid shield, one end dome, berthing port,
hatch, trunions and keel pin. The differ-
ence between it and the Common Module
is, it contains two skin segments, three
rings, one end dome is provided with a
2387.6mm (94 in) diameter opening fitted
with a ground removable cover and only
one hatch. Trunion and keel fittings are
provided.
The Unpressurized Cargo Pallet is an
2438.4mm (96 in) foot long cylindrical
segment. Equipment and storage racks
and bins are mounted the same as those in
the pressurized module. Subsystems are
not provided except for an input to the In-
ventory Management system by means of
a bar code reader.
The Propellant Carrier is a stand-alone
unit designed to transport the orbiting
platform, satellite, and Space Station pro-
pellants. It contains all tanks, plumbing,
valves, disconnects and heaters required
for transport and transfer of propellants to
the Space Station integrated Fluids Man-
agement system. This carrier is equipped
with trunion and keel fittings and can be
handled on the ground and in orbit inde-
pendently of other logistics elements.
Twenty eight volt DC power is provided by
the STS to the carrier during launch op-
erations. On-station, 20 KHz station
power is provided to the carrier.
The Fluids Segment contains tanks and
plumbing necessary to transport the
ECLSS fluids and certain laboratory gas.
The segment is equipped with ring frames
which can connect to the unpressurized
cargo pallet allowing the two units to be
transported in the STS as one unit. The
segment can also be equipped with trunion
and keel fittings to allow transport inde-
pendent of other elements.
6.5.2.1 Pressurized Module
The Logistics Systems pressurized element
is made from common module elements
consisting of a stiffened welded aluminum
structure with conical end bulkheads. The
module has a berthing port at one end
with a closure hatch hinged for inward
opening. The opening is 1270 mm (50 in)
square with 304.8mm (12 in) corner radii.
The primary rings are welded integrally to
the pressure shell and the two end rings
form the junction at the bulkhead-to-shell
joint. The external and internal ring
flanges provide attach points for the ther-
mal and meteoroid protection and for the
payload support structure.
The meteoroid, debris and radiation pro-
tection subsystem will use common mod-
ule hardware. Protection to the module
cylindrical portion is provided by the pres-
sure shell, multilayer insulation, and the
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outer 1.016mm (0.04 in) meteoroid panel.
This configuration provides for a 127ram
(5 in) standoff between the meteoroid
panel and the pressure shell. Stiffened
panels provide protection at the module
ends.
Trunion and keel pin fittings for attaching
the module within the orbiter payload bay
are located on the primary rings as shown
in Figure 6.5.2.1-1. These fittings and
pins are common module parts. The se-
lected payload bay attach points must per-
mit the cargo to fall within the center of
gravity and weight envelope specified for
orbiter payload bay cargo.
The internal configuration of the Pressur-
ized Module is shown in Figures 6.5.2.1-2
and 6.5.2.1-3.
6.5.2.2 Unpressurized Cargo Pallet
The unpressurized cargo pallet is a cylin-
drical section 2438.4 mm (96 in) long and
4165.6 mm (164 in) in diameter. The con-
figuration of the pallet is shown in Figure
6.5.2.2-1. It is used to transport cargo
which does not require environmental con-
trol for transport or storage.
6.5.2.3 Propellant Carrier
The propellant carrier configuration is
shown in Figure 6.5.2.3-1. It is designed
to transport all propellant to the Space
Station.
6.5.2.4 Unpressurized Fluids Segment
The unpressurized fluids segment is used
to transport and store all non hazardous
fluids except water. The segment consists
of a five foot long structure which contains
six 1143 mm (45 in) diameter tanks for
liquid nitrogen and helium, and two 812.8
mm (32 in) diameter tanks for liquid oxy-
gen and Argon. The segment forward and
aft ring frames are common module hard-
ware and mate directly with the pressur-
ized module and with the unpressurized
cargo carrier. Figure 6.5.2.4-1 shows the
configuration of the segment.
6.5.2.5 Outfitting
The pressurized Logistics Module shall be
provided, complete with all subsystems as
defined in Logistics Elements Contract
End Item Specification SS-SPEC-0003.
Outfitting of this module will consist of
the development and installation of racks,
an inventory management system, and a
transport status system.
Outfitting of the unpressurized carriers
includes the design, development, and
production of the various carriers. Re-
quirements for the carriers are included in
Logistics Elements Contract End Item
Specification SS-SPEC-0003.
6.6 Vehicle Accommodations
This section summarizes requirements and
general constraints, and provides some
ground rules for preliminary design. Items
coverd in this section are: 1) OMV Ac-
commodations 2) OTV Accommodations
and 3) Smart Front End.
6.6.1 OMV Accommodations
6.6.1.1 Space Station OMV
The baseline OMV configuration used for
Space Station OMV Accommodations is
described in the January, 1985, revision of
the NASA document Orbital Maneuvering
Vehicle Preliminary Definition Study pre-
pared by the Program Development office
of Marshall Space Flight Center. The ref-
erence ON_¢" configuration was updated
with information received from the NASA
OMV Program Office in September, 1985.
The update, which includes the substitu-
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tion of Helium gas as pressurant, has been
incorporated into this document. The
baseline OMV configuration is presented
in Figure 6.6.1.1-1 It is anticipated that
the OMV configuration will change as the
OMV program progresses.
The baseline OMV design is 4521.2 mm
(178 in) in diameter x 939.8mm (37 in)
thick. Its mass is 5810 kg (12808.8 lb)
fully loaded. Of the reference weight, over
50%, or 3265 kg, is storable propellant
contained within 4 oblate spheroid tanks.
The propellants are a combination of Ni-
trogen Texroxide and Monomethyl Hydra-
zinc, 6500 kg of which is estimated to be
the required SS storage capability. Sepa-
rate tanks on the OMV hold 15 kg (33.07
lb) of the pressurant Helium gas, and 80
kg (176.4 lb) of the gaseous Nitrogen used
for non-contaminating cold gas propul-
sion.
6.6.1.2 OMV Accommodations
Reference Configuration Data
The following discussion of OMV Accom-
modations configurations depends in part
upon the reference overall Space Station
configuration. Primarily this concerns lo-
cation of OMV Accommodations on the
Space Station, but includes operational
considerations such as any requirements
for direct visual observation of OMV Ac-
commodations activities, e.g., close prox-
imity flight, docking, berthing, payload
integration and vehicle inspection. The fol-
lowing data for OMV Accommodations is
from reference configuration revisions
supplied by NASA.
The station will have an OMV that will be
used to deploy and retrieve free flying
payloads and to perform in situ servicing
using OMV kits. The station will have ac-
commodations for the OMV such that the
OMV can be maintained in space. The ac-
commodations will consist of support
structure, automated umbilica!s, and an
orbital vehicle control console. The Ac-
commodations have the capability to de-
ploy, launch, capture, and berth the OMV
by use of the Canadian MSCS.
6.6.1.3 OMV Accommodations
Operations
The OMV is controlled from the Space
Station when the vehicle is within Control
Zone (CZ) 1 and 2. CZ 1 is the proximity
operations zone and consists of a 1
KMdiameter sphere centered about the
Space Station. CZ 2 is a 75 KM cube cen-
tered at the Space Station. Figure
6.6.1.3-1 indicates a typical OMV opera-
tional scenario.
An estimate of total time required to sup-
port a single OMV mission is presented in
Figure 6.6.1.3-2. Potential operations time
overlap is shown, as is time required for
operations performed only once per year.
An estimate of Space Station crew time
required to support OMV mission opera-
tions is presented in Figure 6.6.1.3-3. In-
dication is made as to whether IVA or
EVA is utilized for the various operations.
Maintenance operations include those as-
sociated with EVA scheduling, internal re-
pair activity, and equipment calibration
and adjustments. Time listed for EVA in-
dicates the time in which EVA is being
performed - EVA at the Space Station will
require two EVA crewmembers and one
IVA crewmember simultaneously.
Table 6.6.1.3-I indicates the control func-
tions that have been identified for OMV
Accommodations. Indication is given as to
whether the function is planned to be auto-
mated, performed manually, or be con-
trolled in a hybrid manner.
Automated systems shall be incorporated
into the control of Vehicle Accommoda-
tions elements. One automated system will
be used to monitor the vehicles and their
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FIGURE 6.6.1.1-1 BASELINE OMV SPACE STATION CONFIGURATION
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OMV SERVICING CREW REQUIREMENTS
Crew Time Req'd
(hours per operation)
Propellant re-supply 2.75 (IVA)
Inspection 2 (IVA)
Battery charging .25 (IVA)
System and interface checkout 4 (I_A)
Preflight Tests + Launch 5 (IVA)
Retrieval OPS 8 _(_(_A)
ORU changeout (if required)
Maint. OPS (if required)
Payload Handling (if required)
2 (EVA) annually
9 (IVA) annually
2 (EVA), 2 (I'VA)
FIGUR_ 6.6.1.3-3 OMV ACCOMMODATIONS
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TABLE 6.6.1.3--IOMV ACCOMMODATIONS CONTROL FUNCTIONS
Flight Control
Docking and Berthing
Deployment
Payload Integration {mate/de-mate)
Subsystem Monitoring
Subsystem Check-out
Fluid Resupply
ORU Change-out
Safing
Automated Manual
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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accommodations. This system will track
the subsystems' status, report any discrep-
ancies, follow trendlines, supply summa-
ries to the crew, and be able to
reconfigure to redress anomalies. In addi-
tion to monitoring functions, fluid transfer
and system checkout operations will also
be highly automated. The automated func-
tions will allow Space Station crew time to
be spent more effectively.
6.6.1.3.1 Flight control
The OMV is piloted from the Space Sta-
tion within CZ 2. The flight control is
transferred between the Space Station
OVCC and the GCS as the OMV reaches
the boundaries of CZ 2. Within control
zones 1 and 2 the vehicles are monitored
by Ground Control Stations (GCS), which
have the capability to assume control of
the vehicles, should multiple Space Station
system failures cause loss of control from
orbit.
6.6.1.3.2 Docking, Berthing, Deployment,
and Payload Integration
The Space Station M1LMS is employed to
dock to the vehicles when they are in the
immediate vicinity of the Space Station,
and is used to transport the vehicles and
their payloads to storage locations, and to
berth them in those locations. The MRMS
is used to transport ORUs and fluid tank-
ers about the SS, and to assist in the mat-
ing of the vehicles and their payloads.
Likewise the MRMS is used to deploy the
vehicles and payloads. This requires the
capability to control the MRMS and the
OMV flight during consecutive portions of
the vehicle flight operations.
6.6.1.3.3 Monitoring
All OMV subsystems require monitoring
while the vehicles are being operated. In
addition, the accommodations subsystems
require monitoring during all times. The
subsystems include fluid storage, fluid
conditioning, fluid transfer, electronics
subsystems, and maintenance subsystems.
The monitoring function is automated,
with notification of anomalies made to the
crew.
6.6.1.3.4 Check-out
OMV and accommodations elements re-
quire periodic check-out to ascertain
whether they are operating correctly, espe-
cially after being serviced.
6.6.1.3.5 Service and Maintenance
The OMV and accommodations require
regular service and occasional mainte-
nance. The OVCC accommodates activity
scheduling, inventory tracking, procedures
Control, and contingency plans.
Additional detailed information on OMV
accommodations can be found in Boeing
Document D483-50022-6, Vol I (DR-02)
dated October 31, 1986.
6.6.20TV Accommodations
6.6.2.1 Space Station OTV Reference
Configuration Data
The current phase of design of the OTV
leaves many critical areas still under con-
sideration, most notably the manner of
aero-assisted braking to be used with the
vehicle. Raked cones, shields and ballutes
have substantial geometric differences, as
well as differences in their servicing re-
quirements for regular re-use. The vari-
ations in possible OTV design concepts
and missions also result in changes in the
accommodations facilities, from size and
shape of hangar to the spares storage fa-
cilities and propellant resupply volumes
required.
The following OTV Space Station refer-
ence configuration description was pro-
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vided by NASA on August 30, 1985. This
data will be used for initial OTV accom-
modations analyses. See Figure 6.6.2.1-1.
OTV Envelope: 10972.8mm (432 in)
in length
13411.2mm (528 in)
diameter Aerobrake
Propellant LO 2
LH2
RCS Hydrazine
OTV Weight 31297.7 KS
(69,000 lb)
6.6.2.2 OTV Accommodations
Reference Configuration Data
The SBOTV at the FOC station will trans-
fer payloads to and from higher energy or-
bits. The initial spaced based OTV
accommodations will be sized to support
the OTV Program Phase A, Rev 8A low
mission model through the manned GEO
missions. Phase A OTV studies indicate
one single stage OTV can perform the Rev
8A low mission model up to but not in-
cluding the lunar missions. The OTV ac-
commodations must grow to allow the
support of lunar missions which require a
dual stage OTV stack.
The initial SBOTV accommodations will
consist of fluid storage, conditioning, and
transfer equipment, a maintenance and re-
pair facility, and a Multipurpose Applica-
tions Console (IVIPAC). The MPAC will be
located in a pressurized area and will be
used to monitor, checkout and control the
OTV and its accommodations.
The fluid storage facility will be capable
of storing 90,100 kg (200,000 Ib) of cryo-
genic propellants. This storage capacity
will be updated when final Phase A OTV
study results are available. The initial
OTV accommodations mass on the FOC
station is estimated to be 115,700 Kg
(254,530 lb). This estimate includes a dry
OTV, a tank farm with propellant, ORU's,
service and maintenance facility, and
ancillary equipment. See Table 6.6.2.2-1,
OTV Accommodations Mass Summary.
The OTV accommodations mass will in-
crease during the growth period because
of the additional OTV stage required for
Lunar missions and its storage facility.
It is anticipated that the OTV Space Sta-
tion Reference Configuration will be af-
fected by the Phase A OTV study. Three
Phase A contractors are generating OTV
concepts. Currently no Phase A OTV ref-
erence configuration exists. The SBOTV
IOC is scheduled for 1999 in the Phase A
Rev 8A low mission model. Figure
6.6.2.2-1 shows a typical operations sce-
nario.
6.6.2.3 OTV Accommodations Growth
The following discussion is based on the
Rev 8A, OTV mission model. The model
has two levels of flight frequency.
These flight frequencies are designated
"low" and "nominal." The low model rep-
resents a level of activity which character-
izes a level budget and utilization of
existing launch facilities and vehicles. The
nominal model represents a level of activ-
ity which characterizes a slow net gain in
NASA budget and the acquisition of facili-
ties, equipment and vehicles to allow a
yearly shuttle launch rate growing to ap-
proximately 40 flights per year.
Lunar missions identified in the mission
models drive on station growth of the OTV
Accommodations. Lunar missions first oc-
cur in 2006 and 2015 for the nominal and
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Vehicle -10972.8--. (432 in)
in Length
\
13411.2mm (528 in)
Diameter Aerobrake
FIGURE 6.6.2.1-1 OTV SPACE STATION REFERENCE CONFIGURATION
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TABLE 6.6.2.2-I OTV ACCOMMODATIONS MASS SUMMARY
TABLE 2.1-I OT1/ ACC01_tODATIONS )4ASS SUMHARY
g
Propellant Resupply and Storage
LH 2 Tank System (2) 1555
LO 2 Tank System (Z) 3480
Propellant Transfer Equipment
Propellant Storage System
Translator (Z) 1400
OTV Resupply Tanker
OTV Maintenance and Checkout Facility
OTV Berthing Assembly
Tools and Support Equipment
Payload Integration Stand
OTV Storage Facility
- Hangar
013/
LO 2
LH 2
TOTAL
Mass lbs.
3110
6960
1480
2800
3770
1200
760
380
25,000
9,070
171,430
_8.570
254,530 lbs
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FIGUR.E 6.6.2.2-1 SPACE STATION OPERATIONS SCENARIOS
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low mission models respectively. Figures
6.6.2.3-1 through 6.6.2.3-2 is a summary
of mission frequencies for each level.
Enlargement of the original storage and
maintenance facility must be completed
before the first 80 K lb lunar delivery mis-
sion. No 80 K lb lunar missions are sched-
uled in the low model, however Figure
6.6.2.3-3 indicates a projected time for 80
K lb lunar missions. These projections are
beyond the Rev 8A mission model enve-
lope of 2010. Enlarging the existing facil-
ity would increase its size to 16.4 x 19.2 x
27.4 meters (54 x 63 x 90 feet).
Additional detailed information on OTV
accommodations can be found in Boeing
Document D483-50022-6, Vol Ill (DR02)
dated October 31, 1986.
6.6.3 Smart Front End
This section summaries specific design re-
quirements and general design constraints
for Smart Front End.
6.6.3.1 Documented Requirements
General SFE performance and interface
requirements are provided or referenced
in document SS-SPEC-0009 "Contract
End Item for Space Station Smart Front
End."
6.6.3.2 Derived Requirements
The documented requirements are of a
general nature and do not include the spe-
cific customer servicing data necessary for
preliminary design. This includes ORU de-
signs, manipulation requirements, fluid
types and quantites, mission timelines,
etc. Therefore, the developement of re-
quirements for the SFE and OMV Mission
Kits were derived from sources such as
the Langley Data Base, BDM report
(OSSA Space Station Servicing Data
Book), Customer Servicing Requirements
Report JSC 30000 Section 5, STS EVA
Description and Design Criteria JSC
10615, Rev A, RUR-2 Platform Require-
ments input from WP-03 and Space Sta-
tion Maintenance Requirements from
WP-01.
6.6.3.3 Ground Rules
The following ground rules apply to the
SFE and OMV Mission Kits:
a.
b.
MCS is able to handle and transfer
the SFE and Kits.
Micrometeoroid and debris protection
are not required.
e. SFE and Mission Kits are based at
the Space Station.
d. The Space Shuttle will resupply the
Space Station at 90 day intervals.
e. The reference configuration (dual
keel) of the Space Station will be
used.
f. The MSFE reference design of the
OMV will be used.
g. ORU and fluid resupply from ground
to orbit is not a SFE responsibility.
6.6.3.4 General Description
The SFE is a modular system consisting of
a telerobotic system, ORU carrier, fluid
resupply system and tools. Additional
module kits such as power and communi-
cation kits will be added if deemed neces-
sary. At this time the reference OMV, or
MSC can handle the interface require-
ments on Table 6.6.3.4-1. A drawing tree
is shown in Figure 6.6.3.4-1. Table
6.6.3.4-11 and Figure 6.6.3.4-2 provides
list of SFe elements and dipicts the SFE
configuration respectively.
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PAYLOAD
NO. SERIES
13000
13000
13000
15000
15000
15000
17000
17000
17000
17000
17000
18000
18000
19000
MISSION GROUP
EXPERIMENTAL GEO PLATFORM
OPERATIONAL GEO PLATFORM
UNMANNED PLAT. SERVICING
MANNED GEO SORTE
GEO SERVICE STATION ELEMENTS
GEO SERIVCE STA. LOGISTICS
PLANETARY
UNMANED LUNAR
MANNED LUNAR SORTE
LUNAR BASE ELEMENTS
LUNAR BASE SORTE/LOGISTICS
MULTIPLE GEO PAYLOAD DELIVERY
LARGE GEO SATELLITE DELIVERY
DOD (GENERIC)
WEIGHT(LB)
UP/DOWN
12000/0
2000/0
7000/4500
LENGTH
(FT)
30
35
9
MISSION
MODEL
LOW NCM
1 1
5 6
1 1
7500/7500 10 3 17
13000/0 15-20 2 2
12000/2000 15 5 26
2000-4000/0 5-35 6 14
5000-20000/0 20 2 2
80000/15000 50 0 3
80000/0 53 0 3
80000/10000 60 0 6
12000/2000 25 46 79
20000/0 20-35 3 7
SUBTOTALS
12000-20000
(EQUIV)
10100 REFLIGHTS
TOTALS
48 85
142 252
3 5
145 257
IOC (YEAR)
2000/1995
2004/1993
2001/1995
2008/2002
20001998
2004/1998
1994/1994
2007/2001
2015/2006
2020/2008
2021/2009
1994/1994
2001/1997
1959/1994
1996/1997
FIGURE 6.6.2.3-30TV MISSION MODEL COMPOSITION SUMMARY
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TABLE 6.6.3.4-I SFE INTERFACE REQI.2fl_MENTS
Accommodations Interfaces
Physical
Mechanical
Electrical
Data
Ruids
(3,000 lb, 1 truss bay)
includes fluids & ORUs
4 Iruss nodes
1 automatic electric uml:=lical
50-100 watts
Negfig_le
None
Physical
Mechanical
Electrical
Data
Ruids
Operation Interfaces (with OMV, SS MSC)
65.00 Ibs, 14 x 14 x 7 It (includes fluids & ORUs)
2 active and 1 passive lTunnion/keel pin latches (to SS)
2 RMS grapple fittings with electrical umbilical (to OMV & MCS) e[ec-
bical umb=lical (to SS}
1420 watts (peak)
3. Mpbs video signal (2 color cameras)
1-2 Kpds command data rate 2 Kpds rebJm data rate
None
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I
SFE
Accommodations
- Berthing
Adaptor
Assy
-- Trunnion
• arch Assy
t Keel Pin
Restraint
Assy
Electrical
Umbilical
Assy
[-- Wire
Harness
Assy
I
ORU Carrier
- Structural
Frame Assy
- Positioning
Arm Assy
-- Satellite
Interface
Mechanism
Assy
- Camera &
Light Assy
- Video
Processor
- Controller &
Ins_amentation
- Wire Harness
Assy
- ORU Holder
Assy
I
I
Fluid Resupply
System
SMART FRONT
END
- Structural
Frame Assy
-- Fluid Storage
Assy
- Fluid Dist.
Assy
- Controller &
Instrumentation
- Inmrfacm
Assy
- Wire Harness
Assy
I
Control Station
-- Structural
Frame Assy
- Hand Control
Assy
- Video
Monitor Assy
- Controller &
Instrumentation
- Wire Harness
Assy
I
SFE Tool Set
i
J
- Sdssan
Assy
- Module
Servicing
Tool
- Wrench
Set
-- Tape
Dispenser
-- Tethers
I
Telerabatic
System (Trierm
End Eft.)
-- Structural
Frame Assy
-- Manipulator
Arm Assy
- Camera &
Light Assy
- Video
Processor
_ Controller &
Instrumentation
- Wire Harness
Assy
FIGURE 6.6.3.4-1 SFE DRAWING TREE
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TABLE 6.6.3.4-1I SMART FRONT END ELEMENTS
.
iTEM
_i"eleroba_c System
Structural Frame
Manipulator Arm Assay
Canlera
Ughts
End Effector
Wire Harness Assy
Camera Control & Video Processing
Cont_0iler
Grapple Fitting (with"elec. interface)
Interface Assy
JContTol Stal_on
SFE Tool Set
Scissors
Tape 0ispenser
MSTTooi
I
Wrench Set
SFE Accommodations
Berthing Fixture
Wire Harness
interface Assy
ORU Carrier
StTucturai Frame
Pos/Uoning/Manipulator Arm
Camera
Ughts
ii
W'ne Harness Assy
i
Camera Conool & Video Processing
i
Hydra_ne Refueler
Structural Frame
Fluid Storage Assy
_u_u oisc.Assy
Insa'umenCalr_on & Cona'ai ,_ssy
Interface Ass'y
QUAmlT'r
i ,.
1
3
ill i
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
TSO
Q
i
1
1
1
1
i
o
1
1
1
1
1
TBO
i
1"80
i 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
)
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TABLE 6.6.3.4-IISMART FRONT END F_J._EMENTS(Cont'd)
Software
ITEM
Arm Control Analyzer (positioning arm)
Arm Control Analyzer (positioning arm)
Video Signal Handler
Health Monitoring Handler
Proximity Sensing Handler
End Effector Analyzer
QUANTITY
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FIGURE 6.6.3.4-2 SMART FRONT END
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6.6.3.4.1 Telerobotic System With OMV:
The telerobotic system is a humaniod type
manipulator consisting of at least a body
like base, three manipulator arms, a head
camera, grapple fittings, wire harness and
electronics.
The base is approximately 203.2 x 304.8 x
457.2 mm (8 x 12 x 18 in). It will be made
out of aluminum or graphite epoxy. A
grapple fitting is fitted to the back of the
base. The grapple fitting has an electrical
receptacle for operating on the MSC posi-
tioning arms. An interface utilizing the
grapple fitting electric receptacle will also
be designed for mounting on the ORU car-
rier positioning arm. The manipulator
arms are 660.4 mm (26 in) long. They in-
corporate end effectors, controls, motor
modules, joints and heaters. A camera
may be mounted on the wrist of each arm.
A head camera may also be used. It is
mounted on a 152.3mm (6 in) "neck" and
the base of the neck has pan and tilt capa-
bilities. The electronics consist of a data
processor. A video processor may also be
used.
The telerobotic system is used as an end
effector for either the ORU carrier posi-
tioning arm or the MSC arm.
6.6.3.4.2 ORU Carrier
The ORU carrier consists of a structural
frame, positioning arm, cameras, satellite
interface, OMV interface, payload inter-
faces and electronics. Figuro 6.6.3.4.2-1
through 6.6.3.4.2-6 describe these compo-
nents.
6.6.3.5 Interfaces With Other Elements.
The following describes the various ele-
ments the SFE interfaces with, the possi-
ble interfaces, and the interfaces chosen
for the SFE.
The SFE may use any of the three struc-
tural interfaces with the OMV: the grap-
pie, the FSS latches or the trunnions and
keel pin. The grapple and the FSS also
have electrical umbilicals associated with
them that the SFE may use. A unique
electrical umbilical may be required if the
trurmions and keel pin are used (a front
mounted SFE could use the grapple in
conjunction with the trurmions and keel
pin). The Boeing Phase B SFE concept
uses the grapple fixture.
The current grapple can handle up to 1200
ft-lb torque. The reference MSFC OMV
can input a torque upto 1750 ft-lb. This
discrepancy may be corrected as better
OMV definition is available. As a last re-
sort, the interface may be changed. It is
notable that this problem is not unique to
the SFE, satellites that use the grapple to
interface with the OMV will also have this
concern.
With Satellite:
Six possible ways to interface with satel-
lites have been identified:
- grapple fitting used by OMV
- grapple fittings other than above
- FSS pins used by OMV
- trunnions and keel pins
- EVA handholds
- EVA foot restraint sockets
Of the above interfaces, only the grapple
fitting and FSS pins used by the OMV
have associated electrical connections;
also, these interfaces must be used when
reboosting the satellite. The Boeing Phase
B SFE concept uses these interfaces for
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FIGURE 6.6.3.4.2-1 SMART FRONT END, EXPLODED VIEW
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hard docking. The other interfaces may be
used by the telerobitic system for stability.
With Satellite ORU's (Positioning Arm/
Telerobotic System):
ORU interfaces currently consist of:
- EVA handholds
- 7/16" bolt heads
- (TBD) appendage drive heads
- MMS attachment
- EVA wing tab electrical connectors
- latch handles
- switches
- RMS grapple fittng
- other interfaces in current develope-
merit for platforms
- Through the use of grippers and
various end effectors, the SFE will
interface all the above ORU inter-
faces.
With Satellite ORUs (ORU Carrier):
- The mounting scheme between the
ORU carrier and the satellite ORUs
has not been defined. If possible, it
will be common with the exterior lo-
gistics carrier.
With Space Station:
- SFE Accommodations interface with
the truss node, the Space Station
power system, DMS system and com-
munications system. Physical charac-
teristics are not yet known.
The SIZE control station is part of
the MPAC.
The SFE shall have a grapple fitting
with electrical connectors for inter-
facing with the MSC.
With Ground:
An SFE ground control station shall
interface with the OMV ground con-
trol station.
6.6.3.6 Operation Scenario
The purpose of the Smart Front End
(SFE) is to reduce OMV propellant and
EVA costs. The module system can handle
the total servicing requirements of most
satellites reviewed.
This system operates in three modes as
follows: 1) attached to the OMV, 2) at-
tached to the MSC, and 3) attached to the
SFE Space Station Accommodations.
6.6.3.6.1 Teleroboties System Attached
to the MSC
The MSC positioning arm attaches to the
grapple fitting located on the back of the
telerobotic system (TRS). The positioning
arm provides power, communications and
data to the telerobotic system via the grap-
ple electrical connector. The telerobotic
system releases from its berthing fixture
on either the ORU carrier or accommoda-
tions. The MSC transfers the TRS to the
SS maintenance ORU storage area. The
TRS picks out the replacement part and
attaches it to the MSC base. The MSC
transfers the TRS to the servicing location.
The TRS attaches one or two manipulator
arms to the serviced element structure for
stability and removes the replaced part.
The part is transferred to the MSC base
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and the replacement part is picked up.
The replacement part is installed. The pro-
cedure is then reversed. If the ORU can be
replaced with only one TRS arm, the ORU
may not have to be stowed on the MSC
base.
6.6.3.6.2 SFE Attached to the OMV
A SFE operation is described for the SFE
replacing a satellite multi- mission modu-
lar spacecraft (MMS) module and elec-
tronic box.
It is determined that two ORU's need re-
placement on a satellite. New ORU's are
mounted on the logistics pallet and flown
to the Space Station. The pallet is re-
moved from the Shuttle and transferred to
the SFE.
The ORU's are mounted on racks that in-
terface with the pallet and the ORU car-
rier. If necessary, the rack has a box for
protecting the ORU's. The ORU rack is
transferred by the SFE positioning arm
from the pallet to the ORU carrier. If nee-
essary, an electrical umbilical is mated to
the rack. The MSC then grabs the SFE.
The SFE fixture latches are opened, the
MSC transfers the SFE to the OMV. The
SFE and OMV are mated. Still holding to
the SFE, the MSC transfers th¢_'SFE-OMV
to a release point. The OMV flies the SFE
to the satellite. The SFE docks to the satel-
lite. If needed, power is supplied from the
SFE to the satellite. The SI_ positioning
arm attaches to a module servicing tool
(MST). The arm then detaches the re-
placed MMS module from the satellite and
places it in a temporary fixture on the
ORU carrier. Leaving the MST in the re-
placed MMS module, the arm end effector
opens the cover of the rack box (if neces-
sary). The end effector thert reattaches to
the MST and the arm removes the replace-
ment MMS module from its box and in-
stalls it on the satellite. The arm installs
the replaced MMS module in the box and
closes the box.
The replacement of the second ORU is a
detailed task requiring the telerobotic sys-
tem. The replacement involves such jobs
as cutting and taping MLI, installing hinge
pins, removing bolts and removing EVA
wing tab type electrical connectors.
The positioning arm attaches to the TRS.
The TRS grabs a tool (such as a scissors),
and the positioning arm transfers the TRS
to the satellite ORU. The TRS performs
detailed work, changing tools as required.
When the ORU is changed out, the TRS is
stored, the positioning arm restrained, and
the OMV flies the SFE back to the Space
Station.
It is anticipated that at least 50% of satel-
lite servicing can be accomplished by the
positioning arm without the TRS. To re-
duce actuators, the positioning arm will
also deploy the camera booms and actuate
the satellite interface/stabilizer mecha-
nism. Figure 6.6.3.6.2-1 shows the SFE
servicing SPARTAN.
6.6.3.7 SFE Accommodations
The Space Station SFE accommodations
consist of a berthing adaptor that supports
the SFE and hydrazine resupply modules.
The SFE is mounted in such a way to pro-
vide easy positioning arm access to the
MSC (for self loading) and easy MSC and
EVA access to the SFE. The hydrazine
modules are located to allow self loading
by the positioning arm (if allowed) and
loading by the MSC. The accommodations
adaptor is attached to the Space Station in
close proximity to the OMV to limit MSC
travel during stackup. Optimally, the
adaptor will also be close to the enternal
ORU storage area and S.S. hydrazine
resupply area to limit MSC travel when
loading the SFE.
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FIGURE 6.6.3.6.2-1 SFE SERVICING SPARTAN
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SFE accommodations also include control
station both at the Space Station and on
ground. The Space Station Control Station
is MPAC. A ground station that interfaces
with the OMV control transmission and re-
ception will be provided for situ servicing
(a ground based activity).
Detailed information on SFE can be found
in Boeing Document D483-50022-6, Vol
II, Rev C (DR-02) dated October 31,
1986.
6.7 Propulsion System
The reference propulsion subsystem con-
cept selected for the Space Station is
bipropellant gaseous oxygen and hydrogen
from water electrolysis. This system repre-
sents state-of-the art design, low-to-mod-
erate initial cost, high performance and
low life-cycle cost. This concept is de-
scribed herein for the baseline configura-
tion IOC Space Station.
Propulsion subsystem impulse require-
ments for the Space Station dual-keel con-
figuration were provided by the Reboost
working group. During the course of these
comparative studies, propulsion require-
ments were defined to provide altitude
maintenance through reboost, backup atti-
tude control, collision avoidance, infre-
quent desaturation of control moment
gyros, and damping and stabilization of
the station during docking procedures.
Growth station impacts were considered
and determined not to have a significant
impact on the design of the propulsion
system.
Other propulsion concepts or combined
concepts may be more beneficial to the
overall Space Station program by offering
reduced resupply costs, integration with
other subsystems, the ability to efficiently
dispose of unneeded consumables, the
enabling of more efficient strategies for
formation flying with platforms, reduced
contamination, and/or reduced overall
life-cycle costs. Representative of such
subsystems are different versions of gase-
ous oxygen/hydrogen, gaseous neon, gase-
ous nitrogen, waste gases and low-thrust
resistojets.
6.7.1 Propulsion Subsystem
Requirements
The propulsion subsystem is required to
perform the altitude maintenance and atti-
tude control maneuvers. However, for the
reference configuration, the CMGs and
magnetic torquers are assumed to be the
primary control effectors for performing
the attitude control function. Therefore,
the propulsion requirements were as-
sumed to fall into two major categories:
1)those that can be done only by the pro-
pulsion subsystem and 2)those in which
the propulsion subsystem operates in the
event that another subsystem fails and a
backup capability is required. The primary
requirements are:
a. Reboost and orbit adjustment
b. Collision avoidance
C. Accommodation of disturbances re-
suiting from docking, berthing, and
movement of objects by the manipu-
lator
d. Maintenance of an adequate propel-
lant reserve margin.
The backup requirements are:
e. Three-axis stabilization in the event
of failure of momentum exchange
devices (in this event, control is pro-
vided at a reduced level)
f. Desaturation of the momentum ex-
change devices.
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6.7.1.1 Guidance, Navigation and
Control Requirements
The GN&C requirements and strategy dic-
tate the propulsion subsystem design and
operation. The input for the GN&C comes
from the operational requirements and the
payload accommodation needs. Require-
ments applicable to propulsion are:
a. All credible failures of critical sys-
tem shall have fail operational/fail
safe/restorable levels of redundancy
except for pressure vessels
b. Selective or total inhibits shall be
available for EVA operations
c. Propellant usage data base shall be
provided.
6.7.1.2 Requirements
6.7.1.2.1 Operational Requirements
The operational requirements pertain to
restrictions and needs based on the overall
Space Station. Those requirements perti-
nent to propulsion are:
a. The Space Station shall not perform
any maneuvers during docking/berth-
ing operations
b. Maintenance operations including
resupply shall consider EVA a lim-
ited resource
c. Maintenance operations shall mini-
mize the need for special skills
suchas soldering and welding or time
consuming procedures
d. Removal, repair, or replacement of
equipment shall be at the ORU level-
without the need for special fixtures
e. Subsystems shall be as functionally
independent as possible tofacilitate
maintenance
f. Subsystems shall be automated to the
fullest extent possible
g. The program shall support the rapid
assimilation of new technology with-
out requiring major redesign or re-
validation
h. The station will be resupplied by the
Orbiter on a 45, 60 or 90-day basis.
6.7.1.2.2 Customer Accommodation
Requirements
One critical customer accommodation re-
quirement that impacts the propulsion
subsystem is, that the steady state gravity
level of the station shall be designed for
0.3 micro g's or less.
6.7.1.2.3 System Requirements
Requirements placed on all subsystems
are:
a. SSPEs shall have the ability to re-
main operational indefinitely through
periodic maintenance.
b. Onboard spares shall be provided
c. Maintenance of ORUs shall not intro-
duce hazardous conditions
d. Contaminants from external sources
shall be limited.
6.7.1.2.4 Safety Requirements
Safety requirements that have a particular
impact on the propulsion subsystem are:
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a. Materials in the habitable volumes
shall not outgas toxic constituents
b. Toxic fluid storage or lines shall be
external to the pressurized volumes.
6.7.2 Propulsion Subsystem Baseline
Configuration Description
The propulsion subsystem consists of four
propulsion modules containing thruster
clusters and multiple accumulator tanks,
one propellant production subsystem con-
taining water electrolysis units and dryers,
and one centralized storage facility (con-
sisting of two propulsion modules and a
propellant distribution system. A sche-
matic of the propulsion subsystem is
shown in Figures 6.7.2-1A - 6.7.2-1E.
The propellant production system gener-
ates oxygen and hydrogen gas via a static-
feed water electrolysis unit. Water from
the shuttle, ECLSS, or MTL is electro-
lyzed using a bootstrapping technique. Af-
ter electrolysis, the "wet" gases are dried
through molecular sieve dryers, which ab-
sorb moisture left in the gases after elec-
trolysis. These gases are then distributed
out to the four propulsion modules and
central storage facility and stored in high-
pressure accumulator tanks. The tanks are
filled on a continuous basis.
Impulse requirements used to size the pro-
pulsion system and determine the average
resupply requirements are shown in Figure
6.7.2-2. A 2-sigma atmosphere was used
for sizing the accumulator tanks and water
electrolysis units, while a nominal atmos-
phere was used to determine resupply re-
quirements on a 90-day basis. In addition
to the 2-Sigma impulse requirement, a
15% contingency was added to include
backup attitude control, docking distur-
bances, CMG desaturation, collision
avoidance and reserves. Accumulators
were sized assuming a 30-day reboost
strategy. The four thruster clusters are lo-
cated in a pattern that accommodates the
varying location of the Space Station cen-
ter of gravity. Thruster cluster locations
are shown in Figure 6.7.2-3. Thruster fir-
ing directions provide torques about the X
and Y axes of the Space Station and trans-
lational capability along the X-axis.
Other significant system features and
characteristics:
Peak power includes electrolyis and valve
actuation during thruster firings. Average
power requirements include electrolysis on
a continuous basis only.
Propellant Production Facilities
Two static-feed water electrolysis units
are dedicated to the propulsion system.
Only one unit is required to operate at a
time. The water electrolysis system (WES)
uses excess water from either the Shuttle,
ECLSS, MTL or some combination. A
"bootstrapping" method is used to pres-
surize the incoming water up to 1,000 or
3,000 psia. This method utilizes high-
pressure oxygen, generated from the
ECLSS water electrolysis unit, to pressur-
ize water which is drawn into a small ac-
cumulator tank. After the water is
pressurized from 1 atm to 1,000 or 3,000
psia, it is expelled into the water electroly-
sis unit. After this has been completed,
the accumulator tank is regulated back
down to 1 atm and the oxygen is dumped
into the atmosphere of the modules. The
electrolysis process requires 2.227 kw-hrs/
Ibm of H20 electrolyzed, or an average of
1.3 kw of power.
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• Propellant distribution system
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6.7.2.1 Lines and Valves
6.7.2.1.1 The propellant Distribution and
Valving
The propellant distribution system of the
Space Station O2/H2-connected modular
propulsion system configuration is de-
signed to provide and control the flow of
propellant from the propellant production
system to the accumulator tanks in the
Central Storage Facility (CSF) and the
propulsion modules at the four comers of
the Space Station and, finally, to the thrus-
ters. The propellant distribution system
will also be able to provide emergency 02
to the crew and to supply excess H2, gen-
erated by the ECI_S, to the accumulator
tanks. Single redundant lines are provided
as backup in case of line rupture. Propel-
lant transfer between modules to accom-
modate shifts in the station center of
gravity will also be possible. Approxi-
mately 6.35mm (.25 in) lines will be used
to distribute the oxygen and hydrogen to
the central storage facility and 9.525mm
(.375 in) lines from the CSF to the mod-
ules. Line heaters and interconnects be-
tween lines will not be necessary, due to
the extremely low freezing point of oxygen
and hydrogen, and to the nature of the
capillary lines. Approximately 341.38 mm
(1,120 ft) of propellant line is required.
6.7.2.2 Propellant Storage Facilities
Due to the low package efficiency (i.e.,
low density), both the oxygen and hydro-
gen require large, high-pressure accumu-
lator tanks to store the required amount of
readily available propellant. At a storage
pressure of 1,000 psia and a temperature
of 200F., the oxygen has a density of
7.051 lbm/ft3 and hydrogen of .391 Ibm/
ft3. Each propulsion module can store
75,000 lbf/sec impulse or 193 Ibm of pro-
pellant at a mixture ration of 8:1 under
these storage conditions.
The tanks are composite, allowing for
lower system weight at high pressure than
metallic tanks could offer. The oxygen
tanks use an inconel 718 liner with an
IM-6 graphite/epoxy overwrap. The in-
conel liner is used to avoid spontaneous
ignition of the oxygen with other metals
(i.e., aluminum) when stored at high pres-
sures and struck by high-speed particles
or hydrocarbons. The hydrogen tanks use
6061-T6 aluminum liner with an IM-6
graphite/epoxy overwrap.
Each module has six hydrogen tanks and
two oxygen tanks. This allows for better
packaging, given the volume constraints
during build-up and assembly. It also al-
lows for better fail-safe/fail-operational
capability.
6.7.2.3 Avionics/Controller
The propellant utilization and manage-
ment system is designed to gauge propel-
lant quantities, control intertank propellant
usage, control propellant flow rate, control
propellant production rates, and to interact
with the ECLSS, fluid management sys-
tem, power, and MTL.
The operational strategy for the O2/H 2
propulsion system involves feeding off all
accumulator tanks simultaneously during
thrusting procedures. On a continuous or
non-continuous basis, propellant will be
generated so that all tanks will have de-
pleted propellant replenished within 30
days of thrusting. Dual isolation valves in
both direction on the 02 lines will allow
for emergency 02 to be sent to the crew
modules.
The propellant utilization and manage-
ment system has temperature sensors and
pressure transducers on all tanks, thrus-
ters, and lines, in order to monitor these
systems. Components of the Space Station
propulsion system will interface directly
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with the DMS. The GN&C system will in-
terface with propulsion systems via the
DMS.
Additional details can be found in Boeing
document D483-50022-5, Vol I (DR-02)
dated October 31, 1986.
6.7.3 REBOOST
6.7.3.1 Groundrules and Requirements
The objective of the reboost analysis is to
determine the requirements for orbit
maintenance and adjustments, and to de-
termine the reboost strategies and proce-
dures. The requirements include the
nominal altitude, operating strategy,
reboost interval, reboost strategy, thrust
location, reboost control strategy, and
thrust level. The total mission impulse is
made up of impulses for translational and
rotational operations. The total impulse is
further broken down into contingency and
mandatory operations. The IOC station
contingency operations include a collision
avoidance maneuver, a 20 n.mi. (37 kin)
altitude transfer, and a 24 day allocation
for z-axis attitude control. The IOC sta-
tion mandatory operations include a
reboost manuever and an allocation for at-
titude control to accommodate distur-
bances over and above the momentum
management devices (MMD) capabilities.
The IOC reference configuration, as de-
scribed herein, will be used as the baseline
in the trades described in the reboost pro-
gram plan. The plan is attached for com-
pleteness.
6.7.3.1.1 IOC Reboost Requirements
Operating Altitude 250 nm (463 KM)
- Station Elements
Flyers/Platforms
Co-Orbiting Free
- Reboost Interval 30-90 Days
- Reboost Strategy
- Thruster Location
- Reboost control
- Thrust Level
Minimum Altitude
Distributed
Pulse
4 (75 to 25 LBf)
4(333.6 to 111.2 N)
Natural Environment - The natural envi-
ronment is the environment described in
the NASA document, NASA TM86498,
"Natural Environment Design Criteria for
the Space Station Definition and Prelimi-
nary Design (2nd Rev)", March 1985. The
density model is the MSFC/JTO Orbital
Atmosphere Density Model. The docu-
ment addresses the atmospheric dynamic
and thermodynamic environments, mete-
oroids, radiation, magnetic fields, physical
constants, etc.
Nominal Altitude - The baseline nominal
altitude for the Space Station is 250 nm
(463 Km). This is the planned minimum
altitude at the time of shuttle rendezvous.
The concept of a variable altitude reboost
strategy was approved by the program in
order to improve STS payload-to-orbit ca-
pability. The variable altitude strategy is
described in Section 3.8.
6.7.3.1.2 Propellant
The baseline IOC propulsion system util-
izes oxygen and hydrazine propellant.
Thruster Location - The thrusters are lo-
cated in 4 cluster groups distributed about
the center of mass. Each cluster contains 9
thrusters, 3 thrusters directed in the y
axis, 3 thrusters directed in the -x axis,
and 3 thrusters directed in the x axis. The
thrusters are located as shown in the Pro-
pulsion DR-02.
Thrust Level - The nominal thrust level
for each of the 36 thrusters is 25 Ibf
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(333.6N). The thrusters are of the regu-
lated type; therefore, the thruster range is
25 Ibf yp 21 Ibf.
6.7.3.1.3 Operating Strategy
The Space Station will be allowed to decay
for 90 days following which the station
will be reboosted. The nominal altitude is
the altitude at which the station is
reboosted to and allowed to decay from.
The operating strategy is termed variable
as opposed to fixed about a nominal alti-
tude. The Space Shuttle (Orbiter) is
docked for 14 out of the 90 day resupply
period. The Space Station shall not be
reboosted with the Shuttle docked.
Reboost Interval - The time period be-
tween the beginning of two succeeding
reboost maneuvers is termed the reboost
interval. The reboost interval is 30-90
days.
Reboost Strategy - The baseline reboost
strategy is termed minimum altitude. The
station is reboosted (shortly after the shut-
tle departs) to an altitude that allows de-
cay back to the minimum altitude in the
required reboost interval. Reboost shall
not occur with the shuttle docked. A vari-
able altitude reboost strategy is now rec-
ommended.
Reboost Control Strategy - The attitude
control during a reboost maneuver is per-
formed by the same thruster groups as de-
scribed in Section 2.1.6. The Space
Station's primary attitude control are mo-
mentum management devices (MMD) that
will be desaturated or locked up during the
reboost maneuver, the control strategy is
to pulse the active thrusters to attain the
desired station attitude control within set
limits. The control limits are an attitude of
+ 5 degrees and an attitude rote of + .02
degrees.
6.7.3.2 Total Impulse Allocation
6.7.3.2.1 Translational Allocations
Collision Avoidance - From the Statement
of Work, Requirements C-4.2.2.8(b) and
C-3.2.4.3(h) both address collision avoid-
anee. The C-3 requirement gives 24 hours
to accomplish a 10 Km maneuver. The
C-4 requirement states that the station
shall not be reoriented during maneuver
and that providing collision avoidance
shall not size the propulsion system. The
reference configuration provides a 61,500
l.,Bf -s (273,550 N-S) total impulse con-
tingency for collision avoidance, this cor-
responds to a 396,000 Ibm (180,027Kg)
station given a 5 ft/s (1.52 m/s) velocity
change.
Altitude Transfer 20 nmi (37Kin) - The
Statement of Work does not have a re-
quirement that addresses this maneuver.
This maneuver is in addition to the re-
quired 90 days reboost maneuver. The ref-
erence configuration provides 831,000
Ibf-s (3,696,288 N-s) total impulse contin-
gency for a 20 n.mi. (37 Kin) altitude
transfer maneuver. The altitude transfer
maneuver will be used to transfer the sta-
tion to a 20 N.Mi. (37 Km) altitude circu-
lar orbit (higher or lower). This is to give
altitude flexibility. It was not intended to
provide reboost backup for a missed (90
day resupply) opportunity.
Reboost Maneuver - From the Statement
of Work, Requirements C-3.3.4 (b) and
C-4.2.2.8 both address the mandatory
reboost maneuver. The major requirement
is the 90 day resupply.
The reference configuration reboost inter-
val is 90 days, up to a nominal altitude of
270 nmi (500 Krn). The maneuver is a
Hohmarm transfer from the altitude at the
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end of the 90 days to the nominal altitude.
The velocity change is 39.3 ft/s (12 m/s)
for a 90 day decay of 11.0 N.Mi. (20.4
Kin). The total impulse is 483,000 LBf-s
(2,148,384 N-s) for the 396,060 l_,Bm
(180,027 Kg) station. This reboost maneu-
ver does not correspond to the worst ease
solar activity. The reboost maneuver is ac-
complished by firing one 25 LBf thruster
from each cluster in the direction opposite
of flight for approximately 30 minutes (to-
tal).
6.7.3.2.2 Rotational Allocations
Attitude Control for 24 Days - Z Axis
Only - The above case is a part of the
rotational allocation section and is intro-
duced on the basis of a failure of the RCS
attitude control subsystem except in the
Z-axis (yaw axis) direction. A time factor
of 24 days has been selected by NASA
with the assumption that this would be the
minimum turn around time for a shuttle to
be launched.
The Z-axis only direction was selected for
the reason that if no attitude control sys-
tem were active the space Station would
be oriented to a position where the solar
array boom would be aligned in the orbit
plane thereby causing difficulty for the so-
lar arrays to track the sun resulting in a
reduction of power output and a possible
malfunction of Space Station activities.
The given value, in Table 6.7.3.2.2-1, of
angular momentum for this case at a mo-
ment arm equal to 68 ft. is 10,000,000
ft-lb-sec. This number is presented as the
approximate amount of angular memen-
tum necessary to keep the proper attitude
of the station in the Z only axis direction.
The proper attitude of the station is de-
fined as having the solar array boom per-
pendicular to the orbit plane when in
steady state flight.
Orbiter Capture and Orbiter Berthing - In
Table 6.7.3.2.2-1 in the rotational alloca-
tion section values of moment arm length
and angular momentum are given for or-
biter capture and orbiter berthing. Both
have identical values for the moment arm
which is 88 ft. and is measured from the
centerline of the orbiter docking port to
the center of mass of the Space Station.
The berthing angular momentum value, of
1,500,000 ft-lb-sec, includes the Space
Station mass plus the orbiter mass. Thus,
with the additional mass of the orbiter an-
chored at the Space Station, the required
impulse needs to be increased if proper
attitude is to be maintained for the dura-
tion of the orbiter stay. Therefore, the cap-
ture angular momentum, 150,000
ft-lb-sec, does not include orbiter mass
but probably takes into account the distur-
bance torque generaged by the orbiter
when trying to dock. Module Berthing -
Table 6.7.3.2.2-I also shows that for mod-
ule berthing the same moment arm of 88
ft is used. This procedure of module
berthing assumes that the value of the an-
gular momentum, 500,000 ft-lb-sec, is
the sum of each module being unloaded
and berthed by the orbiter RMS from the
shuttle cargo bay.
6.7.3.3 Resupply Scenario's
Resupply Scenarios are dependant upon
the selection of propellant, (N2I-I4 or
O2/H2). The baseline propellant was
changed 7-86 to be O2/I-I2, allowing inte-
gration of the propellant fluid system with
all other SS systems utilizing water and
O2/H2 gases. Strategy calls for utilizing
excess water obtained from the STS or-
biter while the orbiter is docked to S.S.
Therefore the amount of available propel
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TABLE 6.7.3.2.2-I REFERNCE CONFIGU'RATION IMPULSE ALLOCATIONS
TRANSLATIONAL
ALLOCATION
COLLISION AVOIDANCE
AV - 5FT/SEC
MOMENT ARM
(FEET)
ANGULAR
MOMENTUM
(FT-LB-SEC)
90-DAY
RE-SUPPLY
IMPULSE
(LS-SEC)
90-DAY
RE-SUPPLY
N2H 4 9LBS
CONTINGENCY
IMPULSE
(L3-SEC)
61,500
CONTINGENCY
N2 H4 (LBS)
-280
• ALTITUDE TRANSFER 20 .... 831,000 3,780
N. MILES
• REBOOST90 DAYS AT -- -- 483,000 2,300 - --
270 NM (MIN)
ROTATIONAL ALLOCATION
• ATTITUDE CONTROL 24 63 10,000,000 - -- 147,500 G70
DAYS - 2 AXIS ONLY
• ORBITER CAPTURE 88 150,000 - -
• ORBITER BERTHING 83 1,500,000 26,000 120 - -
• MODULE BERTHING 83 600,000 -- --
N2H 4 RESUPPLIED EACH 90 -- -- 509,000 2,320 - --
DAYS (LOCATED
INLOGISTICS MODULE)
N2H 4 CONTINGENCY ...... 1,339,500 4,730
i (LOCATED ON STATION)
TOTAL AVAILABLE 1,548,500 LB-SEC- 7,050 LBS- N2H4
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lant is dependant upon the frequency of
shuttle rendezvous with S.S. The propel-
lant quantities are resupplied during the
shuttle stay period.
6.7.3.4 ECLSS Augmentation
The Environmentai Control and Life Sup-
port System is a major user of water, oxy-
gen, and hydrogen. The ECLS System
utilizes electrolysis to convert liquid HmO
into Hydrogen and Oxygen gases, just as
the propulsion system. The ECLS System
can therefore be highly integrated with
and supplemented by the O2/H2 propul-
sion system. For a more detailed descrip-
tion, See Volume I of this document.
6.7.3.5 OMV Options
Utilization of OMV during the S.S. life cy-
cle is not recommended because of the in-
herently lower performance of the OMV
propellants with respect to the S.S. O2/H2
propulsion system.
Utilization of OMV for reboost is consid-
ered primarily for the initial phase of S.S.
assembly. Flight altitude may have to be
low in order to increase STS payload to
orbit so that the propulsion system reli-
ability is most critical. Because OMV is
scheduled to be flying in 1991, the system
will be proven for use during this time.
6.7.3.6 Subsystem Commonality
Propulsion subsystem equipment com-
monality is found with ECLSS subsystems,
especially in that equipment required for
high pressure water electrolysis.
6.7.3.7 FOC
The reboost requirements for the FOC
Space Station are entirely dependent on
the actual growth of hardware attached to
the SS. The characteristics most pertinent
to the reboost requirements are:
1) total S.S. mass and
2) drag area
The Space Station mass directly effects
the required impulse to achieve a given
change in orbit velocity. As S.S. total mass
increases, so does the total reboost im-
pulse requirement. The S.S. drag area ef-
fects the rate at which the S.S. orbiter
decays due to drag, with greater drag area
leading to increased rates of decay, and
consequent increased magnitude of S.S.
reboost. Mass and drag area are related in
the expression for ballistic coefficient,
which indicates the relative magnitudes of
orbit inertia and the drag forces experi-
enced by an orbiting body. The actual
growth of S.S. is undefined at this time.
For the purpose of trade studies and life-
time altitude projections various assump-
tions have been made. Including that of
linear growth in Mass and proportionate
growth in drag area. Specific assumptions
are indicated where appropriate in the
trade study section of this document.
Additional detail can be found in Boeing
document D483-50022-5 Vol 11 (DR-02)
dated October 31, 1986.
6.8 Airlocks
6.8.1 EVA Airlock
The Airlock is a Space Station element
which provides a means of exiting the
Space Station Habitable Modules when-
ever the astronaut wishes to engage in Ex-
tra Vehicular Activity (EVA). The Airlock
is comprised of a Structural Subsystems; a
Meteoroid/Debris Protection System; an
Environmental Control Life Support Sys-
tem (ECLSS) TCS, Internal Comm and
EPS distribution, an internal Structural
Support System; and there is a Docking/
Berthing System at the Hatchway that will
be connected to a Space Station Element.
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The Structural Subsystem consists of a
3657.6mm (144 in) diameter which in-
cludes a standard docking port. The
Hatch/I_tch Assembly at each of the ac-
cess ports are identical and are inter-
changeable one with another and are also
identical to that pair used on the Common
Module.
6.8.2 Hyperbaric Airlock
The Hyperbaric Airlock is a Space Station
element that provides a pressure environ-
ment in excess of the 14.7 psia atmos-
phere of the Space Station (up to 5 ATM.
Its presence will allow an astronaut who is
suffering from an air embolism or the
bends to be placed in a pressure several
times greater than that of the modules.
The Hyperbaric Airlock is comprised of a
Structural Subsystem; a Meteoroid/Debris
Protection System; TCS, ECLSS, IC &
EPS distribution, an internal Structural
Support System; and there is a Docking/
Berthing System at the Hatchway that will
be connected to a Space Station Element.
The Hatch/Latch Assembly at each of the
access ports are identical and are inter-
changeable one with another and are also
identical to that pair used on the Common
Module.
6.9 Resource Nodes
The Resource Nodes (4) are Space Station
Elements which provide connection be-
tween the various modules, airlocks, STS
berthing adapters and attached payloads.
Each node is comprised of a Structural
Subsystem; a Meteoroid/Debris Protection
System; a Thermal Control System; an
ECLSS, Internal Communications, IC &
EPS an internal Payload Support System;
and there is a Docking/Berthing System at
each of ten Docking Ports.
The Structural Subsystem consists of two
conical end bulkheads, each of which in-
eludes a standard docking port, and a cy-
lindrical section that is formed from three
barrel sections. The two end barrels each
contains four radial access ports. The bar-
rel sections are welded to the end bulk-
heads at a large 2219 aluminum forged
ring on which a pair of support trunnion-
fittings and a keel pin fitting have been
welded. The two docking port barrel sec-
tions are welded at their inner edge to a
cylindrical section made up of a pair of
forged 2219 rings welded to a waffle stiff-
ened cylinder. In the interest of reducing
program costs, the structural subas-
semblies that comprise the Structural Sys-
tem are identical to those forming the
structural subsystem of the Common Mod-
ule and are assembled on the same tool-
ing. The Hatch/Latch Assembly at each of
the access ports are identical and are in-
terchangeable one with another and are
also identical to that pair used on the
Common Module.
The internal Payload Support Structures of
the Interconnect is formed of the same
structural components as the Common
Module payload support structure, but be-
cause the Internal Subsystems of the Inter-
connect, the Thermal Control System, is a
modification of the Common Module
Thermal Control System, it is supported
on a customized support. The ECLSS, IC,
TCS and EPS are common subsystem de-
rived from the HAB USL.
6.10 Habitation Module
The Habitation Module (HAB Module) is
the Space Station Program Element which
provides for station operations and off-
duty crew accommodations.
The HAB Module is comprised of a struc-
tural shell, mechanisms, utility distribu-
tion, subsystems, and outfitting. HAB
Module to Station interfaces occur at the
pressure shell for utilities and the external
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mounting points for structures. HAB Mod-
ule to other module interfaces occur at the
hatches and hatch utility penetrations.
Four equally spaced utility distribution
chases and rack support structure, stand-
offs, carry utilities, rack structural loads
and distribute cabin air and lighting. Stan-
dardized interface plates and quick discon-
nects transfer utilities from the standoffs
to the racks.
Subsystem and utility distribution schemes
and structural shell and mechanism com-
monality exists between the HAB Module
and other modules. The HAB Module has
modified ECLSS plumbing to support
crew functions.
HAB Module rack layout configuration is
shown in Figure 6.10-1.
6.10.1 Crew Quarters
Eight crew quarters are provided, one for
each IOC crewmember. Each crew quarter
occupies the volume of 2.5 single racks.
The major internal volume in each crew
quarter is the two single rack area with the
remaining half rack being a shared utility
core with the adjacent crew quarter. This
provides acoustic insulation between crew
quarters for privacy.
Entry into the crew quarter is through a
specially designed door. This provides
area for storage in the crew quarter and
does not impact egress requirements.
Sleep restraints can be detached and
placed in various positions to suit an indi-
viduals orientation preference for sleep,
reading, etc. The aisle facing wall is thick,
providing stowage and acoustic isolation.
Provisions for adding radiation shielding
to crew quarters walls and ends are in-
eluded at part of the basic compartment
design.
6.10.2 HMF Exercise Area
Three single racks are provided for the ex-
ercise area and equipment stowage. Provi-
sions are included for mounting a
multitude of exercise devices (e.g. a row-
ing machine, bicycle ergometer or tread-
mill) in the compartment. A window is
provided for recreational viewing during
the exercise period. Audio and video are
also provided for entertainment.
Controlled airflow is directed over the ex-
erciser, from head to foot direction. Force
reaction for exercising is provided by ad-
justable padded restraints. The exercise
devices are designed to be mounted also
on any rack front to allow then to be
moved the the crew to optimal locations to
minimize noise, odor or congestion.
6.10.3 HMF Medical Facility
Three single racks are provided for con-
tainment of GPE medical diagnostic and
treatment equipment.
6.10.4 Wardroom
The wardroom uses three double racks to
provide seating for eight crewmembers.
Two tables can extend to accommodate all
crewmembers at one time. Two windows
are provided, one at each end of the table.
Display monitors can be positioned over
the windows for communication or enter-
tainment viewing. This allows the primary
viewing at either window or monitor.
Stowage is provided under the tables. The
wardroom occupies space equipment to
three double racks.
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6.10.5 Waste Management
A commode, urinal,handwash and vacuum
are provided to accommodate body waste
and subsequent cleanup. A double rack is
allocated for this function.
Adjustable foot restraints are provided to
allow for correct foot positioning while us-
ing the commode. Storage is provided for
ancillary equipment and consumables
such as disposable wipes.
6.10.6 Galley
Three double racks contain the equipment
and storage necessary to provide meals for
eight crewmembers for fourteen days. A
handwasher and dishwasher are included
within the galley for both water dispensing
and post-meal cleanup.
Two ovens are provided for simultaneous
heating of food for all eight crewmembers.
6.10. 7 Shower
A double rack contains the shower/dress-
ing room. A movable partition separates
the two areas. When the crewmember is
dressing or undressing, the partition is
moved to increase the size of the dressing
area. As the crewmember steps through
the dressing area to shower door (in the
movable partition), the partition is moved
to increase the size of the shower.
A liner protects the shower from contami-
nation. After a given interval, the liner is
removed and cleaned or disposed. This
prevents long term accumulation of bacte-
ria or fungus in the shower. It also makes
cleanup after each shower less demand-
ing.
A Skylab type shower restraint is used for
stability. A shower head/vacuum pickup is
located on a flexible stalk. Airflow is di-
rected from head to toe direction. Tempo-
rary storage for clothing is provided in the
dressing area.
6.10.8 Laundry
A double rack contains a combined
washer/dryer. When clothes are placed in
the device, it first washes them using a
nested perforated drum, rotating inside a
larger sealed drum. When the clothes are
clean, the water is removed using centrifu-
gal force and a fan separator. Warm air is
then passed through the clothes while they
are spun, until they are dried.
6.10.9 Multi-Purpose Applications
Console (MPAC)
The MPAC fits within a double rack. It
provides both Station control and proxim-
ity operations control. Internal and exter-
nal control functions are provided as well
as OMV and NSTS proximity operations.
The MPAC has a multifunction keypad, a
alphanumeric keypad and redundant six
degree of freedom controllers as well as
two visual display monitors.
The MPAC also functions as the DMS
crew interface. A portable MPAC is pro-
vided for command and control functions
which are not performed at the MPAC sta-
tion.
6.10.10 Reserved
6.10.11 Storage
Storage racks are provided for several
categories of storage. Included are crew
consumables, on-board spares and equip-
ment.
6.10.12 Safe Haven
One single rack stores equipment, food
and supplies for a crew of eight for 28
days.
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6.10.13 Electrical Power Distribution
System
The HAB Module Electrical Power Distri-
bution System (EPDS) receives power
from the Space Station electrical power
generation system through penetrators
(connectors which penetrate the pressure
shell). Power is distributed internally and
to ports for distribution to attached ele-
ments. Figure 6.10.13-1 shows the Electri-
cal Power System Distribution
Architecture.
The HAB Module has two penetrators, two
25 kW Primary Power Distribution Assem-
blies (PPDA).
The PPDA receives power from the
penetrator and distributes power to the
SDAs and ports. It contains RCCBs which
protect output cabling and provides a
means for bus reconfiguration.
The SDAs distribute power to the standoff
interface plate. It contains RCCBs which
protect the cabling to the interface plates
and provides a means for load manage-
ment. There are no components of the
EPDS in the user racks. Figure 6.10.13-2
depicts the EPS Module layout.
6.10.14 HAB Module Thermal Control
Subsystem
The HAB Module TCS consists of a sin-
gle-phase, pumped-water loop that ab-
sorbs waste heat from the module interior
and transfers it to the station central heat
rejection system through external interface
heat exchangers. A portion of the heat is
rejected to both the 35 and 70 degree F
central thermal utility buses. The HAB
Module subsystem loop provides coolant
to life-critical module loads such as
ECLSS, DMS, EPDS and COMM. The
thermal transport capacity of the HAB
Module internal loop is 22 kW. A func-
tional schematic is shown in Figure
6.10.14-1 to illustrate the flow connec-
tivity of this loop. The TCS includes a sub-
system controller with manual override
that automatically maintains coolant
flowand interfaces with the DMS. A sin-
gle-phase water loop satisfies cabin safety
and minimum development cost consid-
erations. Two-fault tolerant (fail-opera-
tional/fail-safe) requirements are satisfied
by redundant plumbing/pumping systems.
TCS components are designed for on orbit
service, replacement, repair and minimum
noise generation. Fluid diseormeets are
provided at component interfaces to facili-
tate maintenance. The subsystem TCS is a
closed coolant loop and, during opera-
tions, does not require expendable resup-
ply.
The HAB Module external structure is
wrapped with MLI blankets to thermally
decouple the module from external envi-
ronment changes.
6.10.15 Data Management System (DMS)
The Habitability/Station Operations Mod-
ule (HAB Module) Data Management Sys-
tem (DMS) provides for data acquistion
and control, data processing, data routing,
data storage, and retrieval, and subsystem
monitoring and control. These functions
will be provided to the user via a fault tol-
erant computer system implementation
utilizing a hierarchy of networks and com-
puter products. The following sections de-
tail the DMS.
6.10.15.1 Computer Components
The HAB Module DMS consist of the
following components to provide the data
acquistion, control, and processing func-
tions.
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6.10.15.1.1 Standard Data Processor
The Standard Data Processor, (SDP) will
be a 32 bit, virtual addressing, space
qualified, low power computer that will
provide the resources necessary to manage
the subsystems in the HAB Module. The
SDP will service the following subsystems:
-OMA (Operations Management Applica-
tions)
-DMS (Data Management System)
-EPDS (Electrical Power Distribution Sys-
tem)
-TCS (Thermal Control System)
-ECLSS (Environmental Control and Life
Support System)
-C&T (Communications and Tracking)
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
The Multiplexer/Demultiplexer (MDM)
shall be a shared resource allocated in a
per rack basis that will provide data ac-
quistion and control functions. The MDM
will be able to acquire signals from the
various subsystems attached to it using the
following signal formats:
- +5 VDC discrete inputs
- +28 VDC discrete inputs
- +/-5 VDC analog inputs
The MSM will also be able to generate the
following signals for control of attached
subsystems:
- +5 VDC discrete outputs
- +28 VDC discrete outputs - +/-5
VDC analog outputs
- +28 VDC relay driver (100 mA)
In addition to the above signals, the fol-
lowing busses will be provided:
- RS-232
- RS-422
- IE E-488
6.10.15.1.2 Mass Storage Unit
The Mass Storage Unit (MSU) will provide
300 Mbytes of volume shadowed storage
on hard disk. This Media shall be used for
program load, data base storage, subsys-
tem resource schedules and logs, resource
accounting data bases, and temporary data
storage for local processing, training, and
entertainment.
6.10.15.1.3 Embedded Data Processor
The Embedded Data Processor (F_Z)P) is a
single board computer consisting of a 16
bit microprocessor, 1 Mbyte of RAM, 128
Kbytes of EEPROM, and an interface to a
standard computer backplane. The EDP is
used for management of various comput-
ing and networking components, such as
the MDM or the BR (see next section).
Networking Components
Network Interface Unit
The Network Interface Unit (NIU) us a
single board implementation of the inter-
face required to communicate between the
computer backplane and the Data Acquisi-
tion, Module Data, or Station Data Bus.
There are four varieties of the NIU:
1- 10 Mbps on EDP style backplane
2- 10 Mbps on SDP style backplane
3- 100 Mbps on SDP style backplane
4- 100 Mbps on EDP style back-
plane
Item 1 is used in the MDM to communi-
cate to the Data Acquistion Bus; item 2 is
used in the SDP to communicate with the
Data Module Data Bus; item 3 is used in
the SDP to communicate with the Module
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Data Bus; item 4 is used in the Bridge (see
next section) to communicate between the
Module and Station Data Busses.
6.10.15.1.4 Bridge
The Bridge (BR) is a combination of two
type 4 NIU's and one EDP that performs
the data buffering and routing necessary
between the Station Data Bus and the
Module Data Bus.
6.10.15.1.5 Data Acquistion Bus
The Data Acquistion Bus (DAB) is a coax-
ial cable used to route data from MDM's
to SDP's and vice versa. The data rate on
the DAB is 10 Mbps an access protocol is
via a virtual token ring implemented on a
bus.
6.10.15.1.6 Module Data Bus
The Module Data Bus (MDS) is a fiber op-
tic cable used to route data and programs
between SDP's MSU's and MPAC's. The
data rate on the MDB is 100 Mbps and
access protocol is via a virtual token ring
implemented on a bus using a star cou-
pler.
6.10.15.1.7 Station Data Bus
The Station Data Bus (SDB) is identical to
the MDB, allowing communications be-
tween modules, interconnects, airlocks,
and external payloads.
6.10.15.1.8 Workstations
The workstations (or Multi-Purpose Appli-
cations Console - MPAC) provided by
WP-01 are a common intorface to the
DMS, the subsystems, and all Space Sta-
tion elements and payloads. There will be
two types of workstations available for use
on the Space Station: Fixed and Portable.
6.10.15.1.9 Fixed MPAC
The Fixed MPAC (FMPAC) is a double
rack unit with the following hardware ele-
ments in it:
-Dual display CRT's
-Keyboard
-Caution and Warning displays -Speaker/
Microphone unit (Audio subsystem)
-Audio recorder (Audio subsystem)
-Dual video recorders (Video subsystem)
-SDP
-Graphics processor
-Video frame grabber/processor
-MDM
-Hardcopy unit
6.10.15.1.10 Portable MPAC
The Portable MPAC (PMPAC) is a laptop
sized unit with the following hardware ele-
ments in it:
-Flat panel display
-Keyboard
-Joystick
-Partial MDM
-EDP
-RS-232 interface card
-Analog/Digital interface card
-NIU, type 1
-Power conditioner
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With these components, the PMPAC can
be connected at any location where a DAB
tap is located. Power levels in an the pack-
aging of the PMPAC will be such as to
allow for radiational cooling.
6.10.16 Structural and Mechanical
Components
6.10.16.1 Pressure Shell
The HAB Module pressure shell is an all
welded 2219 aluminum shell with 300
conical end bulkhead. The Shell has a 450
waffle grid with ribs on the outside and a
smooth surface on the inside. As shown in
Figure 6.10.16.1-1 the module is
4616.4mm (166 in) inside diameter,
4445mm (175 in) outside and 11784.2mm
(464.14 in) cylinder length.
The shell has a pressure carrying skin
which is 3.175rnm (.125 in) thick. The ribs
are 2.286mm (.09 in) thick and 22.225mm
(.875 in) high and are optimally spaced to
carry the appropriate loading and torsions.
The shell panels are rolled before welding
into a 90 degree segment of the skin. Four
of the 90 degree segments are welded lon-
gitudinally to form a cylindrical section.
The basic shell has a fairly large ring forg-
ing that is welded to the end bulkheads
and the cylinder section adjacent to it.
There is, in addition, a pair of intermedi-
ate rings of a somewhat reduced cross sec-
tion that also act to stabilize the pressure
shell during lift off or landing load events.
These rings are carefully sized to insure
that the cylindrical section buckling loads
are consistent with the shell panels be-
tween stiffeners (ribs).
The rings also provide for the mounting of
the trunnions and the keel pin. The shuttle
load doctrine requires the longitudinal
thrust load to be carried by the aft pair of
trunnions. Two longitudinal shear beams
are provided to shear the thrust loads into
the shell and to-beam the kick loads re-
suiting from the local eccentricity into
areaction at the keel pin ring and the aft
trunnion ring.
6.10.16.2 Hatches
There is a pressure hatch built into the
docking port in the center of each of the
end buldheads. The hatch has a square
opening 1270mm (50 in) on each side
with the corners rounded off at a twelve
inch radius. There are 16 latches equally
spaced around the opening which will act
to carry the hatch load if the hatch is
called on to support a reversed pressure
situation that occurs, if the interconnect is
pressurized but the module is not. Each
hatch has a 6 inch diameter window. The
hatches slide on tracks during opening and
closing and are adapted from a 767 door.
This arrangement allows good storage and
takes up less space.
6.10.16.3 Windows
There are provisions for 3 windows 20
inches in diameter in the basic design.
Two basic concepts were investigated. Be-
cause of the load paths and stress pattern
while on-orbit and under pressure, a con-
figuration of a window that Would conform
to the cylindrical curvature of the shell
was investigated as was a conventional cir-
cular (flat) porthole type window. The
conventional porthole appears to be a
lower weight system and was therefore se-
lected.
6.10.16.4 Secondary Structure
The subsystems and payloads inside the
shell are supported by four equally spaced
standoffs. These standoffs are candidates
for fabrication out of composite materials
as an alternate to conventional aluminum
shapes. In either event, the stiffness of
structural members that comprise the se-
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condary structure will be tuned to be con-
sistem with the shell stiffness to keep the
interface loads to a minimum during shut-
tle flight events. A meteoriod-debris
shield which is 1.016mm (0.040 in) thick
6061 aluminum is installed with a 4.5 inch
standoff to protect the pressure shell.
6.10.16.5 Structural/Mechanical
Subsystem
The HAB Module Structural/Mechanical
Subsystem consist of the following major
components:
- Standard single racks
- Standard double racks
- Rack restraint system
- Utility routing support structures
- External end cone-c=mounted truss for
consumable tank storage
- End-cone utility feed
-through bulkheads
- Vibration isolation system assemblies
Standard Racks
The standard single rack is 1892.3mm
(74.5 in) high by 546.1mm (21.5 in) wide
by 914.4mm (36 in) maximum depth and
has a standard hole pattern to accept
panel-mounted equipment per MIL-
STD-189, i.e. the standard front panel
width is 482.6mm (19 in) and the center
distance of the mounting holes is
464.82mm (18.3 in). The maximum
opening between the front panel mounting
flanges is 451.1mm (17.76 in) and the
maximum corresponding width for equip-
ment housed within the single rack is
442.5mm (17.42 in).
Each single rack houses Avionics supply
and return air ducts and a fire suppression
bottle assembly in the rear portion of the
rack, as well as standard subsystems inter-
face panel occupies approximately 6 in. of
rack height, and the Avionics ducting oc-
cupies approximately 6. in of rack depth
the rack design allows for the attachment
of equipment to the inside surfaces of the
four comer posts via standard hole pat-
terns and light-weight attach rails.
The standard double rack is effectively
two single racks sharing common center
posts at the front of and rear, and a cen-
tral segmented bulkhead which is remov-
able. The overall width of the standard
double rack is 42 in.
6.10.16.6 Rack Restraint System
Rack restraint systems which have been
considered include the following:
a. a sliding rail/guide system employing
double rails at the top and bottom of
each rack
b. a statically determinant mounting
system similar to the Spacelab rack
attachment system. This arrangement
consists of a fastener at each lower
front comer (each reacting X, Y, and
Z loads), and two adjustable struts
between the top of each rack and the
USA Laboratory shell structure (re-
acting X and Y loads while allowing
the USA Laboratory shell to
"breathe" relative to the rack struc-
ture).
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6.10.16.7 Communications Systems
The communications systems in the HAB
Module consist of an internal audio and
video system. These systems are described
in the following sections.
6.10.16.8 Audio System
The audio system in the module (See Fig-
ure 6.10.16.8-1) consists of several C&T
rack mounted components which control
the audio system, and distributed elements
in the working areas of the module.
The C&T rack mounted components are
the audio controller, audio terminal unit,
and audio interface unit. The audio con-
troller is the interface to the audio system,
for such things as caution and warning
messages, and receives status information
about the audio portion interface to the
end to end audio system. It allows crew
members to communicate via the wireless
system to any part of the station or to the
ground. The audio interface unit is the in-
terface to the external C&T equipment
which allows crew members in the USL
Module to communicate to the ground or
to other SS elements.
This distributed elements of the audio sys-
tem in the HAB Module are the speaker
microphone, audio recorder, and the crew
wireless units. The speaker microphone lo-
cated in the bulkheads, crew quarters,
health maintenance facility, wardroom,
galley, and MPAC, is the element by
which crew members access the audio sys-
tem. It consists of a speaker, microphone,
keypad (to select the various operational
modes) and an optional jack for using a
headset. From the speaker microphone a
crewmember can access any internal sta-
tion location or the ground. The audio re-
corder is located in the MPAC and is
available via MPAC control to record two
channels of audio communications upon
demand. The crew wireless units are used
to access the wireless communications sys-
tem. From the wireless units a crew mem-
ber can access any internal station
location and the ground.
The elements of the audio system are in-
terconnected by a station audio bus. These
buses run through out the station allowing
intermodule audio communications. The
bus switching unit, located at either end of
the USL module allows the module to be
isolated from the rest of the station in case
of a failure.
6.10.16.9 HSO Video System
Operation of the video system in the HSO
Module (See Figure 6.10.16.9-1) is simi-
lar to operation of a broadcast studio. The
system uses a 32 x 16 baseband video
switch. This switch, operating under con-
trol of the Control and Monitor subsystem,
establishes proper interconnection of
sources and sinks. Possible sources in the
HSO include a video camera located at
each end of the module on the endcone,
two video recorders located in the MPAC,
TBD sources from structure mounted cam-
eras, TBD inputs from WP-02 RF links,
and 8 sources from the interconnects (this
includes intermodule baseband sources).
Possible sinks include 2 video monitors
and two video recorders in the MPAC,
TBD outputs to the WP-02 RF links, one
monitor in the galley, and 8 links to the
interconnects (this includeds intermodule
baseband links).
There will also be ten reconfigurable I/O
ports evenly spaced throughout the mod-
ule. These will be used for portable cam-
eras or monitors at various places
throughout the module.
Cameras will have the capability of gener-
ating a test signal to test the signal charac-
teristics of the path between the camera
and any link location. There will also be a
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test signal generator in the C&T rack used
to test the signal path from the switch out-
puts to the link devices and to the ground.
A sync. signal will be generated and sent
to each camera to allow multiscreen dis-
plays as well as limit crosstalk. Special ef-
fects for muntiscreen display will be
generated in the C&T rack and looped
back to the video switch for distribution to
the selected sink device. Graphics overlay
of the video will occur in the MPAC.
6.10.17 ECLSS
The Environmental Control and Life Sup-
port Subsystem (ECLSS) provides and
maintains a healthful, comfortable
shirtsleeves atmosphere in the pressurized
volumes of the space station; provides
clean water for the crew consumption and
sanitation; and collects, processes and
stores waste materials for return to the
Earth. Related services are provided to
equipment/experiment racks. Figure
6.10.17-1 is a total ECLSS schematic dia-
gram. The HAB Module ECLSS consists
of six subsystems as described below.
6.10.17. I Temperature and Humidity
Control (THC)
The ECLSS Temperature and Humidity
Control subsystem (THC) circulates air
through the HAB Module to provide ade-
quate ventilation for the crew's comfort
and cools and dehumidifies a portion of
the circulating air to maintain the module
temperature and the dew point within the
prescribed comfort range. The THC pro-
vides a separate avionics air cooling loop
to remove sensible heat generated by elec-
tronic/electrical devices in equipment/ex-
periment racks. The THC provides
intermodule air supply and return to adja-
cent SS elements. The THC provides re-
frigerator/freezer storage in the HAB
Module.
6.10.17.2 Atmosphere Control and Supply
(ACS)
The Atmosphere Control and Supply sub-
system (ACS) maintains the atmospheric
total pressure and 02 and N2 partial pres-
sures within the pressurized volume by
adding appropriate gases from the stored
N2 and stored or generated 02. Excess
pressure in the module is relieved by vent-
ing through pressure equalization valves to
adjacent modules, or is vented to space.
6.10.17.3 Atmosphere Revitalization
Subsystem (AR)
The Atmospheric Revitalization subsystem
(AR) processes a portion of the circulating
air in the HAB Module for cooling and de-
humidification to remove excess CO2 pro-
duced metabolically by the crew. Excess
water is electrolyzed to generate 02 to re-
place that consumed by the crew. H2 pro-
duced as a by-product of the electrolysis
is used to reduce the CO2 to carbon and
water. This water replaces the water from
other sources used in the electrolysis unit
to effectively close the CO2/O2 loop.
Trace contaminants released into the at-
mosphere from a variety of sources are re-
moved by filters and catalytic reactors in
the AR.
6.10.17.4 Water Recovery and
Management Subsystem (WRM)
The Water Recovery and Management
Subsystem (WRM) processes humidity
condensate from the THC and water pro-
duced in the reduction of CO2 in the AR
in the HAB Module to provide potable
water for crew consumption. Additional
processors recover most of the water from
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the crew's urine and urine flush water and
reclaims used hygiene waters. Both of
these sources are used for hygiene uses
and electrolysis to provide 02. All waters
are treated to prevent the formation of-
hazardous or objectionable products and
are dosed with a biocide to prevent the
growth of bacteria. Processed waters are
monitored to ensure acceptable quality
prior to use.
6.10.17.5 Waste Management Subsystem
(WM)
The Waste Management Subsystem (WM)
collects human metabolic wastes, wet
trash from the galley, and dry trash from
all sources; treats them to prevent decom-
position and stores them for return to
Earth in the Logistics System for ultimate
disposal. Feces collected in the commodes
is stabilized and compressed or encapsu-
lated for storage. Wet trash, such as food
wastes, is treated, compacted, and pack-
aged for storage.
6.10.17.6 Fire Detection and Suppression
Subsystem (FDS)
The FDS provides fire detection sensors in
each equipment rack and at selected loca-
tions within the THC ducting and module
volume. Upon detection of a fire, visual
and audible alarms are provided to the
crew and the fire suppression system acti-
vated. The fire suppressant is supplied
from a centralized tank through distribu-
tion lines to each rack. Portable extin-
guishers provide local suppression
capability. Emergency breathing packs for
the crew are located in the HAB Module.
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7.0 OPERATIONS AND PLANNING
In this section will be a narrative summary
of the operations and planning study ef-
fort. It will be covered in four parts 1)
Prelaunch/Postlanding, 2) Orbital Opera-
tions Approach Planning, 3) Logistics and
Resupply Approach Planning, and 4) On-
orbit Maintenance Approach Planning.
7.1 Prelaunch and Postlanding
This section defines the ground processing
plans for WP-01 (MSFC) Space Station
elements at Kennedy Space Center (KSC).
This processing includes prelaunch assem-
bly, test, checkout, integration, and launch
of the initial Space Station (SS) elements
and payloads, as well as launch of the cy-
clical resupply elements.
The general philosophy for ground proc-
essing of WP-01 elements at KSC is de-
fined in this plan, and key ground rules
and assumptions are identified. The plan
discusses overall processing requirements
for site activation, support equipment,
flight equipment, facilities, security, safety
and customer interfaces.
7.1.1 Ground Operations
The primary objective of the ground op-
erations processing is to ensure that the
WP-01 elements are ready for delivery to
orbit, and ready for assembly, integration,
and use with Space Station elements al-
ready in orbit.
The prelaunch ground ol_rations se-
quences will require verification of system
level and element level functional integ-
rity, as well as verification of interface op-
erational integrity, between WP-01
elements and interfacing elements. The in-
terfacing elements consist of: WP-01 ele-
ment to orbiter, WP-01 element to launch
facility, and WP-01 element to ground
support facility, as applicable.
A general launch site test and operations
flow is shown in Figure 7.1.1-1.
Complete outfitting of the U.S. Laboratory
module and the Logistics Elements prior
to deliv.ery to the launch site is planned,
and allows for minimal launch site proc-
essing and checkout activities. These ac-
tivities include receiving/inspections, preps
of internal equipment and supplies for
launch, prelaunch configuration checks,
and element-to-NSTS interface integrity
verification.
a. The U.S. Laboratory Module will un-
dergo a stand alone system level test
in the SSPF. Orbiter interface electri-
cal testing will not be required, as
the U.S. Laboratory will be quiescent
during RSS PGHM, Orbiter, and
launch processing.
b. The Logistics Module will also un-
dergo a stand alone system level test
in the SSPF, and in addition, will re-
quire tests to verify power, telemetry,
and thermal interfaces, in the SSPF,
and in the Orbiter.
c. The payload equipment which will be
installed in the Logistics Module for
transfer, on orbit, to a laboratory
module, may be active at launch and
may require power-up testing at
KSC.
7.1.2 Top Level NASA Requirements
The following Prelaunch Operations Re-
quirements were obtained from the SS
Phase B RFP, Section C, Attachment C-3,
Paragraph 2.3.
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The Space Station Program will employ a
number of practices designed to reduce
the cost of developing space hardware. To
ensure that program costs are minimized,
it is assumed that the practice of
protoflighting will be employed to reduce
test article costs.
Operational requirements for initial ele-
ments processing and for resupply activity,
in preparation for delivery to orbit, are:
a. Prelaunch operations shall provide
for cost-effective processing of all
elements and payloads and for verifi-
cation that their respective systems
are launch ready.
Maximum use shall be made of
flight system capability to reduce the
requirements for Ground Support
Equipment (GSE) and other support
during ground testing.
c. Physical and functional interfaces be-
tween each Space Station element,
subsystem, component, between pay-
loads, the NSTS, and the Space Sta-
tion shall be demonstrated as
compatible and functional before be-
ing committed to launch.
d. A program capability shall be pro-
vided to ensure that all modifications
and upgrades function properly and
are compatible with interfacing hard-
ware and software comp0nonts.
e. The Space Station equipment and fa-
cilities required for an NSTS rescue
mission shall be configurable to a
launch readiness state within 19 days
of notification.
b.
f. Flight element design shall not pre-
clude its horizontal and vertical in-
stallation into, and removal from, the
Orbiter; nor shall it preclude late
launch pad access.
g. The capability to service and deser-
vice consumables within the flight
element and to deservice waste and
refuse shall be provided.
The following general assumptions are
made:
a. Space Station elements are assumed
to be fully assembled and acceptance
tested at the manufacturer's facility.
Any extra services required at the
launch site, will be analyzed and ad-
justments made accordingly.
b. The basic SS modules are assumed
to have been designed to be best ac-
commodated by horizontal process-
ing, with installation in the NSTS
vertically at the launch pad; however,
capability to install/remove vertically
or horizontally shall exist.
c. The following KSC facility capabili-
ties are assumed:
- A facility to accommodate non-haz-
ardous ground processing of Space
Station elements, Space Station
resupply and Space Station payloads.
- A facility capability for cryogenic
testing and processing of OMV com-
ponents.
- A processing facility to perform haz-
ardous operations on Space Station
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propellant resupply tankage, OMV
related tankers, and hazardous por-
tions of the Logistics Elements.
d. Use of proven design center or sup-
plier assembly and test procedures,
programs, GSE and personnel will be
made for launch site operations to
the maximum extent possible.
The following WP-01 related assumptions
are made:
a. The U.S. Laboratory Module and Lo-
gistics Elements will be processed
horizontally in the SSPF and installed
vertically in the Orbiter at the pad.
b. The Logistics Elements will be re-
moved horizontally at the Orbiter
Processing Facility (OPF) on return
flights.
c. The U.S. Laboratory has no require-
ment for cryogenic or hazardous pro-
pellant servicing.
d. The U.S. Laboratory payload/experi-
ment equipment will be installed and
integrated into the module at MSFC.
e. The U.S. Laboratory launch configu-
ration has no requirement for orbiter
services. The lab will be quiescent at
launch and will be activated during
Space Station on-orbit installation
and integration.
f. The Logistic Module launch configu-
ration will require data, power and
thermal interfaces with the Orbiter.
7.1.3 Verification Requirements
The WP-01 Requirements are listed be-
low.
7.1.3.1 General Verification
Requirements
The following requirements apply to all
Space Station flight elements, associated
GSE, and facility processing at KSC dur-
ing the initial operations phase and the
follow-on operations phase:
a. Space Station system verification
shall demonstrate that the perform-
ance of the SS subsystems, elements,
payloads, and GSE meet established
requirements and that the related in-
terfaces are compatible and func-
tional.
b. Final assembly, integration and dem-
onstration of capability will occur
on-orbit and will never be fully dem-
onstrated on the ground.
c. Verifications will be at the lowest
system, subsystem, assembly, or
component level practical, to mini-
mize costs.
d. Interface simulators and master tool-
ing will be used extensively for inter-
face verifications.
e. Before beginning flight element proc-
essing, proper operation of all facil-
ity services and GSE (to be used in
processing the flight element) shall
be verified.
f.. Procedures, techniques, software, and
capabilities planned for use on-orbit
shall be demonstrated and shall be
used to the maximum extent possible
for prelaunch verification of the SS
elements.
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g. Safety critical hardware and inter-
faces shall be verified by ground
tests whenever feasible.
h. SS elements shall be installed hori.
zontally or vertically in the NSTS Or-
biter as late in the NSTS processing
flow as feasible.
i°
7.1.3.2
SS hardware and software configura-
tions and interfaces shall not be
changed or disconnected subsequent
to verification for launch unless ab-
solutely necessary.
Flight Element Verification
Requirements
The requirements listed below apply to
element stand alone verification process-
ing and integrated element verification
processing at KSC. Where requirements
are peculiar to the Initial Orbital Capabil-
ity (IOC) or the PMC, they are so desig-
nated. Otherwise, the requirements are
applicable for ground processing for both
the Space Station IOC and PMC.
7.1.3.2.1 Basic Element Verifications
a°
b.
Space Station modules shall be proc-
essed horizontally from arrival at
KSC through element checkout.
Upon delivery to KSC, a cost effec-
tive, minimum test program, com-
mensurate with acceptable risk, will
be conducted:
to demonstrate proper system per-
formance following transportation
to provide assurance that the system
will function after deployment in or-
bit
C. element checkout/reverification at
KSC shall use applicable sections of
the same procedures, software and
GSE used for element checkout at
the element contractor's site.
7.1.3.2.2 Element-to-Payload
Verifications
a. Payload form, fit and functional in-
tegrity shall be verified by the inte-
gration contractor prior to delivery to
KSC.
b. For ground processing, payload test-
ing after installation in an SS module
shall normally be limited to that re-
quired to verify P/L-to-SS interface,
and will be performed at the Con-
tractor's facility.
c. During PMC processing, payload-to-
SS interfaces shall be verified, using
simulators, before payload delivery
to the orbiting SS.
d. Payloads to be manifested in the Lo-
gistics Elements will be verified prior
to shipment to KSC. Payloads that
require an active interface (power,
data, thermal, etc.) within the Logis-
tics Elements, will be verified during
Logistics Element Cargo Integration
at KSC. Payloads that do not need
an active interface, should not re-
quire any subsequent verifications.
7.1.3.2.3 Element-to-Orbiter
Verifications
a. SS Element-to-NSTS interface verifi-
cation shall be performed (if re-
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quired) after installation of the
elements into the Orbiter Payload
Bay.
b. Functioning of the SS elements while
in the Orbiter Payload Bay shall be
limited to that required for the mis-
sion and SS Element-to-Orbiter in-
terface verifications.
c. Procedures and equipment developed
for these interface verifications will
reside at the launch site and will
"adequately demonstrate physical and
functional interface capabilities.
7.1.3.2.4 Logistic Element Verifications
a. Initial processing of Logistics Ele-
ments shall conform to the general
initial processing of the other Space
Station modules.
b. Logistics provisions shall be stowed
in the Logistics Elements off-line, as
late as practical, before installation
of the Logistics Elements into the
Orbiter. Time critical items will be
installed at the latest opportunity
prior to launch.
c. Upon return from orbit, the Logistics
Elements shall be recovered from the
Orbiter in the OPF and delivered to
the appropriate processing facility
where the returned cargo shall be re-
moved and dispositioned.
d. During Logistics Element turnaround
processing, the Logistics Elament
systems will be reserviced, cleaned
and reserviced as necessary, and the
integrity of the element shall be
reverified, as required. Subsystem
testing will be minimized with only
testing of newly established inter-
faces. WP01 contractor will partici-
pate in this activity.
7.1.3.2.5 Modification/Upgrade
Verifications
a. All modifications and changes to the
baseline hardware, software, and
procedures shall be Verified prior to
their commitment for use.
b. During IOC, processing, modifica-
tions and changes prior to launch of
SS flight elements, hardware, and
software shall be verified during
ground processing of the affected
element.
C. During FOC, processing, proposed
modifications and changes to on-or-
bit flight elements may be verified
on the ground using SS element
simulators, or identical SS elements
that have not yet been delivered to
orbit.
7.1.3.3 Requirements Documentation
The ground processing launch site test and
retest requirements documentation system
will be determined during Phase C/D.
7.1.3.4 Test Documentation
Maximum use will be made of contractor
integrated procedures and element proc-
essing documentation, that have been veri-
fied by use at the WP-01 assembly and
integration facility for KSC activities.
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7.1.4 IOC Processing Concepts
7.1.4.1 Verification Approach
The verification approach taken for proc-
essing the IOC Space Station elements is
based on operations to achieve maximum
assurance of mission success consistent
with a cost-effective processing of the ele-
ments, and verification that the respective
systems are launch ready.
7.1.4.1.1 Ground Support Equipment and
Facilities
Space Station facilities and GSE will be
verified before first use processing of the
flight elements. Handling equipment will
be proof-tested; tools and test equipment
will be calibrated and placed in a certifica-
tion recall system. Facility power, liquids
and gas supplies will be verified before
connecting them to SS flight equipment or
to GSE. Facility air-conditioning tempera-
ture, humidity, and filtration capability
will be verified.
Element unique GSE will be delivered to
KSC and installed in the appropriate facil-
ity. GSE-to-facility and GSE-to-Element
interface verification tests will be per-
formed prior to use in processing the
flight elements.
NOTE: MGSE, EGSE, and FSE are de-
fined in detail in WP01 End Item Support
Equipment, DR02, dated October 31,
1986.
7.1.4.2 Operations Processing
Team Concept
KSC will provide management, technical
support and facilities for test, integration
and launch of Space Station elements. The
processing team will be composed of
NASA, KSC contractor personnel and
WP-01 personnel.
Processing of the IOC Space Station ele-
ments will be the prime responsibility of
the WP-01 personnel, supported by appro-
priate KSC personnel. The FOC and cycli-
cal resupply processing will be processed
in the same manner by a resident KSC
processing team, with WP-01 supporting
personnel.
Space Station WP-01 element checkout
will be controlled from a test and monitor
station other than the Launch Control
Center (LCC). Space Station functions,
when integrated with Orbiter activities per-
formed at the OPF and Launch Pad, will
be controlled from the Payload Console lo-
cation in the Launch Control Center. The
Space Station Element test conductor will
provide the interface between the Space
Station processing team and the Orbiter
test conductor.
7.1.4.3 Standard Launch Site Operations
There are several operations to be per-
formed during launch preparations of the
Space Station elements that are common
to all of the individual element processing
flows. These operations are described in
the following paragraphs as standard
processing tasks.
7.1.4.3.1 Transportation
Space Station elements will be unloaded
from their carrier vehicles at the KSC
Shuttle Landing Facility or CCAFS Skid
Strip (for air transported elements), at the
KSC Turn Basin Facility (for barge trans-
ported cargo), and at Port Canaveral (for
ship-carried cargo). Each SS Element, in
its transportation container or fixture, will
be loaded onto a suitable land transporter/
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trailer and routed to the SSPF receiving
area. Overland transported items will be
routed directly to the SSPF receiving area.
7.1.4.3.2 Off-Site Transportation
Transportability is a key factor in early
Space Station planning and must be fac-
tored into the development of Space Sta-
tion element design. Transportation is
considered a KSC responsibiltiy.
7.1.4.3.3 Handling/Hoisting
Handling and hoisting operation of all ma-
jor elements and support equipment will
be performed using element unique han-
dling GSE, same as, or equivilant to, the
handling GSE used at the factory. A full
complement of element unique GSE will
accompany the flight hardware to the
launch site. The standard KSC inventory
of sling, cables, fixtures, and other han-
dling/hoisting equipment will be used on
an as-required basis. Refer to paragraph
7.4.1 for MGSE.
7.1.4.3.4 Receiving Inspections
All WP-01 Space Station hardware re-
ceived at KSC will undergo a receiving in-
spection by WP-01 personnel, in
conjunction with KSC persormcl, to ensure
an acceptable condition of the hardware
and accompanying documentation.
7.1.4.3.5 Leak Checks
Leak checking will normally be done only
in case the system level verification test
indicates a pressure was below specified
limits. Each of the pressurizad modules
will have a leak check performed if re-
moval and replacement of a port, hatch,
or closure plate is required.
7.1.4.3.6 Weight Checks and Center-of-
Gravity (CG) Checks
Weight and CG checks will be made using
load cells during the final hoisting of the
elements into the Orbiter Payload Canister
(OPC) for delivery to the Orbiter. Weight
and CG checks must also be performed on
the resupply Logistics Elements.
Weight Logs will be maintained on all
items installed or removed from the ele-
ments after the weighing operations to
permit an analytical determination of the
final weight and CG.
7.1.4.3.7 Stowage and Closeout
Stowage of crew equipment and supplies
as well as spare parts and expendables
should be performed before the elements
leave the checkout facility. All non-perish-
able items should be stowed, and racks
and other containers inspected and closed
out before leaving the checkout facility.
Hans should be made to also perform
time-critical stowage, if at all possible,
prior to move to the pad.
There should be no planned access to the
U.S. Laboratory Module at the pad. For
the Logistics Module, some near-continu-
ous power-up support is anticipated to
maintain refrigerated and frozen items.
Space Station portable GSE, as well as
electrical power and thermal control from
the Orbiter, will be used to maintain the
modules after module installation into the
Orbiter.
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7.1.4.3.8 Element Installations into the
Orbiter
WP-01 elements will be installed at the
launch pad from inside the Orbiter pay-
load Canister (OPC), by hoisting the OPC
to the Payload Changeout Room, and
transferring the elements into the Payload
Ground Handling Mechanism (PGHM) the
OPC will then be removed, and the SS ele-
ments will be installed into the Orbiter
PLB using the PGHM.
Installation of SS elements at the pad will
permit independent preparation and
scheduling of NSTS Orbiter, and will al-
low cargo operations to be optimized with
the greatest flexibility. However, Space
Station mission-dependent panels and
equipment may be installed in the Orbiter
at the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF),
to permit ease of installation and earlier
checkout.
7.1.5 Operational Phase Processing
Concepts
7.1.5.1 Resupply Flow
The Logistics Element resupply flow, is
shown in Figure 7.1.5.1-1. The Logistics
Element Resupply Flow is also contained
in Boeing document D483-50052-2,
"Space Station" Prelaunch Operations
Plan (DR-07).
7.1.5.2 Follow-On Element Processing
Growth of the Space Station will consist of
processing and delivering additional habi-
tat and laboratory modules to extend the
basic station capabilities, including crew
size, as well as adding totally new ele-
ments to provide a greater range of pay-
load services. This section provides
processing concepts that are envisioned to
apply to the follow-on phase of Space Sta-
tion operations.
7.1.5.3 Additional Element Processing
The second, and any additional flight ele-
ments that are replicas of those launched
for the IOC, will be processed through ba-
sically the same phases as the initial ele-
ment. Some operations may be reduced in
scope due to the maturity of experience
with the hardware, software, procedures,
and results of the on-orbit performance
record of the first element of each type.
The use of standard interface mating hard-
ware, as well as the use of standardized
functional interface characteristics, for
electrical power, data, and fluids, will
make ground verifications sufficient to
provide assurance of on-orbit success.
The use of proven procedures, facilities,
support equipment, and an experienced
processing team will enhance the effi-
ciency of preparing the second and fol-
low-on elements, so that a reduction in
time and overall cost can be expected.
7.1.5.4 OMV Accommodations
The growth option for the Space Station
calls for extension of the OMV hangar fa-
cility and the supporting structure, a well
as for the addition of a new OMV facility.
The processing flow for the new OMV fa-
cility will be the same as that for IOC;
however, system and subsystem testing
may be performed at a higher level if on-
orbit operations have shown that the ele-
ments have performed as expected in
space. In addition, experience in handling
these elements will reduce processing op-
erations time.
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7.1.5.5 Maintenance, Refurbishment,
and Reconfiguration
Maintenance, refurbishment and recon-
figuration of Space Station flight hardware
is baselined to be performed on orbit, or
to be returned to ground based service fa-
cilities on infrequent intervals. Space Sta-
tion WP-01 hardware that has been
returned from orbit because of failure will
be analyzed to determine the causes of
failure and what appropriate action needs
to be taken to prevent recurrence of the
failure.
Some items of Space Station WP-01 hard-
ware expected to be returned on a routine
basis for maintenance and refurbishment,
are the Logistics Elements propellant
tanks. The propellant tanks will be re-
furbished and retested in the Hazardous
Processing Facility (HPF) and in the cryo-
genic test facility, as applicable. Addi-
tional items will be refurbished either at
the launch site or at depot maintenance
facilities.
7.1.6 Ground Support Requirements
7.1.6.1 Facility Requirements
Space Station System elements will re-
quire a variety of ground processing facili-
ties. A summary of general ground
processing requirements imposed upon all
Space Station ground processing facilities
are:
a° Sufficient size, space, and room
height for element horizontal proc-
essing, handling, lifting, assembly,
access, loading.
b. Standard utilities; such as electricity,
phones, water, fire protection, com-
pressed air, GN2, vacuum, etc.
c. Environm.ental Controls
• Cleanliness: Class 100,000 (at con-
ditioned air, filter outlets)
• Temperature: 680-770F
• Humidity: 40%--50% R.H.
d. Support areas for office space, logis-
tics, payloads, shops, and labs.
7.1.6.2 GSE Requirements
Requirements for GSE are identified from
the various processing scenarios, ground
processing test phases, and ground opera-
tional requirements, for the Space Station
flight hardware.
WP-01 End Item Support Equipment in-
eluding MGSE, EGSE, and FSE, descrip-
tions and requirements are found in
DR-02, dated October 31, 1986.
a. Access GSE such as Portable work
stands and access equipment will be
required to provide access to all ex-
terior areas of the various elements
and integrated/palletized cargo, both
in the horizontal position in the proc-
essing facility, and for vertical access
at the pad (PCR/Orbiter). Ingress/
egress access equipment and 1G in-
ternal flooring for each module will
be required for horizontal processing,
and contingency vertical-access
equipment will be required for late
pad access to the module interiors.
b. Handling GSE will be required for
lifting modules, major elements, sub-
systems, ORU's and GSE. Pallets
and tugs can be used for movement
of Space Station elements within the
facilities. Overhead cranes and
strongbacks, will be required to in-
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do
e.
stall Space Station elements and inte-
grated cargo into the Orbiter Payload
Canister (OPC) at the SSPF and to
remove Space Station hardware from
shipping containers. Various standard
lifting devices such as forklifts, and
portable cranes, slings, and cables
will be required for auxiliary lifting,
handling, and assembly of heavy
hardware.
In addition, the Logistics Elements
will require external and internal
provisions for installing/removing,
and handling outfitted payload/ex-
periment racks, resupply racks, and
stowage racks.
Protective Equipment will be re-
quired for all surfaces and hardware
subject to scratches, tears, punctures,
or impact damage. This also includes
contamination covers for surfaces
such as heat transfer assemblies,
windows, multilayer insulation (MH)
and hatch sealing surfaces.
Mechanical Simulators will be re-
quired for simulation of SS-to-SS
and SS-to-Orbiter, mechanical sys-
tem interfaces during test, refurbish-
ment and maintenance
configurations. Included are element
functional simulators (liquids and
gases), and if required, berthing
simulators.
Ground air conditioning units are re-
quired for avionics cooling and for
personnel comfort, internal to the
elements, during ground checkout op-
erations.
f. Specialized GSE such as tilt frame
dollies, window holding fixtures,
hatch seal surface protectors, rack
dolly, and airflow balancing equip-
ment will be required for KSC proc-
essing (see Appendix E of reference
document gg, Appendix A, for a
more complete list).
g. Electrical Simulators will be required
for simulation of SS-to-SS, and SS-
to-Orbiter interfaces during test, re-
furbishment and maintenance
verification. Equipment to simulate
individual element interfaces (i.e.,
power, SSIS, audio/video, etc.) will
be required during certain testing.
Power sources will be required to
simulate power from the solar array
and/or power distribution systems.
h. Ground Data Management System
(GDMS) capabilities are still to be
assessed. Interfaces between KSC fa-
cilities and SS Element GSE items
will be defined during Phase C/D.
i. General Purpose Test Equipment
(GPTE) will be required for normal
and contingency operations. It is as-
sumed that a Space Station dedicated
loan pool will provide standard test
equipment such as ohmmeters, oscil-
loscopes, digital voltmeters, and strip
chart recorders that would be shared
between all SS program users.
j. Voice Communications will utilize
the KSC standard Operational Inter-
comm System(OIS), which should be
available at all SS support facilities.
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7.1.6.3 GSE Implementation Approach
The following ground rules and guidelines
will be followed for implementation of the
GSE requirements, with the goals of re-
ducing redundant hardware, increasing
commonality of pans, reducing the num-
ber of GSE units required, and reducing
O&M requirements.
GSE requirements will be documented us-
ing a system that will adhere to the follow-
ing guidelines:
a. Duplication of hardware will be mini-
mized.
b. GSE will be minimized through
maximum use of on-board systems
for test and checkout.
c. GSE performing similar functions
(including hardware, software, docu-
mentation, and procedures) will be
shared.
d. Standard interfaces will be estab-
lished between replaceable units.
e. Database standards will be defined
so that identical data base elements
can be used.
f. If technically and economically feasi-
ble, computer controlled scanning
equipment will be used to verify
physical interface compatibilities of
SS elements, sub-elements, and pay-
load hardware, without requiring me-
chanical moves and mating
operations.
7.1.6.4 Logistics Support Requirements
The transporting of supplies to the SS
crew every 12-weeks will require the fol-
lowing logistics support:
a. Preparation and packaging of food to
be loaded into the Logistics Module's
freezer and storage container.
b. A facility freezer to store food at
KSC, with the capacity large enough
to store food for several resupply
missions.
c. Capability to service, inspect, and fill
the potable water tanks, oxygen
tanks, nitrogen tanks, and other
tanks (when identified), in place,
without removing the tanks from
their carriers.
d. Capability to store, process, recycle,
and dispose of COp. removal chemi-
cals.
e. Packaging and storage of any per-
sonal hygiene equipment.
f. Packing and storage of crew clothing.
g. Matabolic waste disposal
The transporting of Space Station and pay-
load supplies every 12-weeks demands the
following support:
a. Storage, prepackaging, and control of
the Space Station consumables
(lights, filters, tools, and test equip-
ment).
Development of a computerized in-
ventory system, with associated soft-
ware, to establish and maintain
Space Station payload supply require-
ments and spares requirements, as
well as GSE spares.
Storage, packaging, and control of all
Space Station, OMV, and payload
b.
C°
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spares, as well as ground equipment
spares.
d. Storage, maintenance, and control of
Laboratory Module experiments.
e. Storage, maintenance and control of
trunks for Logistics Elements special
items and special carriers.
7.1.7 Customer Interfaces
The Space Station is to supply required
services to potential customers for the op-
eration of payloads in a stable, controlled
environment. The payload integration
process becomes a task of ensuring that
all physical, command, data, safety, and
inter-payload incompatibility issues are
resolved. Payload design reliability, and
probability of success, are the sole respon-
sibility of the individual payload organiza-
tion.
The Space Station program will identify to
prospective payload groups, in the form of
an interface document, the physical inter-
faces requirements (rack dimensions,
standard connections and attach points),
and safety requirements (acceptable mate-
rials, processes, and fire supression tech-
niques), along with the command and data
interface parameters.
NASA will also describe the associated
cost for each service or combination of
services. The customer can then select the
appropriate services for their payload and
enter into a written agreement with the
Space Station program that specifies the
contractual responsibilities for each group.
Costs associated with providing services to
the payloads should be the responsibility
of the customer, as long as the Space Sta-
tion provides the agreed-to services.
To facilitate customer communication and
payload integration, a single Space Station
Integration Group should be established.
This integration group would be responsi-
ble for the entire payload integration proc-
ess, from initial customer contact, through
on-orbit installation, activation, operation,
shut-down, and post-mission retrieval.
With a single NASA integration organiza-
tion providing the customer interface, a
complex integration process can be mini-
mized. Compatibility issues, between pay-
loads, and competition for Space Station
resources, will be resolved by the Space
Station integration office and the affected
payloads re.presentatives.
Payloads destined for operation on the
Space Station (and not while aboard the
orbiter), only have to be integrated into
one of the Logistics Elements rather than
onto the Orbiter. This integration scheme
allows for a smoother interface between
potential customers and the Space Station
integration office. Integration of the Logis-
tics Elements into the Orbiter is a respon-
sibility of the Space Station Logistics
Group.
The customer payload integration process-
ing has the potential for being the greatest
source of customer security problems. Se-
curity considerations/concerns/problems
must be negotiated with NASA on a case-
by-case basis.
To limit customer security risks, the ex-
change of proprietary information between
the customer and NASA Space Station in-
tegration group should be limited to areas
of safety, test, and physical interface veri-
fication, however, non-proprietary infor-
mation from the customer, must list all
materials & processes involved with pay-
load during the mission, to ensure that all
safety requirements are met (toxins, ex-
plosives, etc.). The integration of cus-
tomer data/command security procedures
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and accommodations, other than the
physical security provided by the SSSC,
will be the responsibility of the payload
customer.
The above plans remove much of the com-
plexity currently experienced in customer
payload integration activities, by placing
the design, test, and verification process
within the control and responsibility of the
individual payload groups. The pre-mis-
sion verification process also becomes the
customers responsibility.
7.1.8 Safety and Security
7.1.8.1 Safety
A ground operations safety program will
be implemented by KSC for the Space Sta-
tion Program to prevent injury to person-
nel and to preclude damage to SS flight
hardware, processing hardware, payloads,
and associated GSE.
The SS element contractor will develop a
Safety Plan for WP-01 operations at KSC
in compliance with applicable KSC Safety
Documents. The Safety Plan will become
a part of the Existing D483-50075-1
"WP-01 Safety Plan. "
The SS element contractor will furnish the
a detailed safety plan for Level C ap-
proval. This plan will describe the contrac-
tor's safety program and will present the
approach for implementing the KSC safety
requirements for which the contractor is
responsible. The safety plan will address
areas of personnel safety, equipment and
material safety, safety management, sys-
tem safety, industrial safety, and test op-
erations safety. The plan will be approved
by KSC Safety Office prior to start of
WP-01 hardware processing at KSC.
7.1.8.2 Security
Security plans and procedures will be in-
stituted that will protect SS elements from
damage and will protect Government clas-
sified and private proprietary information
from unauthorized disclosure or compro-
mise.
An integrated Space Station security plan
will be developed by NASA/KSC that will
deal with identified threats and vul-
nerabilities of the Space Station ground
operations systems. Security planning will
address three areas: resource protection,
protection of classified information, and
protection of customer and company sen-
sitive (proprietary) information.
Prior to developing specific security sys-
tem plans, a NASA study will be con-
ducted to determine which items in each
of the categories listed below must be pro-
tected. This can be done through analysis
of the command and data and hardware
elements that make up the Space Station
and its ground support system. The extent
of protection will be consistent with the se-
curity protection needs and the identified
threats and vulnerabilities of the elements
or systems involved.
a. National Security Information
b. Resource Protection
c. Proprietary Information
When encryption or other measures are
required for protection of proprietary in-
formation, such measures are the respon-
sibility of the customer.
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7.2 Orbital Operations Approach
Planning
This section defines orbital operational
functions for the Space Station and de-
scribes the related ground and crew func-
tions, interfaces, roles, responsibilities,
scenarios, and required support systems
for the Space Station assembly operations
and IOC operations. The preliminary on-
orbit operations concept of WP-01, man-
tended option concept, is described as well
as the on-orbit operations plan for the
preliminary growth version of the Space
Station. Candidates for automation and
autonomy applications to Space Station
operations are also discussed. The ap-
proach optimizes Space Station operability
by efficient utilization of the crew and
ground support personnel.
The operations for on-orbit assembly, or-
bital outfitting of the modules, station
shakedown and verification and IOC op-
erations are provided. Included are the op-
erations for the initial and cyclical
resupply elements.
7.2.1 Assembly Phase
Conceptual planning for the SSP has pro-
gressed to the point that preliminary
analysis of flight planning for the station
assembly and implementation has begun.
Because on NSTS cargo delivery capabili-
ties, multiple missions are necessary to
transport the flight elements to orbit and
to complete the station assembly and out-
fitting functions. The NSTS program cur-
rently provides the mission planning and
analysis for the NSTS to deliver cargos to
NASA-user agreed to requirements. The
NSTS has the capability to provided the
mission planning and trajectory develop-
ment for the initial station assembly and
resupply cargo flights with some increased
efficiency. However, the low level detail
planning and development of operational
flows and sequences, equipment packag-
ing, special tool analysis and timeline esti-
mating are new and complex tasks that
cannot be readily separated from the basic
SSP module and equipment design and de-
velopment.
When all the elements defined as a part of
an initial operating configuration are con-
sidered. The Space Station assembly
phase extends over a period of years.
During this period the Space Station must
pass through several sub-phases:
a. A ground controlled space vehicle
b. Orbital laboratory capable of limited
initial experiment operations.
c. A man-tended Space Station support-
ing payloads, satellite repair and sci-
ence.
d. A pre-IOC permanently manned con-
figuration with a specialized checkout
crew complement.
e. A full up configuration, including op-
erations crew.
7.2.1.1 Assembly Sequence
The Space Station assembly sequence be-
gins with the arrival of the first Space Sta-
tion elements at the assembly orbit. The
assembly sequence will be completed
when the elements have been assembled
and the station can be permanently
manned and its systems are capable of
supporting the crew until the next normal
resupply mission. Recommendations on an
optimum assembly altitude and an opti-
mum launch sequence can be made con-
sidering the National Space Transportation
System (NSTS) capabilities.
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The assembly altitude, launch sequence,
operations planning activation and check-
out, manning profile, automation require-
ments, and assembly-unique operations
for the current Space Station concept are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
NOTE: This section has not been up-
dated per Critical Evaluation Task Force
(CETF).
7.2.1.2 Assembly Altitude Profile
The assembly sequence developed mini-
mizes the drag on the Space Station dur-
ing assembly. This is achieved by several
innovations. On assembly missions one
through three, the assembly is flown in a
flight direction parallel to the center trans-
verse boom. This provides a minimum
profile for drag. After mission four, the
flight path is rotated perpendicularly to the
transverse boom to provide necessary
power from the solar power elements to
run limited scientific experimentation in
the Manufacturing and Technology Labo-
ratory. The power and station radiators
and the solar power modules are installed
in two parts with the last part being de-
ferred to a point that full thermal radiation
and electrical power are needed. Deferring
these elements reduces the drag profile. In
addition, the photo voltanic configuration
solar panels should be designed to be par-
tially deployed for electrical power as
needed to reduce drag.
Calculations were made to establish con-
figuration ballistic coefficients for each
step of the assembly sequence. The nomi-
nal case and 2 sigma atmospheric condi-
tions from the JACCHIA 1970
Atmospheric model were used to predict
the necessary initial deployment and
reboost altitude to allow orbital altitude
decay to 407.44 KM (220nm) for the next
assembly rendezvous at a 45 day interval.
7.2.1.3 Launch Sequence
The proposed launch sequence discussed
was developed to meet the following re-
quirements:
a. NSTS assembly flights will be
launched from Kennedy Space Cen-
ter (KSC) and will place the Space
Station in a 0.5 rad (28.45 degree)
inclination orbit.
b. Mission profiles will be used for as-
sembly which result in NSTS rendez-
vous with the Space Station on the
first crew day, but berthing/docking
occurs after a crew rest period.
Therefore, two days elapse from
launch to on station IVA.
c. The ground will be prime for com-
mand and control of the assembly
process. Both NSTS and ground com-
mand and telemetry will be provided
for the checkout, activation and
monitoring of critical components
prior to, during and after deployment
and/or assembly. Until the TDRS ca-
pability is operative, the data rate
will not support video transmissions.
d. Full FL will be berthed to the station
and activated before the spent I.aM is
detached and stowed in the orbiter
for return.
e. Assembly sequences that are depend-
ent upon the simultaneous presence
of more than one orbiter shall not be
considered.
f. The docking module should be con-
sidered as part of the orbiter pay-
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load, and installation of the module
on the station with orbiter modifica-
tions should be considered as an op-
tion only.
g. Orbiter lift capabilities to the various
altitudes will be according to Payload
Integration Plan (PIP), JSC 18508,
values. The orbiter lift capability of
17,347.93 kg (38245 pounds) to
500.04 km (270 nm) plus 45.36 kg/
km (100 pounds/nm) for each nm
under 500.04 km (270 nm) was used
for preliminary planning purposes.
h. NSTS performance enhancements per
NASA technical directive JJ20039
will be considered consistent with the
other groundrules. Consider enhance-
ments for two flights per year.
(1) assume an additional 1102.3 kg
(5000 pounds) orbiter lift capability
for assembly analysis involving use
of 109% orbiter main engines.
(2) assume payload penalty of 1814.4 kg
(4000 pounds) for flights requiring
docking/berthing mechanism.
i. For first flight manifesting, Orbital
Maneuvering System (OMS) rendez-
vous propellant should be offloaded.
j. For assembly flight planning all
NSTS flights will be dedicated
flights.
k. A power source will be provided
from the initial flight on, to support
the on-orbit assembly operations and
the activation and verification of
functional capabilities.
1. In order to reduce aerodynamic drag,
the power system shall be capable of
being flown in a minimum drag posi-
tion yet still produce power.
The resulting configuration following
each assembly flight will have the
necessary resources, capabilities and
redundancy to support safe opera-
tions between NSTS flights and to
enable the next step in the assembly
sequence for both nominal and con-
tingency NSTS launch condition.
The proposed assembly sequence dis-
cussed was developed within the following
groundrules and constraints:
n. An Reaction Control Systems (RCS)
capability will be established as soon
as possible to provide both backup
attitude control to the CMGs and
reboost capability.
o. The assembly altitude will be at a
planned minimum altitude of 407.44
km (220 rim).
p. Reboost will be planned to provide
an orbital life time (to loss of control
of the partially assembled station) of
a minimum of 90 days.
q. MSCS will not be used until station
RCS is available for CMG attitude
control backup.
r. The Space Station will maintain atti-
tude control during assembly.
s. The International Space Station (ISS)
configuration includes a dual beam,
two U.S. modules (MTL & HSO)
with nodes and tunnels (intercon-
m.
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nects) and the JEM & ESA elements
defined as IOC Prime.
t. NSTS turnaround and launch rate
during the assembly phase shall be
an average of one orbiter flight every.
45 days (equivalent to a 9 orbiter
flights per year for all Space Station
flights). A minimum of 21 days be-
tween flights is available but will not
increase the average rate of 9 per
year.
u. Assembly flights will utilize standard-
ized NSTS flight designs, capabili-
ties, and services to the maximum
possible extent (e.g., common orbiter
vehicle ascent profiles, flight support
equipment, payload bay configura.
tion, etc.). Development of Space
Station program unique flight support
equipment should be studied as an
option only.
v. The assembly sequence should dem-
onstrate an early and progressive ca-
pability of accommodating user
requirements, however, user accom-
modation will not result in compro-
mising assembly operations.
The proposed assembly sequence dis-
cussed was developed using the following
assumptions:
w. The MSC will be capable of grap-
pling into the orbiter bay and will
have sufficient length/mobility to
reach required locations for assem-
bly. The MSC will be available start-
ing with the third flight.
Mass properties used are contractor
generated data.
X°
y. Structure is a five meter (16.4 feet)
erectable cell that is stowed be piece
parts in the orbiter payload bay.
z. Any violation of the NSTS cg enve-
lope published in Volume XIV of
JSC 07700 series documents can be
arbitrated on an individual basis.
aa. The propulsion system is designed
with enough modularity to provide a
limited reboost capability before the
total system is installed, and is capa-
ble of being relocated during the as-
sembly sequence.
bb. Orbital outfitting will be accom-
plished by logistics flights as a trans-
fer mode carrying common racks of
outfitting equipment.
co. The maximum of 48 hours of EVA
permitted is sufficient to support
EVA requirements to assemble sta-
tion structure, power production ele-
ments, and radiator panels prior to
permanent manning.
7.2.1.4 Assembly Operations Planning
Operations planning for the Space Station
Assembly Phase begins with an analysis of
the mission and systems requirements.
Flight scenarios are being developed for
the WP-01 elements and used as a
baseline for detailed functional require-
ments for Space Station assembly flight
operations. In addition to defining the
functional requirements for SS assembly
and checkout payload integration with
NSTS is required.
The initial integration activities include de-
velopment of the Payload Integration Plan
(PIP) for Space Station WP-01 elements.
The PIP is the technical contract between
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the Space Station WP-01 elements and the
NSTS. It identifies all of the technical re-
quirements for the integration and opera-
tions of the payload. In conjunction with
the PIP, the development of the more de-
tailed Interface Control Document (ICD)
is required, and a flight compatibility as-
sessment is conducted to evaluate .the total
payload and mission compatibility of the
SS elements assigned to a particular flight.
This activity culminates in a Cargo Inte-
gration Review (CIR) at approximately
launch minus nine months. Subsequent to
the CIR, the NSTS flight-specific products
are generated.
PIP annexes which are subservient to the
PIP and ICD are prepared to document the
detailed information required by the NSTS
to configure the Flight and Ground Sys-
tems necessary to support the Assembly
Sequence missions. The number of an-
nexes required is dependent on the details
of a particular Space Station element.
Typically, the PIP annexes are:
1. Payload Data Package
2. Flight Planning
3. Flight Operations Support
4. Command and Data
5. Payload Operations Control Center
6. Orbiter Crew Compartment
7. Training
8. Launch Site Support Plan
9. Interface Verification
10. (Reserved)
11. Extravehicular Activity
Based on the requirements detailed in the
PIP and its annexes, the NSTS will de-
velop a basic version of all the tools used
for training and for the execution of the
flight. This includes all crew procedures,
crew activity plan, and the mission rules.
The Payload Operations Working Groups
(POWG's) are used to review the NSTS/
Payload requirements and to resolve any
issues during the development process.
The POWG will consist of representatives
from NSTS, WP-01, and any other work
packages manifested for that mission.
These basic products are reviewed at the
Flight Operations Review, typically sched-
uled three months prior to launch. Any
changes will be reflected in the final set of
operations products, which are used for
that flight.
7.2.1.5 Activation and Checkout
The on-orbit verification of the functional
operations capability of the Space Station
can be broken into four phases. The first
two phases (station build-up and activa-
tion and on-orbit shakedown and verifica-
tion) are the subjects of this paragraph.
Each launch transported a set of Space
Station elements to orbit that were re-
moved from the orbiter cargo bay, in-
stalled on the existing station elements
(after the first flight), hav_e their mechani-
cal and unpowered features verified Out-
fitting design must keep the outfitting
equipment in a rack configuration as
much as possible.
The manpower for the on-orbit shake-
down and verification will be provided, in
the main, by the Space Station crew that is
in residence after the station can accom-
modate them. This phase of verification
may be accomplished concurrently with
the early station operational functions,
e.g., when the first station supported EVA
is planned, the appropriate verification
procedures for that part of proximity op-
erations can be accomplished.
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Finally, some of the crew's time will be
devoted to performing scientific experi-
mentation after flight five. The Space Sta-
tion will then have a partially outfitted
Manufacturing Technology Laboratory,
power, thermal control system and avail-
able NSTS crew support.
In summary, the manning profile assumes
7 personnel for 12 days with flight 9
through 12 being supplemented by the
resident Space Station crew.
7.2.1.6 Automation Requirements
The Space Station buildup will benefit
from automation assistance to human
crew procedures. The automation require-
merits for WP-01 assembly will be consis-
tent with the levels of automation to be
incorporated at IOC. The current concept
does not call for any unique automation
devices/techniques for the assembly
phase.
7.2.1.7 General Structure
The Space Station Program selection of
erectable structures will require some spe-
cial support equipment. Where special
equipment is identified, it, in turn, has
special functional requirements. This
equipment may have to be assembled, po-
sitioned, set up, controlled, monitored,
serviced and maintained with specially-
trained personnel or servicer equipment
located at the construction site.
7.2.1.8 MSCS
The Mobile Service Center (MSC) is a
multipurpose device outfitted with a space
arm. It plays an important function in the
buildup of the Space Station and is a pri-
mary tool on the station to transport mod-
ules and/or payloads from the Shuttle
cargo bay and position them for attach-
ment to the Space Station truss structure.
The combination of MSC and EVA astro-
naut is utilized in locating, latching and
erecting the structure segments. The same
procedure is repeated for the radiators,
the keel extensions and the lower boom. A
major feature anticipated of the MSC is
the "cherry picker" mode. Astronauts in
EVA suits are positioned within their work
envelope by the movable arms. Control of
the arms and all features ofthe MSC re-
sides with the EVA astronaut(s). The two
arms can be used in several different loca-
tions on the MSC. This capability greatly
expands the work volume of the astro-
nauts.
The MSC will have a self-contained, re-
chargeable power supply. Depending on
the work and the mission, the platform
will be adaptable in terms of special stor-
ing devices and cradles for miscellaneous
hardware.
An alternative to human support will be
dexterous manipulator for the MSC arm.
This system has the design goal of being
equivalent to the capabilities of man, yet
reduces the amount of support equipment
and preparatory work.
7.2.1.9 Assembly-Unique Operations
Most of the initial assembly operations for
the Space Station will be unique. The op-
erations will initially occur from the Shut-
tle Orbiter and later from the available
Space Station elements in conjunction with
the Orbiter. Ground control will be the pri-
mary management authority for the as-
sembly process, providing most of the
monitoring, checkout, verification, and
technical guidance. The on-orbit crew will
provide control of the assembly process.
These functions differ significantly from
previous manned space activities and the
post assembly operations described in this
operations plan.
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7.2.2 IOC Phase Ground Support
Operations
This section provides a conceptual de-
scription of the operational functions to be
performed by the ground elements in sup-
port of the Space Station during the IOC
timeframe. Emphasis is placed on the
roles and responsibilities, interfaces, and
ground support daily activities.
The concept includes the following fea-
tures: a streamlined approach to customer
payload operation and the extensive use of
software routine to reduce ground crew
workload.
7.2.2.1 Ground Support Complex
The Space Station will interface with its
ground support system primarily through
the Space Station Support Center (SSSC)
and various Payload Operation Control
Centers (POCC). Operations and control
of the station systems and subsystems will
reside with the SSSC while users will oper-
ated via remotely networked POCCs.
These POCCs operate under geographical
functional control centers, (e.g., MSFC's
MTL Operations Support Center (OSC),
and OM'V Control Center, GSFC's Plat-
form Control Center (PCC), JEM's Tsu
kuba Central Operations, and ESA's Cen-
tral User Facility. While recognizing the
necessity for communications and limited
data flow between these two facilities, they
will operate as autonomously as possible.
The capabilities of the initial ground sup-
port system will evolve as the station
grows, including the ability to add remote
POCCs as the need dictates.
Technical support of WP-01 subsystems
will be provided at the SSSC. This re-
source will provide assistance in
troubleshooting possible problems with
subsystem hardware or in station monitor-
ing/control as required. A telemetry link
back to MSFC and/or WP-01 contractor
facilities will provide additional technical
support and operations planning for the
MTL on an as needed basis. Due to the
automation anticipated systems monitor-
ing, the manpower required for each time
station support is expected to be less than
for the STS.
POCCs will support and manage payload
operations in a mode as transparent to the
station as possible. A major POCC is fore-
seen for the manufacturing and technology
laboratories with the capability of remote
user support. Specific data will be
through-put to user facilities, eliminating
the need for extensive TDY and additional
ground support equipment. User com-
mands (non-critical) will be generated and
formatted at the POCC for subsequent
transmission to the station (or the SSSC if.
required by RF network constraints). All
SSP centers will also interface via a coor-
dination loop with audio, video and house-
keeping data. Teleoperations will be
performed for MTL experimental support
from the ground.
7.2.2.2 Systems Monitoring and Control
The ground management of Space Station
systems involves the monitoring, systems
control, and malfunction and anomaly
resolution when the station crew and auto-
matic systems monitoring and control ca-
pabilities cannot adequately manage the
system. The ground support complex will
have systems management capabilities
similar to those onboard the station, with
the additional access to experts, test beds,
and detailed knowledge bases for prob-
lems not resolvable onboard or more effi-
ciently solved by a ground crew.
The SSSC will have systems management
command and telemetry processing and
control interfaces for all of the onboard
monitoring and control systems. Individu-
als responsible for projected operations
and support knowledge base will support
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 414
the ground monitoring and management
of the Space Station systems. They will be
managed at the SSSC and the information
will be stored on board the Station for
crew and other systems access.
A conceptual SSSC must have a complete
data processing and display capability to
support the on-line ground support team
who may be the remote operators of the
Space Station subsystems at a particular
time; or they may be observing and acting
as backup of an on-board Space Station
crew; or they may be supporting a tran-
sient orbiter crew in an initial assembly
and activation task or in a man-tended
mode. The sequence of subsystem activa-
tion should prioritize getting the power
and DMS on-line, then proceeding
through reverification of the rest of the
subsystems. Depending upon the
"manned" mode in use, the SSSC must be
manned to some level of surveillance at all
times when a Space Station Crew is not
on-board.
Communications and tracking systems
data will also be available. Proximity and
automated controlled approach data if, ap-
plicable, and status of other spacecraft
during rendezvous and docking will be
available. The SSSC crew will take control
of the operation as a backup for Space
Station control or in an unmanned SS con-
dition. Attitude control and altitude con-
trol data will be displayed, including status
of Attitude Control System (ACS) and
reboost propulsion system. Appropriate
safety systems alarms and status will be
displayed identically in the SS and the
SSSC. The ability to transfer control be-
tween the SS and the SSSC must exist at
all times with appropriate software inter-
locks during certain critical operations. At
other times, control would be established
by Standard Operating Procedure (SOP),
with primary control vested in the SS Di-
rector.
As much as possible, the SSSC will have
identical display, controls, automated data
systems, computer and data file access as
the Space Station. If additional data capa-
bility is added in the SSSC, provisions will
be segregated from the basic control and
monitor equipment available in the station
in order to stress identical control and
management environments. Since the
functional status of most, if not all, of the
systems will be computer monitored for
operation within limits by the on-board
built-in self test capability and the DMS,
the requirement for manned surveillance
in the SS or the SSSC can be reduced sig-
nificantly. Out--of-limits operation will be
determined by the computer and an appro-
priate status or or alarm signal generated
to the SS or SSSC monitor, who cart initi-
ate corrective action.
7.2.2.3 Flight Design
The flight design function involves flight
resources planning, maintenance planning,
flight control planning and traffic man-
age-merit planning (proximity operations)
for the Space Station, platform, OMV and
interactions with the STS.
Flight resources planning includes plan-
ning for the use of Space Station, plat-
forms, OMV, and payload in-flight
systems, equipment and consumables. The
SSSC will perform long term (monthly
and weekly) Space Station platform and
OMV resources planning and integrate the
resources planning for the platform, OMV
and payloads with the station resources
planning. The SSSC planners may use a
similar system to the onboard automated
interactive flight resources planning sys-
tem. The approved plan may be stored in
the Mission Plans Knowledge Base for un-
link to the Space Station version of the
Mission Plans Knowledge Base. The Mar-
shall Space Flight Center (MSFC) Opera-
tions Support Center will provide the flight
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resources planning for use of the MTL and
the MTL payloads.
The ground planners at MSFC will use the
following knowledge base types as infor-
mation sources and flight control plan-
ning:
• Systems Performance
• Operating Procedures
• Logistics
• Mission Plans
• Customer Unique Knowledge Bases
The flight resources planning function will
iterate with the flight control planning,
crew activity planning, maintenance plan-
ning and traffic management planning ac-
tivities. The maintenance planning
function, as part of the Maintenance Man-
agement Data System, is described in the
On Orbit Maintenance Plan.
Flight control planning includes trajectory/
flight dynamics design and planning,
Guidance, Navigation and Control (GNC)
planning, propulsion systems planning,
ephemerides generation, star catalog
maintenance, CG modeling and structural
modeling for the Space Station, OMV,
platform, Mobile Service Center System
(MSCS), robots and EVAs. The SSSC
planners perform the long term (monthly
and weekly) flight control planning using
the ground version of the onboard auto-
mated interactive flight control planning
system. The approved flight control plans
will be stored in a mission plans knowl-
edge base for uplink to the Space Station
when appropriate.
The flight control planning function will
interact with the flight resource, traffic
management and crew activity planning
activities.
Traffic management planning is the inte-
grated planning process for the control of
spacecraft that will penetrate the Space
Station traffic control safety zones. Traffic
management planning requires coordina-
tion and exchange of data between the
SSSC and other spacecraft control centers.
It also involves interacting with the North
American Air Defense Command
(NORAD) for forecasting possible colli-
sions and closest point of approaches to
various space objects.
7.2.2.4 Operations Planning
The basic planning tool to be used in per-
formance of operations planning is the
mission and systems requirements analy-
sis. The technique and engineering disci-
pline will be used for flight operations
analysis. Based upon the preliminary
Flight Operations Plan JSC 30201, and
other general program planning guide-
lines, generic flight operations scenarios
for WP-01 flight elements will be devel-
oped. These scenarios then become gener-
alized baseline flows from which the
detailed set of functional requirements will
evolve. The development of these flows is
an iterative process as the program devel-
ops and design and operations guidelines
become more firm. As successive versions
are developed, they will be released in this
document with a summary narrative out-
lining the overall plan scenario. A fallout
of this analysis will be a definition of sup-
port equipment, software, procedures and
manning requirements.
The operations planning function is used
to verify the correct utilization of Space
Station resources (power, thermal, station
supplied common user equipment, crew
availability, etc.) and to ensure coordina-
tion between ground and space activities.
Three levels of planning will be used to
ensure efficient resource utilization; long
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term (monthly), short term (weekly), and
daily planning cycles.
The long term and short term planning cy-
cles are a ground function. During these
two planning cycles conflicts between re-
quested resources are identified and re-
solved. In addition, periods for payload
operations that require coordination be-
tween the Space Station and ground
POCCs, tracking, data processing facili-
ties, etc are established.
The monthly and weekly planning cycles
are used to produce a daily activity sched-
ule. The daily schedule produced by the
ground provides the crew with a skeleton
activity plan that the crew must perform
that day, along with the time constraints,
required sequences, and other task con-
straints. The crew uses the ground pro-
vided plan to develop the detailed
operations plan for that work day. The
detailed crew work plan is then sent to the
ground for coordination purposes.
Under the contingency conditions, the
Ground Support Center become responsi-
ble for all planning activities in order to
facilitate rapid flight crew resolution of
the contingency. If the contingency in-
cludes a loss of communications are re-
stored.
7.2.2.5 Procedures Management
Space Station procedures will be managed
on the ground as part of the normal
ground operations support function. The
review and modification of the procedures
will be a continuing effort over the life of
the program. The ground will uplink re-
quired procedures to the Space Station for
use by the onboard crew. The procedures
stored at the station will be a subset of the
total set of operational procedures. Proce-
dures that are used infrequently will be
transmitted to the station on an "as
needed" basis.
All test and operations procedures used in
conjunction with flight hardware process-
ing and the interfacing ground support
system will be maintained under engineer-
ing configuration control for hardware/
software and documentation. As the
hardware configuration becomes firm in
released drawings and documentation, the
procedures will be developed initially in a
narrative/scenario format. They will then
be converted to a computerized format
maintained in the test monitor and control
data base. An objective will be to auto-
mate all functional test and verification
procedures and test sequencing. Maxi-
mum use will be made of the flight equip-
ment built-in self test capability. The
executive programs will sequence through
a set of subroutines which may be called
up, or deleted, as the test objected may
require. If a procedure or software error is
encountered, it will be documented on a
procedure/software change notice as it is
corrected. The PCN goes to Engineering to
change the released record and the opera-
tion proceeds. The software in question
will be electronically flagged to note the
real-time change and contents in the op-
erational records.
All procedures (preflight, flight operations
and contingencies/emergency) would be
integrated into this data file. This includes
pertinent, other-contractor procedures in-
terfacing into an integrated preflight or
flight operation. As the Space Station pro-
gram achieves IOC, the procedures for op-
erational use will have transitioned from
an assigned contractor-sustaining control
and delivered into a fully-operational on-
line NASA data system. Provisions must
be made for availability on-orbit for both
hard copy readout portability as well as
screen display, as is appropriate for the
activity being performed. For unusual
EVA, a "procedure talker" on the audio/
video net may be necessary for more com-
plex operations.
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7.2.2.6 Proximity Operations
Primary tracking and control responsibility
resides on the Space Station during prox-
imity operations with unmanned vehicles
within the Space Station Command and
Control Zones (CCZ). Ground functions
during this phase of a mission re: back-up
control, tracking for contingency opera-
tions, and performing independent checks
for trajectory computations. Preflight plan-
ning for proximity operations would be
performed on the ground and then trans-
mitted to the Space Station.
A typical proximity operations mission
would begin before the actual flight with
detailed mission planning occurring on the
ground. These would include trajectory
analysis and contingency operations devel-
opment which would include accommoda-
tion for possible unique instructions would
be transmitted to the Space Station. When
an arriving unmanned vehicle enters the
Station CCZ ground phases control and
tracking handover to the Space Station.
During proximity operations where the
Space Station has primary control, ground
control will still have the capability to
reacquire control for contingency opera-
tions. During proximity operations, if an
approach is aborted, ground control reac-
quires control and plans another ap-
proach. During proximity operations,
ground control acts as an independent
check for trajectory computations. The
ground would receive Global Positioning
Satellite (GPS) positioning for both the
Space Station and the incoming vehicle
and compute relative trajectories.
7.2.2.7 STS Interface
The Space Station interface with the NSTS
appears to be the normal user relationship
with the transportation system over the
long range. During the earlier SS imple-
mentation phase, a closer working rela-
tionship could prove beneficial. The SSP is
unique in STS experience with respect to
the concentration of multiple cargo flights
to place the SSPEs on-orbit, followed by
the detailed effort to assemble the station
and activate it. This means that the flight
crew/SS specialists will be performing new
and different tasks than is normally per-
formed with a new user. There will also be
a number of "first time" unusual opera-
tions required.
Schedule integration and management
during the post-IOC phase will be busy,
but should be maintainable within the ex-
isting NASA scheduling system. The sta-
tion schedules will interface with NSTS
schedules and, as necessary, interface
joint milestone commitment dates. If there
is a great deal of interleaving of two flows
of activity under separate agencies, special
integrated schedules can be worked out
jointly and maintained.
The Space Station interface to the STS, as
any other user will be defined through the
Payload Integration Plan (PIP). The PIP
will identify all STS services required in
support of the Space Station operations,
including special tests, access require-
ments, and contingency planning.
Current WP-O1 design concepts are highly
compatible with standard STS flows, but
will aquire late on-pad access for the Lo-
gistics Module (specific discussion of the
STS Ground Operations Interface is pro-
vided in the WP-O1 Ground Operations
Plan. Early station flights will require
close coordination with the STS MCC.
This interface will provide backup ground
support capability during SSSC checkout
and verification.
7.2.2.8 OMV Interface
The SSP becomes a part of the NASA
Support System relative to the OMV and
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its users. The OMV/User place their re-
quirements on NASA/SS and others as ap-
propriate, like KSC, NSTS, JSC. The
existing NASA program management sys-
tem provides a basic framework for han-
dling program requirements, schedules,
management systems.
During Space Station operations the Or-
bital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) strate-
gic planning will be performed in
conjunction with the MSFC OMV Control
Center. Outside the Space Station CCZ,
the ground control has primary tracking
and control responsibility. A typical OMV
mission conducted from the Space Station
entails detailed mission planning on the
ground. This is followed by uplink of mis-
sion unique instructions to the Space Sta-
tion. After the OMV is launched and flies
beyond the CCZ, the station crew will
hand control over to the ground. The
ground control then commands the orbit
adjust and attitude maneuvers necessary
to complete the planned mission. Upon re-
turn to the Space Station, the ground
hands over control to the station crew for
proximity operations. This same scenario
applies to an NSTS launched OMV, except
the OMV returns to a parking orbit and is
retrieved by the NSTS by the orbiter crew.
7.2.2.9 Platform Interface
During normal operation of platforms, the
ground has primary control and monitor-
ing. The only time this is not the case is
during proximity operations within the
Space Station CCZ, or during servicing
operations using the OMV. The ground
will be responsible for long term and real
time mission planning, including orbit
maintenance and logistics operations.
Operation of the platforms would be simi-
lar to OMV operations except that mission
duration is considerably lengthened. Cur-
rently, the space based OMV is scheduled
to service the platforms from the Space
Station or NSTS remotely or by bringing
the platforms to the Space Station and al-
low easy integration of various POCCs
into the Space Station telemetry and com-
mand network.
7.2.2.10 Customer Interface
This section describes the customer inter-
faces for prelaunch payload integration
and the operational payload interfaces for
command and telemetry support. The pur-
pose of the following approach is to pro-
vide a system that is user friendly the the
customer.
7.2.2.11 User Philosophy
The mission of the Space Station is to sup-.
ply the required services to potential cus-
tomers for the operation of payloads in a
stable, controlled environment. With this
mission, the payload integration process
becomes a task of insuring that physical,
command, data, safety, and inter-payload
incompatibility issues are resolved. As
long as the above issues are resolved, pay-
load reliability, design concepts, and prob-
ability of success are the sole
responsibility of the user payload organi-
zation. Costs associated with providing
services to the payloads should be the re-
sponsibility of the user payload agency as
long as the Space Station provides the
agreed upon services.
This approach removes much of the com-
plexity currently experienced in payload
integration on the Shuttle by placing the
design, test, and verification process
within the control and responsibility of the
user payload groups. However, the pre-
mission verification process inherent in
the current Shuttle payload integration
process, and the risk reduction built into
that process, also becomes the user re-
sponsibility.
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7.2.2.12 Customer Payload Integration
The Space Station program will identify to
prospective payload groups, in the form of
an interface document, the physical inter-
face requirements (rack dimensions, stan-
dard connections and attach points),
safety requirements (acceptable materials,
processes, and fire suppression tech-
niques), along with the command and data
interface parameters. NASA will also de-
scribe the services offered by the Space
Station along with the associated cost for
each service or combination of services.
The payloads can then select the appropri-
ate services for their payload and enter
into a written agreement with the Space
Station program that specifies the contrac-
tual responsibilities for each group.
To facilitate customer communication and
payload integration to the Space Station, a
single Space Station integration group has
been established at Level B. This integra-
tion group is responsible for the entire
payload integration process from initial
customer contact through on-orbit instal-
lation. With a single NASA integration or-
ganization providing the customer
interface, a complex integration process is
minimized.
The integration process has the potential
for being the greatest source of customer
security problems. To limit customer secu-
rity risks, the exchange of proprietary in-
formation between the customer and the
NASA Space Station integration group
should be limited to areas of safety, test,
and physical interface verification. Com-
patibility issues between payloads and
competition for Space Station resources
will be resolved by the Space Station Cus-
tomer Integration Office and the affected
payloads representatives. A working group
will convene and support each of the
Space Station's 90-day missions. If pay-
loads cannot be flown during the same
90-day mission due to incompatibility,
then the payloads will be scheduled for
separate flights by the Space Station inte-
gration office.
Payloads destined for operation on the
Space Station only have to be integrated
into one of the logistics system elements
rather than on to the Shuttle. This integra-
tion scheme allows for a smoother inter-
face between potential customers and the
Space Station Customer Integration Of-
rice. Integration of the logistics system ele-
ments into the Shuttle is a responsibility of
the Space Station logistics group.
The integration of customer data/com-
mand security procedures and accommo-
dations, other than the physical security
provided by the SSSC or other functional
geographic centers, will be the responsibil-
ity of the payload customer.
7.2.2.13 Customer Telemetry Interface
The telemetry links supplied to the cus-
tomer at their POCC must be capable of
supporting low, medium, and high data
volume users; meet NASA communication
interfaces, and be expandable for future
Space Station program operations. In addi-
tion, the communication system should ap-
pear to the customer to be separate from
other users and appear transparent except
for input, output, and planning activities.
The telemetry system that meets these re-
quirements is best accommodated by a
distributed network. The distributed net-
work accommodates high, medium, and
low data users on the Space Station in a
common super-multiplexed data link. The
super multiplexed data link is demul-
tiplexed on the ground and the individual
user data is then shipped "bent pipe" to
the users for processing.
Establishing an operational policy where
data is shipped directly to the individual
customer POCC and allows the customers
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to provide their own data processing capa-
bility removes a costly, complex interface
resident in past NASA programs. How-
ever, processing of user experiment data
at NASA ground facilities can be accom-
plished as an optional service provided to
customers. If the customer provides his
own processing, the telemetry system be-
comes "transparent" as far as the Space
Station system design is concerned. The
concept also limits the complexity of cus-
tomer integration to the Space Station.
A distributed network allows the system to
be adaptable and evolve with the least
amount of scarring over the station life-
time. By adding multiplexers for high rate
users, submultiplexers for medium rate
users, and by adding low rate users to the
Space Station management network, the
communications subsystem can be ex-
panded to meet all future needs.
7.2.2.14 Customer Command Interface
The command system design and opera-
tion for the Space Station should be trans-
parent to the customers and allow the
customers to freely interface with their
payloads from their POCCs with as little
interference from the Space Station pro-
gram as possible. The following concept
supports these requirements.
The concept requires the customers to
generate commands at their own POCC
facilities and transmit these commands via
a "bent pipe" configuration to the Space
Station for execution by the payload. For
customers who are unable to generate
commands at their own facilities, the
Space Station Program could provide the
command generation and transmission
function as an optional service.
The inter-laboratory command coordina-
tion and planning function will be the re-
sponsibility of a group resident at the
SSSC. Inputs concerning services required
by the payloads (power, thermal, crew,
etc.) will be by each laboratory support
center intra-laboratory group on a
monthly, weekly, and daily basis. The pay-
load operation requirements will then be
assessed against current Space Station ca-
pabilities, operations safety issues, and the
requirements of all their payloads for the
identification and resolution of conflicts.
Once conflicts are resolved, the individual
laboratory support centers will generate,
format, and transmit commands from
their facilities to the SSSC. The SSSC will
combine the various command streams
into a common command uplink and
transmit the commands to the Space Sta-
tion.
7.2.2.15 Ground Support Operations
Personnel Training
Interactive terminals will provide for
ground support operations training system
familiarization and practical problem solv-
ing exercises. Scripted simulations will
employ the use of ground based support
equipment, linked via training software
and operational communications links, to
provide high fidelity exercises. All ground
support centers will be involved in console
exercises and will experience simulated
nominal and contingency operations. Inte-
grated simulations will be minimized.
They will be used mainly to check out new
interfaces.
Major training facilities will be located at
various locations and will contain, where
appropriate, interactive simulators and
mockups used in the Space Station train-
ing program. Space Station modules will
be modeled and will contain hardware/
software necessary to facilitate the train-
ing required. Modules and systems will be
capable of data and software links among
the station systems and between the sta-
tion and ground support consoles.
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Student terminals used for the self-paced
portions of the preflight training program
will be capable of high resolution graph-
ics. They will be geographically remote
and linked to the main frame.
A training planning and inventory systems
should exist to provide the training plan-
ners improved efficiency in the training
process. It should interact with a mission
plans knowledge base and a training
knowledge base. Appropriate segments of
a training knowledge base will be uplinked
for onboard training.
7.2.2.16 Program Phase Deltas
The evolution of ground operation systems
is predicated on the development of auto-
mation and expert systems. The standard
approach for developing these systems is a
four step process. The first step in the
process is to develop the human opera-
tional expertise necessary to perform the
function. The man-tended era supplies the
medium for establishing the human knowl-
edge base for Space Station operations.
Once human "expertise" is developed, the
second step can be initiated by converting
this knowledge into expert automated sys-
tems. As the expert systems are devel-
oped, the third step in the process can be
performed, i.e., the verification and vali-
dation of the expert autonomous system.
Verification and validation will be per-
formed by running the expert system in
parallel with the existing ground opera-
tional system. As confidence in the new
expert system is gained and operational
problems are overcome, the final step of
integrating the new capability into the op-
erating system will be performed. This fi-
nal step relieves the ground controllers of
performing the related systems functions.
During each phase of the Space Station
development (man-tended to growth), sta-
tion functions will be reallocated between
the space and ground segments. The real-
location process will assign a given func-
tion to that operational element which
provides the most efficient support for
that specific development phase. It is ex-
pected that single functions will be trans-
ferred between the ground and space
segments several times during the pro-
gram lifetime.
The ground operations staffing levels will
shift from a ground support intensive ef-
fort during the man-tended phase to mini-
mal ground support during the growth
phase.
7.2.2.17 Man-tended
During the man-tended phase, the ground
support system will be performing all of
the station system monitoring functions.
The level of ground support personnel per-
forming these functions will be relatively
high due to the lack of maturity of expert
systems and the nature of the tasks. The
ground involvement during this time
frame can be characterized as operating in
much the same manner as a ground sys-
tem in support of an unmanned satellite.
Ground operations of teleoperated experi-
ment systems are planned.
The operations planning function during
the man-tended phase will require all of
the IOC planning tasks to be performed on
the ground. The planning process will be-
come a two-phase process: one for the
unmanned portion of the mission and one
for the man-tended timeframe. The un-
manned planning periods (monthly,
weekly, and daily) will be performed. The
man-tended planning cycle will contain
long range planning to develop the most
efficient payload operations plan for short
duration manned visits. A shorter term
planning cycle will be used for the routine
station maintenance and station repair ac-
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tivities that are required since the last
manned visit.
Procedures management will be per-
formed in much the same manner for both
the man-tended and IOC timeframes. An
exception is that two sets of procedures
will be required, one for the unmanned
operation and a second set for the man-
tended operation. These two sets of pro-
cedures will have to be validated for
overlap to ensure a smooth and safe tran-
sition between each operational phase.
The man-tended phase will require a dif-
ferent training philosophy than that em-
ployed during the IOC phase. The short
duration of the man-tended visits will re-
quire the crew to be completely trained
prior to the flight. The training techniques
and skill levels of the crew will have to
closely resemble current NASA shuttle
training activities.
7.2.2.18 Growth
The growth version of the Space Station
will require minimal real time ground sup-
port. During this phase, most system
monitoring functions will be automated
either or the ground or on the station. The
ground support will consist of a small
crew providing assistance in contingency
situations and performing long range
planning and trend analysis on the subsys-
tems and automated software package op-
eration.
Additional mission planning complexity is
added to the SSP with the introduction of
OTV operations involving rendezvous and
docking, refueling, and maintenance with
other spacecraft. Additional third party
user participation would also be involved
in mission planning and design. Rendez-
vous and orbit translation planning add
more complexity and potentially increase
resupply requirements for propellants,
other consumables, and equipment main-
tenance (at least remove and replace on
orbit). Properly established in the begin-
ning of the program, the basic program
management functions established for the
SSP implementation should suffice for the
post-IOC growth period.
7.2.3 On-Orbit Operations
This section provides a description of the
operational functions to be performed by
the flight crew, hardware and software us-
age, and the Space Station subsystems op-
eration during the IOC timeframe.
Emphasis is placed on the system inter-
faces and crew activities that take place
within the architecture. This concept was
developed in conjunction, with Ground
Support Operations, to ensure consistent
interface definition.
The concept presented includes extensive
use of software routines for reducing the
crew workload, cross training require-
ments for all crew members, and the ef-
fects that EVA activities have on the
availability of crew time.
7.2.3.1 Station Crew
At IOC, the onboard flight crew will con-
tain eight members consisting of one sta-
tion specialist, two mission specialists, and
one payload specialist on each 12 hour
shift. Crew members will be NASA per-
sonnel due to Space Station administrative
and technical requirements. These Space
Station requirements include EVA activity
(where two crew members are performing
an EVA with one crew member monitor-
ing the Space Station subsystems), opera-
tion of Space Station subsystems by the
mission specialists during the station spe-
cialist's day off, simultaneous operation of
Space Station equipment, and general
safety constraints. The two payload spe-
cialists may be USER supplied.
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7.2.3.2 Organization
The station crew will be organized with a
command structure headed by the director
and his deputy. These two individuals will
each have the responsibility and authority
to make final determination on all matters
effecting on-board operations and person-
nel. They will be assisted with information
from the other crew members, ground sta-
tion support crews, and the station DMS.
The Director will normally be in charge of
the primary shift and its crew while the
Deputy will have the secondary shift.
In addition to their leadership function,
they will be responsible for the IVA opera-
tions/monitoring of the modules common
subsystems, propulsion system, vehicle ac-
commodations and logistics system. They
will have capability to also perform re-
quired EVA functions.
The mission specialists and the payload
specialists will be responsible for achiev-
ing payload mission objectives by onboard
operations of assigned payloads and ex-
periments conduction payload and experi-
ment systems monitoring, control and
maintenance; to include co-orbiting plat-
form payload maintenance, daily crew ac-
tivity planning, inventory management and
station housekeeping under guidance of
the director or deputy director. Mission
specialists will be responsible for payload
related MSCS, robot, and EVA operations.
Each mission specialist will be trained to
assist the payload specialists operate spe-
cific payloads and experiments. Mission
specialists on opposite shifts may be
cross-trained to assist on the same pay-
loads and experiments. Skills unique to
payload and experiments in the Manufac-
turing and Technology Lab may be pos-
sessed by one mission specialist on each
shift while skills unique to the interna-
tional labs will be possessed by the other
mission specialist will become necessary.
For early IOC, onboard NASA mission
specialists will be cross trained in Space
Station checkout, verification, operations
and payload assembly and those tasks in-
volving MSC, robotics, EVA, and arrival
and departure support.
Payload specialists will either be NASA or
personnel from other organizations, uni-
versities, and governments, depending
upon payload missions and customers.
Payload specialists will be specifically
trained for specific payload operations and
maintenance. For crews having interna-
tional makeup, integration of overall pay-
load specialist activities will be the
responsibility of a designated NASA inter-
national mission specialist.
7.2.3.3. Manning Profile
The manning profile for IOC, i.e., the
number and skill levels for the crew and
employing agency for the crew and em-
ploying agency for the operators of the
MTL will be dependent upon the results of
functional analysis and the mission profile
for any given duty cycle. However, a first
estimate of the known functions required
to operate and maintain WP-01 systems,
indicates that a total of 11,560 hours/year
is needed. This is equivalent to a five man
crew if one assumes eight productive
hours in a twelve hour shift, a six day
work week, and a three-day loss every 90
days for crew change-out. For this first
estimate, a crew of eight will be necessary
to fully operate a four module Interna-
tional Space Station.
7.2.3.4 Operations Planning
The operations planning function includes
crew activity planning and flight resource,
flight control, maintenance task, and in-
ventory planning. Use will be made of ap-
propriate knowledge bases and interactive
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planning systems. Planning for logisties
system support, including onboard inven-
tory management, is covered in the Space
Station Logistics Resupply Recycle Plan.
Crew activity planning for the SSP will
consist of two phases of planning in vari-
ous levels of detail: long-term planning
performed by ground teams, and near-
term planning performed by the station
crew. The hand-over should take the form
of a weekly Crew Activity Plan (CAP) de-
veloped by the ground planning support
function and electronically transmitted to
the Space Station. After a review by the
station crew of the weekly CAP it will be
worked into its daily form by the flight
crew.
7.2.3.5 Daily Crew Activity Planning
This near-term CAP is a detailed, task-in-
tegrated orbital operations "script" gener-
ated and used by the onboard crew as a
guide to executing their daily station sys-
tems, science, and payload mission activi-
ties. Its principal purpose is to facilitate
the accomplishment of mission objectives
through efficient interleaving of con-
strained and unconstrained crew tasks and
through the economical utilization of ex-
pendable station resources such as power,
data transmission and storage, and crew
time. Near-term planning should require
no more than one hour of each crew mem-
ber's time per day and should largely in-
volve the manipulation of standardized
crew activity time/task blocks into a struc-
tured array or timeline. It will be the re-
sponsibility of the onboard crew to
optimize their daily effectiveness while op-
erating in a relatively autonomous environ-
ment. Daily CAP activities must be
consistent with the ground constraints as
well as the current status of the station ac-
tivities and progress of the experiments
and payloads onboard. This planning
should not require excessive crew time but
will enhance the crew's ability to improve
its own effectiveness. These activities will
be performed on an as-available basis by
the crew, and belong under the crew's on-
board scheduling authority. Accomplish-
ment of these activities will be logged into
the software data base by voice or key in-
put, automatic sensing, or automatically
recorded unless specified otherwise. Con-
straints and requirements affecting these
or other scheduled crew activities will be
maintained in the common flight data base
and will be subject to refinement or up-
date by both the ground and onboard
crews. There will be some activities which
will require detailed checklist type plan-
ning.
7.2.3.6 Detailed Event Planning
This category includes activities with flight
resource, flight control, and maintenance
constraints. Typical activities would be
maneuvers for orbit maintenance, systems
maintenance which takes systems or
equipment offline, earth observations, or
operations which require dedicated use of
otherwise shared equipment and re-
sources. These activities would be sched-
uled in as much detail as required in the
CAP, making frequent reference to other
data base procedures for operations de-
tails. The CAP will coordinate all crew ac-
tivities with onboard or ground resource
constraints and trajectory requirements,
and provide the onboard framework for
daily planning of each individual's sched-
ule. The same scheduling constraints and
resources that are available to the ground
planners would be provided to the station
crew through a common flight data base.
7.2.3.7 Procedures Management
The procedures management function in-
volves review and modification of existing
procedures and development of new pro-
cedures. Since knowledge for procedures
modifications and development is obtained
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from experiences in operations, simula-
tions and training, they are best managed
through judicious recording of the proce-
dures for recall and use when needed.
This is accomplished by use of an operat-
ing procedures knowledge base. Such a
knowledge base shall contain the Space
Station flight data and customer unique
flight data file type articles patterned after
the NSTS Flight Data File. These shall in-
clude station and payload systems operat-
ing procedures and checklists, contingency
operating procedures, in-flight mainte-
nance and malfunction procedures, flight
rules, and medical, and security and safety
procedures. The operating procedures
knowledge base shall be maintained on the
ground and stored onboard for ready crew
access. Crew recommended changes and
updates to the operating procedures
knowledge base shall be transmitted to the
SSSC for implementation into the knowl-
edge base.
Space Station Standard Operational Proce-
dures, as developed by ground support
personnel, will be system oriented and will
contain the following:
a° References to detailed procedures,
drawings, and data stored in the
Space Station DMS or transmittable
from ground DMS storage.
b° Description of standards used in the
procedure. These will also be avail-
able to the DMS display. See Space
Station On-Orbit Maintenance Plan
for a discussion of these standards.
C. All caution and warning associated
with the procedure. These will be an-
notated with visual emphasis on the
DMS display and an oral tone or ver-
bal note to draw the crew's attention
to the possibility of human injury,
equipment damage or mission degra-
dation.
d. Back-out steps in the event that the
procedure cannot be safely com-
pleted. The back-out steps should
leave any critical system operational
and noncritical system in a safe con-
dition.
e. Quality control checks performed on
predesignated critical steps. These
checks may take one of several
forms: certification of accomplish-
ment by another crew member, vis-
ual/verbal confirmation by ground
support quality personnel, and/or re-
view of the completed procedure via
an electronic record of the accom-
plished procedure by ground support
quality. Configuration control will be
maintained by the ground using elec-
tronic records.
f. Required interfaces with systems con-
trolled/supported by other flight/
ground crews. Communication with
those interfaces will be established
as a preprocedure event.
g. Required resource list. Communica-
tion resources will have the mode,
channel, and call sign specified.
Tools and consumables will have
their quantity and storage location
specified. Electrical power will be
specified in terms of watts, fre-
quency, voltage, connection required
and available location (outlet). Data
support will be specified in terms of
rate, storage, software and hardware
required.
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7.2.3.8 Procedures Implementation
All procedures developed on the ground
will be verified on-orbit prior to imple-
mentation. On-orbit implementation will
be accomplished as scheduled by the daily
CAP, and run from the Space Station data
management system fixed workstation or
portable console. Rehearsal of the proce-
dures may be a part of the on-orbit simu-
lation or run separately prior to the
procedure. All tools utilized by the proce-
dure will be confirmed as available and
operable prior to commencing the proce-
dure. If a procedure is not successful, the
station director may modify the CAP to al-
low for the formation of a trouble shooting
team of flight and ground crew experts for
resolution.
7.2.3.9 Procedural Updates/
Modifications
Changes, updates or modifications to pro-
cedures will be configuration controlled by
an electronic revision system yet to be de-
signed. Block updates will be used unless
critical changes are identified for immedi-
ate implementation. Any technical change
to safety or mission critical procedures
will require an on-orbit verification to be
run or, at least, the affected section of the
procedure to verify the change has not im-
pacted the Space Station in an unforeseen
manner.
7.2.3.10 Logistics Module
The logistics system provides Space Sta-
tion ground-to-orbit logistics, on-orbit
supply for extended periods and return-
to-ground logistics. Loaded with con-
sumables, hardware, and resupply
propellant, the logistics system will be car-
ried into orbit in the STS orbiter cargo bay
for changeout at the Space Station. Space
Station resupply operations will include
exchanging the pressurized logistics ele-
merit, separate pallets and tanksets, and
possibly, items carried in the STS Orbiter
cabin.
The LM system configuration consists of
four major hardware/software elements.
These elements are structured to allow
clear identification of the areas covered.
These areas are primarily bounded by
functional assignments and their inter-
faces. The logistics system will interface
with the crew in their performance of the
following functions:
a. Berth pressurized module to a center
node intereormeet utilizing the MSC.
The pressurized module has been de-
signed with two grapple fixtures to
allow a hand-off between the RMS
and MSC if necessary. However, if
such a hand-off is necessary, proce-
dural efficiency would direct the sole
use of the MSC. The module has
berthing capability designed into one
of the nodal interconnect radial ports
which also serves as the utility con-
nects for the module to Space Sta-
tion interfaces. This procedure will
be accomplished by and EVA crew
operating from the MSC or, as an
alternative, IVA from the work sta-
tion in the Space Station or if the
capability is provided, from the
NSTS mid-deck if visibility is suffi-
cient from those locations. Three
video cameras mounted on Space
Station structure will allow monitor-
ing of the berthing. Internal battery
power is provided in the pressurized
module, and RF communications
Space Station monitoring the module
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caution and warning system are
maintained during the transfer.
b. Remove supplies as needed from
pressurized transporter. The module
is pressurized to 101.36 KPd (14.7
psia). Access through the nodal inter-
connect hatch is gained after a check
of the atmospheric condition and af-
ter pressure is equalized. The sup-
plies can be removed easily since the
storage hardware has been designed
with captive attachment hardware
which accommodates the manufac-
ture and installation tolerances.
Transfer of the storage elements is
facilitated by handles installed on
each bin or larger assembly.
c. Exchange experiment racks with in-
terconnects MTL. The racks will be
moved IVA by two astronauts. The
nodes/interconnects and the hatches
have been sized to accommodate a
double rack transfer. Utility connec-
tions will be through standard inter-
faces and interface tests will be
accomplished by simple BITE go/no-
go tests. Returning racks will contain
data and non-hazardous products for
examination on earth. The fluids car-
rier will accommodate waste storage
including toxic materials.
d. Transfer and connect fluids carrier to
Space Station Structure. This is ac-
complished IVA by opening auto-
mated valves via the station DMS.
Fluids are routed through the utility
interconnects.
e. Transfer propellant segment to the
Space Station structure. Hookup is
f.
g.
7.2.3.11
via automated connectors or as a
backup manual connectors operated
by an EVA crew man.
Transfer unpressurized pallets/con-
tainers to the Space Station structure.
These pallets/containers can be trans-
ferred using the MSC, but will have
to be unloaded EVA since they con-
tain external payloads and external
replacement ORUs.
Transfer return cargo and fuel tank
sets from Space Station to orbiter
bay. In addition to those discussed in
"f" above, returning items from the
laboratories include solid and fluid
crew wasted not recycled by the
ECLSS, ECLSS fluids residuals, pro-
pulsion residuals, and ORUs not re-
pairable on the station. Logistic
element design for return packaging
will facilitate the return of these
items. The crew will accomplish
these tasks IVA for the pressurized
commodities and EVA for the un-
pressurized. The operations manage-
ment system will have a Logistics
inventory management, subsystem
which will keep the status of con-
sumables and cargo by automated
input to increment and decrement,
calculate cg for the logistics module,
and collect operational life data for
ORU's. These functions will be auto-
matic, provided the crew makes the
necessary data inputs.
Vehicle Accommodations
The vehicle accommodations on the Space
Station will provide the following services
for the OMV and the OTV: 1) deploy-
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merit, launch capture and berthing, 2)
monitoring while in Space Station control
areas, 3) power, thermal, data communi-
cations, tracking and lighting, 4) GN2
resupply, and 5) micrometeoroid and
space debris protection during storage.
The initial station will utilize a NSTS
based OMV that will be used to deploy
and retrieve free flying payloads and to
perform insitu servicing using an OMV ro-
botic servicer. The station will have ac-
commodations for the OMV such that the
OMV can be stored in space between
NSTS servicing flights. The accommoda-
tions will consist of support structure,
automated umbilicals, and an orbital vehi-
cle control console. The accommodations
must have the capability to deploy, launch,
capture and berth the OMV as well as con-
trol it.
The OMV accommodations are planned to
be located on the starboard lower keel.
The accommodations will include ORUs
and special tools for the OMV accommo-
dations elements. An OMV control area
will be located in a module pressurized
area and will be used to monitor and
checkout the OMV and its accommoda-
tions and perform telepresence flight con-
trol of the OMV.
The accommodations facility will prepare
the OMV for a mission and for stowage
after the mission has been performed. In
addition to controlling the flight of the
OMV in the vicinity of the station, the
OMV control area will monitor and exe-
cute functions in the OMV accommoda-
tions.
An OMV Robotic Servicer Kit is a comple-
mentary element of the Space Station Ve-
hicle Accommodations System required to
enhance the usefulness of the OMV.
The above described vehicle accommoda-
tions will interface with the crew in their
performance of the following functions:
a. Grapple OMV, transport and secure
to servicing attachments. The MSC
will be used to grapple an OMV
coasting by on an unpower approach
or one station keeping for pick-up.
The crew can be IVA at the control
console or EVA at the MSC.
b. Service the OMV. Although utility
connections may be made automati-
cally, they will probably be manually
assisted by an EVA crew member.
Servicing includes monitor and check
out of the OMV systems, GN2 resup-
ply and reconfiguring the OMV with
the Robotic Servicer Kit or payloads
for deployment.
c. Deploy the OMV. The MSC will be
used to place the OMV into a launch
area where the OMV cold gas system
can move it to a position where its
propulsion system can be fired with-
out contaminating the Space Station.
7.2.3.12 Manipulator and Robot
Operations
The Space Station will employ the use of a
Mobile Service Center (MSC) and an
OMV robotic Servicer Kit. The crew will
operate these devices from a workstation.
The MSC will be used to manipulate large
external structures (i.e., OMV, OTV, Log
Modules, ect.), perform inspection and
maintenance and act as a platform for
EVA activities. Robotic Servicer Kit will
be used to partially replace manned EVA
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activity required for maintenance and
servicing of free flyers.
7.2.3.13 Transfer
Analysis indicates that MSC can be used
to transfer the logistics system elements at
each resupply. The current concept is
made up of a pressurized transportation
module for supplies destined for use in the
station pressurized volume, an unpres-
surized transportation module/pallet for
supplies that are to be installed on the ex-
terior portion of the station or that can be
transported unpressurized and moved into
the pressurized volume via the station air-
lock, a fluids resupply tank set to be at-
tached to the structure and an Propulsion
resupply tanker pallet. All of these will
have to be transferred from the Orbiter
payload bay to their functional positions
on the station.
The mechanical connection of these ele-
ments may be designed to be automatic,
but will require an EVA astronaut to ver-
ify proper functioning and alignment. Util-
ity connections may need an EVA
astronaut to verify the connection prior to
flowing toxic propellants. All other neces-
sary functions will be taken by the MSC
being controlled from the module work
station or from the mobile platform of the
MSC. Estimates to perform the installa-
tion/removal of these logistic systems ele-
ments indicate that the MSC will be in use
for 13.7 hours.
Other WP-01 elements to be transferred
are the OMV with or without an attached
payload. Simulation efforts to evaluate a
candidate operation of an unpowered
launch and retrieval relying on the MSC
and orbitial mechanics indicate this
method is achievable.
7.2.3.14 Inspections
The MSC will have high resolution video
cameras and lights attached which can be
used to inspect WP-01 elements. Routine
inspections of the fluid lines for the
ECLSS, reboost, and vehicle accommoda-
tions can be inspected for visual damage.
Detection systems for the fluids in these
lines can be added to sniff for leaks. This
inspection could be automated and rou-
tinely scheduled for low station activity
times. The MSC will also act in support of
EVA astronaut inspection procedures.
Candidates for these inspections are the
module thermal radiators, meteorite pro-
tection, insulation, external panes of the
module windows, OMV and MTL external
payloads. Automated photographic docu-
mentation of Space Station construction
for quality control purposes is also possi-
ble.
7.2.3.15 Maintenance
The MSC can be used in the support role
as a position aid, tool and ORU transpor-
ter and lighting and communication
backup to perform maintenance on WP-01
elements.
7.2.3.16 Extravehicular Operations
EVA is manned operations performed out-
side the pressurized volume of the Space
Station. It involves using the airlock.
Airlock: The airlock supports astronauts
while they prepare for and conduct extra-
vehicular operations. Activities supported
are suit donning and doffing, and airlock
pump-down and repressurization, and
provision of coolant and atmosphere con-
trol to crewmen in the airlock. One airlock
is equipped for hyperbaric operations, at
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pressures up to 506 kPa (5 atmospheres)
above cabin pressure.
EVA is preformed in support of all WP-01
elements. The majority of this support is
maintenance Proximity Operations. Prox-
imity operations are the operations con-
ducted exterior, unattached, to the core
station out to the limits of operating zone
one, a one kilometer (3281 ft) sphere.
This includes EVA by the crew when oper-
ating untethered and/or with the Manned
Maneuvering Unit (MMU), retrieval and
launch of OMV with or without payloads,
free flying (powered) payloads and/or
platforms, and the NSTS orbiter arrival
and departure.
Issues involved with WP-01 elements are
contamination of module windows, and
external MTL experiments; plume in-
pingement on those same systems; colli-
sion with all elements; and clearance for
earth/space viewing by MTL experiments/
payloads.
One approaeh for retrieval and launch of
the OMV and other spacecraft is an un-
powered launch and retrieval relying on
orbital mechanics and the MSC. In this ap-
proach all spacecraft within station control
zone are propulsion-safed, i.e., their pro-
pulsion and ACS have triple redundant in-
hibits in place. This unpowered launch
and retrieval reduces safety issues and
eliminates plume impingement and con-
tamination issues.
7.2.3.17 Payload Operations
Operation of the Manufacturing Technol-
ogy Laboratory constitutes the major
WP-01 interface with payload operations.
The experiments and manufacturing facili-
ties of MTL users are generally under the
control of a crewman that manages the op-
erational flow in accordance with
timelined sequence integrated with other
crew support as required.
Due to the variety and number of experi-
ments on board the MTL during and mis-
sion, customers must write procedures and
design experiments so that crew expertise
needed for any single experiment is mini-
mized. On-Orbit characterization will be
costly in terms of equipment and crew
time and involves the risk of error. Where
possible, samples shall be returned for
characterization. The MTL crew will exe-
cute the following tasks on a routine basis.
a. Obtain equipment from storage and
install in racks.
b. Make all necessary mechanical, elec-
trical,thermal, and data connections
and verify preliminary functions.
c. Load software into computers and
initate check programs.
d. Remove materials from storage. Pre-
pare samples and insert into test
units.
e. Input processing parameters and in-
itiate experimental proceduresl
f. Perform limited interactive functions
perferably initiated by timed se-
quence or audible alarm.
g. Operate cameras and recorders.
h. Shut down experiments and remove
samples to prepare for storage, char-
acterization or return.
i. Perform limited diagnostic and chac-
terization tasks.
j. Clean up and dispose of wastes.
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k. Remove or exchange equipment from
racks and return to storage.
1. Non-interactive data analysis, reduc-
tion and down-linking.
m. Replenish supplies including gases,
cryogens, liquids, and so forth.
no Place or obtain experiments/materi.
•als/samples on pallets outside of the
MTL environment.
o. Troubleshoot and repair equipment.
Rapid sample return refers to the means
by which samples produced in the MTL
can be returned to earth more frequently
than the regular 90-day resupply cycle. It
may be accomplished by additional shuttle
flights or by the adoption of an autono-
mous, unmanned vehicle which can be de-
ployed for the purpose of returning
packages to earth.
Rapid sample return would apply to those
samples which would change during on-
orbit storage, which require analysis be-
fore the process can be repeated or are of
such value and sensitivity that they should
be returned to earth as soon as possible.
It shall be a design requirement of the
MTL that hazardous materials not be ad-
mitted to the module environment. All po-
tential hazardous materials, irrespective of
the quantities involved, shall be contained
so that any predictable sequence of fail-
ures will not result in releasing them into
the MTL atmosphere or into any other
piece of equipment not intended for that
purpose. Containment designs shall in-
clude active monitoring devices to alter
the crew of such failures.
The remaining interface between WP-01
elements and payload operations is the use
of the Robotic servicer kit on the OMV.
7.2.3.18 Crew Training Philosophy
Training on the Space Station will use
computers, CCTV, video tape/disk and
other training media. Standard techniques
learned on the ground will be applied to a
variety of situations onboard without prior
practice. Training on the SS will be a con-
tinuation of the training received on the
ground. It is not feasible to train crew
members to perform all maintenance and
repair functions on the Space Station.
Training will be provided for basic opera-
tional functions and selected emergency
functions. On-the-job training must be
planned. Appropriate visual aids should
be provided to cue troubleshooting and
maintenance activities. Training for main-
tenance or operation of international
equipment or payload and training for in-
ternationals on the MTL equipment is re-
quired.
7.2.3.19 Training Approach
Space Station flight crew training will not
be conducted using the traditional class-
room/instructor format. Computer technol-
ogy will be exploited to provide innovative
ways to accomplish the required training.
Computer-assisted instruction (CAI) and
part-task trainers will be incorporated to
maximize the training product and student
interaction while minimizing re.gimen nor-
mally associated with a formally struc-
tured and sequenced curriculum.
Task analysis will be used to identify
knowledge levels and performance crite-
ria. All course material will be developed
in functionally grouped modules to satisfy
training program requirements.
Each module will be stand-alone with no
time-table requirement and minimal
prerequisities. The complete training pro-
gram can therefore be tailored to meet the
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needs of a variety of agencies, from a re-
fresher course for NASA personnel to the
total curriculum required for customers.
These training modules will exist in a
training knowledge base maintained on the
ground with appropriate information
stored onboard when needed for crew ac-
cess.
Flight crew training will be conducted in
two phases. Phase one will be the pre-
flight segment emphasizing system famili-
arization. System knowledge, as identified
in the task analysis stage of course devel-
opment, will be presented in the CAI for-
mat and through use of full scale mockups
and functional simulators.
Operations planning, procedures manage-
ment, and system management will re-
quire a greater portion of the computer
instruction, with problem solving exercises
being presented as an integral part of the
course exercises.
Mechanical systems requiring method in-
terface will be introduced using CA/, and
the greater portion of the material will be
presented in the form of scripted simula-
tions and exercises.
MSC, robotic, OMV, and flight control op-
erations will utilize interactive worksta-
tions and flight software. The student will
be required to perform generic tasks based
on anticipated on-orbit operations.
Extravehicular activity (EVA) will be pre-
sented using the Manned Maneuvering
Unit (MMU) simulator. The student will
become familiar with the MMU as a sys-
tem and will perform tasks normally asso-
ciated with EVA.
Payload operations training will include
only Space Station interfaces. The student
will become familiar with station systems
required to support payloads (i.e., ther-
mal, power, mechanical, etc.). Payload
specific training will be the responsibility
of the customer.
Contingency operations training will be in-
eluded in the appropriate system curricu-
lum. Students will be required to complete
problem solving exercises under nominal
and anomalous condition. Phase two of
the crew training will be conducted on-or-
bit and will encompass task specific and
general refresher training.
Task training will be conducted by non-
traditional on-the-job training (OJT) to
address each task required to be per-
formed on-orbit including station and ex-
periment tasks identified by the customer.
Each specialist will identify the required
task and retrieve a "cook-book" checklist
(hard copy or video display) from the op-
erations procedures knowledge base which
will provide all instructions necessary to
complete the task. This method of OJT
eliminates duplication of effort and
subsequent loss of manhours normally as-
sociated with the more traditional demon-
stration/performance methods.
Refresher training is required to maintain
critical skills and practice hand/eye coordi-
nation tasks. Because of volume con-
straints, this training will utilize actual
flight hardware and workstations wherever
possible. On-orbit tasks will be performed
integrating flight stations with the training
knowledge base to simulate the opera-
tional system. Visual cues will be provided
by high resolution video displays to pre-
clude use of external hardware (e.g.,
MSC, OMV, etc.). Performance will be
verified by ground operations via data
downlink.
In-flight contingency operations training
will be divided into two categories. 1)
Training for system malfunctions and
anomalies that may impair mission ac-
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complishment or station operations with
no serious impact on crew safety or sub-
system capability. Category one training
will be provided via an accessible data
base; 2) Training for critical system mal-
functions and anomalous events that could
adversely impact crew safety or station in-
tegrity. Category two will require practice
drills such as fire, escape, rescue, etc.
Malfunction procedures flow diagrams will
be maintained in the operating procedures
knowledge base.
Integrated simulations between the Space
Station and ground should be used primar-
ily to check out new interfaces.
7.2.3.20 Contingency Operations
The Space Station will be designed to tol-
erate any singie credible failure and con-
tinue to function until maintenance can
be accomplished during the nominal
resupply mission excluding safety critical
items. Space Station and payload systems
will be designed with sufficient redun-
dancy to provide for mission success and
designed for safe degraded operations on
non-critical systems. In the event of com-
plete functional loss of a single Space Sta-
tion module, the station will provide the
following capabilities for not less than 28
days to allow a NSTS Orbiter rescue:
• Habitable conditions for the crew
Access to habitable conditions with-
out EVA
• Orbiter berthing capabilities
• Command and control of the Station
by the crew and automatic systems.
Based on these guidelines, contingencies
will be responded to by appropriate pre-
planned contingency plans maintained in
the operating procedures knowledge base.
Pre-plarmed contingency responses will
also be developed for contingency situ-
ations where system redundancy capabili-
ties do not exist, i.e., loss of pressure
integrity of a module, fire, collision, ex-
cessive radiation, and hazardous contami-
nation.
In the event that any one Space Station
module becomes uninhabitable for the
crew, enough capability will exist in other
modules to sustain the crew for not less
than 28 days to accomplish rescue or
maintenance. If the failed module happens
to contain the central systems monitor and
control system and the flight control sys-
tem, at least one other module will also
possess the capability of these systems to
allow the crew to maintain control of the
station.
Space Station pre-plarmed contingency re-
sponses will be developed during the
Space Station design and implementation
phases and updated throughout the pro-
gram. Specific mission related contingency
responses will be developed during the op-
erations planning process and modified as
appropriate for real-time situations. All of
the planned contingency responses will be
part of the operations procedures knowl-
edge base. The planned contingency re-
sponse procedures will be verified by
simulation prior to approval for use. Op-
erational experience will be used in the
modification and development of new re-
sponses. If a scheduled resupply mission
fails, enough supplies will be onboard to
sustain the crew for a nominal recycle of
the resupply mission launch.
7.2.3.21 NSTS Interface
After the Space Station has been assem-
bled, the NSTS Orbiter will interface with
the Space Station during resupply and pos-
sible rescue missions. When the Orbiter
approaches the Station and enters the Sta-
tion command and control zone, the sta-
tion specialist will monitor the Orbiter
approach and docking for safety. During
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Orbiter departures, the station specialist
will monitor Orbiter undocking and depar-
ture until the orbiter is beyond the Space
Station safety/control zone.
7.2.3.22 Crew Interface
The NSTS crew cadre is a resource for se-
lection of the Space Station specialists,
i.e., the Director and Deputy. On a normal
resupply/crew change-out mission the
NSTS would transport half the Space Sta-
tion crew to orbit. Although these mis-
sions are baselined at 90-day intervals,
mission analyses indicate 45 days to be
more likely intervals.
During the rendezvous the NSTS crew has
the responsibility for flight management.
If the orbiter docks to the Space Station
(an event of some concern due to des-
tabilizatiordcontamination) the NSTS crew
will retain flight management responsibili-
ties. However, if the MSC were used to
grapple an unpowered NSTS approach as
described in Proximity Operations, then
the point at which orbiter makes the final
burn, the SS Director will have flight man-
agement control.
After the Orbiter is berthed/docked the SS
Director should have administration re-
sponsibilities for the total station including
the NSTS. However, The NSTS Com-
mander retains the responsibility for the
functioning of the orbiter systems. If any
logistics elements are handled by the shut-
tle RMS, then the NSTS Commander has
the responsibility for the operation. How-
ever, If the logistic elements are grappled
(either directly from the cargo bay or in a
handover from the orbiter RMS) by the
MSC then responsibility reverts to the SS
Director at the release of the orbiter attach
fittings or RMS. The reverse of these
statements is true for return on any logis-
tics elements.
7.2.3.23 Other Interfaces
While docked, the mechanical interface
between the orbiter and the Space Station
will be the docking module and berthing
adaptor. Electrical, communications, and
data interfaces are through the docking
module. Communication will be hard-line
audio and video and data may be copper
path or optical fiber. NSTS data and com-
munication to the ground via TDRS may
go through the station communication and
antenna systems to prevent any NSTS
broadcast interference with the station.
There is no planned interface between the
NSTS and station ECLSS systems, nor is
there any planned interface for the ther-
mal control system. In order to preserve
the balance of each system, a connecting
module hatch may remain closed.
During the transportation phase, all
WP-01 elements will utilize the standards
NSTS interfaces in the orbiter payloads
bay. These interfaces will be minimized
and might only include electrical power
for payload support in the logistics module
and DMS monitor capabilities of the MTL,
vehicle accommodation, propulsion and
logistics systems. Thermal control inter-
faces of these elements with the NSTS is
not now planned. Mechanical interfaces
will be through standard attach fittings
and NSTS FSE, if possible.
7.2.3.24 OMV Operations
Orbitial Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) op-
erations will require significant Space Sta-
tion support from the crew and OMV
Space Station hardware accommodations.
The time phasing required to complete an
OMV sortie can vary from an hour to sev-
eral days. This provides a significant vari-
able impacting plans for the required
durations of quiescent microgravity condi-
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tions for payloads. The crew time required
to control the OMV interrupts crew avail-
ability for payload operations. The station
specialist receives control of the OMV
from the OMV ground control, when the
OMV reaches the station command and
control zone during arrival and relin-
quishes control to OMV ground control
when the OMV exits the zone. Two crew
members are required during OMV opera-
tions: one to control the OMV, and a sec-
ond crew member to control the stations
systems.
7.2.3.25 OMV Interfaces
An OMV/Space Station Interface Require-
ments Document will define representative
missions such as station fly-around, satel-
lite placement and retrieval, logistics sup-
port, and possible station reboost. It will
also define operational interfaces in terms
of control zones, station controlling func-
tions, and station servicing. The physical
interfaces (structural and mechanical,
electrical power, communications and
data) will be described. Finally, crew sys-
tems constraints on the OMV will be de-
fined.
Presently known data about the physical
interfaces are described below:
Structural: Secured at Space Station
by OMV trunnion mounts grapple
fixture for MSC attachment umbili-
cals for power and data.
0 ¸ Power: Low power levels required
during monitoring and storage
(300W) higher levels required inter-
mittently estimates peak-1200 watts
(12-24 hrs preceding flight) battery
charging 450W thermal control 350W
checkout 400W additional power re-
quired internal to Space Station for
control station lighting, refueling pro-
visions (estimated at 500W).
Communication and Data Manage-
ment: RF interface to be S-band
compatible with OMV/STDN link.
Space Station provides state vector to
OMV Space Station Control Center: Initi-
ate pilot control of OMV in vicinity of
Space Station monitors OMV checkout
and servicing status has ability to: Ascer-
tain OMV position (GPS provided) com-
mand maintenance of relative position
Initiate approach and departure trajecto-
ries Initiate collision avoidance maneu-
vers.
7.2.3.26 Man-Tended
On-orbit operation of the man-tended sta-
tion will differ from IOC operations due to
differences in crew involved and in the
levels of automation employed. With the
limited role of humans involved in the on-
orbit operations of the man-tended sta-
tion, the functions of operations planning,
procedures and systems management are
performed on the ground and will be auto-
mated with current generation techniques
while more advanced techniques are de-
veloped.
Several functions will be performed at the
station only during the manned resupply
mission. These on-orbit functions include
manipulator operations, EVA activities
and crew supported payload operations.
The level of support that can be provided
during a resupply mission is dependent on
the length of resupply mission and the
crew size. The minimum resupply dura-
tion is seven days. Within the projected
seven day scenario, only station mainte-
nance and payload changout activities can
be accomplished. If the Shuttle on-orbit
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time is 14 days, additional payload opera-
tions will be performed.
Payload operations will be confined to un-
manned operations except for short resup-
ply periods when the NSTS crew will be
available for payload support. With this
restriction, the payloads will have to be
automated, remain dormant between
resupply missions, or be capable of react-
ing to ground control (POCC) commands.
7.2.3.27 Growth
Growth of the Space Station will involve
substantial advances in areas of systems
management, robotics, automatic rendez-
vous and docking, and should result in a
corresponding increase in the time allo-
cated for crew payload operations.
Crew involvement in the system manage-
ment functions may be limited to respond-
ing to hazardous situations either as a
verification of a system's response or as a
manual reaction to a malfunction warning.
The ground will provide the verification
that the autonomous control systems are
operating properly.
Anticipated robotics will reduce EVA ac-
tivity. Advanced robotics systems will be
capable of performing maintenance activi-
ties without human monitoring once the
maintenance task has been identified and
programmed. Part of the automation and
robitics technoloy increase will be in the
area of rendezvous and docking. With the
projected levels of OMV/OTV activities
and Shuttle resupply missions for the
growth version, automatic rendezvous and
docking is necessary to free the crew for
other operations.
As the station is automated, the crew pro-
ductivity will increase in the operation of
payloads. Automation will allow a greater
payload workload to be accomplished
without an increase in crew size. this will
significantly reduce logistics, mainte-
nance, and station procurement costs.
7.3 Logistics and Resupply Approach
Planning
The purpose of this section is to provide
guidance, identify procedures and re-
sources, and establish policies necessary
to develop and implement an integrated
logistic support system to support WP-01
project hardware and equipment.
7.3.1 Organizational Relationships and
Responsibilities
The SSP Manager is responsible for man-
aging the integration of the SS efforts of
the NASA Centers and for managing the
integration of customer SS requirements.
The logistics integrator is responsible to
the SSP manager for performing the inte-
gration of SS logistics activities and
for incorporation of customer logistics re-
quirements.
The Project Logistics Manager implements
the Integrated logistics requirements and
those guidelines issued in the future by the
SS Logistics Integrator.
The user has the responsibility for defin-
ing his logistics requirements. These re-
quirements will be integrated by the SS
Logistics Integrator into the SS Logistics
System in a manner responsive to the cus-
tomer.
7.3.2 Logistics Management Information
The Logistics Management Information
System (LMIS) will be an automated sys-
tem that provides management level visi-
bility of logistics activities during the
development and operational phases. The
system contains master development
schedules, logistics element subschedules,
data bases responsive to Level B data re-
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quirements and project ILS activities, and
a performance evaluation mechanism.
7.3.3 Logistics Support Analysis 0-_A)
LSA is a set of systematic, comprehensive
analyses performed iteratively during con-
ceptual, design, and development phases
for the purpose of identifying and optimiz-
ing system supportability, and support sys-
tems.
The recommended LSA method is MI_
STD-1388-1A tailored to the SS program
requirements. This process consists of five
basic activities: functional analyses, stud-
ies/analyses, design analysis, engineering
interfaces, and data verification.
The LSA results will be recorded in the
automated LSAR data base. The LSAR
data base will be the primary data source
for system level requirement summaries.
7.3.4 Logistics Elements
7.3.4.1 Maintenance
Maintenance is a focal point for the major-
ity of the logistics elements. The fre-
quency, type, and level of maintenance
directly impacts supply support, OMD,
PHS&T, training and personnel, facilities,
and support equipment requirements. The
most critical step in the identification of
maintenance support elements is the for-
mulation of a maintenance concept.
7.3.4.1.1 Maintenance Concept
Maintenance shall be performed at the
lowest level of the maintenance structure
commensurate with the authorized person-
nel skills, tools and test equipment, repair
parts, and technical documentation.
Maintenance shall be accomplished within
a three-level maintenance structure (or-
ganizational, intermediate, or depot) in
which each maintenance action is author-
ized to the level at which it can be effec-
tively achieved.
The concept shall be to remove and re-
place ORUs at the organizational level. A
"REPAIR IN PLACE" determination will
be made only when justified by the results
of the logistics analysis or on the basis of
actual experience, with due consideration
to its impact on system operations and
turnaround. All levels of maintenance
shall be accomplished in a manner that
provides support of operational time con-
straints, prevents deterioration of accept-
able operational levels of reliability and
safety, ensures timely recycle of failed
items to serviceable stocks, and accom-
plishes this support at minimum practical
risk and cost.
7.3.4.2 Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RCM)
RCM is a systematic approach for identi-
fying preventive maintenance tasks for an
equipment end item and for establishing
intervals between maintenance tasks in
accordance with a specified set of proce-
dures. RCM analysis consists of analyzing
system/equipment reliability and safety
data to determine the feasibility and desir-
ability of preventive maintenance tasks, to
highlight maintenance problem areas for
design review consideration, and to estab-
lish the most cost-effective preventive
maintenance program for the new system/
equipment. RCM logic is applied to the in-
dividual failure modes of each reparable
item in the system/equipment identified
during FMEA, to determine of how im-
pending failures can be detected and cor-
rected in order to preserve the inherent
level of reliability and safety in the sys-
tem/equipment.
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7.3.4.3 Technical Documentation
Overall direction and control of technical
documentation will reside with the pro-
gram level technical documentation man-
ager.
7.3.4.3.1 Operations and Maintenance
Documentation (OMD)
OMD is the technical documentation used
to describe the equipment and provide de-
tailed procedures for organizational, inter-
mediate, and depot level operations and
maintenance. This documentation is an in-
tegral part of the WP-01 system and the
associated support equipment, and is
planned, developed, progressively moni-
tored, and updated. Documentation media
such as manuals, microfiche, hard disk,
and laser disk are analyzed to ascertain
the best medium. Supporting analyses,
such as LSA, and information such as pro-
visioning technical documentation, are
also considered in this process and used to
determine the level and scope of SS
OMD.
7.3.4.3.20MD Validation/Verification
(V/V) and Reviews
The review, validation, and verification of
technical documentation will be as di-
rected by the procuring activity. In process
reviews are conducted for review of tech-
nical documentation during the prepara-
tion process to provide guidance to the
preparing agency as well as to assure that
program requirements are being met.
Validation is the process whereby the pre-
paring activity tests the technical docu-
mentation for accuracy and adequacy.
This is accomplished by actual perform-
ance of maintenance using the OMD on
the system/equipment for which it is writ-
ten. Verification is the process by which
the technical documentation is tested and
proved (under procuring activity jurisdic-
tion) to be adequate for operation and
maintenance of equipment procured for
operational units. A cost effective option
is to plan VN in conjunction with main-
tainability demonstrations and combine
the validation and verification testing as a
single test.
7.3.4.3.3 Other OMD
A documentation package shall be pre-
pared for each hardware/software item,
facility system, and for selected support
equipment. This package shall provide de-
finitive description of facility system/
equipment configuration. The following
represent typical types of data which are
to be included in an OMD package. The
exact content will be determined based on
complexity of the equipment and users'.
needs:
SE/Facility System Description and Opera-
tion- Contains a concise description of the
equipment/facility systems and capabilities
and a description of major elements, their
functions, and operational criteria. It will
contain a block diagram, if required due
to complexity, depicting the major ele-
ments and an outline of the discrete types
of drawings, diagrams, and lists which
make up the package.
Mechanical Drawings with Parts Lists -
Illustrates the system end-to-end and in-
eludes all LRU/ORU components within
the system. Drawings may be supple-
mented by wire run and patch lists. When
required, elementary electrical schematics
will be provided. These schematics will
depict all data of the electrical connection
diagram except that wire routings and
much of the detailed wire connections to
components can be omitted.
Logic Diagrams - Logic diagrams as re-
quired to describe the signal flow.
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Electromechanical Control Diagrams-
These diagrams combine the essential in-
formation of elementary electrical sche-
matics and the mechanical schematics and
plumbing diagrams.
Documentation List - An indentured list
of all pertinent drawings, specifications,
and other documentation in the engineer-
ing documentation system, required by the
operations and maintenance organization
to prepare working documents for work
reference.
7.3.4.4 Supply Support
The supply support program contains a
spares concept, quantification techniques,
GFE management procedure, provisioning
procedure, inventory control methods, and
resupply and return concepts.
7.3.4.4.1 Spares Concept
Existing experience from similar equip-
ment or systems (Skylab, Spacelab, etc.)
is utilized in spares selection and quantifi-
cation. Where experience data does not
exist, reliability predictions based on de-
sign specifications, statistical analysis, and
subsystem criticality are the primary spar-
ing determinants.
Reliability predictions derived from com-
ponent performance specifications and us-
age rates derived from mission
requirements statements and component
density, provide necessary inputs to com-
pute failure rates. These failure rates will
be adjusted where MTBF estimates appear
unrealistic.
7.3.4.4.2 Quantification
Initial spare/repair parts will be computed
using a NASA approved quantification
model developed for the STS program.
The model algorithm is based on the Pois-
son distribution, a discrete exponential
distribution.
7.3.4.4.3 Government Furnished
Equipment (GFE)
The prime contractor will be responsible
and accountable for all GFE and will
maintain and update all equipment docu-
mentation supplied with the equipment.
7.3.4.4.4 Spares Provisioning
The initial lay in of spare/repair parts re-
quires a time phased, systematic provi-
sioning program beginning with the
identification of long-lead time items no
later then critical design review (CDR)
and ending with the reprovisioning of
spare/repair parts during the operational
phase. The provisioning process consists
of spares selection, SMR coding, DISC
screening, acquisition, and reprovisioning.
7.3.4.5 Resupply
A primary function of the WP-01 ILS pro-
gram is to provide cost effective on-orbit
resupply of support materiel. Support ma-
teriel includes spare/repair parts, support
equipment, raw materials, fluids, gases,
propellants, and consumables. The pri-
mary mode of resupply will be the STS
with a scheduled 90-day resupply cycle.
WP-01 logistics is identifying resupply
and return requirements as part of the
LSA process. The LSAR data base will be
continually updated as the system design
solidifies and resupply/return quantities
become more definable.
7.3.4.6 Facilities
Facilities planning is the process of deter-
mining the characteristics and cost of the
space and physical facilities which will sat-
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isfy the operational and functional require-
ments of the user. The facilities planning
function provides an objective analysis of
land usage, site selection, building, struc-
ture, and other facilities and equipment
requirements to perform specified tasks. It
includes the development of preliminary
layouts of facilities and equipment and a
determination of the engineering and con-
struction feasibility of a project. Facilities
requirements established from mainte-
nance flow rates, equipment requirements,
and environmental requirements will be
identified by the LSA. The decision to
build new facilities, or to use existing fa-
cilities, considers useability, cost, time,
and growth potential. Facilities that will be
required include maintenance, training,
testing, and payload processing.
7.3.4.7 Packaging, Handling, Storage,
and Transportation (PHS&T)
The WP-01 PHS&T program provides
analyses, design, and procurement of pro-
tective measures for on-orbit hardware
and SE throughout the program life cycle.
Transportability requirements and criteria
are identified and integrated into the de-
sign of flight hardware and SE. This in-
cludes ensuring that these
requirements/criteria are contractually im-
posed on contractors/subcontractors.
Transportation analyses and cost studies
will also consider interface requirements
of associated SS projects and of user in-
stallations. As program/project changes
are made, transportation analyses are up-
dated.
Additionally, the transportation analysis
will identify requirements for successful
movement of equipment and supplies
from suppliers to the user. Analysis will
be performed to determine the transporta-
tion requirements for operations and sup-
port equipment, consumables, and spares.
Methods of environmental protection are
evaluated to determine the most effective
means of protecting the equipment from
damage and reliability degradation result-
ing from in transit vibration, shock, heat,
humidity, contamination, etc.
7.3.4.8 Personnel/Training
A maintenance training program must be
developed, implemented, and completed
prior to establishing an organic mainte-
nance activity. In addition to the mainte-
nance training program, supplemental
training in skilled areas which augment or
support the overall maintenance training
program must be prepared and presented.
The training activity must support the re-
quirements for SS hardware and support
equipment organizational, intermediate,
and depot maintenance. The training ma-
terial will be derived from the output of
the Training Requirements Analysis
(TRA) which, through use of the LSA,
will establish the baseline requirements
for specific maintenance actions in addi-
tion to the skill level and personnel cate-
gory required to accomplish the task.
7.3.4.9 Support Equipment (SE)
Specific SE will be defined concurrently
with the design of the SSPEs. The project
shall produce a Support Equipment Plan
(SEP). The prime objective of the plan is
to identify, define, and schedule all ef-
forts necessary to provide complete and
cost-effective support equipment making
maximum use of existing hardware/soft-
ware. A support equipment list shall be
developed by the project and provided to
users. The list contains the following SE
data:
a. Nomenclature
b. Part Number
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c. Model Number
d. Quantity
e. Location
f. Serial Number
g. Item number
7.4 On-Orbit Maintenance Approach
Planning
This section provides a description of the
approach to WP-01 on-orbit maintenance.
It conceptually defines the maintenance
concept and support requirements neces-
sary to ensure that the system or equip-
merit attains the specified operational
capabilities with minimum life cycle cost.
The maintenance concept specifies the
who, what, and where aspects of the main-
tenance requirements. Outputs of the lo-
gistics analysis define the support
requirements.
7.4.1. Maintenance Types
Maintenance functions are classified into
the following major functional types.
7.4.1.1 Preventive (Scheduled)
This classification generally includes tasks
such as service/deservice, alignment, com-
ponent time/cycle replacement, inspection,
and other periodic tasks.
7.4.1.2 Reliability Centered
Maintenance (RCM)
RCM is a systematic approach for identfy-
ing preventive maintenance tasks for an
equipment end item and for establishing
intervals between maintenance tasks in ac-
cordance with a specified set of proce-
dures. RCM analysis consists of analyzing
system/equipment reliability and safety
data to determine the feasibility and desir-
ability of preventive maintenance tasks, to
highlight maintenance problem areas for
design review consideration, and to estab-
lish the most cost effective preventive
maintenance program for the new system/
equipment. RCM logic is applied to the in-
dividual failure modes of each repairable
item in the system/equipment identified
during FMEA, how impending failures can
be detected and corrected in order to pre-
serve the inherent level of reliability, and
safety in the system/equipment.
7.4.1.3 Corrective (Unscheduled)
Maintenance
This classification generally includes such
tasks as troubleshooting, fault detection
and isolation, diagnostics, disassembly, re-
pair, reassembly, recertification, unsched-
uled inspection/verification and
modification.
A primary systems goal for SS equipment
should be "zero maintenance." High reli-
ability and maintainability in equipment
design promote this goal.
7.4.1.4 Maintenance Personnel
Trained maintenance personnel will per-
form maintenance tasks commensurate
with their skills and maintenance alloca-
tions.
7.4.1.5 Flight Crew
Mission specialists must be trained for
general maintenance tasks and will pri-
marily perform PM, before-operations,
during-operations, and after-operations
maintenance tasks.
Station specialists must be formally
trained in general and speciality mainte-
nance skills, e.g.: Soldering, troubleshoot-
ing, calibration, system analysis and fault
detection, spot welding, etc. Station spe-
cialists will backup mission specialist
maintenance activities and will be the fo-
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cal point for all flight maintenance re-
quirements to include prime interface with
ground support.
7.4.1.6 Ground Crew
Ground maintenance activities will include
a team of maintenance experts trained and
experienced in various maintenance disci-
plines with a prime role of providing
maintenance information and assistance to
the on-orbit station specialist. Contingen-
cies may require quick-reaction response
from this ground support team to provide
immediate "fix" instructions.
7.4.1.7 Contact Teams
Contact team support is that maintenance
provided by intermediate/depot (including
contractors) to a lower level maintenance
activity. This support will primarily in-
volve repair operations; however, they
may also be utilized for technical assis-
tance/liaison.
Fly-in contact teams will be comprised of
depot level maintenance personnel to pro-
vide backup for station maintenance per-
sonnel (station specialists) on an as
needed basis. Scheduled fly-in teams will
provide refurbishment, overhaul and
modifications.
Ground contact teams will be composed of
separate intermediate and depot contact
teams to provide backup and corrective
maintenance support at the organization/
user location.
7.4.2 Procedures and Data Development
On-orbit maintenance procedures for each
ORU will be developed by the contractor
with evaluations by on-orbit crew person-
nel. Procedure development will com-
mence with task analysis during the design
and will include recommended tools and
specialty training requirements.
All task procedures and data will be deter-
mined as part of the LSA process, devel-
oped, and stored in an electronic data
format that can be easily transferred be-
tween system hardware suppliers, users,
NASA centers, and between the on-orbit
and the ground Space Station activities.
Procedures for ORU maintenance and re-
pair will be demonstrated using protoflight
subsystems and progressing from ground
facilities to zero-gravity environments,
where practical.
Known and projected maintenance re-
quirements for each period between resup-
ply missions shall be developed and
submitted to the WP-01 project for incor-
poration into the overall mission opera-
tions requirements document for the
specified time period.
7.4.3 Mission Set Maintenance
Procedures
The maintenance plan will identify all
maintenance actions and the associated
procedures. The plan and the maintenance
procedures, will be uplinked to the Space
Station SS or provided in replacement
video disk format, as appropriate during
resupply. The same information will drive
the ground logistics system for spares pro-
visioning and positioning to support the
on-orbit maintenance plan. A preventive
maintenance schedule and forecast of fail-
ure schedule will be developed using life
cycle data of the MMI)S and will be part
of the mission cycle maintenance plan.
Data will be dynamic, updated by and re-
sponsive to the failure experience of the
maturing Space Station program.
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8.0 ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT
Design and develop of experimental hard-
ware which lays the framework for the ad-
vanced development process has played a
major role in the study effort.
8.1 Advanced Development Activities
A summary of the Advanced Development
Activities is summarized by the following
items:
AR-1
EC-1
EC-2
EC-3
Automation and Robotics
ECLSS Water Management
ECLSS Air Management
Air and Water Monitors
EC-4 Component/Subsystem Test
and Evaluation
• PO-I&2 Electric Power Distribution
Network and Control Architecture
• TH-1 Thermal Interface Develop-
ment
• MS-1 MPAC Element Demonstrator
• AP-1 Propulsion and Fluid Systems
• SM-1 Meteriod/Debris Impact Shield
Testing
• DM-1 System Controller Develop-
ment for Data Management Systems
• DM-2 Hierarchical Controller Devel-
opment
8.1.1 AR-1 Automation and Robotics
8.1.1.1 Description
Automation and Robotics is a multi-
tasked program with the primary aim to
reduce crew time for Operation and Main-
tenance tasks on the Space Station. This
section is broken down into the following
tasks:
a. Robotics Advisory Board
Assemble recognized experts in A&R com-
munity to review present space related
A&R activities and develop the direction
of future A&R work.
b. Robotics Logistics System
Fabricate Hardware and develop Software
to demonstrate the concept of a two armed
manipulator for managing logistic ele-
ments within the Space Station logistic
module.
c. On-board Crew Scheduler
Demonstrate a prototype on-board sched-
uler with rudimentary algorithms for
more realistic utilities resource and crew
task scheduling.
d. Remote Space System Servicing
Development
Explore and evaluate the effects of
teleoperation with and without time delay.
Obtain learning curves of different sub-
jects performing ORU changeouts. The
data obtained will be used as design re-
quirements for future remote space servic-
ing systems.
e. FMEA Assistant
Implement a knowledge based system that
will serve as an engineering aid in per-
forming FMEA. The system uses an ob-
ject-based message passing representation
to capture component failure information
and system relationships among compo-
nents.
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8.1.1.2 PRODUCTS
The products that will result from this
multi-tasked effort are:
a. Robotics Advisory Board
Transfer of A&R knowledge to design ef-
forts, and identification of future A&R ac-
tivities.
b. Robotics Logistics System
Definition of IVA robotics requirements
for Inventory Manipulation on Space Sta-
tion.
c. On Board Crew Scheduler
Definition of an on-board crew scheduler.
d. Remote Space System Servicing De-
velopment
Design requirements for servicer, worksta-
tions, and ORUs.
e. FMEA Assistant
Tool for FMEA and single and multiple
failure point predictions.
8.1.1.3 Test Results Summary
Test results are expected to show the ca-
pability and feasibility of concepts systems
such as the Robotics Logistics System, the
On-board Crew Scheduler, and the FMEA
assistant on Space Station. Additionally,
the learning curve and design requirement
information obtained from the Remote
Space System Servicing and Robotics Ad-
visory Board tasks will drive station opera-
tion requirements and subsystem
design/scarring for implementation of IOC
and growth automation. Space Station util-
ity and productivity is dependent upon in-
corporation of flexible automated systems
to relieve the crew from dangerous, bor-
ing, repetitive, and computationally inten-
sive tasks.
8.1.2 EC-1 ECLSS Water Management
8.1.2.1 Description
Develop a technique for microorganism
growth prevention in ECLSS condensing
heat exchangers. Providing a heat ex-
changer design compatible with the growth
prevention method is a parallel effort. The
test procedures developed will be con-
ducted over a four month period on sev-
eral conceptual configurations.
Coordinate with Umpqua Research Com-
pany in evaluation of a multifiltration unit
for reclamation of wash water. Unit will
be designed and built by Umpqua and
tested in the Boeing ECI_SS Laboratory by
processing typical hygiene water. Long
term parametric data will be obtained rela-
tive to water purity (e.g. expendables, en-
ergy costs, recovery efficiency, weight and
volume penalties).
Boeing will also evaluate hollow fiber
membrane reverse osmosis unit in proc-
essing hygiene water. Data comparable
with the Umpqua system will be obtained
and reported. Testing will be accom-
plished by Boeing.
A bench test unit for mixing pretreatment
material with urine will be designed and
built per Boeing/NASA requirements. The
unit will be tested in the Boeing ECLSS
Laboratory. A vapor compression distilla-
tion for water recovery from pretreatd
urine will be fabricated for utilization in
MSFC ECLSS testbed.
8.1.2.2 Test Results Summary
Testing to evaluate the most effective tech-
nique for control of microbic growth in the
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Space Station humidity control heat ex-
changer is in progress. The methods; high
temperature (250"F), biocide addition (io-
dine) and ultraviolet light are being evalu-
ated. To date, the high temperature
technique has been implemented and indi-
cates a high kill effectiveness.
8.1.2.1.1 Urine Pretreat Mixture (UPM)
The urine pretreatment mixer which has
the capability to add both liquid and solid
pretreatment formulations was evaluated.
Functional testing verified the capability
of the hardware to add specific amounts
of both liquid and solid components to
meet a wide range of formulation specifi-
cations.
During the test program, the four formula-
tions evaluated were: 1) sulfuric acid with
10gr/liter of urine oxione; 2) sulfuric acid
with 5 gr/liter of urine oxione; 3) sulfuric
acid and hexadecyl trimethyl ammonium
bromide with 0.04 gr/liter urine; and 4)
sulfuric acid with 0.18 gr/liter chromic
acid. Results indicate that all formulations
accomplish stabilization of free ammonia
and microbial growth equally well. For
Space Station application, the liquid treat-
ment formulations appear to show lower
expendable requirements and ease of op-
eration when handling of solids is consid-
ered. The UPM has been delivered to
MSFC for utilization in integrated ECLSS
testing.
Hollow Fiber Reverse Osmosis (HFRO)
and Multifiltration Water Recovery Units
(M/F) functional tests have been com-
pleted.
8.1.2.1.2 Vapor Compression Distillation
(VCD)
A three man capacity evaporative urine re-
covery has been fabricated and acceptance
tested. Utilizing distilled water, the accep-
tance tests have reverified that the three
man design recovery capacity has been ex-
ceeded. The unit has been delivered to
MSFC for utilization in integrated testing.
8.1.3 EC-2 ECLSS Air Management
8.1.3.1 Description
Boeing, with the AiResearch Mfg. Co.,
will develop an upgraded Skylab type of
molecular sieve unit for CO2 removal.
Based on NASA requirements, AiResearch
will design a four-bed, water-save,
CO2-save molecular sieve for evaluation
by the Boeing ECLSS Laboratory. An al-
ternate system using a recently developed
hydrophobic carbon-based material will
also be evaluated relative to the first sys-
tem. Results will provide the information
required for trade studies relative to com-
peting CO2 removal such as solid amine
and electrodepolarization.
The AiResearch Mfg. Co. will design and
build a conceptual bench-test unit capable
of liquifying and storing carbon dioxide as
provided by the mole sieve collection sys-
tem. This unit will be available for utiliza-
tion in MSFC testbed.
Life Systems, Inc. will design, fabricate
and test a static feed electrolysis system
and Bosch CO2 reduction system for utili-
zation in MSFC ECLSS simulator.
8.1.3.2 Test Results Summary
8.1.3.2.1 Molecular Sieve and Liquefac-
tion System
The four bed molecular sieve was de-
signed and fabricated utilizing the major
components from two Skylab 2 bed sys-
tems (sorbent/desiccate canisters and
process air valving). The liquefication sys-
tem was fabricated utilizing a high pres-
sure oxygen compress from an Air Force
program. Acceptance testing of both units
have verified that desired functions of car-
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bon dioxide removal and liquefication are
accomplished. The predicted carbon diox-
ide removal performance utilizing the ca-
pacity for desiccant and absorbent
available in the Skylab canisters was a
three man capacity (0.275 LBSCO2/HR)
with a carbon dioxide inlet partial pres-
sure of 3.0 mmHg. Test data show that a
three man capacity is achieved with a 3.5
mmHg carbon dioxide partial pressure
which is adequate performance to satisfy
integrated ECLSS system testing objec-
tives. The carbon dioxide removal and li-
quefication system has been delivered to
MSFC for integrated ECLSS testing.
8.1.3.2.2 Static Feed Water Electrolysis
System (SFWES)
The SFWES has been fabricated and ac-
ceptance tested. Test data has reverified
that the design capacity has been met. The
SFWES has been delivered to MSFC for
integrated testing.
8.1.3.2.3 Bosch Carbon Dioxide
Reduction
The fabrication of the Bosch system is
complete and the unit is in acceptance test
at life systems prior to delivery to MSFC
for integrated testing.
8.1.4 EC-3 Air and Water Monitors
8.1.4.1 Description
Boeing, with Perkin-Elmer, will develop a
test unit for monitoring major constituents
and trace contaminants in the atmosphere.
Monitoring requirements will be defined
and prior gas chromatograph-mass spec-
trometer systems reviewed for applicabil-
ity to Space Station. An IOC design will be
fabricated for test evaluation. Techniques
for analyzing carbon monoxide (CO2 not
amendable to mass spec analysis) will be
investigated and IOC analyzers evaluated.
Boeing will assist NASA in obtaining the
best available information on instruments
for water quality monitoring (pH, conduc-
tivity and total organic carbon). Based on
the results of industry response, an im-
proved breadboard water quality monitor
will be designed and fabricated for bench
testing at the Boeing ECLSS Laboratory.
8.1.4.2 Test Results Summary
8.1.4.2.1 Air Monitor
The Spacelab Trace Gas Analyzer (TGA)
has been made operational and perform-
ance of known gases selected from the
original design criteria have been verified.
A training course has been conducted at
Perkin-Elmer for members of NASA
(KSC and MSFC) and Boeing engineering.
The training course was provided to train
the individuals who will utilize the TGA
during integrated ECLSS testing.
8.1.4.2.2 Water Quality Monitor
The water quality monitor which monitors
pH, conductivity and total organics for
both potable and hygiene was evaluated
and performance characterized. The moni-
tor has been delivered to MSFC for inte-
grated testing.
8.1.5 EC-4 Component/Subsystem Test
and Evaluation
8.1.5.1 Description
Boeing will work with its subcontractor
team and NASA to provide the systems
for an integrated ECLSS test capability.
Selected breadboard and bench test units,
developed by Boeing and subcontractors
will be tested in the Boeing ECLSS Labo-
ratory then provided to MSFC for use in
the ECLSS test bed. Subsystems supplied
by other vendors will also be tested, as
they become available.
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by other vendors will also be tested, as
they become available.
The following subsystems have been ac-
ceptance tested at suppliers and delivered
to NASA for integrated ECLSS testing:
a. Vapor Compression Distillation Sub-
system
b. Carbon Dioxide Removal and Li-
quefication Subsystem
c. Static Feed Water Electrolysis Sub-
system
Bosch Carbon Dioxide Reduction Subsys-
tem will be assembled. Trace Gas Analyz-
er, performance evaluation complete.
Water Quality Monitor Performance test-
ing accomplished.
Note: This is a MSFC conducted test.
8.1.6 PO1/2 Electric Power Distribution
Network and Control Architecture
8.1.6.1 Description
PO-1 determines the feasibility of using
high voltage (vs 28VDC) at 20 kHz electri-
cal power distribution within the common
module.
PO-2 determines degree of control and
automation required for common module
electric power distribution system.
The original intent of this task was to de-
termine the feasibility of using 200V for
power distribution within the module and
to evaluate the degree of control and auto-
mation required for module power distri-
bution.
Because of the NASA decision to baseline
400 Hz in December 1985, the plans were
revised to evaluate the performance of
SOI_XD STATE remote control switches
for control and monitor of electrical power
within the module.
8.1.6.2 Task Products
PO-1 - Two contracts were let, to
Sunstrand and Westinghouse to study and
analyze requirements, conduct trade stud-
ies and provide recommendations for two
types of solid-state power switches for
possible use in the Space Station electrical
power distribution systems. During pro-
gress reviews various changes in the scope
of work took place. The most critical
change was from 20 KHz to 400 Hz. The
Sunstrand contract was terminated with a
final report, dated July 6, 1986. The Wes-
tinghouse contract was continued with the
additional requirement of delivery of re-
mote-control solid-state switches. One 20
Ampere and three 50 Ampere 400 Hz re-
mote-control solid-state switches were de-
livered on March 25, 1986.
PO-2 - A test facility for evaluation of the
remote-control solid-state switches with
full power water cooled loads was de-
signed and fabricated. The facility was
completed and the switches installed by
July 15, 1986. The switches had to be re-
turned to Westinghouse for modification
from 200V to 115V. Functional testing of
the switches was complete by August 1,
1986.
8.1.6.3 Test Results
The remote-control solid-state switches
include the following features:
• All solid state switching elements paral-
lel inverse SCRs
• Over current trip
• Under voltage drop-out
• Over temperature trip
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• Data bus compatible
a. On/Off
b. Reset
c. BIT
d. Measure current flow
e. Measure load voltage
f. Report StatusReady
ON Tripped BIT operation
All these functions were verified as opera-
tional.
8.1.6.4 Findings and Reccomendations
• Determine accuracy of voltage and
current sensors over time and tem-
perature.
• Verify SCR temperature and cooling
requirements.
• Time response of each function
should be investigated.
• Current packaging is operational
"Brass" board. Repackaging for
minimum size and weight should be
investigated.
• SCR selection for 20 kHz should be
investigated.
8.1.7 TH-1 Thermal Interface Develop
ment
8.1.7.1 Description
Design, fabricate and test an interface
heat exchanger between the internal loop
and the central radiator system, and be-
tween the internal loop and the Body
Mounted Radiator (BMR).
8.1.7.2 Task Products
Develop and fabricate interface heat ex-
changer and heat pipe radiator and the ac-
cessory hardware components necessary
for successful test of the system in ther-
mal vacuum chamber.
Develop and fabricate a 2-phase compact
heat exchanger and an ammonia test facil-
ity for successful testing of 2-phase heat
exchanger performance.
8.1.7.3 Test Result Summary
Analysis and test has shown that the liquid
sleeve heat exchanger that is developed
under this task is thermally efficient and
mechanically sound in simulated operating
environment.
A compact 2-phase heat exchanger was
designed that has shown (by analyses) that
it can transfer 20 kW of energy at the pre-
scribed operating temperature range of the
Space Station central thermal bus. This
heat exchanger measures 4" x 12" x 3.5"
and weighs less than 10 lbs. Tests to dem-
onstrate the predicted performance will be
accomplished.
8.1.7.4 Findings
The thermal vacuum chamber test for the
radiator heat exchanger has been com-
pleted. Preliminary data has shown that
this heat exchanger operates well in vac-
uum condition and that it is thermally effi-
cient. It is therefore recommended that
this concept be kept as a possible interface
for the heat pipe radiator.
If predicted performance is verified by
test, a light weight alternative to the con-
tact heat exchanger could be established.
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Figure 8.1.7.4-1 shows the schematic of
2-phase heat exchanger test facility.
8.1.8 MS-1 MPAC Element
Demonstrator
8.1.8.1 Description
This task was originally formulated as the
construction and empirical study of the
optimum configuration of an OMV Con-
trol Station. Subsequently, the description
of work has been changes to reflect more
nearly the actual resources available to be
allocated to it. The title of the task has
been changed from "OMV Control Station
Development" to "MPAC Element Dem-
onstrator," and the task elements to be ac-
complished have also been revised to
reflect the capabilities inherent in the less
expensive and less sophisticated console
built under this umbrella.
The specified hardware includes program-
mable switches, CRTs, disk storage, and
hand controllers. These devices might be
considered as elements of the MPAC, as
the term is generally understood, but not
as the MPAC itself. The services per-
formed include display control options for
OMV simulation, storage of simulation
data and simulation input devices. Obvi-
ously, this device will not be a replica of
the physical device that would be installed
on the SS, but rather a functional repre-
sentation of the controls, displays, and
some of the capabilities of the workstation
electronics core. This is an engineering de-
vice, useful for gathering data for design
decisions, and thus aiding th.e design of
the workstations to be installed in Space
Station.
The console or element demonstrator;
which is being built under the auspices of
MS-l, is used as a research tool to collect
some comparative data on controls and
displays. There is no intent to actually de-
sign an MPAC or the MPAC or a repre-
sentation of any actual piece of hardware.
To be consistent with the following defini-
tions from the PDRD, paragraph 2.2.10 of
JSC 30000, nomenclature will need to be
carefully defined. The term "multipurpose
applications console" has been used by
some to mean nearly the same thing that
the PDRD uses the term "workstation" to
mean. The PDRD would probably use the
label of OMV workstation for the rela-
tively narrow mission of controlling the
OMV. It would further designate it the pri-
mary OMV workstation.
"Crewstation--any location in the space
station where a task or activity is per-
formed. Each crew station shall have a
consistent local vertical. For displays and
controls utilizing the overhead, the local
up is consistent with rotation of the head
back in order to look up. For function allo-
cation, the primary viewing and access ar-
eas are defined as those areas within
which are located the most highly utilized
equipment. That equipment which is less
frequently utilized and less critical is lo-
cated in progressively less viewable and
accessible areas of the crew station. Some
crew station are workstations."
"Workstation--some crew stations are
workstations. A workstation is a dedicated
structure at which SS tasks, such as labo-
ratory work, subsystems monitoring, in-
ventory management, and crew support
tasks (e.g., health maintenance monitor-
ing) are performed. A workstation may
contain an electronics core (e.g., a multi-
purpose applications console, comprised
of displays, controls, SSIS and video inter-
faces, and resident firmware), crew sup-
port equipment (e.g., cameras, restraints,
etc.), crew job aids, lighting and controls,
and stowage, integrated into a physical
support structure. Workstations may be
fixed or portable. For some tasks one
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workstation may be designated as a pri-
mary workstation, where that activity is
usually performed. Other workstations, ca-
pable of supporting that activity, are de-
fined as alternate workstations."
The objective of MS-1 is to build and de-
liver a console which can be used to dem-
onstrate elements of input and output:
components of the man-machine interface
(or MMI).
8.1.8.2 Products
The elements that are to be included in
this device are not intended to be exact
duplicates of the hardware that might ac-
tually fly in the SS, but rather to function-
ally represent that hardware so that some
early useful work can be accomplished.
Accordingly, the degree of fidelity is not
what is usually considered to be simula-
tion quality. One of the more difficult de-
cisions is to determine the number and
type of hand controllers to be installed to
operate the MRMS and the OMV. There is
some background available for the con-
figuration employing two controllers, each
with three degrees of freedom (dot'), but
no published data that has been identified
that addresses the configuration employ-
ing a single controller with six dof.
Control of the Canadian-built manipulator
arm on the shuttle orbiter is done using
two hand controllers, each with control of
three degrees of freedom. The position
normally assumed by the astronaut to per-
form this control function is somewhat
awkward, requiring the operator to push
his/her face forwards to get the best possi-
ble outside view out of the small window
provided, and making the position of the
right hand actually behind the body while
control movements are being made. The
fact that the astronauts have been able to
accomplish useful work with this configu-
ration seems attributable to human flexi-
bility and ability to learn very unnatural
tasks when highly motivated, rather than
to the "goodness" of the design.
An engineering prototype of a single con-
troller, capable of controlling six degrees
of freedom, has been on loan to MSFC for
the last two or three years from CAE of
Canada, and has been used to control a
robotic arm in some experimental settings.
Information gathered from NASA indicate
that the six dof controller is vastly supe-
rior to a pair of three dof controllers for
this kind of task. A small drift developed
in their arm, which needed to be compen-
sated for by the experimental operators if
they were to complete their tasks. Opera-
tors using a pair of three dof controllers
were unable to effectively overcome the
drift, while operators using a single six
dof controller were able to compensate for
the drift almost instinctively, and learned
to Overcome it in a matter of seconds. This
seems to strongly support the preferability
of a six dof controller, vis-a-vis a pair of
three dof controllers, for control of the
MRMS.
Originally, it was thought that two, three
dof controllers would be advantageous for
OMV operations because they would in-
sure against control inputs being con-
founded between translations and
rotations at some critical mission juncture;
say, during the actual final stages of dock-
ing engagement following rendezvous. The
consequences of translating a few feet
when you really wanted to roll a few de-
grees could be very expensive, and per-
haps even disastrous! However, that
problem could be resolved with some sim-
ple device such as a button or voice com-
mand to lockout unwanted control channel
inputs. Therefore, separate controls for
translation and rotation may not necessar-
ily be required to support OMV opera-
tions.
A pair of three dof hand controllers and a
single six dof controller are required. They
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need to put out an analog signal than can
be input to an IBM PC/AT in which the
control station operating software will re-
side. The preliminary nature of this effort
and the recognition that any substantive
conclusions are likely to be replicated
means that useful work can be accom-
plished with what could be called "arcade
quality" devices.
Controls include multifunction, program-
mable switches and means that the leg-
ends to be displayed thereon for selected
mission phase tasks needs to be developed
and evaluated. The flexibility afforded for
designers of man-machine interfaces by
the advent of programmable switches is
not yet well understood. Research to date
has not found any significant performance
advantage for either text or icons as repre-
sentations for higher level commands.
To fulfill the requirements for the pro-
grammable switches in this endeavor, a
panel of some 20 switches which can be
controlled by software to display and con-
trol different legends dependent upon the
legend displayed, is included.
The three dof and six dof controllers will
make inputs to control station software re-
siding in a PC/AT through an interface
box developed in conjunction with UAH.
The outputs from the hand controllers go
into a TECMAR Labtender board in the
AT. This board can accommodate up to 16
single ended ADC channels, 8 DAC chan-
nels and 24 bit digital IO channels. All
ADC and DAC channels have eight bit
resolution, adequate for this application.
Output from the control station computer
goes into the simulation host computer (a
microVax 1/) where the OMV dynamic
math model resides.
Output from the simulation host computer
will go into the Alcyon front ond of the
GTI Poly 2000, which will serve as a
throughput device to communicate to the
Poly 2000 System Control Module for gen-
eration of graphics images. The output
from the Aleyon to the Poly will be the 12
data points that make up the state vector
of the OMV and a control word. The 12
values are the X, Y, and Z coordinates
and roll, pitch and yaw and the rates of
change of each.
The output of the Poly 2000 is a picture of
the Space Station, as seen from the OMV
camera. This visual display is intended as
a visual supplement to the digital state
vector information that will be available
on the local display from the control sta-
tion AT.
The programmable touch panel (PTP) will
be interfaced to the AT using a dual
RS-422 interface. The PTP contains 20
programmable display modules with the
associated electronics built into the panel,
and a separate box for the power supply.
8.1.8.3 Test Results Summary
The selected hardware components have
all been received and built into a single
integrated console rack assembled from
commercially available sources. Correct
operation of the controllers and their com-
patibility with the visual displays gener-
ated by the Poly 2000 have been verified
with preliminary subjects, and the final
"fine-tuning" of the control operations are
completed. The collection of the empirical
comparative data will be completed.
8.1.9 AP-1 Propulsion and Fluids
Systems
The propulsion and fluids systems ad-
vanced development program (AP-1) con-
sists of four tasks, long-life thrusters,
augmented N2I-I4 thruster, minimum spill
connector and O2/H2 test.
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8.1.9.1 Long Life Thruster
8.1.9.1.1 Description
The program objective was: show
feasiblity of a hydrazine thruster capable
of providing greater than 750,000 lb-sec
total impulse. The test 25-1b. rocket was
an extended life version of flight and pro-
duction proven inertial upper stage (IUS)
rocket engine assembly.
The extended life rocket is identical to the
IUS engine except that Haynes 25 catalyst
retention screens were replaced With
platenum-iridium alloy. Life testing con-
sisted of a complex array of numerous
short duration pulses followed by a long
steady-state pulses followed by both short
and long cool downs. The tested pattern
simulated both reboost and ACS require-
ments. A typical pattern is shown in Fig-
ure 8.1.9.1.1-1. In addition, to satisfy
possible throttling requirements, tests
were conducted with thrust levels set at 25
Ibs. 18 lbs., and 10 lbs. Durations at each
level were approximately equal.
8.1.9.1.2 Test Result Summary
The purpose of the test was to fire at least
750,000 lb-sec of impulse through the
thruster. The test program accummulated
11,980 valve cycles and 786,100 lbf-sec
total impulse. The test was terminated be-
cause of depletion of the available
monopropellant hydrazine allocated for
this program. All firings used monopropel-
lant grade hydrazine containing 0.45%
maximum aniline.
For steady-state baseline performance
(100 seconds pulse or greater), the nomi-
nal thrusts were 25.4/18.2/10.1 lbf with Isp
respectively 231.8/229.0/222.7 at
330/220/110 psia inlet pressures. Exhaust
gas samples were taken during steady-
state operation. The percent ammonia dis-
sociation ranged from 48.8% to 61% and
generally increased with decreasing inlet
pressure and aniline content.
For pulsing baseline, minimum impulse
bits of 1.267/0.948/0.593 lbf-sec were re-
corded at 330/220/110 psia inlet pressures,
respectively.
Beginning of life oscillatory roughness was
+ 3.0/4.6/4.5% and end of life roughness
was + 14.3/8.8/3.7% at 330/220/110 psia
inlet pressures, respectively. Based on an
extrapolation of these data, Hamilton
Standard estimated the subject rocket en-
gine could have achieved a total impulse
throughput of - 900,000 lbf-see before ex-
ceeding a rule of thumb acceptable rough-
ness of + 25% at Pinlet = 330 psia.
8.1.9.1.3 Findings
State-of-the-art monopropellant hydra-
zine thrusters have demonstrated the capa-
bility to produce greater than 750,000
Ib-sec without maintenance extrapolation
of these test data indicate up to - 900,000
Ib-sec may be possible.
It is recommended that these data be re-
mitted to WP-02 for further testing as fol-
lows:
Determine impact of order of magni-
tude reduction in aniline content on
thruster life.
Conduct tests to determine life of a
new thruster designed from the be-
ginning to maximize life.
8.1.9.2 Augmented N2H4 Thruster
(Waste gas Injection)
8.1.9.2.1 Description
The purpose of this program was to meas-
ure the effect of waste gas injection on
performance, life and exhaust products of
a long life 5-1bf hydrazine thruster. A
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spring-loaded catalyst bed was used in the
thruster to minimize catalyst loss ratio.
Waste gases tested included the expected
byproducts of the environmental control
and life support system (C02 CH4 N2) and
Argon, presumed to be a byproduct of on-
board experiments or material processing.
All testing was conducted by Rocket Re-
search Company under subcontract to
Boeing Aerospace Company.
8.1.9.2.2. Products
The end product of this program was per-
formance and life margin test data in suf-
ficient detail to permit a demonstration of
requirements compliance. The engine data
was used to improve the accuracy of ana-
lytical predictions.
8.1.9.2.3 Test Results
Performance characteristics necessary of
the thruster to meet the reboost require-
ments are presented below.
Thruster Performance Parameters
Nominal Inlet Pressure 250-400 psia
Minimum Inlet Pressure 33% of Nominal
Maximum Duty Cycle 100%
Minimum Duty Cycle 30%
Maximum On Time 33 minutes
Minimum On Time 0.100 seconds
Total Impulse 160,500 minimum
750,000 goal
Operating Media N2H4 and
decomposition
products, C02, CH4, N2,
ARGON
The test set-up is shown in Figure
8.1.9.2.3-1.
A pre-test and post-test checkout of the
thruster was performed. The pre-test
checkout included tests for engine integrity
(pressure test, propellant valve test, etc.).
An x-ray of the catalyst bed was taken to
determine catalyst bed geometry prior to
firing, for comparison with the post test
x-ray. Post-test checkout was a repetition
of the pretest checkout.
Firing tests consisted of reference per-
formance testing, waste gas Performance
Mapping (WGPM) and life testing.
Waste gas was injected on opposing sides
of the thruster into a circumferential mani-
fold, just downstream of the catalyst bed.
A heat exchanger was used to preheat the
waste gases.
Gas samples were taken downstream from
the catalyst and waste gas injection loca-
tions.
The equation used to quantify the augmen-
tation or Augmentation Ratio (AR) was as
follows:
AR Ira e (combined)
%N2H 4 %WG °I
100 "INIH 4 +. 100
vac (WG)
where Ivac was the combined specific im-
pulse measured, IN2t-I4 was the specific
impulse of N2H4 measured alone, Ivac
(WG) was the Isp of Waste Gas (WG)
measured alone, and the percent was the
mass fraction.
Figure 8.1.9.2.3-2 shows the results of the
experimental measurement and theoretical
predictions of AR. A very strong agree-
ment between expected and measured val-
ues is shown for argon and nitrogen which
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are nonreactive. CI-I4 and CO2 in particu-
lar have relatively large deviations from
the theoretical model.
The test impulse summary presented in
Table 8.1.9.2.3-1 shows distribution of im-
pulse between tests and individual waste
gases. The reference performance test
were conducted to assess the engines ca-
pabilities as engine hours accumulated.
Life tests were performed using 50 per-
cent (by weight) of CO2, At, or N2 plus 50
percent N2H4. Nearly 30 percent of the
total impulse was provided by waste gases.
8.1.9.2.4 Findings
An impulse of 807,834 lbf-sec was accu-
mulated, on a long life 5-1bf hydrazine
thruster using various waste gases to aug-
ment impulse. Post test x-rays indicated
approximately 50 percent degradation of
the catalyst bed. Based on this testing,
Rocket Research estimates the life of this
engine to be over 1.5 million lbf-sec.
The amount of Isp augmentation was close
to or greater than predicted values, except
for CO2. The discrepancies in the CO2
data is believed to be caused by the for-
mation of solid carbamates and/or carbon-
ates which reduced the effective Isp.
The waste gas thruster shows promise for
the Space Station as a method of dispos-
ing of the waste gases accumulated on the
Station. The data from these tests should
be provided to WP-02 for consideration in
the propulsion system design. Further test-
ing of this thruster should be conducted
injecting water into the thruster for aug-
mentation. Mixing of CO2 with other
gases to inhibit formation of carbamates
and carbonates should be investigated.
8.1.9.3 Minimum Spill Connector
The purpose of this program is to develop
a minimum spill disconnect for toxic flu-
ids in space, specifically the design, fabri-
cation and testing of a unit with the
capability to purge any remaining fluid
which spills/dribbles after the poppet is
activated.
8.1.9.3.1 Task Products
The end product will be two connectors
which meet the objectives and require-
merits in Table 8.1.9.3.1-I.
8.1.9.3.2 Test Results Summary
At this date, the connector design shown
in Figure 8.1.9.3.2-1 has been completed
and long lead parts ordered for fabrica-
tion.
8.1.9.4 02/H2 Test Bed Description
The objective of this program is to demon-
strate the operation of a complete O2/H2
static feed water electrolysis propulsion
.system. Initial tests will be conducted at
an electrolysis pressure of 350 psi. Predi-
cated on the success of these tests subse-
quent tests are planned at operating
pressures of 500 psia, 750 psia and 1000
psia. To accomplish this program, a team
with Boeing as test integrator and MSFC
as test conductor with support from Rock-
etdyne, Life Systems Incorporated, and
Structural Composites Incorporated, has
been formed. Individual responsibilities
are presented in Figure 8.1.9.4-1.
8.1.9.4.1 Task Products
These tests will demonstrate technology
uncertainties and concerns associated with
operation of a high pressure electrolysis-
propulsion system. Specifically:
Can a high pressure static feed elec-
trolysis reliably and safely produce
02 and H2 gases?
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 459
TABLE 8.1.9.2.3-I IMPULSE SUMMARY
TEST
NzH4CATEGORY
Ref. Performance I 14,253
Performance Map 8,687 (1)
Ref. Performance 2 15.175
life Tests 504,360 (1)
Ref. Performance 3 17,670
COz
4,061
iMPULSE SUMMARY (2)
N 2
2,123
CH4
°
3.340
ARGON
1,789
108,690 72,209 54,437
560,145 113,291 74,332 3,840 56,226
SUBTOTAL
14,253
21,040
15,175 (3)
739,696
17,670 (3)
% N2H4 Impulse = 69.3
(1) Based on N2H4 flow rate and Isp correlation from Ref. Performance Tests.
(2) Wase gas impulse includes effect on augmentation.
(3) Includes impluse of sequences repeated due to test errors.
CUMULATIVE
TOTAL
14,253
35,293
50,468
790,164
807,834
Rev D483-50115-2 Sheet 460
TABLE 8.1.9.3.1-I DESIGN PARAMETERS
Fluid Port Size
Material Compatibility
Pressure Drop (@ 20 GPM)
Weight
Max Size Envelope
Alignment
- Lateral Offset
- Angular
Life Cycle
Engagement Force
Disengagement Force
Proof Pressure
Burst Pressure
Leakage
Working Pressure
Working Temperature
Dribble Volume
1/2 n
- Hydrazine
- Isopropyl Alcohol
- Deionized Water
- Helium
- Nitrogen
TBD
TBD
6 X 6 X 12 Inches
1/8"
± 5 °
i000 Cycles
Max 50 ibs. @ 0 psi
Max 50 ibs. @ 0 psi
2.0 x Operating Pressure
3 x Operating Pressure
< 1.4 * 10 -8 sccs He
Vacuum - 500 psi
0 ° F. to 350 ° F.
Zero After Purging
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FIGURE 8.1.9.3.2-1 MINIMUM SPILLAGE FLUID CONNECTOR
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Will the 02 bootstrap pressurization tech-
nique work at high pressures?
Can aluminum-lined composite tanks be
used to store 02 and H2?
Can the mol sieve dryers be regenerated
for indefinite life?
Will a full-up system work?
8.1.9.4.2 Analysis and Test Results
The system failure modes and effects
analysis has been completed and indi-
cates. There are no outstanding safety
issues. Test requirements have been docu-
mented for incorporation in the test plan.
Preliminary mol sieve tests indicate dry-
ers can be reconstituted by exposure to
vacuum with 2500F applied temperature in
less than four hours of regeneration time.
Single cell 1000 psi electrolysis tests
have begun at Life Systems, Inc. Results
of these tests will serve as a guide in later
full-scale system tests.
8.1.9.4.3 Findings
Preliminary results of analysis and tests
conducted have uncovered no major prob-
lems date. Final findings and recommen-
dations are pending based on the results
of planned testing.
NOTE: Propulsion and Fluids Systems
Test is conducted by MSFC
8.1.10 Meteoroid/Debris Impact Shield
Testing
Description
The objective of the Meteoroid-Debris
Test Program is to determine the effects of
space debris and meteoroids on the pro-
posed space station integrated module
wall and window designs, and use the test
results to determine an optimum design
configuration. To accomplish this objec-
tive, 77 representative test specimens of
the meteoroid-debris shield and module
wall were tested. Five representative win-
dow test specimens were also tested. All
tests were conducted from July 22, 1985 to
March 31, 1986 at the Marshall Space
Flight Center light gas gun laboratory.
The penetration control guideline for the
inhabited pressurized structure is defined
as a 97 percent probability of no penetra-
tion in 10 years of service. Critical particle
size and density are defined by currently
available meteoroid and space debris flux
data. Projected increases in man made
space debris from future activities is con-
sidered. Variables examined during test-
ing of the integrated module wall
configuration are: bumper shield thickness
and material, standoff distance between
the bumper shield and pressure wall,
presence of multi,layer insulation, and
projectile speed, size, shape and material.
All projectile shots in the SM-1 test pro-
gram struck the test specimen at a normal
impact angle.
Findings
a. Projectile shape does influence pene-
tration results. A tumbling cylinder
shaped projectile has a more severe
effect on impact than a spherical
projectile.
b. Varying projectile aluminum series of
6061-T6 verses 1100 produced no
effect on penetration results.
C. A six inch standoff between the
bumper shield and pressure wall is
more desirable than a four inch
standoff.
d. Use of multi-layer insulation, 30 lay-
ers of 1/2 millimeter aluminized kap-
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ton, significantly improves no
penetration capability.
e. Composite bumper shield material
does not provide protection for the
pressure wall.
f. A liminated window pane reduces
secondary debris.
Plots of the SM-1 test data are presented
in Figures 8.1.10-1, 8.1.10-2 and
8.1.10-3.
g. During the SM-1 test-program, nor-
mal angle impacts were considered
to be the most severe impact angle
for design. However, subsequent test-
ing has shown oblique angle impacts
to be more critical than normal im-
pacts4. Furthermore, oblique angle
collisions are more likely to occur
than normal angle collisions5.
h. For normal angle impacts, a 0.063
inch bumper was more effective than
a 0.040 inch thick bumper shield.
However, for oblique angle impacts,
the opposite proved to be true due to
the thicker bumper creating larger
shrapnel from the bumper shield it-
self.
8.1.10.1 Recommendations
Consider using a variable meteoroid-de-
bris shield. A single 0.040 inch shield is
sufficient for the walls between the mod-
ules and interconnects, the half of each
module protected by other areas of the
module configuration. These walls are
subject to meteoroid strikes only and not
space debris. The exposed half of each
module will utilize a double bumper con-
figuration, two 0.020 inch thick sheets one
inch apart stabilized by a central core.
Consider installing the bumper shield on
orbit. The advantages are: increased
launch capability for module interior
items, a greater standoff between the
bumper and pressure wall can be
achieved, and the shield latch-release
mechanisms can be simplified since they
would not have to endure launch loads.
8.1.1.1 DM-1 System Controller
Development for Data Management
Systems
8.1.11.1 Description
DM-1 is concerned with the fault-toler-
ance and data acquisition aspects of high
speed, distributed, multiple-redundant
Data Management Systems (DMS).
Fault tolerance schemes were being stud-
ied because of high availability, reliability
and safety requirements for manned
spacecraft control system computers.
Fault tolerance is probably the only avail-
able technique for satisfying these require-
ments. Tasks in defining a fault-tolerance
concept include: 1) using Space Station
Program reliability requirements and DMS
architecture concepts to define a fault tol-
erant philosophy for architecture compo-
nents, and 2) designing an implementation
for the fault tolerant philosophy, maximiz-
ing system reliability in performance of
fault detection, fault isolation, damage
containment and recovery.
Another significant component of this ef-
fort is the data acquisition and control of
subsystem elements. It is estimated that
there will be hundreds of sensors and ef-
fectors in each module. These data points
will have to be serviced at or near their
source with the use of a multiplexer/
demultiplexer device (MDM), and this in-
formation passed on to the appropriate
subsystem controller. Since this same
process will need to be repeated for each
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rack, a substantial savings in the total
lines of software could be realized if a
portion of this code could be duplicated
for all subsystems. Early definition of this
repeated code will allow earlier develop-
ment of application software. Therefore,
the concept of Generic Data Acquisition
and Control (GDAC) software was devel-
oped. Tasks include: 1) develop require-
ments for data acquisition and control
subsystem analysis and application soft-
ware requirements, 2) develop and imple-
ment GDAC software written in Ada on a
MIL-STD-1750A machine in control of
sensors and effectors, 3) define graphic
Ada modules that will implement the re-
quirements and be usable by application
software, and 4) use the prototype soft-
ware and the knowledge gained in 2) to
implement the generic data acquisition
and control.
8.1.11.2 Products
The products that result from this effort
are:
Fault tolerant architecture and recov-
ery schemes for a two tiered archi-
tecture that can be used to design
inherently fault-tolerant SDPs and
MDMs.
GDAC software that will include
scan routines for data acquisition,
engineering unit conversion schemes,
PIN control methods, sensor data ac-
quisition methods, control algorithms
and status reporting techniques. Use
of Ada generics will ease software
validation costs.
8.1.11.3 Test Results Summary
Analysis of fault tolerance in DMS archi-
tectures showed that special processor ar-
chitectures are required to achieve high
reliability in SDPs and MDMs. Recom-
mendations were made for these architec-
tures and fault detection, fault isolation,
damage containment, recovery and repair
procedures were outlined. Additionally, it
was found that the use of pooled spares in
SDPs adds greatly to the flexibility, modu-
larity and reliability of functions per-
formed by those components, but requires
significant design integration with DMS
hardware and software (particularly the
OS, NOS, bootstrap ROM and module or
station -management functions). Another
finding was that the sharing of MDMs be-
tween subsystems provided a much lower
component count (and thus higher reliabil-
ity and lower weight)--benefits which off-
set the cost of integration between
subsystems.
Analysis of data acquisition and control
requirements for subsystems showed com-
mon requirements for data monitoring. A
design approach was selected which parti-
tioned a small set of functions to the
MDM or SDP. Requirements were derived
for these functions. Using the require-
ments, data flow diagrams and a software
architecture were developed. The output
will be a common set of software for each
application-defined low-level functions.
GDAC concepts are being implemented in
a testbed that uses a MicroVAX as a stan-
dard data processor, a Mikros MIL-
STD-1750A computer (equipped with
analog and digital I/O capability) as an
MDM and the System Designers cross-
compiler. The testbed also includes a
Tektronix development system and the
necessary software for Ada development.
Prototype GDAC software has been devel-
oped. Tests will be performed using a sen-
sor/effector test box to checkout data
acquisition and control algorithms and ru-
dimentary closed loop control strategies.
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8.1.12 DM-2 Hierarchical Controller
Development
8.1.12.1 Description
The goal of this project is to develop con-
sistent module, subsystem and component
control concepts which can be applied to
WP-01 subsystems. We will build on
IR&D research in which we adapted our
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
System to control the thermal and electri-
cal power subsystem testbed hardware.
We will test the performance of this soft-
ware in thermal subsystem control. Addi-
tionally, we will add ECLSS and
Experiment Control components and dis-
plays to our SCADA system.
From our experience with these subsys-
•tems, requirements for data acquisition
and distribution services which are to be
fully or partially implemented in Data
Management System (DMS) software will
be developed.
The final stage of this effort will be to de-
velop reusable Ada components and to in-
corporate these into our hierarchical
control software architecture.
As a separate subtask, we will study the
testability aspects of artificial intelligence
software. Although A.I. techniques offer
promise to Space Station automation ap-
plications, they have not been developed
with traditional software life cycle consid-
erations as a goal. Safety workshops at re-
cent A.I. conferences have called in to
question the advisability of using current
techniques in critical applications. Under
subcontract, Vanderbilt University Center
for Intelligent System will survey the cur-
rent state-of-the-ann, identify problem ar-
eas, prepare potential solutions and make
recommendations in this area.
Note: For additonal details on the Boeing
ADP prjects refer to DR-19 item DP
1.6(c)Advance Development Test Results
and Assessments, dated October 24, 1986.
8.2 Advanced Development Growth
Recommendations
The recommendations for growth Space
Station advanced development is provided
herein in responce to the paragraph 3.4.3
(c-15) of the S.O.W. The following areas
are recommended for development:
• Data Development and Com-
mumication
• Electrocal/Electronic
• Thermal
• Propulsion/Fluid Management
. ECLSS
• Software
• Automation/Robotics
Criteria for selection of growth technology
candidates are:
• Increase productivity
• Improved crew and station safety
• Increased autonomy
• Improved technologhy transfer
• Lower cost
The following recommendations are pro-
vided.
8.2.1 Data Management and
Communications
Task Title: Processors for Artifical Intel-
legence
Discipline/Subsystem: Data Mangement
Task Description: The purpose of this
task is to investigate computer designs
qualified for the processing of Artifical In-
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telligence application in space environ-
ments. The resulting hardware may be
founded on any of the several currently
discussed architectures, these being (1)
LISP processors, (2) data flow machines,
(3) demand driven, or (4) conventional
(Von Neuman) machines. This task might
also be expected to identify necessary sup-
port software, especially for parallel exe-
cution environments.
Task Title: Advanced Video Systems
Discipline/Subsystem: Data Management
and Communications
Task Description: Video image processing
for the 1988-1995 time frame exists in the
area of High Speed Video Image Analysis.
This will allow experimenters the use of
video analysis to record the pertinent in-
formation in a high speed motion experi-
ment, such as combustion diagnostics, and
provide the data to be downlinked immedi-
ately instead of waiting for the motion pic-
ture film return. Video Image analysis can
be used to relieve the station specialist
that humans would miss in a periodic in-
spection.
Task Title: Integrated Voice Recongnition
System
Discipline/Subsystem: Data Management
and Communication
Task Description: The purpose of this ad-
vanced developement task is to 1) investi-
gate the latest voice recognition systems
and determine the feasibility of their use
in the Space Station distributed audio sys-
tem, and 2) perform a detailed analysis to
determine the utilization of a voice recog-
nition system on the station. The benefit
which could be realized from having
highly reliable voice recognition system
available for use at any distributed audio
location in considerable. The effect on
crew and mission efficency with the utili-
zation of voice recognition shoud be stud-
ied. The possibility of using voice
recognition for berthing and docking, for
the teleoperation and for EVA tasks could
greatly effect the overall Space Station ef-
ficiency.
8.2.2 Electrical/Electronic
Task Title: Solid State Remote Power
Controllers
Discipline/Subsystem: Electrical Power
Task Description: Changes in solid state
device technology will result in greater
utilization of solid state remote power con-
trollers at higher current levels. Current
technology limits utilization to units in the
10-20 Amps range based upon weight,
volume, and thermal considerations. With
the development of higher efficiency solid
state componentry and paralleling tech-
niques, smaller and cooler operating de-
vices are conceivable in the 1988-1995
time frame.
From a size and weight standpoint, ad-
vanced development in the area of power
control should be followed to reduce in-
stalled equipment volume and weight as
technologhy matures.
Task Title: Advanced Sensors
Discipline/Subsystem: Electrical Power
Task Description: Current technology
voltage and current sensors are relatively
large and heavy in comparison to associ-
ated componentry. With continued Space
Station growth, additional sensor require-
ments will be created, increasing overall
installed equipment weight and diminish-
ing available volume. Advanced developed
in the area of sensors should be guided
towards miniturized non-contracting de-
vices replacing conventional scalar voltage
and current sensors for the purpose of
sensing vector power flow and having a
standardized digital signal format output.
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In addition to voltage and current devices,
requirements for temperature and phase
sensors may become necessary to provide
optimum •utilization of available power
levels due to increased availability and dis-
tribution of power and more reactive
loads.
8.2.3 Tlaermal
Task Title: Two Phase Thermal Transport
System
Discipline/Subsystem: Thermal
Task Description: Develop two-phase
water thermal transport technology for ap-
plication inside laboratory modules for
cooling high-heat-load, isothermal cus-
tomer requirements.
8.2.4 Propulsion/Fluid Management
Task Title: Composite Cryogenic Tanks
Discipline/Subsystem:
Management
Propulsion/Fluid
Task Description: Develop and demon-
strate light weight composite cryogenic
tanks capable of long term space storage
of cryogenic fluids. Composite structure
tanks offer the benefit of one-half the
weight savings of existing metal cryogenic
fluids tanks.
Task Title: Fluids Refrigeration and Li-
quification
Discipline/Subsystem:
Management
Propulsion/Fluids
Task Description: Develop and demon-
strate a system capability of refrigeration
and reliquification of fluids such as N2,
O2, H2 on board the Space Station.
Task Title: Electrolysis Propulsion System
Discipline/Subsystem: Propulsion
Task Description: Develop and demon-
strate an electrolysis 02/I't 2 propulsion
system capable of using waste water as its
propellant. Utilization of this waste prod-
uct eliminates the need to provide logistics
to orbit for a propellant and eliminates the
logistics to ground for a waste product.
The electrolysis approach offers high volu-
metric efficiency by minimizing propellant
storage volume.
8.2.5 ECLSS
Task Title: High Efficiency Oxygen Re-
covery
Discipline/Subsystem: ECLSS
Task Description: Develop a simplified
high effiency process for direct conversion
of carbon dioxide into carbon and oxygen
in lieu of the the conventional complex
process of CO2 reduction to water and
oxygen generation by electrolysis. Video
Tracking would greatly improve the capa-
bility for proximity operations such as
OMV, and EVA. Crewmen could be re-
leased from the tedious tasks of camera
pointing and concentrate on MRMS opera-
tion, and other more demanding tasks.
Digital video trasmission on fiber optic ca-
ble would reduce weight, power consump-
tion, and size, and improve performance
capabilities. Advances in video processing
techniques and circuits could greatly re-
duce power consumption as well as
weight. Constraints on the format for the
video signal from experimenters could be
eased and allow much more useful data
collection from the experiments.
Task Title: Integrated Waste and Water
Management
Discipline/Subsystem: ECLSS
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Task Description: Develop a process that
collects urine, feces, humidity condensate
and non-metallic trash and process this
waste material into potable water, into
useable gases (such as N2 and CO2) and
the remainder into a high density residue
for logistics return from orbit.
Task Title: Toxic Waste Management
Discipline/Subsystem: ECLSS
Task Description: Develop and demon-
strate a toxic waste management technol-
ogy that handles a wide range of lab
effluents and wastes with minimum crew
involvement.
8.2.6 Software
Task Title: Validation and Test for A.I.
Software
Discipline/Subsystem: Software
Task Description: The purpose of this
task is to analyze, classify, and document
procedures by which Artifical Intelligence
software may be validated and tested. Of
specific interest to AI are procedures re-
lated to discovery errors in:
• I/O, i.e., data acquistion and conclu-
sion presentation.
• Inferencing scheme, i.e., modeling
"reasoning."
• Control strategy appropriateness.
• Test case formualation and mix to
reflect
- Diverse conditions
- Probes of system competence
"boundaries"
- Problem class overlap ambiguities.
Conclusions for "hard" problems
identified by experts.
Task Title: Integration of all into Conven-
tionally Based Software Systems.
Discipline/Subsystem: Software
Task Description: Add operating .system
constructs to network operating system
and host operating system that will sup-
port integration of symbolic processing
(AI) elements with the real time proce-
dural processing environment. Since the
majority of IOC software will probably be
Ada, this integration must make use of the
Ada run-time support equipment for task-
ing, signaling, and monitor blackboard
services. The goal of this task would be
(a) minimum impact on existing operating
systems, (b) low overhead in context
switches and parameter passing, and (c)
guaranteed maintenance of real time capa-
bility.
8.2.7 Automation/Robotics
Task Title: Experiment Support
Teleoperator
Discipline/Subsystem: Automation/Robot-
ics
Task Description: Development of a
teleoperated mechanism capable of mim-
icking human manipulative functions. The
system would allow ground operators
seated at a work station to manipulate ex-
perimental tasks by moving arms and fin-
gers in reaction to images on one or more
CRTs. System would operate on a stand-
alone basis (24 hours per day minus main-
tenance and experiment change out).
Task Title: Automation and Robotics
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Discipline/Subsystem:
Automation
Logistics Module
Task Description: Development of a ro-
botic inventory management system to re-
trieve/replace ORUs from storage.
Establish conceptual design of a carriage
mechanism that could be centrally located
in the logistics module. Examine SOA of
manipulators and sensors to locate/re-
move/replace components. Develop soft-
ware and man/machine operations.
Design, fabricate and test a brassboard
system, follow with prototype demonstra-
tion.
Task Title: Integrated Safety Monitor
Discipline/Subsystem:
Monitor
Integrated Safety
Task Description: Development of an AI
assisted system to detect, isolate and ap-
propriately respond to safety and other
fault related concerns. This task will inves-
tigate the feasibility of using AI technology
to detect safety hazards in a general set-
ting, assess their likely cause, and to gen-
erate advice and/or control actions.
Develop a demostration that would focus
initially on atmospheric contamination,
loss of atmosphere and fire.
Task Title: Integrated Crew Information
System
Discipline/Subsystem: Automation/Robot-
ics
Task Description: Development of an AI
aided system to intelligently prioritize and
display information competing for crew at-
tention. Initial task would investigate and
implement logic that imitates the human
prioritization process. The IOC approach
will no doubt be query/responce and hu-
man-directed data base and information
needs. The growth crew information sys-
tem evolves toward a more symbolic man/
machine interface, configuration,
architecture, and topology.
Task Title: Active Inventory Sensing Sys-
tem
Discipline/Subsystem: Automation/Robot-
ics
Task Description: Development of an ac-
tive tracking system for critical inventory
items including consumables to facilitate
logistics operations and minimize crew in-
volvement.
This is an investigation of the feasibility of
actively tracking inventory for large num-
bers of critical items. "Active" here im-
plies automatic tracking without human
involvement. The intention is to investi-
gate ways and means by which such track-
ing could be accomplished, and would
include radio, infared and ultrasonic prin-
ciples. Consideration would be given to
packing concepts to support active detec-
tion of reorder points, as well as to detect
the presence or absence of critical tools,
etc.
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9.0 TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
(TMIS)
9.1 Description
The Technical and Management Informa-
tion System (TMIS), shown in Figure
9.1-1, that will support Phase C/D Work
Package 1 has been demonstrated as an
integrated and distributed computing envi-
ronment satisfying the following require-
ments:
a. Analysis
b. CAD/CAE
c. Documentation
d. Presentation
e. Electronic Mail
f. Schedules
m
g. Statusing
The TMIS computing environment, acti-
vated as part of Phase B, contains the
hardware and software resources required
to analyze, design, and manage the work
package configuration in Phase C/D. It sat-
isfies program control requirements for
automated office functions and provides
program management visibility of sched-
ules and status. TMIS has the electronic
interfaces to business, financial, materiel,
and operations systems. The electronic
transfer of the engineering bill of
materiels, developed and released as part
of the design process, gives the non-engi-
neering systems the necessary data for ef-
fective cost management and overall
product assurance and configuration con-
trol.
The TMIS computing environment centers
around two core computers, the general
purpose Engineering VAX 11/780 and the
Intergraph CAD/CAE VAX 11/785. These
two computers, connected using DECI_T,
host the majority of the analytical, design,
configuration control, and management
software packages. Auxiliary tools are
provided by IBM and Zenith personal
computers. The personal computers sup-
port the Space Station design by supplying
engineering personnel with the desktop re-
sources required to analyze, document and
present the visibility necessary for man-
agement approval.
The TMIS computing environment design
has the facility for information exchange
at all levels. VAX electronic mail is used
to coordinate and exchange data at the en-
gineering and support group levels. Avail-
able on both the general purpose and
Intergraph VAX computers, the mail facil-
ity are used for; 1)day to day message ex-
change, and 2)the assembly of text and
graphic documentation files for final edit-
ing of released documents. Mail messages
are also exchanged internally and exter-
nally using IBM PROFS by Space Station
management. PROFS accounts were used
to establish the link between MSFC and
BAC TMIS. This connectivity was tested
and demonstrated during Phase B and is
used to transmit ASCII text, non-cad
graphics and CAD datasets.
The following paragraphs detail the capa-
bilities of the TMIS computing environ-
ment used in the engineering design
process. Other sections describe the pro-
gram management systems which will be
used in Phase C/D.
9.2 TMIS Engineering Systems
BAC has in operation a division dated
TMIS system to electronically accomodate
engineering data generated during all
phases of the SSP. These data include all
deliverable documentation (i.e., docu-
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FIGURE 9.1-1 TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
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ments and drawings), models, incoming
and outgoing correspondence, subcontrac-
tor and other agencies' data, and internal
memoranda and reports.
The objective of TMIS is to minimize pa-
per generation by providing the necessary
computing systems hardware, software
tools, and the interfacing between these
systems to support the SSP engineering ef-
fort. This electronic support includes data
collection and storage, engineering release
and control, sign off, and delivery.
The TMIS system has been designed with
a modular structure to provide for growth,
technological improvements, and proce-
dure revisions. TMIS also has been de-
signed for a large number of users, and its
users have access to tailored training plan
designed to enhance productivity.
9.2.1 Analytical Systems and Supporting
Tools
Various tools were implemented to
streamline the engineering and engineer-
ing management process. These tools sup-
port engineering design and analysis,
design reviews, and configuration manage-
ment. In supporting systems engineering
and integration, they also accumulate sta-
tistics that provide visibility for manage-
ment decisions leading to productivity
improvements.
9.2.2 Computer Aided Design System
A key objective of the TIVIIS is the elec-
tronic delivery to NASA of drawings and
design models in a format compatible with
NASA CAD/CAE systems. A second ob-
jective is to support a high level of CAD/
CAE productivity. Both of these objectives
are being achieved by 1) utilizing an Inter-
graph CAD/CAE system, already in place;
2) incorporation of design standards and
Boeing procedures into customized menus;
and 3) by the use of standard exchange
formats.
All CAD models and drawings (mechani-
cal, electrical, and electronic) electroni-
cally delivered as released data are fully
compatible with the NASA MSFC SSP In-
tergraph system. Compatibility has been
achieved by delivering these data in the
Interactive Graphics Design Software
(IGDS) format. The one exception is 3D
models developed using GEOMOD. These
models are delivered in GEOMOD Univer-
sal format.
The CAD/CAE host computer executes
the design and analysis software to sup-
porting a cluster of workstations. In addi-
tion to providing computational support
for the workstations, the host also acts as
a local file server. The basic system pro-
vides interactive 3-D geometric construc-
tion, analysis, modification, and drafting
functions. The system also provides for fi-
nite element modeling, solid modeling,
schematic and printed circuit board design
and analysis.
9.2.2.1 Mechanical and Structural
Design
The Intergraph mechanical and structural
CAD system provides for the design of the
Space Station end item component parts.
In addition to the CAD data, an engineer-
ing database will be maintained which
contains non-graphic data such as that
necessary for the bill of materials (BOM)
and for design analysis. The data base in-
cludes items such as part quantity, inden-
tured parts list, used-on parts list, mass,
material and process specifications, and
revisions. This non-graphical data will be
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9.2.2.2 Electrical and Electronic Design
(Phase C/D)
The Intergraph electrical and electronic
CAD system provides for the design of
schematics, printed circuit boards, wiring
diagrams, and cables and harnesses
datasets. In addition to the CAD data, an
engineering data base will be maintained
which will contain non-graphic data such
as wire lists, equipment lists, and bill of
materials. This data will be retrievable for
query and report generation independent
of the graphic environment.
9.2.2.3 Modeling and Analysis Support
TMIS provides CAE computational sup-
port for various modeling, simulation, and
analysis studies to support SSP systems
engineering and integration. These studies
include solid and wireframe models, finite
element modeling, circuit timing, reliabil-
ity analysis, failure modes analysis, stress
analysis, dynamics and loads, thermal
analysis, propulsion analysis, mass prop-
erties, and electrical and electronic analy-
sis. Most of these studies are performed
on VAX or PC based equipment. The data
from these studies are maintained in an
engineering database and will be retriev-
able in support of the CAD effort.
9.2.3 Engineering Computer Data
Storage
The engineering computer data is stored
as shown in Figure 9.2.3-1. The data may
originate from the Intergraph CAD/CAE
system, the General Purpose (GP) VAX,
local PC data bases, word processing, the
laboratory, Mentor system (electrical de-
sign), or other systems used by subcon-
tractors. All work in progress data shared
among the various engineering organiza-
tions are stored on the GP VAX 11/780
except for CAD/CAE data which are
stored on the Lntergraph VAX. In ,,,,,4.¢,,.,tluultlull,
all released engineering data or that which
are to be released, are stored in the elec-
tronic vault on the GP VAX, using DEC
Engineering Data Control System (EDCS)
Softwares.
9.2.3.1 Sole Authority Dataset
All engineering data such as documents,
drawings, and data bases will be con-
trolled and released as shown in Figure
9.2.3-1 by using the VAX based system
EDCS (Engineering Data Control System).
The procedures to implement this system
follow the Boeing release standards. How-
ever, the electronic dataset, not the
hardcopy, will be the sole authority. Docu-
ment, drawing, and database approval and
signoff will be performed electronically.
9.2.3.2 Electronic Data Vault
The electronic data vault contains the ref-
erence configuration, pre-release, release,
and historical data bases. EDCS provides
an audit trail in support of configuration
management of these data bases and vari-
ous other types of data. In addition, EDCS
provides a library index capability for
query, dataset copy capability, and report
generation. Also, this system has the capa-
bility to maintain proprietary rights of the
users.
The electronic data vault eventually will
contain several tens of gigabytes of data.
The quantity of data will prevent daily full
backups. Therefore, the data vault will be
incrementally backed up on a daily basis.
Full backups will be performed weekly.
9.2.3.3 Electronic Data Transfer
TMIS has the demonstrated capability to
transfer data between the various internal
computer systems, subcontractors, and
MSFC via interconnections as shown in
Figure 9.2.3.3-1.
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FIGURE 9.2.3.1-1 ENGINEERING RELEASE AND CONTROL OF DATASETS
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All BAC managers, supervisors, and the
data library have PROFS accounts for
transfer of electronic mail with each other
and MSFC.
9.2.3.3.1 Intersystem Connectivity for
Data Transfer
To support the capabilities described
above, TMIS will include a number of
computer systems distributed throughout
various Boeing buildings. These systems
will be linked together as shown in Figure
9-4. Some of these linkages provide data
access backup in case of hardware failure.
The goal is that one failure does not inca-
pacitate TMIS nor does it cause additional
failures. Maintenance is being performed
without interference with other TMIS op-
erations.
9.2.3.3.2 External Data Transfer and
System Linkage
All electronic data deliveries to NASA are
being transmitted to MSFC's IBM 4381
from BAC's IBM 3083 via RSCS. The data
are sent to a special account specifically
for BAC data. For each dataset delivered,
a Dataset Control Sheet (DCS) is transmit-
ted to a special PROFS account as a re-
cord of data delivery.
Currently, the IBM 3083 has an interface
to a GFE 9.6 kilobaud line. The interface
will be upgraded as necessary if the GFE
line is upgraded.
All CAD data will be delivered electroni-
cally as specified in Section 2.4.2.2.2. All
non-CAD graphics, i.e., figures and
viewgraphs, is optionally delivered elec-
tronically in DI-3000 Metafile format. All
documentation text electronically deliv-
ered is generated in clear ASCII. The only
non-printable characters generated will be
carriage returns, line feeds, form feeds,
and blanks. The clear ASCII is then being
translated to EBCDIC before transmitting
to MSFC. All document text and figures,
if printed, will conform to the format
specified by MSFC such as JSC 30200,
Documentation Format Requirements or
equivalent. The BAC data base containing
data pertinent to the Space Station refer-
ence configuration are maintained and de-
livered in RIM 7 unload format. All other
data bases are maintained and delivered in
R:base 5000 format.
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